S. Narayanaswami Vs. G. Pannerselvam
& Ors [1972] INSC 105 (12 April 1972)
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) GROVER, A.N.
RAY, A.N.
PALEKAR, D.G.
CITATION: 1972 AIR 2284 1973 SCR (1) 172 1972
SCC (3) 713
CITATOR INFO:
E 1973 SC 38 (11,19) F 1977 SC2328 (11) R
1978 SC 897 (7) RF 1980 SC1896 (103) R 1981 SC1274 (11) R 1992 SC 96 (14)
ACT:
Constitution of India 1950, Arts. 171 to 173
and Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) s. 6-Candidate from
Graduates' constituency to Legislative Council-If should be a graduate.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent challenged the appellant
selection to the Madras Legislative, Council from the Madras District
Graduates' Constituency on the grounds, (1) that, the purpose of Art. 171 of
the Constitution was to confer a right of functional representation upon
persons possessing certain educational or other qualifications so that the
appellant who was not a graduate could not be elected to the Legislative
Council from the Graduates' Constituency; (2) that, it would be absurd and
destructive of the concept of representation that an individual, who did not
possess the essential or basic qualification of the electors, should be their
representative, and (3), that, the Constitution, being an organic instrument, must
be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner so as to give effect to the
underlying principles and purposes of the system of representation sought to be
embodied in it.
The High Court set aside the election.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) (a) Graduates are not an
occupational or vocational group, but merely a body of persons with particular
educational qualifications. It would, therefore, not be correct to describe the
additional representation sought to be given to them in the Legislative Council
as an attempt to introduce functional or vocational representation. [181B] (b)
The qualifications of the elector constituting the electorate, and of those who
can represent each electorate, contemplated by the Constitution and
supplemented by Parliament, are separately set out for each House. As regards
the Legislative Council, the qualifications for the four electorates are
indicated in Art. 171 (3) (a), (b), (c) and (d). The plain and ordinary meaning
of the term "electorate is that it is the body of persons who elect. It
does not take in the extended notion of a body of persons electing
representatives from amongst themselves. It does not impose a requirement that
the person to be chosen must also be a member of the electorate. [177D-F] (c)
The qualifications of candidates for seats in the Council are given in s. 6 of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951. While a member of the Legislative
Assembly should also be an elector in the constituency from which he stands,
the member of the Legislative Council is not so required to be a member of the
electorate. All that is required is that the person to be chosen as a member of
the Legislative Council should be an elector for an Assembly constituency in
the State to whose Legislative Council he is chosen. [179E] (d) Whatever may
have been the opinions of the Constitution makes or their advisors it is not
possible to say, on a perusal of Art. 171, that the Second Chamber found here
were meant to provide for functional 173 or vocational representation. AR that
can be inferred is that additional representation or weight age was given to
persons possessing special types of knowledge and experience by enabling them
to elect their special representatives.
The concept of such representation does not
carry with it the further notion that, the representative must also possess the
very qualifications of those he represents. The High Court erroneously
travelled outside the four corners of the statutory provisions when there was
no ambiguity at all in the language, and by resorting to a presumed legislative
intent, it added a qualification to those expressly laid down in the
Constitution and other statutory provisions. [1 80F] Davies Jankins & Co.
v. Davies, 1967 (2) W.L.R. p. 1139 (a_) 1156, inferred to.
2(a) Article 171 is designed only to give a
right to choose their representatives to those who have certain types of
presumably valuable knowledge and education. If the presumption of their better
competence to elect a suitable representative is there, it would be for the
members of such a constituency themselves to decide whether a person who stands
for election from their constituency possesses the right type of knowledge-,
experience and wisdom. The Constitution makers, acting on such a presumption,
may have intentionally left the educational qualifications of candidate for
election from the Graduates Constituency unspecified.
[181C] (b) It could not possibly be said that
the question to be dealt with was not known to the legislators. The provisions
of law show that the qualifications of the electors as well as of those to be
elected were matters to which the attention of the law makers, both in the
Constituent Assembly and in Parliament, was specifically directed. Hence, the
omission must have been deliberate. [181G] R. v. Cleworth, (1864) 4 BSS 927 and
Craies on Statute Law6th Edn. 1963 72, referred to.
(c) The legislative history of the Article
also shows that the omission by the Constitution makers or by Parliament, to
prescribe graduation as a qualification of the candidate from the Graduates'
constituency, was deliberate. The provisions of the Government of India
(Provincial Legislative Assemblies) Order, 1936, prescribing the qualifications
of persons to be chosen from special constituencies set up for representation
in the Legislative Councils under the Government of India Act, 1935, indicate
that it was invariably expressly provided where it was so intended, that a
necessary qualification of a candidate for a seat was that he should be
entitled to vote for the choice of a member to fill it. Such a qualification
was not left to mere implication. [181H-182E] (3) It is true that a
constitution should be interpreted in a broad and generous spirit, but the rule
of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation could not
altogether be abandoned. The object of interpretation is to discover the
intention of the law makers, and this object can obviously be best achieved by
first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions. A logical
corollary of the rule of literal interpretation is that a statute may not be
extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not
been made; and an application of this rule necessarily involves that addition
to, or modification of, words used in statutory provisions is not generally
permissible. Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity.
[175D] Sri Ram Narain Medhi & Ors. v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R.
1959 S.C. 459; British India General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v.Captain 174 itbar Singh & Ors., [1960] 1 S.C.R. 168;
R. C. Jacob v. Union of India, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 800; State of Madhya Pradesh v.
M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. & Anr. A.I.R. 1967 S.C.
276; Hira Devi v. District Board,
Shabiahanpur, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 362 & 365, referred to.
From the language as well as the legislative
history of Arts. 171 and 173 of the Constitution and s. 6 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951, it could be presumed that the omission of the
qualification that the representative of graduate should also be a graduate was
deliberate. By presuming such an intention of the law makers, no absurdity
results. By adding 'deemed to be necessary' or 'implied' qualification of a
representative of the graduates, which the Constitution makers or Parliament
could easily have imposed, the Court would be invading the legislative sphere.
[183F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 189 of
1971.
Appeal under Section 116-A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated
January 8, 1971 of the Madras High Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 1970.
V. P. Raman and Vineet Kumar, for the
appellant.
Jagdish Swarup, Socilitor-General of India,
B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for the Election Commission of India.
B. Sen and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the Supreme
Court Bar Association.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Beg, J. This is an appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of People
Act, 1951. The appellant's election, held on 11-4-1970, to the Madras
Legislative Council from the Madras District Graduates' Constituency was set
aside by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court who decided all the issues
except one in favour of the appellant. The only issue decided against the
appellant, which is now before us, was framed as follows :
"Whether the first Respondent was not
qualified to stand for election to the Graduates Constituency on all or any of
the grounds set out by the petitioner in paragraph 7 to 9 of the election
Petition" ? Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the election petition against the appellant
are lengthy, prolix, and argumentative. The case and the contentions of the
Respondent G. Panneerselvam, the petitioner before the High Court, which were
accepted by the High Court, may be summarised as follows Firstly, the whole
purpose of Article 171 of the Constitution was to confer a right of
"functional representation" upon persons possessing certain
educational or other qualifications so that the Appellant Narayanaswami, who
had only passed the High School Leaving Examination and was not a Graduate, could
not be elected 175 at all to the Legislative Council from the Graduates'
Constituency; secondly, it would be absurd and destructive of the very concept
of representation of especially qualified persons that an individual who does
not possess the essential or basic qualification of the electors should be a
representative of those who are to be represented because of this special
qualification of theirs; and, thirdly, the Constitution, being an organic
instrument for the governance of the land, must be interpreted in a
particularly broad and liberal manner so as to give effect to the underlying
principles and purposes of the system of representation sought to be set up by
it and not in such a way as to defeat them. Hence, the educational
qualification of the electors should be read into the system of representation
set up by the Constitution for Legislative, Councils as a necessary
qualification of candidates in such constituencies.
Authorities are certainly not wanting which
indicate that Courts should interpret in a broad and generous spirit the
document which contains the fundamental law of the land or the basic principles
of its Government. Nevertheless, the rule of "plain meaning or
"literal" interpretation, described in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes
as "the primary rule", could not be altogether abandoned today in
interpreting any document. Indeed, we find Lord Evershed, M.R., saying:
"The length and detail of modern legislation, has undoubtedly reinforced
the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule". (See : Maxwell
on "Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition p. 28). It may be that
the great mass of modem legislation, a large part of which consists of
statutory rules, makes some departure from the literal rule of interpretation
more easily justifiable today than it was in the past, But, the object of
interpretation and of "construction" (which may be broader than
"interpretation") is to discover the intention of the law makers in
every case (See: Crawford on "Statutory Construction" 1940 Ed. para
157, p. 240-242). This object can, obviously, be best achieved by first looking
at the language used in the relevant provisions. Other methods of extracting
the meaning can be resorted to only if the language used is contradictory,
ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results.
This is an elementary and basic rule of
interpretation as well as of construction-processes which, from the point of
view of principles applied, coalesce and converge towards the common purpose of
both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may be
reasonably possible to do this, of what is found laid down. The provisions
whose meaning is under consideration have, therefore, to he examined before
applying any method of construction at all.
To these provisions we may now turn.
Article 168 of our Constitution shows that
the State Legislatures in nine States in India, including Madras, were to
consist of two Houses : the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative, Coun176
cil. Article 170 lays down that the Legislative Assembly of each State
"shall consist of members chosen by direct election from territorial
constituencies in the State, in such a manner as the Parliament may by law
determine".
After that, comes Article 171 which may be
reproduced in to here:
"1.71(1) The total number of members in
the Legislative Council of a State having such a Council shall not exceed one
third of the total number of members in the Legislative Assembly of that
State,:
Provided that the total number of members in
the Legislative Council of a State shall in no case be less than forty.
(2) Until Parliament by law otherwise
provides, the composition of the Legislative Council of a State shall be as
provided in clause (3).
(3) of the total number of members of the
Legislative Council of a State(a) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be
elected by electorates consisting of members of municipalities, district boards
and such other local authorities in the State as Parliament may by law specify;
(b) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth salt be
elected by electorates consisting of persons residing in the State who have
been for at least three years graduates of any university in the territory of
India or have been for at least three years in possession of qualifications
prescribed by or under any-law made by Parliament as equivalent to that of a
graduate of any such university;
(c) as nearly as may be. one-twelfth shall
be, elected by electorates consisting of persons who have been for at least
three years engaged in teaching in such educational institutions within the
State, not lower in standard than that of a secondary school, as may be
prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament;
(d) as nearly as may be, one-third shall be
elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State from amongst
persons who are not members of the Assembly.
(e) the remainder shall be nominated by the
Governor in accordance with the provisions of clause (5). (4) The members to be
elected under sub-clauses(a), (b) and (c) of clause (3) shall be chosen in such
territorial constituencies as may be prescribed by or under any law made by
Parliament,, and the elections under 177 the said sub-clauses and under
sub-clause (d) of the said clause shall be held in accordance with the system
of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.
(5) The members to be nominated by the
Governor under sub clause (2) of clause (3) shall consist of persons having
special knowledge or practical experience in respect of such matters as the
following namely Literature, Science, Art. cooperative movement and social
service." The term "electorate", used in Article 171(3) (a)(b)
& (c) has neither been defined by the Constitution nor in any enactment by
Parliament. Sec. 2(1)(e) of the Representation of People Act 43 of 1951,
however, says :
" 'elector,' in relation to a
constituency means a person whose name is entered in the electoral roll of that
constituency for the time being in force and who is not subject to any of the
disqualifications mentioned in Sec.16 of the Representation of the People Act,
1950".
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term
" electorate" is confined to the body of persons who elect. It does
not contain, within its ambit, the extended notion of a body of persons electing
representatives "from amongst themselves".
Thus, the use of the term "electoral"
in Article 171(3) of our Constitution, could not, by itself, impose a limit
upon the field of choice of members of the electorate by requiring that the
person to be chosen must also be a member of the electorate. The qualifications
of the electors constituting the "electorate" and of those who can
represent each " electorate", contemplated by the constitution and
then supplemented by Parliament, are separately set out for each house. We may
glance at the provisions relating to Legislative Assemblies first.
Section 16 of the Representation of People
Act 43 of 1950 lays down the qualifications of an elector negatively by
prescribing who shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll. A
disqualified person is one who :
(a) is not a citizen of India; or (b) is of
unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; _or (c) is for the
time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any law relating to
corrupt practices and other offences in connection with elections".
Section 19 lays down the two conditions for
registration on the electoral roll of a constituency. The person to be
registered must not be less than 21 years of age on the qualifying date and
must 178 be ordinarily resident in the constituency. The persons so registered,
whose names appear on the electoral roll, constitute the electorato for the
legislative Assembly of each State. Section 5 of the Representation of People
Act, 43 of 1.951 enacts :
"5. Qualifications for membership of a
Legislative Assembly: A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a
seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless(a) in the case of a seat
reserved for the Scheduled Castes or for the Scheduled Tribes of that State, he
is a member of any of those castes or of those tribes, as the case may be, and
is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State;
(b) in the case of a seat reserved for an
autonomous district of Assam, other than a seat the constituency for which
comprises the cantonment and municipality of Shillong, he is a member of a
Scheduled Tribe of any autonomous district and is an elector for the Assembly
constituency in which such seat or any other seat is reserved for that district;
and (c) in the case of any other seat, he is
an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State";
Coming to the Legislative Council, we find
that the qualifications for the four "electorates" are indicated by
Art. 171(3)(a)(b)(c) & (d). And, the qualifications of candidates for seats
in a Legislative Council are given in Section 6 of the Representation of People
Act 43 of 1951 which lays down:
"6. Qualifications for membership of a
Legislative Council.(1) A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a
seat in the Legislative Council of a State to be filled by election unless he
is an elector for any Assembly constituency in that State.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be
chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Council of a State to be filled by
nomination by the Governor unless he is ordinarily resident in the State".
A look at Article 171(2), set out above,
indicates that the composition of the Legislative Council of a State was a
matter to be also provided for by law made by Parliament.
It is evident that the constitution makers
had directed their attention specifically towards the methods of election and
composition of the legislature 179 of each State. They themselves prescribed
same qualifications to be possessed by members of each House of the
Legislature. Article 173 lays down :"173. A person shall not be qualified
to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he(a) is a
citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorised in
that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according to the
form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule;
(b) is, in the case of a seat in the
Legislative Assembly, not less than twentyfive years of age and, in the case of
a seat in the Legislative Council, not less than thirty years of age; and (c)
possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or
under any law made by Parliament".
An important and very noticeable difference
between, qualifications prescribed by Parliament for the membership of a
Legislative Assembly by Section 5 of the Representation of People Act of 1951
and those for the membership of a Legislative Council by Section 6 of that Act
is that, so far as a member of the Legislative Assembly is concerned, he or she
has to be an Elector in the Constituency from which he or she stands, but a
member of a Legislative Council in a State is not, similarly, required to be a
member of the electorate. That entire Parliament says, in Section 6 of the Representation
of People Act, 1951, is that the, person to be chosen as a member of the
Legislative Council has to be "an elector for any Assembly
constituency" in the State to whose legislative Council he was to be
chosen. He has to be "ordinarily resident" in the State to qualify
for nomination. No other qualifications, apart from those found in Article 173
of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act of 1951,
are to be found laid down anywhere. But, an additional qualification was found,
by the judgment under appeal before us, to exist by resorting to a presumed
legislative intent and then. Practically adding it to those expressly laid
down.
It may be possible to look for legislative
intention in materials outside the four-corners of a statute where its language
is really ambiguous or conflicting. But, where no such difficulty arises, the
mere fact that the intentions of the law makers, sought to be demonstrated by
what was said by some of them or by those advising them when the Constitution
was on the anvil, were really different from the result which clearly follows
from language used in the Legislative provisions under consideration, could not
authorise the use of such an exceptional mode of construction. "It is well
accepted", said Lord Morris (See: Davies Jankins & 180 Co. v.
Davies)', "that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of
Parliament cannot make the law".
The judgment under appeal, after discussing
the manner in which Article 171 of the Constitution was framed and the
different views expressed about the nature of the Second Chambers to be set up
by it in our States, says : "The system of functional, which is also
called occupational representation, as distinguished from territorial
representation, was borrowed from the Irish Constitution and that is the
underlying principle in Article 171. The opinion of political thinkers and
statement on the wisdom of such representation may not be unanimous. Whatever
be the divergent views, the accomplished fact in the Constitution is that such
a representation has been given recognition and it has to be implemented. In
making the Legislative Council as a representative body, the framers of the
Constitution have not made it exclusively one of elected representatives according
to their occupations. It is intended to be a heterogeneous and more broad based
body consisting of persons of different walks of life, some elected and some
nominated, each with the experience in his own field of activity". The
learned Judge concluded; "It is with these objects that clauses (a),, (b),
and (c) of Article 171(3) have been conceived so that persons in those walks of
life could make their contribution to the Legislative functions of the State.
Article 1.71 in fixing the composition of the Legislative Council as a
functional chamber. has also indirectly laid down certain qualifications and
also disqualifications of members to be elected there under".
Whatever may have been the opinions of
Constitution makers or of their advisers, whose views are cited in the judgment
under appeal, it is not possible to. say, on a perusal of Article 171 of the
Constitution, that the Second Chambers set up in nine States in India were
meant to incorporate the principle of what is known as "functional"
or "vocational" representation which has been advocated by
Guild-Socialist and Syndicalist Schools of political thought. , Some of the
observations quoted above, in the judgment under appeal itself, militate with
the conclusions reached there. All that we can infer from our Constitutional
provisions is that additional representation or weight age was given to persons
possessing special type of knowledge and experience by enabling them to elect
their special representatives also for Legislative Councils. The concept of such
representation does not carry with it, as a necessary consequence, the further
notion that the representative must also possess the very qualifications of
those he represents.
In the case of the Graduates' constituency,
it is provided in Article 171(3)(b) that the electors must have held their
degrees (1) 1967 2 W.L.R. p. 11 39 @ 11 56.
181 for at least three years before they
become qualified an electors. Thus,. in laying down the test of competence of
voters of such a constituency, more possession of degrees by them was not
considered sufficient. Moreover, graduates are not an occupational or
vocational group but merely a body of persons with an educational
qualification. It would, therefore, not be correct to describe the additional
representation sought to be given to them as an attempt to introduce the
"functional" or "vocational" principle. On the face of it,
Article 171 appears to be designed only to give a right to choose their
representatives to those who have certain types of presumably valuable knowledge
and education. If the presumption of their better competence to elect a
suitable representative in there, as we think that there must be, it would be
for the members of such a constituency themselves to decide whether a person
who stands for election from their constituency possesses the right type of
knowledge, experience, and wisdom which satisfy certain standards. It may well
be that the constitution makers, acting upon such a presumption, had
intentionally left the educational qualifications of a candidate for election
from the graduates constituency unspecified.
A test laid down by Blackburn J. in R. v. Colewort(1),
to determine what the correct presumption, arising from an omission in a
statute should be, was whether what was omitted but sought to be brought within
the legislative intention was "known" to the law makers, and could,
therefore, be "supposed to have been omitted intentionally".
"It makes no difference", says
Craies 'in "Statute Law"(2) "that the omission on the part of
the legislature was a mere oversight, and that without doubt the Act would have
been drawn otherwise had the attention of the legislature been directed to the
oversight at the time the Act was under discussion". In the case before
us, it could not possibly be said that the question to be dealt with was not
"known" to the, legislators. It could not even be said that
qualifications of the electors/-as well as of those to be elected were not
matters to which the attention of the law makers, both in the Constituent
Assembly and in Parliament, was not specially directed at all or that the
omission must be by mere oversight. The provisions discussed above demonstrate
amply how legislative attention was paid to the qualifications, of the electors
'as well as of the elected in every case. Hence, the correct presumption, in
such a case, would be that the omission was deliberate.
A glance at the legislative history lying
behind Article 171 also enables us to reach the conclusion that the omission by
the Constitution makers or by Parliament to prescribe graduation as (1) [1864]
4 BSS 927, 934 (2) Crains on Statute Law-5th En. 1963 P. 72.
182 must be deliberate. Sections 60 and 61 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, deal with composition of Provincial
legislatures and of the two Chambers of such legislatures.
The Upper Chambers in the Provincial
Legislatures were to be composed of members retiring every third year in
accordance with provisions of the Fifth Schedule to the Act. Rule 10 of this
Schedule lays down:
"In a Province in which any seats are to
be filled by representatives of backward areas or backward tribes,
representatives of commerce, industry, mining and planting, representatives of
landholders, representatives of universities or representatives of labour,
persons to fill those seats................
shall be chosen in such manner as may be
prescribed".
On 30th April, 1936, the Government of India
(Provincial Legislative Assemblies) Order of 1936 was issued by His Majesty in
Council. It prescribed the qualifications of persons to be chosen from the
"special constituencies" set up for representation in the Legislative
Councils, A glance at the provisions relating to these qualifications,
including those for the University seats, indicates that it was invariably expressly
provided, where it was so intended, that a necessary qualification of a
candidate for a seat was that he or she should be "entitled to vote for
the choice of a member to fill it". Hence, legislative history on the
subject would also indicate. that, whenever any qualification of the candidate
was intended to be imposed, this was expressly done and not left to mere
implications.
We think that the view contained in the
Judgment under appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding
them to the relevant statutory provisions to the effect that the candidates
from graduates' constituencies of Legislative Councils must also possess the
qualification of having graduated. This contravenes the rule of "Plain
meaning" or "literal" construction which must ordinarily
prevail. A logical corollary of that rule is that "a statute may not be
extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not
been made" (See:
Craies on Statute Law-6th Edn. p. 70). An
application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification
of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible (see e.g.
Sri Ram Narain Medhi & Ors.
v. The State of Bombay(1), British India
General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh & Ors. (2), R. G. Jacob
v.
Union of India(3). Courts may deppart from
this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity (see e.g. State 'of Madhya Pradesh
v. M/s. Azad Bharat Finance Co. & Anr.(4). In Hira Devi v. District Board,
Shahiahanpur(5), this Court observed (1) AIR 1959 S.C. 459. (2) [1960] 1 SCR
168. (3) [1963] 3 SCR 800.
(4) A.T.R. 1967 S.C. 276. (5) A.T.R. 1952 SC
362@ 365.
183 "No doubt it is the duty of the
Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the
Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words
used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an
Act".
Cases in, which defects in statutory
provisions may or may not be supplied by Courts have been indicated in well
known works such as Sutherland's "Statutory Construction" (3rd
Edn.(Vol. 2) (Paragraph 4924 at pages 455-558) and in Crawford's
"Construction of statutes" (1940 Edn.). Only one passage from the
last mentioned work need be cited here: (p. 269) :
"Where the statutes meaning is clear and
explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case,
they are not needed. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more
than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to
be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be
interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced,
or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the
statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word,
interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent
is in the language of the statute".
We think that the language as well as the
legislative history of Articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and Section 6
of the Representation of People Act, 1951, enable us to presume a deliberate
omission of the qualification that the representative of the Graduates should
also be a graduate. In our opinion, no absurdity results if we presume such an
intention. We cannot infer, as the learned Judge of the Madras High Court had
done, from the mere fact of such an omission and opinions about a supposed
scheme "functional representation" underlying Article 171 of our
Constitution, that the omission was either unintentional or that it led to
absurd results. We think that, by adding a deemed to be necessary or implied
qualification of a representative of the Graduates which the Constitution
makers, or, in any event, the Parliament, could have easily imposed, the learned
Judge had really invaded the Legislative sphere. The defect, if. any, in the
law could be removed only by law made by Parliament.
We conclude, after considering all the
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the qualifications
of a candidate for election from the Graduates' constituency of the Legislative
Council of the Madras State, that the appellant possesses all the
qualifications laid down for such a candidate.
184 Therefore, we allow this appeal, set
aside the Judgment and order of the Madras High Court, and dismiss the,
Respondent's election petition. The appellant is entitled to his costs
throughout.
V.P.S. Appeal allowed.
Back
