Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam
@ Brijram & Ors  INSC 227 (30 November 1973)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
CITATION: 1974 AIR 471 1974 SCR (2) 544 1974
SCC (1) 242
F 1974 SC 994 (103) RF 1975 SC2130 (3,4) R
1978 SC 952 (2,3,4) F 1987 SC1986 (13,20) E 1990 SC1725 (18)
Bombay Rent Act, 1947, Ss. 12 and
13-Compromise decree for eviction-When may be passed.
The respondent-landlord instituted a suit
under the Bombay Rent Act for possession against the appellant-tenant on two
grounds, namely, arrears in payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the
premises for personal use and occupation.
A compromise decree was passed. When the
appellant applied for execution of the decree, the appellant contended inter
alia that the compromise decree had been passed by the Rent Court without
satisfying itself as to the existence of grounds of eviction under the Act and
hence, being a nullity, was not executable. The Executing Court accepted the
contention. In appeal, the appellate Court set aside the dismissal and remanded
the matter holding that there were admissions in the compromise itself from
which the Court could be satisfied about the existence of both the statutory
grounds for eviction alleged in the plaint. A revision to the High Court was
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : (1) The public policy permeating this
Act is the protection of tenants against unreasonable eviction.
Construing the provisions of s.12,13 and 28
of the Act in the light of this policy, it should be held that the Rent Court
under the Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in
invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is decors the Act
or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned
in s. 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the. exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent
Court. Parties, by their consent cannot confer jurisdiction on the Rent Court
to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do.
[550C-E] Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand, 12 Guj.
Law Reporter 1012, approved.
Barton v. Fiacham,  2 K. B. 291 at 299,
(2) The fact that 0. 23 r. 3, C.P.C., is
applicable to the proceedings does not remove. that fetter or empower the Rent
Court to make a decree for eviction dehors the statute.
Even under that provision the Court, before
ordering that the compromise be recorded, is required to satisfy itself about
the lawfulness of the agreement. Such lawfulness or otherwise of the agreement
is to be judged also on the ground whether terms of the compromise are
consistent with the provisions of the Rent Act. [551 A-C] (3) But, if at the
time of the passing of the decree there was some material before the Court on
the basis of which the Court could prima facie be satisfied about the existence
of a statutory ground for eviction, it win be presumed that the court was so
satisfied and the decree for eviction, though passed on the basis of the
compromise would be valid.
Such material may be in form of evidence
recorded or produced or it may be partly or wholly be in the shape of express
or implied admissions made in the compromise agreement. Admissions if true and
clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted especially when they are
judicial admissions admissible under s. 58, Evidence Act.
[552F-H] In the present case, because of the
admission to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the contractual rate
and the withdrawing of his application for fixation of standard rent, there was
no dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent, and there was an
admission that the rent was in arrears. The admission of these material facts
constitute a ground for eviction under s. 12 (3)(a). [553BD] Bahadur Singh v.
Muni Subrat Dass,  2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K. L. Bansal,
 2 S.C.R. 1048, and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal, . 3 S.C.C. 181,
545 K. K. Chari v. B. M. Seshadri,  1
S.C.R. 761, followed.
Jeshwant Raj Mulukchand v. Anandilal Bapalal,
 2, S.C.R. 350, distinguished.
(4) Further the Executing Court is not
competent to go behind the decree if the decree on the face of it discloses
some material on the basis of which the rent court could be satisfied with
regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. If on the face of
it the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional
fact, the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to
ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial
court's jurisdiction to pass the decree. The moment it finds that prima facie
such material existed its task is complete, and it was not competent to go
behind the decree and question its validity. [553G-554B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2479 (N) of 1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and
order dated the 26th October 1972 of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad in
Civil Revision Application No. 1254 of 1972.
S. K. Dholakia, for the appellant.
P. H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.-Whether the decree dated September 23, 1964, passed by the Trial
Judge in Regular Suit No. 6 of 1963, filed under the Bombay Rent Control Act,
1947 (for short, called Bombay Rent Act) directing the eviction of the
appellant is a nullity and, as such, in executable, is the only question that
falls for decision in this appeal by special leave. It arises out of these
Appellant was a tenant of the premises at
Ward No. 3, Nondh No. 1823/9 in the Salabatpur area of Surat. He was in arrears
of rent since 16-10-1961. On 16-11-1962, the landlords (respondents herein)
served a notice on the appellant terminating his tenancy and also requiring him
to pay the arrears of rent. On 2-1-1964, the landlords instituted the suit in
the Court at Surat for possession against the tenant on two grounds, namely :
(i) non-payment of rent in arrears for a
period of more than one year, (ii) bona fide requirement of the premises by the
landlords for their own use and occupation.
The rate of contractual rent was Rs. 151per
month. On 23-9-1964 the parties arrived at a compromise, the terms of which, as
incorporated in the decree, were as under :
"(i) The defendant do hand over
possession of the suit premises by 30-9-1968 without any objection. The tenant
to pay Rs. 532 50 P as arrears of rent and mesne profits upto 30-91964. The
plaintiff is to receive Rs. 380/deposited by the defendant in court and the
remaining amount is to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs on or about
31-121964. The defendant is to pay Rs. 151p.m.
as mesne profits from 1-10-1964.
546 (ii) The relationship of the landlord and
tenant between the parties has come to an end and no such relationship is to be
created by the compromise. The defendant has been given time to vacate the
suit. premises by way of grace. If the defendant fails to comply with the
aforesaid terms of the decree, the plaintiffs would be entitled to execute the
decree both for the decretal amount' as well as for possession of the suit
(iii) If the plaintiffs get for the defendant
the lease of the premises bearing Nondh No. 1602 of Ward No. 3 on a monthly rent
50/the defendant is to hand over the
possession of the suit premises immediately.
(v) The parties are to bear their own
costs." On 12-1-1968, the landlords filed a petition for execution of the
decree. It was dismissed as premature. The tenant having failed to pay Rs.
152/50 i.e. the balance of arrears.
by the agreed date, the decree-holders on
17-1-1968, again took out execution for the recovery of the said amount.
Thereafter, on 3-10-1968, the landlords filed
the second petition torecover possession of the suit premises in execution of
The tenant admitted that he had, according to
the compromise, agreed to give possession on 30-9-1968, but added that in 1968
A.D., the ground floor of the premises had become submerged in flood waters,
and thereupon the decree-holders seeing his (tenant's) plight, orally agreed to
allow him to continue in the premises on payment of a monthly rent of Rs. 151-.
and thus the decree had been adjusted and satisfied. Subsequently, by another
application, the judgment debtor raised an objection that since the decree had
been passed by the Court without satisfying itself as to the existence of a
ground of eviction under the Bombay Rent Act, it was a nullity, and as such,
The executing court (Joint Civil Judge,
Surat) rejected the story of adjustment and satisfaction of the decree, but
accepted the other objection holding that the decree was void because "the
Court did not apply its mind while allowing it under s. 13 (1) (j), Rent Act".
With regard to the second ground it was said that it had ceased to exist
because "under the terms of compromise the default in payment of rent was
waived and the defendant was given time to pay up to 30-9-68". In the
result, the execution was dismissed.
From the order of the executing court, the
decree-holders carried an appeal to the Extra Assistant Judge, Surat, who held
that there was ample material in the shape of admissions in the compromise,
itself, from which the court could be satisfied about the existence of both the
statutory grounds or eviction alleged in the plaint. He, therefore, set aside
the dismissal of the execution and remanded the case to the executing court
"to be dealt with in accordance with law". Aggrieved by that order of
the Extra Assistant Judge, the tenant preferred a 547 revision petition in the
High Court of Gujarat,. The revision was dismissed in limine by an order dated
26-101972, against which this appeal by special leave has been filed.
Mr. Dholakia, learned Counsel for the appellant,
contends that in view of public policy which underlies all Rent Control Acts,
including the Bombay Rent Act, no decree or order of eviction can be passed
unless the Rent Court or Tribunal is satisfied, on the oasis of extrinsic
material as to the existence of all the essential facts constituting a
statutory ground for eviction. It is stressed that in the instant case the
material, if any, preceding the decree or even the so-called admission of the
rent being in arrears in the compromise itself, was far too insufficient to
make out a ground for eviction under s. 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act.
Clause (a) of s. 12(3), proceeds the
argument, could not cover the case because the tenant had deposited the rent
due upto the date of the suit and had also made an application for fixation of
standard rent; and clause (b) of the same sub-section did not apply because no
interim standard rent had been fixed by the Court. As regards the ground of
bona fide personal requirement of the land-lords, it is urged that there was
not even a scintilla of material from which the satisfaction of the court as to
the existence of a ground under s. 13 could be spelled out. The decree,
concludes the Counsel, being based solely on the consent of the patties, was a
nullity, and was directly hit by the rule laid down by this Court in Bahadur
Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass;(1) Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K. L. Bansal(2) and Ferozi
Lal fain v. Man Mal (3). Learned Counsel has further attempted to distinguish
this Court's decision in K. K.
Chari v. R. M. Seshadri (4) on the ground
that there was documentary and oral evidence of the plaintiff which not been
challenged in cross-examination, from which the statutory ground of the
premises being required by the landlord for bona fide personal occupation, had
been fully made out. Reference has also been made to Jeshwant Rai Mulukchand v.
Anandilal Bapalal(5) and Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand(6).
On the other hand, Mr. Parekh, learned
Counsel for the respondents, has canvassed three principal contentions: (i) The
appeal should be dismissed on the preliminary ground that there is no equity in
this case in favour of the appellant who has, in spite of the ample time
granted to him, contumaciously failed to comply with the decree and surrender
possession even five years after the expiry of the agreed date fixed for this
purpose in the decree. Counsel has cited in support of this contention, the
decisions of this Court in A. M. Allison V. R. L. Sen (7) and Shri Balwantrai
Chimanlal Trivedi v. M. N. Nagreshna and ors. (8) (ii) The principle laid down
by (1)  2. S.C.R. 432.(2)  2, S.C.R. 1048.
(3)  3. S.C.C. 181.(4)  1, S.C.C.
(5)  2. S.C.R. 350.(6) 12, Guj. Law
(7)  S.C.R. 359. (8)  1, S.C.R.
548 this Court in the cases relied upon by
Mr. Dholakia, is not applicable to a compromise decree passed under the Bombay
Rent Act because:
(a) The provisions of s. 13 of the Delhi and
Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, 1952 (for short, Delhi Rent Act) and s. 10 of the
Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (for short Madras Rent
Act), on the interpretation of which the said decisions are based, are
materially different from ss.
12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act;
(b) by virtue of Rule 8 of the Bombay Rent
Act Rules, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, including 0.23, Rule
3, which gives a mandate to the court to pass a decree in terms of a
compromise, are applicable to suits under the Bombay Rent Act, but the
application of the Code to proceedings before the Rent Controller Tribunal
under the Delhi Rent Act or Madras Rent Act has been expressly excluded' In
support of this contention reliance has been placed on Chandan Baj v. Surjan
(1). (iii) Even if the ratio of the said Supreme Court decisions applies to
decrees under the Bombay Rent Act, then also both the statutory grounds for
eviction pleaded in the plaint, had been expressly or impliedly admitted by the
defendant in the compromise, and it will be presumed that in passing the eviction
decree the court was satisfied about the existence of those grounds.
In this view, according to the Counsel, the
instant case will fall within the ratio of Seshadri's case (supra).
At the stage of the final hearing of the
appeal, especially after the learned Counsel for the appellant had addressed us
on merits, we do not propose to go into the preliminary ground urged by Mr.
Parekh. If the decree turns out to be without jurisdiction, this equitable plea
will be of no avail; because equity cannot operate to annul a statute. If the
decree is found to be in conformity with the statute, the appeal will fail on
that ground, alone, and it will be wholly unnecessary to consider the equitable
aspect of the matter.
We, therefore, come straight to the contention
(ii) raised by Mr. Parekh. In order to find out whether or not a decree or
order of eviction can be passed by the Rent Court/Tribunal exercising special
jurisdiction under any of these statutes Delhi Rent Act, Madras Rent Act and
Bombay Rent Act-on a ground which is not one of the statutory grounds of
eviction, it is necessary to have a peep into the historical background of the
Rent Control laws, in general, and a quick look at the broad scheme and
language of the relevant statutory provisions of these Acts.
The strain of the last World War, Industrial
Revolution, the large scale exodus of the working people to urban areas and the
social and political changes brought in their. wake social problems of
considerable magnitude and complexity and their concomitant evils. The country
was faced with spiraling inflation, soaring cost of living, increasing urban
population and scarcity of accommodation. Rack renting and large scale eviction
of tenants under the guise of the ordinary law, exacerbated those conditions
making the economic life (1) A.I.R. 1972 M.P. 106.
549 of the community unstable and insecure.
To tackle these problems and curb these evils, the Legislatures of the States
in India enacted Rent Control legislations.
The preamble of the Bombay Rent Act states
that the object of the Act is "to amend and consolidate the law relating
to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises, of rates of hotels and
lodging houses and of evictions". The language of the preambles of the
Delhi Rent Act and Madras Rent Act is Strikingly similar. The broad policy and
purpose as indicated in their preambles is', substantially the same viz., to
protect tenants against their landlords in respect of the rents, evictions and
repairs. With the same beneficent end in view, all the three Acts interfere
with contractual tenancies and make provisions for fixation of fair and
standard rents, or protection against eviction of tenants not only during the
continuance of their contractual tenure but also after its determination. indeed,
the neologism " statutory tenant" has come into existence because of
this protective policy which is common to all enactments of this kind. Further,
all the three Acts create Courts/Tribunals of special and exclusive
jurisdiction for the enforcement of their provisions.
Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act which
begins with a non obstante clause, specifies Courts which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and
a tenant inter alia relating to (a) recovery of rent of any premises;(b)
recovery of possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II
The words "to which the provisions of
Part II apply" are significant. They indicate that the exclusive
jurisdiction for recovery of possession is to be exercised when the provisions
of Part II, which include ss. 12 and 13, apply.
All these three Acts lay down specific
grounds more or less similar, on which a decree or order of eviction can be
passed by the Rent Court or the Tribunal exercising exclusive jurisdiction. In
the Delhi Rent Act, such grounds are specified in a consolidated form under s.
13, while the same thing has been split up into two and provided in two
sections (12 and 13) in the Bombay Rent Act which represent the negative and
positive parts of the same pattern. Taken together, they are exhaustive of the
grounds on which the Rent Court is competent to pass a decree of possession.
Similarly, in the Madras Rent Act, the
grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, are given in ss. 10, 14 to 16.
Section 13 of the Delhi Rent Act starts with
a non-obstante clause viz., "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery
of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the
landlord against any tenant.......... Likewise, s. 10(1) of the Madras Rent Act
starts with the clause, "a tenant shall not be evicted whether in
execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of
this section or sections 14 to 16." 550 It will thus be seen that the
Delhi Rent Act and the Madras Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the
Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not
any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant sections of those statutes.
Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not
travel beyond the statutory grounds mentioned in ss. 12 and 13, and to the
parties that they shall not contract out of those statutory grounds, is
inherent, in the public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act).
In Rasiklal Chunilal's case (supra), a
Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court has taken the view that in spite of
the fact that there is no express provisions in the Bombay Rent Act prohibiting
contraction, out, such a prohibition would have to be read by implication
consistently with the public policy underlying this welfare measure. If we may
say so with respect, this is a correct approach to the problem.
Construing the provisions of ss. 12,13 and 28
of the Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeates the
entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion
that the Rent Court under this Act is not competent to pass a decree for
Possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground
which is de hours the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the
statutory grounds mentioned in ss.
12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under these provisions. Even parties cannot
by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something
which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do.
In the view we take, we are fortified by the
ratio of the decision in Barton v. Fincham(1). Therein the Court of Appeal was
considering the scheme of the Rent Restrictions Act, 1920, the language of S. 5
of which was similar to s.
13 of the Delhi Rent Act. In that context,
Atkin L. J.
stated the law on the point thus :
"The section appears to me to limit
definitely the jurisdiction of the Courts in making ejectment orders in the
case of premises to which the Act applies. Parties cannot by agreement give the
Courts jurisdiction which the Legislature has enacted they are not to have.
If the parties before the Court admit that
one of the events has happened which give the Court jurisdiction, and there is
no reason to doubt the bona fides of the admission, the Court is under no
obligation to make further inquiry as to the question of fact; but apart from
such an admission the Court cannot give effect toan agreement, whether by way
of compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act."
It is true that in Barton's case just as in Seshadri's case (supra), the
statute under consideration expressly prohibited the Court from passing a
decree on a ground which was not covered by the statute but (1) (1921] 2, K.B.
291 at 299.
551 the principle equally applicable to cases
under statutes which place such 'a 'fetter on the jurisdiction of the Court, by
The mere fact that Order 23, Rule 3. of the
Code of Civil Procedures applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the
Bombay Rent Act, does not remove that fetter on the Rent Court or empower it to
make a decree for eviction de hors the statute. Even under that. Provision of
the Code, the Court, before ordering that the compromise be recorded, is
required to satisfy itself about the lawfulness of the agreement. Such
lawfulness or otherwise of the agreement is. to be judged, also on the ground
whether the terms of the compromise are consistent with the provisions of the
In view of what has been said above, it is
clear that the general principles enunciated by this Court in cases referred to
by the learned Counsel for the appellant, are a relevant guide for determining
whether in a particular case the consent decree for. possession passed by the
Court under the Bombay Rent Act is or is not a nullity. But the case in hand is
not in line with Bahadur Singh's case, Kaushalaya Devi's case and Ferozi Lal
Jain's case (supra). On facts, they are distinguishable from the instant case.
In those cases, there was absolutely no material, extrinsic or intrinsic to the
consent decree on the basis of which the Court could be satisfied as to the
existence of a statutory ground for eviction.
The case before us falls well nigh within the
ratio of Seshadri's case (supra). Therein, K. K. Chari, who was under an
eviction order,, purchased the suit premises in the same city for his
occupation. Seshadri was then the tenant of the suit premises under the vendor,
and after the purchase, he attuned in favour of the appellant and had been
paying rent to him. Chari issued notices under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, terminating the tenancy of Seshadri. Since Seshadri did not surrender
possession, Chari filed a suit for eviction under s. 10 (3) (a)(i) of the
Madras Act mainly on the ground that be required the premises for his bona fide
use and occupation. Seshadri controverted Chari's claim At the commencement of
the enquiry, Chari was examined before the Court. He particularly testified how
he had purchased the house for his own occupation. He also filed a number of
documents to establish that the requirement of premises for his own occupation
was true. Seshadri did not prefer to crossexamine Chari, About 11/2 months
thereafter, both the parties entered into a compromise in these terms :
"(1) The respondent hereby withdraws his
defence in the aforesaid petition and submits to a decree for eviction
(2) The respondent prays that time for
vacating upto June 5, 1969, might please be given and the petitioner agrees to
(3) The respondent agrees to vacate the
petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to
the petitioner on or before the said date 552 viz. June 5, 1969, without fail
under any circumstances and undertakes not to apply for extension of time.
(4) It is agreed by both the parties that
this memo of compromise-is executable as a Decree of Court." The Court,
after referring to the petition of the landlord being under s. 10 (3)(a)(i), of
the Act on the ground of his own occupation, passed the following order
"Compromise memo filed and recorded. By consent eviction is ordered
granting time to vacate till June 5, 1969. No costs." The aforesaid terms
of the compromise were also incorporated in the order. After distinguishing the
former three cases viz.
Bahadur Singh's case, Kaushalaya Devi's case
and Ferozi Lal Jain's case, Vaidialingam J.
speaking for himself and Dua J. (comprising
majority) enunciated the law on the point, thus :
"The true position appears to be that an
order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if
the jurisdictional fact viz., the existence of one or more of the conditions
mentioned in Section 10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the
Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt
a prerequisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation
borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to
apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it,
before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it
is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on
which the order of eviction was based................ If the tenant in fact
admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the
statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that
admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without
further enquiry." From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the
principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree,
there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court
could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for
eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree
for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be
valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced
in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or
implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself, Admissions, if true
and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in
pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under s. 58 of the Evidence Act,
made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand
on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions
are fully binding on the party that makes them and 553.
constitute a waiver of proof. They by
themselves can be made them. foundation of the rights of the parties On the
other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as
evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive.
They can be shown to be wrong.
We do not find any force in the contention of
Mr. Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the compromise, itself were
insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in s.
12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act, merely because the tenant had made an
application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at the time
of passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne
profits at the rate of Rs. 15/per month, the tenant had clearly withdrawn or
abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the
compromise was thus an admission of the material facts which constituted a
ground for eviction under s. 12 (3) (a).
Rent was admittedly payable by the month;
since the application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn, there was no
dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent.
Further, the rent was admittedly in arrears
for a period of more than six months; so much so that in the present case, the
tenant had neglected to pay the balance of arrears, amounting to Rs. 152/50,
even long after the decree and the landlord was compelled to recover the same
The case of Jeshwant Rai Mulukchand (supra) ,
cited by Mr. Dholakia, does not advance his stand. In that case, there was a
serious ,dispute regarding the amount of standard rent. Though the final order
of standard rent was passed by the Court of Small Causes, neither the landlord
nor the tenant accepted the determination and each side questioned the amount
by filing Revision Petitions. In the present case, however, no dispute
regarding the standard rent was, subsisting at the time of compromise. That
dispute was Put an end to by the compromise itself.
Be that as it may, in cases where an
objection as to the non-excitability of the decree on the ground of its being a
nubility, is taken, the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the
decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis
of which, the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a
statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the
decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the
existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the Executing Court may look
to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any
material furnishing a foundation for the trial court's. jurisdiction to pass
the decree it did.
The moment it finds that prima facie such
material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go
further and question the presumed or expressed finding, 554 of the trial court
on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some
material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have-as distinguished from
must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court
sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court.
Since in the instant case, there was a clear
admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree, of the fundamental
facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under. s. 12 (3) (a), the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails
and is dismissed with costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.