Rukmani Bai Gupta Vs. State Government
of Madhya Pradesh Bhopal& Ors [1974] INSC 281 (20 December 1974)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION: 1975 AIR 991 1975 SCR (3) 72 1975
SCC (1) 627
CITATOR INFO:
D 1976 SC 424 (2) R 1976 SC1125 (7,11)
ACT:
Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961 and
Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, S. 3(e)Notification
by Central Government of minor minerals-Scope of-Rules of business.
Practice-Contention not raised before
authorities and High Court-Whether Supreme Court would interfere on such
contention.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent-Government in exercise of the
power conferred under s. 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)
Act, 1957 made the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral Rules,1961 for grant of
prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals. 'Minor
minerals' are defined in s. 3(c) of the Act, The Central Government, in
exercise of the power conferred under s. 3(e) issued a notification in 1958
declaring, inter alia, "limestone used for lime burning" to be a
minor numeral. The notification was amended in 1961 and the words
"limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material"
were substituted.
The appellant was a lessee under a quarrying
lease from 1961 to 1966 and it was renewed in 1966 for the period 1966 to 1971
for quarrying "limestone for burning". Though there was no option for
renewal in the later lease, the appellant applied for renewal of the lease for
"limestone for burning as a minor mineral." As the application was
not disposed of in time it was deemed to have been refused and the appellant
applied for review.
Meanwhile, the 5th respondent applied for a
quarrying lease for the same area and as this application was not disposed of
in time, it was also deemed to have been refused and the 5th respondent also
applied for review.
The Deputy Secretary rejected the appellant's
application on the grounds,(a) that the quarrying lease granted for
"limestone for burning's was null and void, because, after the 1961
notification the lease was not for a "minor mineral" and hence no
renewal could be granted of a null and void lease, and (b) the application was not
proper, because, the application was for "limestone for burning" and
hence was not for a minor mineral. The Deputy Secretary, by the same order,
allowed the 5th respondent's application observing that 'there was no other
valid application,' but, by that time, an application by the appellant for a
quarrying lease of. "limestone used-in kilns for manufacture of lime for
use as building material," filed by the appellant abundanti cautela, was
in fact pending before the authorities.
As the lease deed in favour of the 5th respondent
in pursuance of the grant of the quarrying lease by the Deputy Secretary, was
not executed in time, the Additional Collector, in exercise of his powers as a
delegate of the State Government. extended the time for execution of the
lease-deed and thereafter, a lease was executed in favour of the 5th
respondent.
The appellant's application for a fresh lease
was again not disposed of in time and it was deemed to have been refused.
She filed a review application and also a
revision against the order of the Addl. Collector extending the time in favour
of the 5th respondent. The Deputy Secretary agreed with the contention that the
Additional Collector had no power to extend time but himself extended the
period for execution of the lease deed and rejected the Appellant's application
for grant of a fresh lease in her favour.
73 The appellant challenged the orders of the
Deputy Secretary but the High Court negatived the challenge, In appeal to this
Court it was contended, (i) that the quarrying lease for 1966 to 1971 in favour
of the appellant was not void; (ii) the application of renewal by the appellant
was proper; (iii) no Power was delegated to the Deputy Secretary by the State
Government to extend the time for execution of the lease deed; and (iv) the sanctioning
of the lease in favour of the 5th respondent proceeded on the wrong basis that
it was the only valid application for the quarrying lease.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD:(1) Both under the original notification
of the Central Government of 1958 and the amended notification of 1961
'limestone' was contemplated to be used for burning for manufacture of lime.
The only difference was that for classification as a minor mineral under the
former, burning could be by any means or process and the lime manufactured
could be for any purpose including building material while under the latter,
the burning should only be in kilns for the manufacture of lime used only as
building material and for no other purpose. Hence, the use of the expression
"limestone for burning" would not indicate whether 'the limestone
referred to is a minor mineral or not, for that would depend on how the
limestone is to be burnt and for what purpose. Moreover the proposition that
the expression "limestone for burning" could cover limestone as a
minor mineral is borne out by Schedule 3 of the Rules which prescribes a
minimum output for "limestone (for-burning)".
Therefore, it could not be said that merely
because the mineral for which the, quarrying lease was granted to the appellant
was described therein as "limestone for burning," it was quarrying
lease for a mineral which was not a minor mineral. [78C-G] In the present case,
the application of the appellant. the order granting the lease, the rule (r.
29) under which the power was exercised, the Form in which the lease was
executed and the royalty stipulated, all indicated that the quarrying leasewas
in respect of a minor mineral; that is it was really a quarry lease for" limestone
used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material."It could
not, in the circumstances. be condemned and void.
[78G-79C] 2(a) When column 6 of paragraph 4
of the application requires an applicant to state the mineral which he intends
to mine, it is for the purpose of intimating to the State Government the
mineral for which the quarrying lease is applied for. So long as the
description given by the applicant in the column ',is sufficient to identify
the mineral, the object of requiring the applicant to give the information
would be satisfied and the application would not suffer from the fault of being
vague or indefinite. In the present case, the appellant Described the mineral
intended to be mined by her as "limestone for burning as a minor
mineral" that is. "limestone for burning" which was a minor
mineral or in other words "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime
used as building material". Therefore.
the application for renewal was in respect of
a minor mineral and the State Government was wrong in rejecting it on the
ground that it was not an application in respect of a minor mineral. [79D-G]
(b)But the application for renewal was misconceived because there was no option
of renewal and hence the State Government was right in rejecting it. [80C]
(3)The Deputy Secretary, in extending the time for execution of the lease in
favour of the 5th respondent, did not act as delegate of the State Government,
but in exercise of the power of the State Government under the Rules of
Business. His order extending time was therefore, valid.
[81B-C] (4)The State Government was in error
in sanctioning grant of lease in favour of the 5th respondent ignoring the
application of the, appellant; but the appellant never raised this contention
at any time before the State Government or the High Court and hence, this Court
would not be justified in interfering with the order of the State Government on
this ground. [80 E-G] 74
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil 'Appeal
Nos. 612 & 613 of 1974.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the 5th May, 1973 and 27th February, 1974 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Misc. Petns. Nos. 552/72 and Misc.
Petn. No. 675 of 1973 respectively.
T. S. Krishnamurthy, P. V. Lale and S. S.
Khanduja and Sushil Kumar,for the appellant (In C.A. No. 612-13/74).
I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1-3 (In
C.A. No. 612/74) and respondents Nos. 1-4 & 6 (In C.A. No. 613/74).
R.S. Dabir , V. S. Dabir, N. M. Ghatate and
S. Balakrishnan, for respondent No. 5 (In both the appeals).
R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 4 (in C.A.
No. 612/74.).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-The Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) divides minerals into two classes, namely,
minor minerals and minerals other than minor minerals, which may, for the sake
of brevity, be referred to as major minerals. The Act itself makes provisions
in sections 4 to 13 for regulating the grant of prospecting licenses and mining
leases in respect of major minerals but so far as minor minerals are concerned,
grant of prospecting licenses and mining leases is left to be governed by rules
to be made by the State Government under section 15. The Madhya Pradesh
Government, in exercise of the power conferred under section 15, made the
Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961 for regulating the-grant of quarry
lease in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. These
rules are ex hypothesi applicable only in relation to grant of quarry lease in
respect of minor minerals. "Minor minerals" are defined in section 3
(e) to. mean building stores, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than
sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central
Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a minor
mineral. The Central Government, in exercise of the power conferred under
section 3(e), issued a notification dated 1st June, 1958 declaring inter alia
"limestones used for lime burning" to be a minor mineral.
This notification was subsequently amended by
the Central Government by a further notification dated 20th September, 1961 and
the words "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as
building material" were substituted for the words "limestone used for
lime burning". The result was that with effect from 20th September, 1961
only limestone used in kiln for manufacture of lime used for building material
remained a minor mineral while limestone used for burning for manufacture of
lime for other purposes ceased to be a minor mineral and became a major
mineral. The appellant was a lessee under a quarry lease of 25.32 acres of land
situate in village Badari, Tehsil Kurwara, District Jabalpur granted to her by
the State Government for quarrying "limestone for burning" for a
period of five years from 21st 75 June, 1961 to 20th June, 1966. This quarry
lease was granted under the Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and it was in Form V annexed to the
Rules and contained clause (15) giving an option of renewal to the appellant
for a further term of five years. Before the period of the quarry lease was due
to expire, the appellant applied for renewal in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules and in the application for renewal against column 6 of paragraph 3
the appellant described the mineral which she intended to mine as
"limestone for burning". This application for renewal was not
disposed of by the State Government before the expiry of the quarry lease and
it was, therefore, deemed to have been refused under rule 8(3). The appellant
thereupon made an application for review under rule 28 and the State
Government, by an order dated 24th December, 1966 made in exercise of the power
conferred under rule 29, sanctioned renewal of the quarry lease to the
appellant. Pursuant to this order a quarry lease was granted by the State
Government in, favour of the appellant for quarrying "'limestone for
burning" for a period of five years from 21st June, 1966 to 20th June,
1971. This quarry lease was also in Form V annexed to the Rules but it did riot
contain clause (15) giving an option of renewal to the appellant.
Even though the last mentioned quarry lease
granted to the appellant did not contain an option of renewal, the appellant
made an application dated 19th June, 1970 to the State Government for renewal
of the quarry lease which was due to expire on 20th June, 1971. This
application was in Form I annexed to the Rules and against column 5 of
paragraph 3, which required an applicant to state whether the application was
for a fresh lease or for a renewal of a lease previously granted, the appellant
stated that the application was for renewal of' quarry lease. The application
was, there-fore, clearly and avowedly an application for renewal of the quarry
lease which was subsisting in favour of the appellant and not 'an application
for a fresh lease. Then again, what was stated by the appellant against column
6 of paragraph 3 is very material. The appellant stated there that the mineral
which she intended to mine was "limestone for burning as a minor
mineral". This application was not disposed of by the State Government
before the expiry of the quarry lease and it was, therefore, deemed to have
been refused on 20th June, 1971.
The appellant thereupon filed an application
for review on 1st July, 1971 under rule 28.
Now, sometime after the application for
renewal of the quarry lease was made by the appellant, respondent No. 5 made an
application dated 11th September, 1970 for, grant of a quarry lease in respect
of' the same area. This application was also in Form I annexed to the Rules and
against column 6 of paragraph 3 it was , stated that the mineral which the
applicant intended to mine-was "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of
lime used as building material". The State Government failed to dispose of
this application within one year from the date of its receipt and therefore
under rule 8(2) it was deemed to have been refused on 10th September, 1971.
Respondent No. 5 too had, in the circumstances, no choice but to file an application
for review, under rule 28 on 11th September, 1971.
76 It appears that after the appellant had
made the application for renewal, She felt that there might be some difficulty
so far as that application was concerned, and therefore, with a view to err on
the safe side, she made another application for grant of a fresh lease on 21st
June, 1971 immediately after the expiration of the subsisting lease.
This application in column 6 of paragraph 3
gave a full description of the mineral which the appellant intended to mine,
namely, "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime for use as
building material". The State Government failed to dispose of this
application also within one year from the date of its receipt and it was,
therefore, by reason of rule 8(2), deemed to have been refused on 20th June,
1972. The appellant thereupon preferred an application for review under. rule
28 against the deemed refusal of her application for grant of a fresh lease.
But before that, the two applications for review, one made by the appellant on
1st July, 1971 and the other made by respondent No. 5 on 11th September 1971,
were disposed of by the Deputy Secretary exercising the power of the State
Government by an ,order dated 19th May, 1972.
The Deputy Secretary by the order dated 19th
May, 1972 rejected the application for review made by the appellant on the
ground that "limestone for burning" for which the quarry lease was
granted to the appellant was a major mineral after the issue of the
notification dated 20th September, 1961, and hence the quarry lease granted by
the Stale Government under the Rules was null and void and no renewal could be
granted of such a null and void lease, and moreover, the application for
renewal made by the appellant was also not proper as it was an application for
mining "limestone for burning" which was a major mineral. The Deputy
Secretary also by the same order allowed the application for review made by
respondent No. 5 and sanctioned grant of a lease to him, as the area had become
available for grant and, according to the Deputy Secretary, "there was no
other valid application for this area".
The appellant being aggrieved by the order
made by the Deputy Secretary preferred a petition in the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the validity
of that order on certain grounds. But none of these grounds appealed to the
High Court and affirming the view taken by the Deputy Secretary, the High Court
upheld the impugned order and rejected the petition. The appellant thereupon
preferred Civil Appeal No. 612 of 1974 ,after obtaining special leave from this
Court.
Now, the main part of rule 22 provided that
where a quarry lease is granted, a lease deed in Form V shall be executed
within three months of the order sanctioning the lease and if no such lease is
executed within that period, the order sanctioning the lease shall be deemed to
have been revoked.
The quarry lease in favour of respondent No.
5 should, therefore, have been executed within three months of the order dated
19th May, 1972 sanctioning grant of lease to him. Unfortunately,, however,
without any fault on the part of respondent No. 5. the quarry lease could not
be executed within the stipulated period 77 of three months.. The order dated 19th
May, 1972 sanctioning lease in favour or respondent No. 5 would, therefore,
have stood revoked under the main part of rule 22. But the proviso to that rule
conferred power on the State Government to permit the execution of the lease
deed after the expiry of the period of three months if it was satisfied that
the applicant for the lease was not responsible for the delay 'in the execution
of the lease deed. The Additional Collector, purporting to exercise this power
as a delegate of the State Government, extended the time for the execution of
the lease deed and within such extended time, a quarry lease. was executed by
the Addl. Collector in favour of respondent No. 5. The appellant, therefore,
added respondent No. 5 as a party respondent in her application for review and
also filed an application for revision under rule 32B against the order of the
Additional Collector granting extension of time and executing the quarry lease.
The appellant contended that-the Additional Collector had no power to extend the
time for the execution of the quarry lease as no such power had been delegated
to him by the State Government and in any event, no extension of time could be
granted after the prescribed period of three months had expired and the order
dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning grant of lease in favour of respondent No. 5
must, therefore, be deemed to have been revoked and the quarry lease must be
held to be null and void, and an order should be made sanctioning grant of
quarry lease in favour of the applicant. The Deputy Secretary, exercising the
power of the State Government, by an order dated 29th May, 1973, agreed with
the contention of the appellant that the power of the State Government not
having been delegated to him, the Additional Collector had no power to extend
the time for the execution of the quarry lease or to execute the quarry lease
on behalf of the State Government, but taking the view that respondent No. 5
was not responsible for the delay in the execution of the lease deed within the
prescribed period of three months the Deputy Secretary extended the time for
the execution of the quarry lease upto 29th August, 1973 in exercise of the
power of the State Government under the proviso to rule, 22. Both the
application of the appellant, one for review against the deemed refusal of her
application for grant of a fresh lease and the other for revision of the order
of the Additional Collector under rule 32B were accordingly rejected by the
Deputy Secretary. The appellant thereupon preferred a petition in the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the order of the Deputy Secretary, but the High
Court negatived the challenge and dismissed the petition. This led to the
filing of Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1974 with special leave obtained from this
Court.
We will first consider Civil Appeal No. 612
of 1974. Two questions arise for consideration in this appeal. First, whether
the quarry lease for the period 21st June, 1966 to 20th June, 1971 granted by the
State Government to the appellant was null and void; and secondly, whether the
application for renewal made by the appellant was proper so as to merit
consideration by the State Government. So far as the first question is
concerned, the High Court took the view that "limie stone for
burning", for which the quarry lease was granted by the State Government
to the appellant, was a major mineral at the date when the quarry lease was
granted, and therefore, the quarry lease was null' 78 and void. The correctness
of this view was challenged before us on behalf of the appellant and we find
considerable force in this challenge. The original notification dated 1st June,
1958 described "limestone used for lime burning" as a minor mineral
but by the amending notification dated 20th September, 1961 only
"limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building
material" was regarded as a minor mineral. The field of minor mineral, in
so far as it concerned limestone, was narrowed down. Formerly limestone used for
burning for manufacture of lime, whatever may be the uses to which such lime
may be put, whether as building material or for other purposes, was within the
definition of 'minor mineral', but after the amendment, it was only limestone
used for burning in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material
that was covered by the definition of minor mineral. When limestone is used for
burning for manufacture of lime for industrial or sophisticated purposes
otherwise than as building material, it would have to be of superior quality
and hence after the amendment, it was classified as major mineral, leaving only
limestone used for burning in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building
material to be regarded as minor mineral. But in both cases, whether under the
original notification or the amended notification, limestone was contemplated
to be used for burning for manufacture of lime. The only difference was that in
the former, burning could be by any means or process and lime manufactured
could be for any purpose including building material, while in the latter,
burning could be only in the kilns and for manufacture of lime used only as
building material and for no other purpose. It would, therefore, be seen that
the mere use of the expression "limestone for burning" would be ambig
uous. It would not indicate whether the limestone referred to is a major
mineral or a minor mineral. That would all depend on how the limestone is to be
burnt whether in kilns or otherwise, and what is the use to which lime manufactured
by burning is to be put, whether as building material or for other purposes.
The expression "limestone for burning" would, therefore, equally
cover limestone as a minor mineral and that is clearly borne out by the Third
Schedule to the Rules which prescribes a minimum output of 200 tonnes per acre
per annum for "limestone (for burning)".
It cannot, therefore, be said that merely
because the mineral for which the quarry lease was granted by the State
Government to the appellant was described in the quarry lease as
"limestone for burning", it was a quarry lease for a major mineral.
Whether it was a quarry lease for a minor mineral or a major mineral would have
to be gathered from the other provisions of the quarry lease and the circumstances
surrounding its execution.
Now in the present case the quarry lease was
granted to the appellant pursuant to the order dated 24th December, 1966 made
by the State Government it on the application for renewal made by the
appellant. The application for renewal was in Form I annexed to the Rules which
was the form prescribed by the Rules for an application for grant of a quarry
lease for a minor mineral. The order dated 24th December, 1966 also treated the
application of the appellant as one made for a quarry lease for a minor mineral
under the Rules and sanctioned renewal of the quarry lease in favour of the
appellant in exercise 79 of the power under rule 29, which was a power
exerciseable in relation to grant or renewal of a quarry lease in respect of a
minor mineral. The quarry lease was also in Form V annexed to the Rules which
is the form prescribed for a quarry lease in respect of a minor mineral. The
royalty stipulated in the quarry lease was Rs. 2/per tonne and that also
clearly indicated that the quarry lease was in respect of a minor mineral. Vide
the First Schedule to the Rules. It is, therefore, clear that though the
mineral for which the quarry lease was granted to the appellant was described
as "limestone for burning", it was a quarry lease for "limestone
for burning" as a minor mineral, that is, for "limestone used in
kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material" and it could not
in the circumstances be condemned as null and void.
That takes us to the second question, namely,
whether the application for renewal made by the appellant was proper ? The only
ground on which the State Government rejected the application for renewal was
that against column 6 in paragraph 3 the mineral which the appellant intended
to mine was described as "limestone for burning as a minor mineral".
The State Government took the view, and this
view was affirmed by the High Court, that "limestone for burning" was
a major mineral and the application for renewal was, therefore, an application
for a quarry lease for a major mineral and the State Government was not
competent to grant it under the Rules. We do not think this view taken by the
State Government and approved by the High Court is correct.
It rests on too strict a construction of the
application for renewal ignoring the substance of the matter. When column 6 of
paragraph 3 of Form V requires an applicant to state the mineral which he
intends to mine, it is for the purpose of intimating to the State Government as
to what is the mineral for which the quarry lease is applied for by the
applicant.
So long as the description given by the
appellant against column 6 of paragraph 3 is sufficient to identify the
mineral, the object of requiring the applicant to give information against
column 6 of paragraph 3 would be satisfied and the application would not suffer
from the fault of being vague or indefinite and the only question then would be
whether the mineral mentioned there is a minor mineral. Here in the present
case, against column 6 or paragraph 3 the mineral intended to be mined by the
appellant was described as "limestone for burning as a minor
mineral". The words "as a minor mineral" following upon
"limestone for burning" clearly indicated that the mineral which the
appellant intended to mine was not "limestone for burning" which was
a major mineral but "limestone for burning" which was a minor
mineral, that is, "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as
building material".
It cannot be gain said that it would have
been better if the full description of the mineral had been given against
column 6 of paragraph 3, but absence of reiteration of the full description
cannot be regarded as having any invalidating effect on the application for
renewal. What was stated by the appellant against column 6 of paragraph 3 was
sufficiently specific to identify the mineral as "limestone used in kilns
for manufacture of lime used as building material" and that showed clearly
beyond doubt that the application for renewal was an application in respect of
a minor mineral. We are, therefore, of the view that the application for 80
renewal was a proper application in respect of a minor mineral and the State
Government was wrong in rejecting it on the ground chat it was an application
in respect of a major mineral.
But that does not mean that the application
for renewal made by the appellant should have been-granted by the State
Government. When the quarry lease in Form V was executed by the State
Government in favour of the, appellant, clause (15) of that form was deleted. There
was, therefore, no option of renewal in the quarry lease and the appellant
could not lay any claim to renewal on the basis of such option. It is apparent
that an applicant can ask for renewal of the quarry lease only if there is an
option of renewal in his favour. Otherwise, all that he can apply for and
obtain is a fresh lease. The application for renewal was, therefore,
misconceived and the State Government was entitled to reject it. We accordingly
uphold the rejection of the application for renewal by the State Government
though for different reasons.
The appellant then contended that the order
dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning lease in favour of respondent No. 5 was
invalid since it proceeded on a wrong hypothesis that the application of
respondent No. 5 was the only valid application for a quarry lease for this
area before the State Government. There was also before the State Government,
pointed out the appellant, the application made by her for grant of a fresh
lease and though this application was later in point of time than the
application of respondent No. 5, the State Government was bound to consider it
as the State Government it could under rule 12(2), for special reasons to be
recorded, grant "quarry lease" to an applicant whose application was
received later in preference to an applicant whose application was received
earlier". Now, there can be no doubt that on 19th May, 1972, when the
State Government sanctioned grant of quarry lease in favour of respondent No.
5, the application of the appellant for grant of a fresh lease was before the
State Government and therefore, it would seem that the State Government ought
to have considered that application along with the application 'of respondent
No. 5 for the purpose of deciding whether quarry lease should be granted to the
appellant in preference to respondent No. 5 even though the application of the
appellant was received later than the application of respondent No. 5. Prima
facie, the State Government was in error in sanctioning grant of lease in
favour of respondent No. 5 ignoring the application of the appellant. But we do
not think we would be justified in interfering with the order of the State
Government on this ground because we do not find that this contention was at
any time raised by the appellant before the State Government or even before the
High Court. The appellant could have 'raised this contention in the application
for review preferred by her against the deemed refusal of her application for
grant of a fresh lease and even if it was not raised at that stage, the
appellant had another opportunity to raise it and that was in either of the two
petitions filed by her in the High Court. But the appellant did not avail
herself of this opportunity and it was only at the hearing of this appeal
before us that she for the first time 81 sought to raise this contention. We
cannot permit that to be done and we accordingly do not propose to entertain
this contention and interfere with the order of the State Government on this
ground.
So far as Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1974 is
concerned, the appellant contended that the Deputy Secretary had no power to
extend the time for the execution of the quarry lease in favour of respondent
No. 5 as no such power had been delegated to him by the State Government. But
this contention is based on the erroneous assumption that the Deputy Secretary,
in extending the time for the execution of the quarry lease, acted in exercise
of the power purported to have been delegated to him by the St-ate Government.
The Deputy Secretary did not act as delegate of the State Government. He acted
in exercise of the power of the State Government under the Rules of Business.
The order made by him extending the time for the execution, of the quarry lease
was, therefore, an order of the State Government and no infirmity attached to
it on the ground that the power to extend the time was not delegated to him.
The appellant also tried to urge the same
contention in this appeal which she urged in Civil Appeal No. 612 of 1974,
namely, that the order dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning grant of lease in
favour of respondent No. 5 was invalid inasmuch as it was made without
considering the application of the appellant for grant of a fresh lease. But
for reasons which we have already given we cannot allow the, appellant to raise
this contention for the first time at the hearing of these appeals before us
and hence we need not express any final opinion upon it.
The result is that both Civil Appeals Nos.
612 of 1974 and 613 of 1974 fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be
only one hearing fee in one set in both appeals.
V.P.S. Appeals dismissed.
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