Mohd. Alam Vs. State of West Bengal
 INSC 34 (14 February 1974)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION: 1974 AIR 917 1974 SCR (3) 379 1974
SCC (4) 463
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1976 SC1207 (560) RF 1980 SC1983 (4) RF
1987 SC1977 (4) R 1990 SC1597 (19)
Prevention detention--'Services and Supplies'
in s. 3(1)(a)(iii) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, Scope
of--Detention until the expiry of the Defence of India Act. if
valid--Counter-affidavit on behalf of State--Who should file--Duty to
communicate material particulars to the detenu.
The petitioner was detained by an order
passed under s. 3(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, with a
view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies
and services essential to the community. The detention order was confirmed by
the Government and the Government directed that the detention should continue
till the expiration of 12 months from the date of detention or until the expiry
of Defence of India Act, 1971, whichever is later. Two instances of thefts of
copper wire were given in the grounds of detention communicated to the detenu.
He alleged that he had been wrongfully arrested and detained for 22 days in the
Police Station and that thereafter the detention order was foisted on him with
false and concocted charges. The counteraffidavit was filed, not by the
District Magistrate who passed the order of detention; but by a Deputy
Secretary in the Secretariat who had not personally dealt with the case of the
detenu, and it stated that from records it appeared that the petitioner was a
"veteran copper wire criminal".
In a petition for the issue of a writ of
habeas corpus it was contended that : (1 ) theft of telecommunication wires or
cables, may disrupt 'services' essential to the community but had no connection
with the maintenance of 'supplies', and since no particulars whatever in
relation to supplies were communicated to the petitioner the ground with regard
to 'supplies' is irrelevant and vague and hence the detention order was
violative of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (2) the period of detention under
the impugned order was indefinite and uncertain and infringed Art. 22(7) (b);
(3) the counter-affidavit filed was not by the officer who was satisfied about
the necessity of detention and was insufficient to rebut the allegations of the
petitioner that his detention was on false grounds with ulterior motives;
and (4) the grounds of detention conveyed to
the petitioner were false, vague and deficient in material particulars in that
the 'reliable information' showing that he was a "veteran copper wire
criminal" was not communicated to him.
HELD : (1 ) The expression 'supplies and
services' in s. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act is to be construed pragmatically in
the context of each case with due stress on the phrase 'essential to the life
of the community'. In a few cases these expressions may carry a meaning
distinct from each other. But in most cases the same activity may equally
affect supplies and services and the connotations of I supplies' and 'services'
may coincide or telescope into each other. Such will be the case where there is
large scale theft of copper wire by cutting and removing the same from the
power mains or telecommunication installations or underground cables. [382 E-G]
Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar Writ Petition No. 1972 of 1973, followed
Strouds' Judicial Dictionary 3rd Edn. p. 2939 and Blackpool Corporation v.
Locker  1, K.B. 349;
(2) The period of detention fixed under the
impugned orders does not infringe the mandate of Art. 22(7) (b) of the
Constitution. [383 G] Fagu Shah etc. etc. v. State of West Bengal Writ
Petitions Nos. 41, 106, 113, 214, 441 and 621 of 1973 decided on 20-12-1973,
(3) The proper person to file the
counter-affidavit is the District Magistrate who had passed the order of
detention under s. 3 of the Act, and, if for some good reason he is not
available the affidavit of a senior officer who personally dealt with the case
of the detenu in the Secretariat or had put it to the minister 380 for orders
should have been filed. These obligations stem from the well-settled principle
that once a Rule Nisi is issued on a habeas corpus motion by the Court the onus
is on the State to show that the liberty of the detenu has been taken away in
accordance with the procedure established by law and that the safeguards
provided in Art. 22 and in the Act have not been transgressed or bypassed. But
for the fact that the allegations of mala fides in the affidavit of the
petitioner are imprecise and deficient in particulars the omission to furnish
the affidavit of the District Magistrate might have been fatal to the impugned
Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal Writ
Petition No. 1679 of 1973 followed. [384 G-385 C; 386 A-B] (4) All the
information received by the District Magistrate and the Government about
repeated criminal activities-of the detenu had contributed towards the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. But for the detenu being,
in the opinion of the detaining authority a 'veteran or habitual copper wire
criminal' the District Magistrate might not have taken the impugned action.
But, admittedly the whole of this material or reliable information about the
antisocial and prejudicial activities of the detenu on which the detention
order was based, was not communicated to him.
The non-communication of that material was
violative of Art.
22(5) of the Constitution and the Act,
inasmuch as it did not intimate to the detenu the full grounds or material to
enable him to make-an effective representation. Omission to communicate this
material to the detenu must have seriously prejudiced him in exercising his
constitutional right of making an effective representation and therefore the
detention was illegal. [386 C-F; 387D]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos.
1678 and 1855 of 1973.
Under Art. 32 of the Constitution for issue
of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.
O. P. Malviya, for the petitioners (amicus
curiae) G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J. As similar questions of fact and law arise in these two petitions
under Article 32 of the Construction, they will be disposed of by this common
Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1678 of 1973
is in detention since January 15, 1972 in pursuance of an order dated January
14, 1972, passed under s. 3 (2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
1971 (for short, the Act) by the District Magistrate, Burdwan. The detention
order as confirmed by the Government on April 12, 1972 under S. 12 (1) of the
Act, directs that the detention "will continue tin the expiration of 12
months from the date of his detention or until the expiry of Defence of India
Act, 1971 whichever is later." In response to the Rule Nisi issued by this
Court, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department,
Government of West Bengal filed a counter-affidavit in para 4 of which it is
"It appears from the records that after
receiving reliable information relating to the illegal anti-social and prejudicial
activities of the above-named detenu-petitioner relating to the maintenance of
Supplies and Services essential to the 381 community, the said District
Magistrate of Burdwan passed order of detention against him under the
provisions of the said Act." In para 7 of the counter, it is said that
"it appears from the records, that the detenu-petitioner is a veteran
copper wire criminal." Two instances of thefts of copper wire or cable
used for telecommunication services, which took place on December 19, 1971 and
December 22, 1971, are also mentioned.
The grounds of detention that had been
communicated to the detenu, read as under "(1) That on 19-12--1971 at
about 00-30 hrs. You alongwith your associates including (1) Md. Kasim son of
Md. Mandal of Kashi Mohalla, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan (2) Hyder Ali son of
Bachchu Md. of Talpukuria, P. S. Asansol, Dist.
Burdwan, took away 40 kgs. underground copper
wire cable used for the purpose of tele-communication service from St.
Patric School compound, P. S. Asansol, Dist.
Burdwan. As a result of this theft important telecommunication service between
Panagarh Army Base Camp and Patna was totally disrupted for long 6 hours
causing much inconvenience to the people.
(2) That between 28.30 hrs. on 22-12-71 and
00.30 hrs. on 23-12-71 you along with your associates including (1) Md.
Kasim son of Md. Mandal of Kasimohalla P. S.
Burdwan (2) Hyder All, son of Bachcha Md. of
Talpukuria, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan took away 80 kgs. underground copper
wire cable used for the purpose of telecommunication service from St. Patric
School compound, P. S. Asansol, Dist. Burdwan. By your act important
telecommunication service Panagarh between Army Base Camp and Patna was totally
disrupted for long 8 hours to the sufferings of the people." Mr. Malviya,
who assisted the Court as amicus curiae has canvassed these contentions :
(i) The impugned order says that the
petitioner has been detained "with a view to preventing him from acting in
a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to
the community". Theft of telecommunication wire or cables, may disrupt
'services' essential to the community, but it has no connection with the
maintenance of 'supplies'. In s. 3(1) (a) (iii) the conjunction "and"
is to be read as "or", and "supplies" and
"services" disjunctively, being two different and distinct matters.
The ground with regard to "supplies" is thus irrelevant and vague and
since no particulars whatever of this ground were communicated to the detenu,
the detention order was violative of cl. (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution;
54Sup CI/74 382 (ii) The period of detention
fixed under the impugned order is indefinite and uncertain inasmuch as it has
been made coextensive with another indefinite and uncertain period viz., the
life of the Defence of India Act, 1971. In this way, the impugned order
indirectly infringes the mandate of Article 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution;
(iii) The District Magistrate who had passed
the detention order, has not furnished his affidavit, nor has any satisfactory
explanation been given as to why he has not done so. The stereotyped affidavit
of the Deputy Secretary who did not personally deal with the case of the
detenu, at any level, is not sufficient to rebut the allegations of the
petitioner that his detention has been effected on "totally false"
grounds, with "ulterior motives;" (iv) The grounds of detention
conveyed to the petitioner were false, vague and deficient in material
All the material or the "reliable
information" relating to the "anti-social and prejudicial activities
of the petitioner", referred to in the Deputy Secretary's affidavit,
showing how the petitioner was a "veteran copper wire criminal", on
the basis of which the District Magistrate/the Government was satisfied about
the necessity of the impugned detention, was not communicated to the detenu
who, in consequence, was deprived of his right to make an effective
We will deal with the contentions ad
seriatum. Contention (1) does not appear to be tenable. The expression
"Supplies" and "Services" in s. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act
are to be construed pragmatically in the context of each case, with due stress
on the phrase " essential to the life of the community". In a few
cases, these expressions may carry a meaning distinct and different from each
other. For example, a sweepers' strike may seriously disrupt the "services"
essential to the community, but no question of disrupting "supplies"
arises, in such a case. In most cases, where, the same activity may equally
affect "supplies" and "services", the connotations of
"Supplies" and "services" may coincide or telescope into
each other Such will be the case where there is large scale theft of copper
wire by cutting and removing the same from the power mains or telecommunication
installations or underground cables.
According to Strouds' Judicial Dictionary 3rd
Edn. p. 2939, "to supply" means to "pass anything from one who
has it to, those who want it". Construed in this sense,
"telecommunication" is both a "supply" and a
"service". So are the copper wires or mains through which the supply
is made and service conducted. The same is true about electricity, water,
light, fuel or other commodity essential for the life of the community and the
medium or the mains essential for their 383 maintenance. In the context of the
acute shortage of essential commodities, many other things such as 'food', 'copper',
'coal' etc. may partake the character of "supplies" as well as
"services". Thus in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker(1), it was held
that the provisions of housing accommodation was within the ambit of
"supplies and services" in Regulation 51(1) of the Defence (General)
In Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar(2), this
Court had the occasion to consider the meaning of "Supplies" and
"Services" in this statutory provision in the context of hoarding and
black-marketing in foodgrains It is, therefore, not necessary to dilate on this
subject any further. It will be sufficient to extract here what the Bench,
constituted by both of us, said on the point :
". . . all supplies are not services and
all services are not supplies but the complex needs and amenities of modern
life and the multifarious obligations of a welfare state mingle supplies and
services so much that the concentric circle geometry becomes a misleading
stroke of gullibility in 'his jural area. For example, an essential commodity is
at once a supply and a service. Section 36(3) of the Defence of India Rules,
1971 defines it to mean :
'essential commodity' means food, water,
fuel, light, power or any other thing essential for the existence of the
community which is notified in this behalf by Government.
Light and power' thus are commodities; so
also food and water. Yet who will deny that light is a service or drinking
water, for that matter ? The touchstone of social control is that it must be a
thing essential for the existence of the community; when crystallised it is
supplies, when sublimated it is services .... Food is supplies, so is shipping
and wagons, kerosene and gasoline.
And yet they are services." Ail that we
may now do is to add copper wire and cables used for tele-communications or
power transmission to the above list of commodities, essential to the life of
the community, which are at once supplies" and "services" within
the contemplation of s. 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act. The first contention of Mr.
Malviya thus stands negatived.
We are unable to accept contention (ii)
because this matter stands concluded by this Court's judgment in Fagu Shah etc.
etc. v. State of West Bengal(3). The argument
therein was that the expression "maximum period" in Article 22(7) (b)
connotes a definite period reckoned in terms of years, months or days and that
no period can be said to be maximum period unless it is possible to predicate
its beginning and end in terms of years, months or days and that since the
determination of the period of detention, namely, expiry of Defence of India
Act, 1971, is dependent upon revocation of Proclamation of Emergency, the
period (1)  1, K. B. 349. (2) Writ Petition No. 1972 of 1973.
(3) Writ Petitions Nos. 41, 106, 113, 214,
441 and 621 of 1973. decided on 20-12-1973.
384 fixed under s. 13 of the Act is not the
maximum period as visualised by Art. 22 (7) (b) Mathew J., who spoke for the
majority, negatived this contention in these terms :
"........ as the object of preventive
detention is to prevent persons from acting in a manner pre-judicial to the
maintenance of internal security, public order or supplies or services
essential to the community or other objects specified in entry 9 of List I the
power to detain must be adequate in point of duration to achieve the object.
And, how can the power be adequate in point of duration, if it is insufficient
to cope with an emergency created by war or public disorder or shortage of
supplies essential to the community, the duration of which might be incapable
of being, predicated in terms of years, months or days even by those gifted
with great prophetic vision ? If 'the maximum period' can be fixed only in
terms of years, months or days certainly it would have been open to Parliament
to fix a long period in s. 13 and justify it as 'the maximum period'.
It would be straining the gnat and swallowing
the camel if anybody is shocked by the fixation of the maximum period of
detention with reference to the duration of an emergency but could stomach with
complacency the fixation of maximum period, may, at fifteen or twenty years ...
We do not think that the Parliament in fixing
the duration of the maximum period of detention with reference to an event like
the cessation of the period of emergency has, in any way, abdicated its power
or function, to fix the maximum period or delegated it to the President. There
can be no doubt that it is Parliament that has fixed the maximum period in s.
13 of the Act. The only question is whether, because the duration of the period
is dependent upon the volition of the President, it ceases to be 'the maximum
period'. We cannot presume that the President will unreasonably continue the
Proclamation of Emergency even after the emergency has ceased to exist."
This takes us to contention (iii).
This objection has been repeatedly raised in
habeas corpus petitions that have come up before this Bench in the last two
months. In Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal(1) this Court had pointed out
that in return to a Rule Nisi issued by this Court in a habeas corpus petition,
the proper person to file the counter-affidavit is the District Magistrate who
had passed the order of detention under s. 3 of the Act, and, if for some good
reason the Magistrate is not available, the next best thing would be to furnish
the affidavit of a Senior Officer who personally dealt with the case of the
detenu in the Government Secretariat, or had put it to the Minister for orders.
Our democratic Constitution inhibits blanket
and arbitrary deprivation of a person's liberty by authority. It guarantees
that no one shall (1) Writ Petition No. 1679 of 1973.
385 be deprived of his personal liberty
except in accordance with procedure established by law. It further permits the
State., in the larger interests of society, to so restrict that fundamental
right that a reasonable, but delicate balance is maintained on a legal fulcrum
between individual liberty and social security. The slightest deviation from or
displacement or infraction or violation of the legal procedure symbolised in
that fulcrum, upsets the balance, introduces error and aberration and vitiates
This symbolic balance therefore has to be
worked with utmost care and attention. Viewed in that perspective, the
requirement as to the filing of the counter-affidavit by the proper person
cannot be treated as an empty formality. This obligation stems from the
well-settled principle that once a Rule Nisi is issued on habeas corpus motion,
by the Court, the onus is on the State to show that the liberty of the detenu
has been taken away in accordance with procedure established by law, and that
the safeguards provided in Article 22 and in the Act, have not been
transgressed or bypassed.
In Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar (supra),
also where the counter-affidavit had been sworn by an Assistant of the Home
Department, not with personal knowledge, but paper wisdom, the court, both of
us, constituting the Bench, expressed itself in the same strain, with added
emphasis, thus :
"It is difficult to appreciate why in return
to rule nisi in a habeas corpus motion, it is not thought serious enough even
where liberty of a citizen is choked off, to get the District Magistrate to
explain his subjective satisfaction and the grounds there for. Not even why he
is not available, nor the next best, the oath of a Senior Officer in the
Secretariat who had been associated with the handling of the case at Government
level. Mechanical affidavits...... by someone handy in the Secretariat cannot
This is not a mere punctilio of procedure but
a probative requirement of substance." In the instant case, the Deputy
Secretary who has sworn the affidavit does not aver that he had personally
dealt with the case of the detenu. He has sworn the affidavit merely on the
basis of paper information gathered from the official records. A stereotyped
explanation, the same which was offered in similar petitions decided by this
Bench, earlier has been given for not furnishing the affidavit of the District
Magistrate. It is stated that the Magistrate is "preoccupied in the matter
of maintenance of law and order and procurement of rice". Such an
explanation is hardly satisfactory.
It was all the more important in this case to
get the affidavit of the District Magistrate, because in this case the detenu
has alleged that lie had been wrongfully arrested and detained for 22 days in
the police station and thereafter the detention order under the Act was foisted
on him on the basis of charges which were 'totally false' and had been
concocted by the police and the detaining authority from ulterior motives to
cover up his initial wrongful detention. These allegations of mala fides may be
But the best informed person to rebut the
same on oath was the District Magistrate against whom they were 386 levelled.
But for the fact that these allegations of mala fides are imprecise and
deficient in particulars, the omission to furnish the affidavit of the District
Magistrate itself might well have been fatal to the impugned order.
Nevertheless, it is a circumstance to be
taken into account in appreciating the next contention.
The Deputy Secretary in his affidavit has
disclosed that therewas "reliable information" and other material,-in
addition to whatwas communicated to the detenu before the detaining
authorities,in regard to the "anti social and prejudicial activities"
of the petitioner showing how he was a "veteran copper wire
No body is born a criminal, much less a
habitual or "veteran" criminalIt takes time for one, to become so.
The adjective "veteran" which is
synonymous with "habitual" implies a long course of recurring or
persistent criminal behaviour or repeated commission of crime. Surely, all the
information received by the District Magistrate/the Government, about the
repeated criminal activities of the detenu had contributed towards the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It will not be extravagant
to say that but for the detenu being in the opinion of the detaining authority
a "veteran" or habitual copper wire criminal, the District Magistrate
might not have taken the impugned action. Admittedly, the whole of ibis
material or "reliable information" about the "anti-social"
and "prejudicial activities" of the detenu that led to his detention,
was not communicated to him. This information which was withheld was not
claimed to be privileged under clause (6) of Article 22. The non-communication
of thatmaterial was violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and the Act
inasmuch as it did not intimate to the detenu the full grounds or material to
enable him to make an effective representation. The detention is thus illegal.
We, therefore, allow this Petition, set aside the detention order and direct
that the Petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.
In Writ Petition No. 1855 of 1973, Mr. O. P.
Sharma, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae, has canvassed the same points
which were urged by Mr. Malviya in Mohd. Alam's case (supra). The same Deputy
Secretary has filed the counteraffidavit in this case also. The same
explanation of the omission of the District Magistrate who passed the detention
order, to file the counter has been given. In the affidavit of the Deputy
Secretary, it is said that the petitioner is a "person of desperateand
dangerous character" and "veteran copper wire stealer". Only two
instances spread over a period of about 2-1/2 months of the theft of one
valuable underground post and telegraph telecommunication cables were
communicated to the detenu. But other material on the basis of which the
District Magistrate/the Government reached the conclusion that the petitioner
was a "desperate and dangerous character" and "veteran copper
wire stealer" was not communicated to the detenu. The non-communication of
this material is not sought to be justified on the ground of its, being
privileged under Article 22(6). Indeed, learned Counsel for the 387 State has
been fair enough to place a copy of the material on record. It reads :
"Jiten Niniaoriginally hails from Dumka.
He works temporarily as loading cooly in the colliery. He has got no
educationgot no landed property. He is addicted to wine and indulges in
gambling in the area. The place where he is staying being infested by criminals
and due 'lo his close association with them. he developed criminal propensity.
His mode of living is beyond his means and as such he started committing petty
thefts against property.
He came in contact with copper wire criminals
of the locality and started committing theft in respect of P.T.
'telecommunication cables and D.V.C. cables
in the area. He is dangerous and desperate in character What has been quoted
above shows that the detaining authority must have been greatly influenced in
ordering the detention by this undisclosed material, not the whole of which was
germane to the grounds on which preventive detention can be ordered under the
Act. In any case, omission to communicate this material to the detenu must have
seriously prejudiced him in exercising his right of making an effective
We, therefore, allow Jiten Ninia's petition
also, set aside his detention and direct that he be set at liberty forthwith.
V. P. S. Petition allowed.