State of Punjab Vs. K. R. Erry &
Sobhag Rai Mehta  INSC 172 (21 September 1973)
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN DWIVEDI, S.N.
CITATION: 1973 AIR 834 1973 SCR (2) 405 1973
SCC (1) 120
R 1974 SC 87 (11) F 1976 SC 667 (3,4,5) RF
1976 SC 676 (12) R 1978 SC 803 (30) R 1987 SC 943 (8)
Punjab Pension Rules-R. 6.4-Natural
justice-Government imposing cut in pension-Allegation of it-regularities while
in Service-Requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Rule 6.4 of the Punjab Pension Rules provides
"6.4 (a) The full pension admissible under the rule is not to be given as
a matter of course, or unless the service rendered has been really approved.
(b) If the service has not been thoroughly
satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension should make reduction in
the amount as it thinks proper.
The respondents were employed in the service
of the appellant State. On their retirement the State government imposed a cut
in their pension and in the gratuity amount.
It was alleged by the State government that
the officers had committed major irregularities and that the records of the
officers showed that their career were not altogether satisfactory. Thereupon
the respondents filed writ petitions in the High Court contending that
pensionary benefit with the right to superannuation pension were property to
which the officers by reason of their service were entitled as a matter of
right and therefore they could not be deprived of any part of that property
without notices to show cause why the cut should not be imposed. The High Court
quashed the orders imposing the cut. It held that the right to superannuation
pension was a right vested in the government servant and before that right is
prejudicially affected he is entitled to a notice to show cause against the
proposed cut, In the appeal to this Court it was conceded on behalf of the
St-ate government that in view of the decisions of this Court in Deokinandan
Prasad v. The State of Bihar and Others  2 S.C.C. 330 it was no longer
open to contend that a pension was a bounty. But it was contended that the
order of the State government in applying the cut was an administrative order
under rule 6.4 of the Pension Roles and therefore, the State government was not
liable to issue a notice to show cause against the proposed cut. It was pointed
out that the St-ate government had in its possession the confidential records
of the officers and on consideration of the same it was open to it reduce the
pens-ion in its discretion.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD: The State government could not have
applied a cut in the pensions of the officers without giving them a reasonable
opportunity to make their defence. Where a body or authority is judicial or
where it has. to determine a matter involving rights judicially because of
express or implied provisions of principles of natural justice audi alteram
partem applies. Where a body or authority is characteristically administrative
the principle of natural justice is also liable to be invoked if the decision
of that body or authority affects individual rights or interests, and having
regard to the particular situation it would be unfair for the body or authority
not to have allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [413C] 406 Advani
& Ors.  S.C.R. 621 (725); Board of High School
Gupta and Ors.  Supp. 3 S.C.R. 36;
State of Orissa v.Dr. (Miss) Biapani Dei & Ors.,  2 S.C.R. 625; In
re.R.K. (An Infant)  2 Q.B.D. 617; A. K. Kraipak & Ors.
v. Union of India & Ors.  1 S.C.R.
457 and Cooper v.Wandsworth Board of Works  14 C.D.N.S. 180, referred to.
M. Narasimachar v. The State of Mysore,
 1 S.C.R.
& CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeals Nos. 18931894 of 1967.
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and
order dated October 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil
Writs Nos. 504 of 1964and 723 of 1965 and Civil Appeal No. 735 of 1968.
Appeal by certificate from the order dated
March 8. 1967 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in L.P.A.
No.66 of 1967.
V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the
appellant (in all the appeals).
Bhimsena Rao and S. Ramachandran, for the
respondent (in C. A. No. 735/68).
B. R. Agrawala, for the respondent (in C. A.
Respondent appeared in person (in C. A. No.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byPALEKAR,
J.-These appeals raise, a common question of law as to whether the State
Government is entitled to reduce the amount of pension and gratuity legally
payable to its officers on their superannuation without giving a reasonable
opportunity to the officers to show cause against the proposed reduction.
In the first case the officer concerned is
Shri K. R. Erry.
He joined the Punjab P.W.D. Irrigation Branch
as an Assistant Engineer in 1926. In due course he was posted as a Central
Designs Officer and remained attached to the Central Designs Office first in
the capacity of Deputy Director from 6-11-1951 to 30-4-1952 and then as an
Executive Engineer (Designs) from 1-5-1952 to 1-11-1955. He was promoted from
P.S.E. Class II to P.S.E. Class I with effect from 22-9-1954 and was confirmed
as an Executive Engineer with effect from 12-8-1956. Early in 1958, he was promoted
to the rank of an officiating Superintending Engineer and was posted as
Director of Central Designs. In November, 1958 407 he retired from service on
reaching the age of superannuation. Shortly, thereafter he was reappointed by
the Government as a Professor and Head of the Department of Civil Engineering
in the Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh, which post he held for about 16
months. The question of his pension was taken up by the Government in the
normal routine and on 29-7-1963, Government informed him that though he was
entitled to a superannuation pension of Rs. 423.05 n.p. per month and
death-cum-retirement gratuity of Rs. 16,320/the Government was pleased to
impose a cut of 20% in the pension and Rs. 2,000/in the gratuity amount under
Rule 6.4 of the Punjab, Civil Services Pension Rules, since, in the opinion of
the Government, the service record of Shri Erry was not satisfactory. It is an
admitted fact that before this cut was applied Shri Erry had not been furnished
the grounds nor had he been given an opportunity to show cause against
The second case also runs on parallel lines.
The officer concerned is Shri Sobhag Rai Mehta. He joined the Punjab Irrigation
Department as a temporary Engineer in 1939 and was confirmed as Assistant
Engineer in P.S.E. Class II in 1946. He was promoted to P.S.E. Class I and as
an officiating Executive Engineer in 1949. After a few months he was reverted
as S.DO. as he was declared unsuitable for the promotion by the Punjab Public
Service Commission. Two years thereafter i.e. in 1951 he was again promoted as
Officiating Executive Engineer and confirmed as an Executive Engineer with
effect from 1-9-1956. Thereafter he was promoted as an Officiating
Superintending Engineer with effect from 12-3-1959 and earned a year's
increment. On 1212-1960 he attained the age of superannuation. As his pension
papers were not finalized soon thereafter he was allowed to draw anticipatory
pension in the sum of Rs. 190/per month and Rs. 6,158/as death-cum-retirement
gratuity pending final disposal of his case. On 4-7-1964 Government decided
that whereas the pension admissible to him under the rules was Rs. 211.35 n.p.
per month along with death-cumretirement gratuity of Rs. 8,211/it was necessary
to impose a cut of 15% in his pension under rule 64 of the Punjab Civil Service
Rules, as in the opinion of the Government the service record of Shri Mehta was
not satisfactory. His pension was thus reduced from Rs. 211.35 n.p. to Rs.
179.60 per month. It is admitted that while applying the cut to the pension, no
opportunity was given to Shri Mehta to show cause against the proposed cut.
In the third case the officer concerned was
Shri Khaushal Singh. He was appointed as an Agriculture Assistant in the Punjab
Government in 1926. Thereafter, he worked in the Department of Agriculture in
various capacities and finally in 1955 he was promoted to the post of District
Agriculture Officer 408 which was P.A.S. Class 11 post. He was confirmed in the
post of the District Agriculture Officer with effect from 13-1-1958. Shri
Khaushal Singh also acted for sometime as the Deputy Director of Agriculture
before retirement on 10th November, 1960 on reaching the age of superannuation.
After his retirement the Accountant General, Punjab calculated and declared
that he was entilled under the rules to be paid pension of Rs. 175.50 np. per
month and death-cum-retirement gratuity amounting to Rs. 5,589/-. But on
7-10-1963 he was informed that his pension had been reduced from Rs. 175.50 to
Rs. 160/per month and the amount of death-cum-gratuity of Rs. 5,589/had been
forfeited by the Punjab Government.
In this case also it is admitted that Shri
Khaushal Singh had not been given any notice to show cause 'why his pension
should not be reduced or death-cum-retirment gratuity forfeited.
In all these three cases the aggrieved
officer filed writ petitions in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh. The
principal contention was that pensionary benefits, with the right to
superannuation pension, which, it is admitted, included death-cum-retirement
gratuity under the rules, were property to which the officers by reason of
their service were entitled as a matter of right. They could not be deprived of
any part of that property without notice to show cause why the cut should not
The contention on behalf of the State was
that pensionary benefits were in the nature of a bounty and under rule 6.4
clauses (a) & (b) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules (Pension Rules) it was
open to the Government to impose a cut, if in the opinion of the Government,
the service record of the officers was not thoroughly satisfactory. It was also
contended that the order imposing the cut was an administrative order and the
Government was not, therefore, bound to give notice to the officers about the
The writ petitions of Shri Erry and Shri
Mehta were heard together by a full bench of the High Court and were disposed
of by a common judgment on October 25, 1966. The High Court held by majority
that the right to superannuation pension was a right vested in the Government
servant and before that right is prejudicially affected he is entitled to a
notice to show cause against the proposed cut. In view of that finding the
orders imposing the cut were quashed.
The Writ Petition filed by Shri Khaushal
Singh came on for hearing before a single Judge of the High Court on December
22, 1966. The learned Judge held that the case was covered by the decision of
the full bench in the, above two cases and the only 409 order he could pass was
to quash the order by which the State Government had imposed the cut in his
pension. The State of Punjab went in appeal to the Division Bench of that court
but, as was to be expected, that appeal was dismissed in limini on 8-3-1967.
The present three appeals are filed by the
State Government challenging the view taken by the full bench.
Much of the argument which would have been
otherwise addressed to us has been cut short by a decision of this Court in
Deokinandan Prasad v. The State of Bihar and Others(1). It was a petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution by which the petitioner maintained that denial
of pension was an infringement of his fundamental rights under Article 31(1)
and Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. This Court held that the right of a
Government servant to receive pension is property under Article 31(1) and by a
mere executive order the State did not have the power to withhold the same. It
was also held that the claim to pension was property under Article 19(1)(f) and
was not saved by sub-Article 5 of Article 19. In coming to this decision a
number of cases of the Punjab High Court were referred to and the view taken by
that court in Shri Erry's case, which is now in appeal before us' was affirmed.
Mahajan who appeared before us on behalf of
the State conceded that in view of the decision in Deokinandan's case it was no
longer open to him to contend that pension was a bounty.
Mr. Mahajan, however, contended that the
order of the State Government in applying the cut was an administrative order
under rule 6.4 of the Pension Rules and, therefore, the, State Government was
not liable to issue a notice to show cause against the proposed cut. It was
pointed out that the State Government had in, its possession the Confidential
records of the officers, and on a consideration of the same it was open to it
to reduce the pension in its discretion.
It was alleged in the written statements
filed in the, petitions that their official careers were not without blemish,
that there were ups and downs in their service and all these matters were
considered by the State Government before applying the cut. It was conceded
that these officers earned promotions and increments in due course of their
service but it was submitted that did not prevent the State Government from
applying the cut to the pension if, on a consideration of the official career
as a whole, the officers were not entitled to unqualified approbation.
Rule 6.4 of the Punjab Pension Rules is as
"6. 4(a) The full pension admissible
under the (1)  (2) S.C.C. 330.
410 rule is not to be given as a matter of
course, or unless the service rendered has been really approved.
(b) If the service has not been thoroughly
satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension should make such reduction
in the amount as it thinks proper." There are five notes appended to this
rule. But we are not concerned with the same in dealing with the general
Some indication was given in the written
statements field on behalf of the State suggesting that the careers of the
three officers were not thoroughly satisfactory. In the case of Shri Erry it
was alleged that he had prepared the design of the Ghaggar Syphon and when the
same was constructed in accordance with the design, a defect was discovered to
remedy which the Government had to spend an extra amount of rupees seven lakhs.
The State Government was of the opinion that the defect was in the design and
not the construction.
So far as this allegation is concerned Shri
Erry has given an, answer. According to him the design for the Syphon was
prepared by him under the able supervision and guidance of his superiors viz.
Shri Handa who was the Chief Engineer, Bhakra Canals and Shri R. K. Gupta,
Chief Engineer, who held charge of the post of Director, Central Designs. Both
these officers had signed the design in token of its correctness and approval.
Shri Erry himself was not concerned with the later construction in accordance
with the design. The construction was entrusted to Shri A. G. Kalha,
Superintending Engineer, Bhakra Main Line and his allegation was that it was a
constructional defect which caused loss to the Government and not the design.
The matter was actually investigated by a 'Committee of Enquiry' which consisted
of three Chief Engineers presided over by Shri S. D. Khunger, I.S.E. General
Manager, Bhakra Dam, and in the view of that Committee the defect was not in
the design but in the construction. That finding was questioned by Shri Kalha
and thereupon the Government set up a high-powered Commission presided over by
Mr. Justice Dulat. Mr. Justice Dulat held, contrary to the finding of the
Committee of Enquiry, that the damage to the Ghaggar Syphon was due to faulty
design and not due to faulty construction. The complaint of Shri Erry is that
in the enquiry before the high-powered Commission of Mr. Justice Dulat he was
not. even called to explain how his design was right and the construction was
wrong. Moreover, he contended it was wrong on the face of it to hold him
responsible for the design when, in fact the design was not the sole creation
of Shri Erry but also of the two high officers Shri Handa and Shri Gupta who
411 had specifically examined and approved the design. It is the grievance of
Shri Erry that while these two officers had retired and had been given their
full pension it was wrong to blame Shri Erry for the defect, if any. Indeed,
the High Court could not possibly have undertaken an investigation into the
blameworthiness of Shri Erry in the Writ Petition. But it is obvious that the
finding of Mr. Justice Dulat that there was a fault in the design and not in
the construction was a finding arrived at without giving an opportunity to the
petitioner to explain. In other words.
if the defect in the design of the Syphon was
the sole reason for making a cut in the pension, Shri Erry would be justified
in his contention that Such a finding would have been appropriate only if his
explanation had been obtained by Mr. Justice Dulat in the Course of the enquiry
or by the State Government before the cut was imposed.
So far as Shri Mehta is concerned the State
Government also gave an indication indication in para 5 of its written
statement that Shri Mehta was involved involved ill Some official
irregularities and these had attracted the comments of the Public Accounts
Committee. We do not know what were the findings and whether those findings
were arrived at after notice to Shri Mehta.
So far the third officer namely Khaushal
Singh is concerned Government stated in para 4 of its written statement that
the State Government had Suffered a loss of Rs. 11,399.50 p. on account of
irrecoverable fertilizer loss issued by Shri Khaushal Singh to bogus persons
and also a further loss of Rs. 12,770,/on account of irregularities committed
by the petitioner in the purchase of seed in the year 1959. It does not appear
that the State Government had instituted any enquiry into these losses with a
view to bring home the guilt to Shri Khaushal Singh.
The above allegations in respect of all the
three officers concerned are undoubtedly serious. But they have remained mere
allegations. The officers could have been properly charged for their
delinquency. This was not done either when they were in service or after they
retired. Were these matters taken into account, as the State Government claims
to have done before the imposition of the cut, it would have beer) fair to have
given an opportunity to the officers to put forward their defence before
depriving them of a large share in their pensionable benefits which.
as we have already seen, are not mere bounty
but property to which they were entitled.
It was also alleged by the State Government
in the written statements that apart from the major defaults referred to above.
the records of all the three officers showed that their careers were nor
altogether satisfactory and here and there were draw 9--L498Sup.Cl/73 412 that
he was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar for a year in 1953 and in the
case of Shri Mehta he had been superseded by his juniors on a number of
occasions. At the same time it cannot be ignored that in spite of some small setbacks
here and there in their long official career these officers earned promotions
and were selected on merit to fill high offices. Shri Erry started as an
Assistant Engineer in Class It service and in due course was promoted as
Executive Engineer in Class I service. At the end of his career lie was
appointed as a Superintending Engineer, the post being a selection post.
Similar is the case with Shri Mehta. The latter has pointed out that as early
as 6-4-1951 Government had framed rules for the preparation of a ranking list
in respect of the selection posts and under the rules no person could get a
selection post unless he was fit and his record of service was satisfactory. He
contended that the very fact that he got the selection post of Superintending
Engineer on 11-3-1959 showed that he was fit and his record of service was
Shri Khaushal Singh started his career as an
Agriculture Assistant in 1927 in class III Service and in 1955 was promoted to
a class 11 post and appointed the District Agriculture Officer. He was
confirmed in that post and also officiated for sometime as the Deputy Director
of Agriculture. When the career of an officer is assessed as a whole the fact
that an officer, though with some impediments in his long career, has obtained
Successive promotions to higher and yet higher posts may well raise the
question whether the State Government, at the time of granting him pension
which is normally determined by the years of service and the last pay he
receives at the end of his career, would be entitled to forfeit rights acquired
by length of service on the ground that faults, which, at the time, were either
overlooked or condoned had now become so rave as to justify punishing him by
inflicting a severe cut in the pension. It is not necessary for us to deal with
this point here except to suggest that this aspect of the case could well have
been urged by the officers before the Government if notice had been issued to
them to show cause against the proposed cut and the State Government would have
had necessarily to apply its mind to that question.
In short it must be conceded that though the
State Government may have had some material before it for imposing a penalty by
way of a cut in the pension it had failed to give a reasonable opportunity to
the officers to put forward their defence or facts in extenuation before the
cut was imposed. The case of Ridge v. Baldwin(1) comes to mind in this
connection. Baldwin who was the Chief Constable of the borough police force was
prose(1)  A.C. 40.
413 cuted on grave charges. Donovan J, the
trial Judge made, while acquitting him, some observations about his moral
incompetence to afford leadership to the police force.
Acting on this severe criticism by a Judge of
the High Court the Watch Committee. entitled under Section 191. of the
Municipal Corporations Act 1882 to dismiss him on a charge of unfitness,
dismissed him from service. This dismissal practically at the end of his
official career had the consequence of depriving him of his pension. The House
of Lords held that the order had to be set aside because Baldwin was not
afforded an opportunity to defend himself, though the statute itself did not
require any such opportunity being given.
The question for our consideration now is
whether the orders imposing a cut in the pension should be set aside for the
reason that the officers were not given reasonable opportunity to show cause.
The law on the point is not in doubt. Where a body or authority is judicial or
where it has to determine a matter involving rights judicially because of
express or implied provision, the principle of natural justice audi ailteram
partem applies. See Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani & others(1)
and Board of High School & Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad v.
Ghanshyam Das Gupta and others (2). With the
proliferation of administrative decisions in the welfare State it is now
further recognised by courts both in En-land and in this country, (especially
after the decision of House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwi that where a body or
authority is characteristically administrative the principle of natural justice
is also liable to be invoked if the decision of that body or authority affects
individual rights of interests.
and having regard to the particular situation
it would be unfair for the body or authority not to have allowed a reasonable
opportunity to be heard. See : State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei &
Ors.(3) and In re H. K. [An Infant(4)]. In the former case it was observed it
page 628 as follows "An order by the State to the prejudice of a person in
derogation of his vested rights may be made only in accordance with the basic
rules of justice and fair play. The deciding authority. it is true, is not in
the position of a Judge called upon to decide an action between contesting
parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure may not be
insisted upon. He is however under a duty to give the person against whom 'in
enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence and an
opportunity to correct or to controvert any evidence in the possession of the
authority (1)  S.C.R. 621 (725) (2)  Sup. (3) S.C.R. 3.
(3)  (2) S.C.R. 625.
(4)  2 Q.B.D. 617.
414 which is sought to be relied upon to his
prejudice. For that purpose the person against whom an enquiry is held must be
informed of the case he is called upon to meet and the evidence in support
thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be
passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies
of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil
consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of Our Constitutional set up
that ever), citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the
State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would therefore arise from the
very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to
be super-added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a
person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If
the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person
is made the order is nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and
importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular
case." These observations were made with reference to an authority which
could be described as characteristically administrative. page 630 it was
"It is true that the order is
administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves
civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules
of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the
State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the
first respondent of being heard and meeting Or explaining the evidence."
This case And the English case in re H. K. (An Infant) were specifically
referred to with approval in a decision of the constitution bench of this Court
in A. K. Kraipak & Ors..
etc. v. Union of India & Ors(1).
It is, therefore, clear that the State in the
case of these three officers could not have applied a cut in the pension of the
officers without giving them a reasonable opportunity to make their defense.
The rule which declares that even an administrative authority has to act fairly
after giving an opportunity to the person rights and interests are affected by
its decision is no more than an extension of the wellknown rule which courts in
England had recognised in the 19th century. In Cooper v. Wandsworth (1) 
1 S.C.R. 457.
415 Board of Works(1) the Board, which had,
under the Act of 1855, the authority to demolish any building constructed if
the owner thereof had failed to give proper notice, was held bound to give the
owner an opportunity of being heard before the demolition, It was contended in
that case by the Board that their discretion to order demolition was not a
judicial discretion. But the court decided unanimously in favour of the owner.
Erle C. J. held that the power was subject to a qualification repeatedly
recognised that no mean is to be deprived of his property without his having an
opportunity of being heard. and that this had been applied "to many
exercises of power which in common understanding would not be at all a more
judicial proceeding than would be the act of the district board in ordering a
house to be pulled down." Wills. J. observed: "that the rule was of
universal application, and founded upon the plainest principles of
justice." In the case before us the officers are being deprived of part of
their property by applying a cut to the pension. Therefore, it was quite
essential in all fairness and elementary justice that they should have been
given reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action.
Reference was made on behalf of the State to
M. Narasimha v.
The State of Mysore(2) and particularly the
following observations at page 889. "Next the appellant contends that as
his pension has been reduced to two-thirds, he was entitled to notice in view
of the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, before the Government
decided to inflict that punishment on him and that this was not done in the
notice dated December 30, 1954. It is enough to say that this contention is
also baseless. Article 311 (2) does not deal with the question of pension at
all; it deals with three situations, namely (i) dismissal, (ii) removal, and
(iii) reduction in rank. The appellant says that the reduction in pension is
equivalent to reduction in rank.
All that we need say is that reduction in
rank applies to a case of a public servant who is expected to serve after the reduction.
It has 'nothing to do with reduction of pension, which is specifically provided
for in Art. 302 of the Regulations. That article says that if the service has
not been thoroughly satisfactory the authority sanctioning the pension should
make such reduction in the amount as it thinks proper. There is a Note under
this article, which says that ',he full pension admissible under the
Regulations is not to be given as a matter of course but rather to be treated
as a matter of distinction. It was under this article that the Government acted
when it reduced the pension to two-thirds. Reduction in person being a matter
of discretion with the Government, it carrier therefore be said that it
committed any breach of the Result (1)  14 C,13,N.S,. 180.
(2)  1 S.C.R.
416 in reducing the pension of the
appellant." Particular reference was made to the last two or three
sentences in the above observations for the contention that payment of pension
was a matter of discretion with the Government. It is enough to say that the
question did not arise in the case as to whether pension is bounty or property.
In that case the appellant M. Narasimhachar had been charged in respect of
seven irregularities committed by him when he held the post. An enquiry was
held and six of the irregularities were found proved. A final notice was served
on him to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired and 50 % of his
pension should not be adjusted towards the amount clue from him on account of
the shortage caused by the irregularities. He did not show cause. In the
meantime he reached the age of superannuation and the Government passed an
order directing that he be retired from service from the date on which had
reached superannuation and given a reduced pinion of two-thirds to which he
would be ordinarily entitled in view of the irregularities committed by him.
One of his contentions was that Article 311(2) applied to his case and,
therefore, lie was entitled to a notice before his pension was reduced to
two-thirds. To that the answer was that Article 311(2) did not apply to him
and. under Article 302 of the Regulations his pension was liable to be reduced
Lit Government's discretion. He had known what the charges there against him
and what punishment was proposed to be inflicted upon him. Therefore, lie was
not in a position to come that his pension was reduced without notice to him.
In the result we hold that the three writ
petitions were correctly decided by the High Court and the appeals must fail.
They are dismissed with costs.
K. B. N. Appeals dismissed.