Aflatoon & Ors Vs. Lt. Governor of
Delhi & Ors [1974] INSC 157 (23 August 1974)
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
RAY, A.N. (CJ) ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
GOSWAMI, P.K.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION: 1974 AIR 2077 1975 SCR (1) 802 1975
SCC (4) 285
CITATOR INFO:
RF 1974 SC2085 (9) F 1975 SC1699 (2,11,12) R
1975 SC2112 (4) RF 1978 SC 515 (7) F 1979 SC1713 (11)
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act, Section 4, sub-sections
(1) and (2)--Initiation of proceedings under, a valid notification sine, qua
non-Delay in moving the Court--Effect.
Land Acquisition Act, Section 23 and
Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 19(1)(f) 31(2) and 31(5)--Compensation
with reference to value of property on the date of notification under sec.
4--Adequacy of compensation, challenge of--Challenge confined only to question
of procedural reasonableness.
Delhi Development Act, sections 12 and
15--Planned development of Delhi to be in accordance with the Act--Central
Govt., if precluded from acquiring land for planned development--Laches and
acquiescence on the part of the petitioners--Effect.
Land Acquisition Act, Section 3(a) and Part
VII--Acquisition of land for planned development of Delhi--Landing over a
portion of the acquired property to co-operative housing societies--Provisions
of Part VII of the Act, whether attracted.
HEADNOTE:
A notification under sec. 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act was issued on Nov. 13, 1959, stating that an area of 34,070
acres of land was needed for a public purpose, viz. the planned development of
Delhi. Between 1959 and 1961, about six thousand objections were filed under
sec. 5A of the Act.
The objections were overruled. On March 18,
1966, the declaration under sec. 6 of the Act was published in respect of a
portion of the area. Therefore, in 1970, notices were issued under sec. 9(1) of
the Act requiring the appellants to state their objections, if any, to the
assessment of compensation. The appellants thereupon challenged the validity of
proceedings for acquisition before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court negative
their contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. In the writ petitions and
civil appeals filed in the Supreme Court it was contended :
(i) The public purpose specified in the
notification issued under sec. 4, namely, the planned development of Delhi was
vague as neither a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was in existence on the date of
the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague,
the appellants and the petitioners were unable to exercise effectively their
right under sec. 5A of the Act; (ii) As there was inordinate delay in
finalizing the acquisition proceedings, they were deprived of the benefit of
the appreciation in the value of the property between the date of notification
under sec. 4 and the date of taking possession of the property. (iii) The
provisions of sec. 23 of the Act laying down that compensation should be
determined with reference to the market value of the land as an the date of
notification under sec. 4 was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental
right of the appellants to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)
(b); (iv) As the acquisition of the property was for the purpose, of planned
development of Delhi, the only authority competent to issue the notification
under sec. 4 was the Central Govt. under see.
15 of Delhi Development Act and since the
proceedings were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings
were abs initial invalid; and (v) The acquisition was not for any public
purpose, but for companies as the major portion of the land acquired was
allotted without any development to co-operative housing societies which were
companies within the definition of the word "company" in the Act and
as the provisions of part VII of the Act were not complied with the proceedings
for acquisition were bad.
Rejecting the contention and dismissing the
appeals and the petitions, 803
HELD : (i) A valid notification under sec. 4
is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. It
is necessary to specify the particular public purpose, in the notification for
which the land is needed or likely to be needed as otherwise, the matters
specified in sub-sec. (2) of sec. (4) cannot be carried out. [807C] Munsh Singh
and Others v. Union of India, [1973] 1 S.C.R.
973 (975 and 984) relied on. Arnold Rodricks
and Another v. State of Maharashtra and others, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 885 referred
to.
In the case of an acquisition of a large area
of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the
specification of the purpose can only, be with reference to the acquisition of
the whole area. Unlike in the case or an acquisition of a small area, it might
be practically difficult to specify the particular purpose for which each and
every item of land comprised in the area isneeded.
[807G] The appellants did not move in the
matter even after the declaration under sec. 6 was published in 1966. They
approached the High Court with their writ petitions only in 1970 when the
notices under sec. 9 were issued, to them That apart, the appellants did not
contend before the High Court that as the particulars of public purpose were
not specified in the-notification issued under sec. 4, they were prejudiced in
that they could not effectively exercise their right under sec. 5A. As the plea
was not raised by them before the High Court, the appellants are not entitled
to have the plea considered in these appeals. To have sat on the fence and
allowed the Govt. to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the
notification under sec. 4 and the declaration under sec. 6 were valid and then
to attack the notification on grounds which were available to the writ
petitioners at the-time when the notification was published would be putting a
premium on dilatory tactics.
The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed
on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners. [808A-B;D
& F-G] Tilok. Chand Moti Chand and others v. H. B. Munshi and Another,
[1969] 2 S.C.R. 824 and Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India and
others [1970] 2 S.C.R. 697 referred to.
(ii) About 6,000 objections were filed under
sec. 5A by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions were also
filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings.
The Govt. had necessarily to wait for the disposal of the objections and
petitions before proceeding further in the matter. The High Court was of the
view that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the Govt. in completing
the acquisition proceedings. The conclusion of the High Court is correct.
[809B-C] (iii) The Land Acquisition Act is a pre-Constitution Act. its
provisions are not, therefore, liable to be challenged on the ground that they
are not in conformity with the requirement of Article 31(2) of the Constitution.
What the appellants and writ petitioners
complain is that their properties were acquired by paying them compensation
computed with reference to the. market value of the land as on the date of the
notification under sec. 4 and that sec.
23 is, therefore, bad. This, in substance is
nothing but a challenge to the adequacy of compensation. Such a challenge is
precluded by reason of Art. 31(5) of the Constitution.
[809F-G] Although a law for acquisition of
property must pass the test of Article 19(5), the challenge to the law would
ordinarily be limited to the question of procedural unreasonableness. [810B] R.
C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, (577) relied on.
It follows that although sec. 23 of the Act
can be challenged on the, ground that it violates the fundamental right of a
citizen to held and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(b), the challenge
would practically be limited to the question of procedural reasonableness. But
sec. 23 does not deal with procedure and cannot, therefore, suffer from any
procedural unreasonableness. [810E-F] 804 (iv) The planned development of Delhi
had been decided upon by the Govt. before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi
Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be no planned development
of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act
after that Act came into force but there was no inhibition in acquiring land
for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was
ready. [812E] Patna Improvement Trust v. Sint. Lakshmi Devi and others [1963]
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 812 referred to.
In other words, the fact that actual
development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the
approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Govt.
from acquiring the land for planned development under the Acts. Section 12 is
concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with
acquisition of property-, acquisition generally precedes development. For planned
development in an area other than a development area, it is only necessary to
obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in sec.
12(3). The Central Govt. could acquire any property under the Act and develop
it after Obtaining the approval of the local authority. As already held the
appellants and the writ petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the validity
of notification under sec. 4 on the ground of laches and acquiescence. The plea
that the Chief Commissioner of D.-]hi had no authority to initiate the
proceedings for acquisition by issuing the notification under sec. 4 of the Act
as sec. 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives that power only to the Central
Govt. relates primarily to the validity of the notification. Even assuming that
the Chief Commissioner was not so authorized, since the appellants and the writ
petitioners are precluded by their ]aches and acquiescence from questioning
the, notification, the plea must be negatived. [812F-H; 813A-B] (v) The plea
that the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not been complied within has
also to be rejected. The High Court was correct in giving the finding that the
acquisition was not for Company'. The mere fact that after the acquisition the
Govt. proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the
property acquired for development to the cooperative housing societies would
not make the acquisition one for company' and therefore, Part VII of the Act
was not attracted, [813C-E]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos.
362 & 363 of 1972.
Petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India.
Civil Appeals Nos. 107, 968 to 971 and 1185
of 1972.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the September 24, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.Ps As.NC3.
172, 177, 151, 170, 171 and 152 of 1971 respectively.
Civil Appeal No. 1168 of 1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and
Order dated the 17th April, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No.94 of
1971.
A. K. Sen, (in W.P. No. 362/72), L. M. Singhvi
(in W.P. No. 363/72 & C.A. No. 968/72), S. K. Dhingra (in C.A. No.
968/72) and B. Dutta, for the petitioners (in
W.Ps.) and appellants (in C.As.) L. N. Sinha, Sol. General of India, S. N.
Prasad (in W.P.No. 363/72 and C.A. No. 968 of 1972 only) and R. N.Sachthey, for
the respondents Nos. 1-3 (in C.A. No. 968, 970, 107/72 and W.P. Nos. 362-363 of
1972 and respondents in other appeals.
805 Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur
Saharya, for respondent No. 4 (in C.As. Nos. 107 & 968/72).
K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B. B. Sinha, for
respondent Nos. 5, 6, 8 (in C.A. No. 968/72).
Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent no. 4 (in C.A.
No. 970/72).
Ashok Grover, for respondent no. 5 (in C.A.
No. 107/72).
S. K. Dholakia, for respondent no. 6 (in C.A.
No. 107/72).
T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent no. 7
(in C.A. No.107/72).
L. M. Singhvi and S. K. Dhingra, for the
interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. These writ petitions and civil appeals raise common questions and
they are, therefore, disposed of by a common judgment. The Civil Appeals arise
out of the decision of High Court of Delhi dismissing the writ petitions filed
by the appellants challenging-the, validity of the proceedings for acquisition
of the land in question for "planned development of Delhi". In the
writ petitions, the validity of the same proceedings is being challenged on
certain additional grounds also.
A notification under s. 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act') was issued on November
13, 1950, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for a public
purpose, viz., the planned development of Delhi. Between 1959 and 1961, about
six thousand objections were filed under s. 5A of the Act. The objections were
civerruled. On March 18, 1966, the declaration under S. 6 of the Act was
published in respect of a portion of the area. Thereafter, in 1970, notices
were issued under s. 9(1) of the, Act requiring the appellants to state their
objections, if any, to the assessment of compensation. The appellants thereupon
challenged the validity of proceedings for acquisition before the, High Court
of Delhi on the following, grounds : (1) that the acquisition was not for
public purpose but for companies and so the provisions of Part VII of the Act
ought to have been complied with, (2) since no part of the compensation payable
came from the public exchequer, the acquisition was not for a public purpose
and (3) that the proceedings for acquisition violated the fundamental right of
the, appellants under Article 19(1)(f) as there was unreasonable delay between
the publication of the notification under s. 4 and the issue of the notices
under s. 9 of the Act with the result that the appellants were deprived of the
benefit of the appreciation in value of the property after the date of the
notification under s. 4. The High Court negatived the contentions and dismissed
the writ petitions.
The main arguments addressed before us on
behalf of the appellants and the writ petitioners were that the public purpose
specified in the notification issued under s. 4, namely, the planned
development of Delhi' was vague as neither a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was
in existence on the date of the notification and as the purpose specified 806
in die, notification was vague, the appellants were unable to exercise
effectively their right under s. 5A of the Act and that as the notification
under s. 4 was published in 1959, the compensation awarded was wholly
inadequate with reference to the market value of the property on the date when
the appellants are to be deprived of their possession of the property. In other
words the contention was that as there was inordinate delay in finalizing the
acquisition proceedings, the appellants were deprived of the benefit of the
appreciation in the value of the property between the, date of the notification
under s. 4 and the date of taking possession of the property. Linked with this
contention was the submission that the previsions of s. 23 of the Act which lay
down that compensation should be determined with reference to the market value
of the land as on the date of the notification under s. 4 was an unreasonable
restriction on the fundamental right of the appellants to hold and dispose of
property under Article 19(1) (f). It was further contended that as the
acquisition of the property was for the purpose of planned development of
Delhi, the only authority competent to issue the notification under s. 4 was
the Central Government under s. 15 of the Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings
were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were ab
initio invalid. The argument was that, as the acquisition was made for the
planned development of Delhi, it could be carried out' only in accordance with
the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, and that, under s. 15 of that Act,
it was only the Central Government which could have issued the notification
under s. 4, after having formed the opinion that the acquisition of the land
was necessary for the planned development of Delhi and, since the notification
was issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the notification was void ab
initio. The last contention was that the acquisition was not for any public
purpose, but for companies, as the major portion of the, land acquired was
allotted without any development to cooperative housing societies which were
companies within the definition of the word Company' in the Act and as the
provisions of Part VII of the Act were not complied with, the proceedings for
acquisition were bad.
The influx of displaced persons in 1947 from
West Pakistan into Delhi aggravated the problem of housing accommodation in
Delhi. With the extension of industrial and commercial activities and the
setting up of the foreign embassies, Delhi acquired enormous potential as an
employment centre.
The consequent increase in the population was
not accompanied by an adequate expansion of lousing facilities.
There was haphazard and unplanned growth of
houses in different areas; land also was not available at reasonable price as
substantial portion of the available land, suitable for development, had passed
into the hands of private enterprises. The Government found it necessary to
take effective steps to check the haphazard growth of houses and to prevent
substandard construction. Therefore, the Government framed a scheme for
"planned development of Delhi". It was in order to implement the
scheme of planned development of Delhi that the Government decided to acquire
34,070 acres of land in 1959 and published the notification under s. 4
specifying the public purpose as "the planned development of Delhi".
807 Section 4 of the Act says that whenever
it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed
or. is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that
effect shall be published in the official Gazette and the Collector shall cause
public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient
places in the said locality. According to the section, therefore, it is only
necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for a public
purpose.
The wording of s. 5A would make it further
clear that all that is necessary to be specified in a notification under s.
4 is that the land is needed for a public
purpose. One reason for specification of the particular public purpose in the,
notification is to enable the person whose land is sought to be acquired to
file objection under s. 5A. Unless a person is told about the specific purpose
of the acquisition it may not be possible for him to file a meaningful
objection against the acquisition under s. 5A. This Court has laid down that it
is necessary to specify the particular public purpose in the notification for
which the land is needed or likely to be needed as, otherwise, the matters
specified in sub-section (2) of s. 4 cannot be carried out.
in Munshi Singh and Others v. Union of India,
etc.(1) the Court said "It is apparent from sub-section (2) of s. 4 that
the public purpose which has to be stated in sub-section (1) of s. 4 has to be
particularized because, unless that is done, the various matters which were
mentioned in sub-section (2) cannot be carried out and if the public purpose
stated in s. 4(1) is planned development, without anything more, it is extremely
difficult to comprehend how all the matters set out in sub-section (2) can be
carried out by the officer concerned." We think that the question whether
the purpose specified in a notification under s. 4 is sufficient to enable an
objection to be filed under s. 5A would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case.
In Arnold Rodricks and Another v. State of
Maharashtra and Others(2), this Court held that a notification under s. 4 of
the Act which stated that the land was needed for "Development and
utilization of the said lands as an industrial and residential area" was
sufficient specification of public purpose.
In the case of an acquisition of a large area
of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the
specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of
the whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might
be practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose for which
each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.
Assuming for the moment that the public
purpose was not sufficiently specified in the notification, did the appellants
make a grievance of it at the appropriate time? If the appellants had really
been prejudiced by the non specification of the public purpose for which the
(1) [1973] 1 SCR 973, at 975 and 984.
(2) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 885.
808 plots in which they were interested were
needed, they should have taken steps to have the notification quashed on that
ground within a reasonable time. They did not move in the matter even after the
declaration under r 6 was published in 1966. They approached the High Court
with their writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices under s. 9 were issued
to them. In the concluding portion of the judgment in Munshi Singh & Others
v. Union of India (supra), it was observed :
"In matters of this nature we would have
taken due notice of laches on the part of the appellants while granting the
above relief but we are satisfied that so far as the present appellants are
concerned they have not been guilty of laches, delay or acquiescence, at any
stage." We do not think that the appellants were vigilant.
That apart, the appellants did not contend
before the High Court that as the particulars of the public purpose were not
specified in the notification issued under s. 4, they were prejudiced in that
they could not effectively exercise their right under s. 5A. As the plea was
not raised by the appellants in the writ petitions filed before the High Court,
we do not think that the appellants are entitled to have the plea considered in
these appeals.
Nor do we think that the petitioners in the
writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in
not challenging the validity of the, notification even after the publication of
the declaration under s. 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by
one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners
should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity
of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the,
public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under s. 4 is a sine
qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat
on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the, acquisition
proceedings on the basis that the notification under s. 4 and the declaration
under s. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were
available to them at the time when the notification was published would be,
putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be
dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see
Tilokchand Motichand and Others v. H. B. Munshi and Another(1); and
Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India & Others(2).
From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of
the Government, it is clear that the Government have allotted a large portion
of the land after the acquisition proceedings were finalised to Cooperative
lousing societies. To quash the notification at this stage would disturb the
rights of third parties who are not before the Court.
(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 824. (2) [1970] 2 S.C.R.
697.
809 As regards the second contention that
there, was inordinate delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, and that
the appellants and writ petitioners were deprived of the appreciation in value
of the land in which they were interested, it may be, noted that about 6,000
objections were filed under s. 5A by persons interested in the property.
Several writ petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the
validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Government had necessarily to wait
for the disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further in
the matter. Both the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the
High Court were of the view that there was no inordinate delay on the part of
the Government in completing the acquisition proceedings. We are not persuaded
to come to a different conclusion.
Linked with the above contention was the
argument that the provisions of s. 23 of the Act imposes unreasonable
restrictions upon the fundamental right of the appellants and writ petitioners
to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) of the, Constitution as
compensation is awardable only with reference to the value of the property on
the date of notification under s. 4 however long the proceedings for
acquisition may drag on and not with reference to the market value of property
when it is taken possession of. It was submitted that compensation should be
paid with reference to the value of the property as on the date when possession
of the, property is taken and the section', as it lays down that compensation
should be fixed with reference to the market value as on the date of the
notification under s. 4, abridges the fundamental right of a citizen under
Article 19 (1) (f). We find that the argument is not persuasive. Article 31(5)
(a) provides :
"(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall affect-(a)
the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of
clause (6) apply," The, Land Acquisition Act is a pre-Constitution Act.
Its provisions are not, therefore, liable to be challenged on the ground that
they are not in conformity with the requirement of article 31(2). What the
appellants and writ petitioners complain is, that their properties were
acquired by paying them compensation computed with reference to the market
value of the land as on the date of the notification under s. 4 and that s. 23
is, therefore, bad. This, in substance, is nothing but a challenge to the
adequacy of compensation. Such a challenge is precluded by reason of Article
31(5). In other words, the appellants and the writ petitioners cannot challenge
the validity of s. 23 on the ground that compensation payable under its
provisions is in any way inadequate, because, such a challenge would fly in the
face of Article 31(5).
It is noteworthy that s. 4(3) of the Land
Acquisition Amendment and Validation Act, 1957 provides for payment of interest
at 6 per cent of the market value after the expiry of 3 years from the date of
the notification under s. 4 to the date of payment of compensation. Section 24
of the Act provides that any outlay or improvements on, 810 or disposal of the
land acquired, commenced, made or effected without the sanction of the
Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4(1)
shall not be taken into consideration by the Court in awarding compensation. This
provision means that any outlay or improvement made with the sanction of the
Collector after the date of the notification will be taken into consideration
in awarding compensation.
In R. C. Cooper v. Union of India(1), this
Court has observed that although a law for acquisition of property must pass
the test of Article 19(5), the challenge to the law would ordinarily be limited
to the question of procedural unreasonableness. This is what the Court said
". . . Where the law provides for compulsory acquisition of property for a
public purpose, it may be presumed that the acquisition or the law relating
thereto imposes a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public.
If there is no public purpose to sustain compulsory acquisition, the law violates
Art. 31(2). If the acquisition is for a public purpose, substantive
reasonableness of the restriction which includes deprivation may, unless
otherwise established, be presumed, but enquiry into reasonableness of the
procedural provisions will not be excluded. For instance, if a tribunal is
authorised by an Act to determine compensation for property compulsorily
acquired, without hearing the owner of the property, the Act would be liable to
be struck down under Art. 19(1)(f)." It follows that although S. 23 of the
Act can be challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental right of a
citizen to hold and dispose of property under Article 19 (1 ) (f), the
challenge would practically be limited to the question of procedural
reasonableness. But section 23 does not deal with procedure and cannot,
therefore, suffer from any procedural unreasonableness. When it is seen that S.
23 is not liable to be challenged on the ground that the compensation provided
by its provisions is inadequate in view of the provisions of Art. 31(5), there
is no point in the contention that it can be challenged for that very reason on
the basis that it imposes unreasonable restriction upon a citizen's right to
hold and dispose of property.
It was argued that there could be no planned
development of Delhi otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the
Delhi Development Act and, therefore, the notification under S. 4 of the Act
should have been issued by the Central Government in view of S. 15 of that Act
and not by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi.
Section 12 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957
provides :
"12(1) As soon as may be after the
commencement of this Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the
(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, at 577.
811 official Gazette, declare any area in
Delhi to be a development area for the purposes of this Act Provided that no
such declaration shall be made unless a proposal for such declaration has been
referred by the Central Government to the Authority and the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi for expressing their views thereon within thirty days from
the date of the receipt of the reference or within such further period as the
Central Government may allow and the period so specified or allowed has
expired.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act,
the Authority shall not undertake or carry out any development of land in any
area which is not a development area.
(3) After the commencement of this Act no
development of land shall be undertaken or carried out in any area by any
person or body (including a department of Government) unless,(i) where that
area is a development area, permission for such development has been obtained
in writing from the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(ii) where that area is an area other than a
development area, approval of, or sanction for, such development has been
obtained in writing from the local authority concerned or any officer or
authority thereof empowered or authorised in this behalf, in accordance with
the provisions made by or under the law governing such authority or until such
provisions have been made, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations
relating to the grant of permission for development made under the Delhi
(Control of Building Operations) Act, 1955, and in force immediately before the
commencement of this Act.
Provided that the local authority concerned May
subject to the provisions of s. 53A amend those regulations in their
application to such area.
(4) After the coming into operation of any of
the plans in any area no development shall be undertaken or carried out in that
area unless such development is also in accordance with such plans.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-sections (3) and (4) development of any land begun by any department of
Government or any local authority before the commencement of this Act may be
completed by that department or local authority without compliance with the
requirements of those sub-sections.
Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957
states "15(1) If in the opinion of the Central Government, any land is
required for the purpose of development, or for any 812 other purpose, under
this Act, the Central Government may acquire such land under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(2) Where any land has been acquired by the
Central Government, that Government may, after it has taken possession of the
land, transfer the land to the Authority or any local authority for the,
purpose for Which the land has been acquired on payment by the Authority or the
local authority of the compensation awarded under that Act and of the charges
incurred by the Government in connection with the acquisition." Counsel
contended that on the date when the notification under s. 4 was published, the
Government had not declared any area in Delhi is a development area under s.
12(1) of the Delhi Development Act, nor was there a master plan drawn up in
accordance with s. 7 of that Act and so the acquisition of the property for
planned development of Delhi was illegal. Under s. 12(3) of the Delhi
Development Act, no development of land can be undertaken or carried out except
as provided in that clause. Section 2(d) states :
"development". with its grammatical
variations means the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other
operations in, on, over or under land or' the making of any material change in
any building or land includes redevelopment. Section 2(e) states
"development area"' means any area declared to be a development area
under sub-section (1) of s. 12.
The planned development of Delhi had been
decided upon by the Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi
Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be no planned
development of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi
Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no inhibition in
acquiring land for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master
Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi
Devi and Others(1).
In other words, the fact that actual
development is permissible in an area other than a development area with the
approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central
Government from acquiring the land for planned development under the Act.
Section 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do
with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development. For
planned development in an area other than a development area it is only
necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided
in S. 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property under the Act
and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. We do not
think it necessary to go into the question whether the power to acquire the
land under s. 15 was delegated by the Central Government to the Chief
Commissioner of Delhi. We have already held that the appellants and the writ
petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of the notification
under s. 4 on the ground of laches and acquiescence. The plea that the Chief
Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to initiate the (1) [1963] Supp. 2
S.C.R. 812.
813 proceeding for acquisition by issuing the
notification under s. 4 of the Act as s. 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives
that-power only to the Central Government relates primarily to the validity of
the notification. Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was not
authorized by the Central Government to issue the notification under s. 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, since the appellants and the writ petitioners are
precluded by their laches and acquiescence from questioning the notification,
the contention must, in any event, be negatived and we do so.
It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the
acquisition was really for the cooperative housing societies which are
companies within the definition of the word company' in s. 3(e) of the Act,
and, therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied
with. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court
were of the view that the acquisition was not for company. We see no reason to
differ from their view. The mere fact that after the acquisition the Government
proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the property
acquired for development to the cooperative housing societies would not make
the acquisition one for company'. Nor are we satisfied that there is any merit
in the contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came from
the consideration paid by the cooperative societies. In the light of the
averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions here, it is
difficult to hold that it was cooperatives which provided the fund for the
acquisition.
Merely because the Government allotted a part
of the property to cooperative societies for development, it would not follow
that the acquisition was for cooperative societies, and therefore, Part VII of
the Act was attracted.
It may be noted that the validity of the
notification under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 was in issue in Udai Ram
Sharma and Others v. Union of India(1) and this Court upheld their validity.
We see no merit in the appeals and the writ
petitions. They are, therefore, dismissed with costs.
Petitions dismissed.
(1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41.
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