Sawal Das Vs. State of Bihar  INSC
3 (9 January 1974)
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
CITATION: 1974 AIR 778 1974 SCR (3) 74 1974
SCC (4) 193
Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 34 and
302--Circumstantial evidence Accused charged under s.302/34--When accused may
be convicted under s. 302, when the others are acquitted under s.
302/34--Offence under s.
Evidence Act (1 of 1872) Ss. 103 and
The appellant is the husband of the deceased.
The evidence in the case established that, the relations between the deceased
and her mother-in-law; were very strained; that, on the morning of the murder
following a quarrel between them the appellant went with his wife, the
deceased, into a room, into which his father and mother then followed; that,
immediately thereafter, cries of the murdered woman were heard to save her from
being killed; and, that, a little while later, the appellant and his father
conveyed the dead body of the deceased and disposed it of by burning it at the
burning that without informing the relations of the deceased who were living in
the town and without performing any funeral rites.
On this evidence, rejecting the appellant's
contention that the deceased died accidentally of injuries caused by fire, the
trial court convicted the appellant, his father, and mother for offences under
s. 302/34 1. P. C. The trial court also convicted the appellant and his father
under s. 201, I.
P. C. On appeal, the High Court acquitted
them of the offence under s. 302/34 I. P. C. but found the appellant ,alone
guilty of the offence under s. 302 1. P. C. The High Court also found the
appellant and his father guilty under s. 201 1. P. C. and passed a sentence of
three years against the father. No separate sentence on the appellant was
passed in view of the sentence of life imprisonment for the offence under s.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : (1) The evidence regarding death by
burning consisted mostly of rumours and beliefs. It was clearly hearsay and was
rightly excluded by the lower courts.
(2) Under Ss. 103 and 106, Evidence Act, the
burden of proving such a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may
absolve him from criminal liability, lies upon him;
though, the quantum of evidence by which he
may succeed in discharging the burden, may be lower than the burden resting
upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The best evidence would have been that of a doctor who could have been
called by the appellant on his phone, but no doctor was called. [79B] (3) But,
neither the application of s. 103 nor of s. 106, Evidence Act, could, however,
absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary
burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when
the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction,
or, which makes out a prima facie case that the question arises of considering
facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused.
[79D] (4) In the present case, after the
acquittal of the appellant's father and mother for murder under Ss. 302/34,
1. P. C., the individual liability of the
appellant has to be established by the prosecution before he could be convicted
under s. 302 I. P. C. simpliciter. There is nothing in the present case which
could fasten or conclusively fix the liability for any particular or separate
act of the appellant which may be said to have caused his wife's death. [79H]
K. G. Patil v. State of Maharashtra,  1 S.C.R. 678, Sohan Lal v. State of
U. P.,  S.C.C. 498 and Yashwant and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 
1 S.C.R. 291, followed.
75 A (5) Further, the prosecution has not
examined an important witness namely,. the maid servant, who was on the
varandah at the time of the occurrence. Her evidence was necessary for
unfolding the prosecution case and hence, the prosecution should not have
withheld her evidence whatever may be its effect upon the case. The appellant
could, there ask the Court to give him the benefit of the presumption under s.
114 illustration (g), Evidence act and to infer that, if she had' been
produced, her evidence would have damaged the prosecution case against the
appellant. Her statement under s. 164, Cr. P. C. could only be used as evidence
to corroborate or contradict her if she had appeared as a witness at the trial and
could not be relied upon by the prosecution. [80 G, H] Stephan Sneviratne v.
The King. A.I.R. 1936 P. C. 289, 300, referred to.
(6) Therefore, although it must be held that,
the deceased was murdered it was not possible to find conclusively that the
person who could have throttled or done some other act which actually killed
the deceased was the appellant and not his father or mother.
(7) So far as the case of disposal of the
body by the appellant was concerned the circumstantial evidence was rightly
believed and held to be conclusive by both the Courts below. [82G] (8) As
regards sentence, the appellant deserves the maximum sentence that can be
imposed under s. 201, 1. P. C. A distinction between the case of the appellant
and his father, as regards sentence is justified because; (a) It was the duty
of the appellant as a husband to have done something to protect his wife even
if It is assumed for the sake of argument, that the actual death may have been
brought about by the acts of others, and, (b) the appellant had taken a leading
part in disposing of the body of the murdered woman. [83B]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 70 1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and
Order dated the 16th September, 1971 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 90 of 1968.
A. N. Mulla, S. N. Misra, S. S, Jauhar and
Sudha Misra, for the appellant.
R. C. Prasad, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J.-The appellant before us by special leave, Sawal Das, his father Jamuna
Prasad, and his stepmother Kalawati Devi, were charged with offences punishable
under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter on the allegation that they had
intentionally caused the death of Smt. Chanda Devi, the wife of the appellant,
on 28-5-1965, in their house in Mohalla Andi Gola, in Muzaffarpur, in Bihar.
The appellant Sawal Das, his father Jamuna Prasad, their motor driver Sita Ram,
and eight other persons were charged under Section 201 Indian Penal Code for
having caused the disappearance of the body of' Smt. Chanda Devi with a view to
concealing the murder. Furthermore, Smt. Kalawati Devi was charged under Section
302/109 Indian Penal Code for having instigated the murder of Chanda Devi. The
Trial Court had amended and converted the charges against the appellant and
Jamuna Prasad and Kalawati Devi into those under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal
Code and convicted each of them with the aid of' Section 34 Indian Penal Code
for the offence of murder and sentenced:
76 them to life imprisonment. It had also
convicted the appellant and his father under Section 201 Indian Penal Code, but
it did not pass separate sentences against them for this offence. The driver
Sita Ram was also convicted under Section 201 Indian Penal Code and sentenced
to three years rigorous imprisonment. It acquitted all the other accused
persons. On appeal, the High Court of Patna had acquitted the appellant, his
father, and his step-mother of offences punishable under Section 302 /34 Indian
Penal Code, but it found the appellant alone guilty of an offence punishable
under Section 302 Indian Penal Code simpliciter and sentenced him to life
imprisonment. It had also found the appellant and his father guilty under
Section 201 Indian Penal Code, but, while passing a sentence of three years
rigorous imprisonment on Jamuna Prasad, it had not passed a separate sentence
on the appellant in view of his conviction under Section 302 Indian Penal Code.
It had allowed appeals of Kalawati Devi and Sita Ram and acquitted them.
The whole case against the appellant depends
upon circumstantial evidence. There is no eye witness of the murder which was
alleged to have been committed by the appellant, his father, and step-mother
conjointly on the morning of 28-5-1965 at about 8.00 a.m. The Sessions Judge
had relied upon the following proved facts and circumstances to convict the
three accused persons of murder under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code
1. The relations between Smt. Chanda Devi and
her stepmother-in-law, Smt. Kalawati Devi, who were living in the same house
with their respective husbands and children, were strained so that there were
frequent quarrels between them.
2. The appellant as well as his father Jamuna
Prasad used to take the side of Smt. Kalawati in the quarrels between the
murdered wife and her mother-in-law.
3. On the morning of the murder, there was a
particularly sharp quarrel between the deceased and Smt. Kalawati so that Smt.
Kalawati, who was living in a room adjoining that of, Smt. Chanda Devi on the
first floor of the house, called out to the appellant that his "rascal
wife" was quarrelling with her and informed him as well as Jamuna that
either she or Chanda Devi will live in the house henceforth.
4. The appellant and his father Jamuna Prasad
went upstairs to the Verandah where the quarrel was taking place and the
appellant took or pushed Chanda Devi inside her room followed by the appellant's
father and his stepmother.
5. Immediately after that, cries of atleast
"Bachao" "Bachao", were heard from inside the room. Nobody
heard the voice of Smt. Chanda Devi after that.
5. Immediately after these cries, the
children of Chanda Devi were heard crying and uttering words indicating that
their mother was either being killed or had been killed.
7. A short while after that, the appellant
and his father Jamuna Prasad were seen bringing a gunny bag with the help of
their driver, Sita Ram, and another person, and keeping it in the luggage boot
of the car which had been brought there by the driver.
8. The car, containing the body of the
deceased Chanda Devi,was driven fast and taken to what is known as PahlezaGhat,50
miles away, to be burnt there at night. The car was shown to have crossed
Sonepur Bridge at 9.00 p.m.
9. The relations of the deceased Smt. Chanda
Devi, who were living in the town, were not at all informed by the appellant or
other members of his family, that she had died either naturally or
10. No persons who usually performed the
funeral rites in the family were shown to have been informed and there was no
funeral procession of the usual kind. But, some of those related to the
appellant, who were co-accused for the offence of illegal disposal of the body,
were said to have followed in a truck.
11. Some blood', which was said to have
distintegrated so much that its origin could not be determined, was shown to
have been scraped from the boot of the car as well as from inside the car.
The Trial Court had come to the conclusion
that, upon the established circumstances listed above, no other inference was
left open to the Court except that the appellant and his father and step-motherhad
conjointly committed the murder of the deceased Smt. Chanda Devi on the morning
of 28-5-1965 and that the appellant and his. father had then hastily and
stealthily disposed of the body in orderto conceal the commission of the
offence. It had also taken into, account, in coming to this conclusion, the
fact that the appellant had unsuccessfully set up a plea, in his written
statement, that Smt. Chanda Devi, who was alleged by him to be wearing a Nylon
Saree, said to have caught fire accidentally while she was using a Kerosene
stove in her room, died of extensive burns on her body and collapsed. The.
appellant had alleged that Smt. Chanda Devi was debilitated and kept a bad
health due to frequent pregnancies and was also suffering from Asthma, a weak
heart, and abdominal complaints. She had given birth to six children.
The Trial Court observed that no Doctorwas
called in to substantiate the appellant's plea. Furthermore, it pointed out
that, as a highly qualified Doctor, Dr. G. B. Sahai, had deposed, normally
death would not take place immediately as a result of accidental burning of the
kind alleged by the appellant and that there would have been evidence of
rolling on the ground or other acts of the deceased in attempts to save herself
in such an event. The Trial Court had also believed the evidence of the
relations of Chanda Devi that she was enjoying good health so that the bare
assertions of the appellant that she had a weak heart could not be accepted. It
also observed that no burnt pieces of cloth or marks of smoke or soot on the walls
or roof of the room in which Smt. Chanda Devi had admittedly died were shown to
78 Learned Counsel for the appellant drew our
attention to a number of pieces of evidence, such as a boil on the finger of
Jamuna, multiple irregular areas of suspected burns, varying from 1 to
1/3" in length and-half inch to 3/4" in width, on the lower third of
right fore-arm, ulnar side, of the appellant, when he was examined by Dr. J.
Nath on 2-61965, the statement by a witness that he saw some smoke coming out
of the house at the time of the alleged murder, the rumour of her death by
burning mentioned by several witnesses, which found a place in the information
sent to the Police on 30-5-1965 by Lallu Prasad, P.W. 28, a relation of the
murdered wife, and into another written information given by Hawaldar
Gorakhnath Singh, P.W.3, at the Police Station, on 28-5-1965, and other similar
bits of information and belief deposed to by witnesses.
So far as the information dated 30-5-1965
(Ex. 17) treated as F.I.R. by the Police, or the information given by
Gorakhnath Singh on 28-5-1965, which, according to the appellant, ought to be
treated .as a First Information Report, and other pieces of information and
belief given by the witnesses are concerned, it is clear that these are based
on hear-say which was rightly excluded. The Trial Court pointed out that the
appellant and other members of his family were the sources of these false
rumour`s circulated by them so as to protect themselves against an accusation
for murder. We, therefore, attach no importance whatsoever either to the
document which the prosecution or the one which the appellant placed before us
as the First Information Report. These contain nothing more than rumour and
hearsay because those who could have reported the commission of an ,offence
were actually the offenders interested in concealing its commission and
As regards the burns on the body of the
appellant, the Trial Court rightly pointed out that the Doctor bad stated on 2-61965
that they were 3 or 4 days old. They were not shown to be connected with .any
attempt to extinguish a fire which could have burnt Smt. Chanda Devi. The best
evidence in such a case could have been that of a Doctor who, as the High Court
pointed out, should have been called but was not called despite the fact that
there was a telephone in the house.
We think that the burden of proving the plea
Chanda Devi died in the manner alleged by the
appellant lay upon the appellant. This is clear from the provisions of Sections
103 and 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Both the Trial Court and the High Court
had rightly pointed out that the appellant had miserably failed to give
credible or substantial evidence of any facts or circumstances which 'Could
support the plea that Smt. Chanda Devi met her death because her Nylon Saree
had accidentally caught fire from a kerosene stove. The Trial Court had rightly
observed that the mere fact that some witnesses had seen some smoke emerging
from the room, with a kitchen nearby at a time when food was likely to be
cooked, could not indicate that Smt.
Chanda Devi's saree bad caught fire. Neither
the murdered woman nor the appellant nor any member of his family was shown to
have run about or called for help against a fire.
79 Learned Counsel for the appellant
contended that Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not be called in aid by
the prosecution because that section applies only where a fact relating to the
actual commission of the offence is within the special knowledge of the
accused, such as the circumstances in which or the intention with which an
accused did a particular act alleged to constitute an offence. The language of
Section 106 Evidence Act does not, in our opinion, warrant putting such a narrow
construction upon it. This Court held in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab(1),
that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may
absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. It is a different
matter that the quantum of evidence by which he may succeed in discharging his
burden of creating a reasonable belief, that circumstance absolving him from
criminal liability may have existed, is lower than the burden resting upon the
prosecution to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Neither an application of Section 103 nor of
106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty
of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case
beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence
which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or, which makes out a prima
facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden
of proof may lie upon the accused.
The crucial question in the case before us is
: as the prosecution discharged its initial or general and primary burden of
proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt? Perhaps the Trial
Court had adopted a more logical course upon facts and circumstances indicating
that the appellant was one of the three persons whose conjoint actions had, on
the morning of 28-5-1965, resulted in the death of Smt.
Chanda Devi. It may be that the appellant was
the primary or the main actor in the actual commission of the murder after his
step-mother had sought his aid in what appeared to be an appeal to him by her
to teach his wife a lesson so that she may not be troubled by her any more.
But, the effect of the finding that the appellant went into the room from which
the cries of the murdered woman, to save her from being killed, came
immediately afterwards, is diluted by the evidence that Jamuna Prasad and Smt.
Kalawati had followed him. The High Court's view could perhaps find some
support from the fact that Jamuna Prasad was seen pacifying and rebuking the
children outside while the appellant may have been dealing with his wife in a
manner which brought about her death. But ' all this is a matter of conjecture.
Lurking but not unreasonable doubts and
suspicions seem to, us to envelope and assail the prosecution case atleast
after Jamuna Prasad and Smt. Kalawati have been acquitted. As the learned
counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed out, after the acquittal of
Kalawati and Jamuna Prasad for murder, by the use of Section 34 Indian Penal
Code, the individual and not the conjoint liability of the appellant has to be
established by the prosecution before the appellant could be convicted under
(1) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 460.
80 Section 302 Indian Penal Code Simpliciter.
Beyond the fact that the appellant is the husband of the murdered wife, who
might be ordinarily expected to take the initiative in teaching her a lesson,
especially when Smt. Kalawati had invoked his aid, and a possibly natural
reluctance of a normal father-in-law to take the initiative or a leading role
in such a matter, both of which could be matters of conjecture or presumption
only, there is nothing which could fasten or conclusively fix the liability for
any particular or separate act of the appellant which may be aid to have caused
his wife's death.
We find that the High Court had not dealt
with the question whether a distinction could be made between the case of the
appellant on the one hand and his father Jamuna Prasad and his step-mother
Kalawati on the other quite satisfactorily, so far as the offence of murder is
concerned. Nevertheless, we may have agreed with its conclusion, on the
evidence on record, that the appellant alone was liable for the murder of his
wife Smt. Chanda Devi and we may not have disturbed its finding of fact but for
another feature of the case which stares one in the face. We proceed now to
deal with this feature.
Even if, as the Trial Court and the High
Court had correctly held, there is admissible and credible evidence of five
witnesses, Ganesh Prasad, P.W. 1, Nand Kishore, P.W. 2, Radhey Shyam Sharma,
P.W.9, Laxmi Narain, PW. 16, and Basdeo Prasad, P.W. 27, who are said to have
heard or watched from outside, from varying distances, Of what was going on in
the Verandah, no eye witness was produced who could prove what actually took
place inside the room where the murder was committed. The only evidence given
of what could have taken place inside the room was the cry of "Bachao
Bachao" although there is some understandable variation between accounts
of witnesses as to whether the murdered woman also uttered some more words
showing that she was being actually killed. We also agree with the view that
the evidence of witnesses about what the children said or did at that time is admissible
under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. In view of some evidence in the case that
the appellant's children had refrained from revealing any facts against the
appellant or his father or his stepmother, when they were questioned by
relations or by the Police, it could be urged that there was no point in
producing the children. The Court could also have rightly decided, in such
circumstances not to examine them under Section 540 Criminal Procedure Code'
But, there is no explanation even attempted to show why the Maid servant ,
Geeta Kurmini, who, according to the prosecution case, was also in the Verandah
at the time of the occurrence, was not produced at the Trial although her
statement was recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code and was brought
on the record (Ex. 12). This statement could only be used as evidence to
corroborate or contradict Geeta Kurmini if she had appeared as a witness at the
The appellant could, therefore, quite
reasonably ask the Court to give him the benefit of the optional presumption
under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act and to infer that, if
she had been produced, it would have damaged the prosecution case against the
appellant. Her statement, if it had been there as evidence in the case, may ,very
well have shown that it was Jamuna who was taking the leading 81 part in
bringing about the death of Smt. Chanda Devi.
There is some evidence in the case as to the
kind of man Jamuna was. It shows. that he was not a naturally kind or gentle or
amiable individual liked by people. The normal inhibitions of a father-in-law
with regard to his daughterin-law , which learned Counsel for the State
emphasized so much, may not really be there at all in this case. Indeed, we
think that, in the circumstances of the case, Geeta Kurmini, the maid servant,
was a witness essential to the unfolding of the prosecution case. Her evidence
could not be withheld by the-prosecution whatever may be its effect upon the
case. We think that the principle laid down by Privy Couneilin Stephen
Sneviratne v. the king (1), with regard to such a witnes, is applicable here.
It was observed there (at page 300) "Their Lordships do not desire to lay
do" any rules to, fetter discretion on a matter such as this was is so
dependent on the particular circumstances of each case. Still less do they
desire to discourage the utmost candour and fairness on the part. of those
conducting prosecutionsbut, at the same time they cannot speaking generally,
approve of an idea that a prosecution must call witnesses irrespective of
considerations of number and of reliability, or that a prosecution ought to
discharge the functions both of prosecution and defence. If it does so,
confusion is very apt to result. and never is it more likely to result than if
the prosecution calls witnesses and then proceeds almost automatically to
discredit them by cross-examination.
Witnesses essential to the unfolding of the
narrative on which the prosecution is based, must, of course, be called by the
prosecution, whether in the result the effect of their testimony is for or
against the case for the prosecution".
Mr. Mulla, appearing for the appellant, has
also drawn our attention to K.G. Patil V. State of Maharashtra (2). This Court
held there that, when two out of three accused persons, each having been
charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Panel Code, were
acquitted, it must be assumed that the two acquitted persons did not participate
in the commission of the offence at all. it is contented that the natural
result of this view is that the particular act of the individual accused which
brought about the death of the murdered person must be established beyond doubt
before he is singly and separately convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal
Our attention was also invited to Sohan Lal
v. State of U.P.,(3) where it was held by this Court that in the absence of
evidence to show which act of the accused caused the death of the murdered man,
it would neither be proper to convict the accused person under Section 302
Indian Penal Code simpliciter nor under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian
Penal Code, when the High Court had acquitted the coaccused of charges under
Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, and the State had not appealed
against the acquittal.
(1) AIR 1936 P. C. 289 @ 300.
(2)  (1) SCR 678.
(3)  (1), S. C. C. 498., 82 In the case
before us, the High court had actually altered the conviction of the appellant
from one under Sections 302/34 I.P.C. to one under Section 302 I.P.C. thereby
implying that he was not guilty of :any offence under Section 302/34 I.P.C. It
is true that this Court explained, in Yashwant & Ors. V. State of
Maharashtra, (1) that the applicability of Section 34 I.P.C. to a case depends
upon the particular fact 8 and circumstances of the case.
Therefore, we have to scrutinize and
pronounce upon the particular facts of the case before us.
We think that, upon the facts of this case,
there could be a reasonable doubt as to whether Section 34 I.P.C. could be
applied to convict any of the three accused persons of murder. After excluding
the application of Section 34 I.P.C. to the case, the evidence does not also
appear to us to prove conclusively that the appellant must have either throttled
the deceased or done some other act, quite apart ,from the acts of his father
and step-mother, which brought about the death. This result follows from the
totality of evidence and the presumption from the non-production of Geeta
Kurmini which destroys the value of the evidence which weighed so much with the
High Court, that the appellant was doing something like pushing or taking the
murdered woman inside her room at the time when she was last :seen alive.
The Trial Court and the High Court relying on
the evidence of 'some bleeding of the body of the deceased, admitted by the
appellant. to have been carried in the car to the burning ghat, and the absence
of evidence of death caused by burning, came to the conclusion that the
appellant must have throttled the deceased. This was pure conjecture after
eliminating the defence case of burning by accident. if it had been a case of
throttling only, it would be difficult to explain the cries of murdered woman
for help which were heard by witnesses on the road unless we assume that the
murdered woman cried out, as she may have done, before the hands which choked
her were placed on her throat.
Therefore, although we may hold, as we do,
that this must be a case of murder, it is not possible for us to find conclusively
that it was a case of throttling and of nothing else or that the person who
could have throttled or done some other act which actually killed the deceased
was the appellant and not his father or step-mother.
So far as the case of quick disposal of the
body by the appellant is concerned, the circumstancial evidence was rightly
believed and held to be conclusive by both the Courts below. This evidence was
too damaging to admit of any doubt that the appellant took the leading part in
doing away with the remains of the body of his wife after she had been
murdered. The Trial Court and the High Court, while maintaining the appellants
conviction under Section 201 Indian Penal Code, had not fixed his sentence. It
was urged by Mr. Mulla before us that the appellant should not be given more
than three years rigorous imprisonment just as his father Jamuna had been
sentenced to three years rigorous imprisonment only under Section 201 Indian
Penal Code. It may be mentioned here that, while special leave to appeal was
granted to the appellant against the judgment of the High Court, this Court (1)
 1 SCR 291.
83 had refused to grant any leave to his
father Jamuna to appeal against his conviction under Section 201 Indian Penal
Code. We, however, think that a distinction between the case of the appellant
and his father is justified on two grounds mainly; firstly, it was the duty of
the appellant, as the husband, to have done something to protect his wife, even
if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the actual death may have been
brought about by the acts of others ;
and secondly the applicant had taken a
leading part in disposing of the murdered woman. We think that the maximum
sentence which can be passed under Section 201 Indian Penal Code is deserved by
the appellant upon facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we allow
this appeal to the extent that we set aside the conviction of the appellant
under Section 302 I. P. C., but we maintain his conviction under Section 201 1.
P. C. and sentence him to undergo seven years rigorous imprisonment and to pay
a fine of Rs. 1,000/and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months.