Keshavsinh Dwarkadas Kapadia Etc. Vs.
M/S. Indian Engineering Company [1971] INSC 242 (10 September 1971)
RAY, A.N.
RAY, A.N.
SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) PALEKAR, D.G.
CITATION: 1972 AIR 1538 1972 SCR (1) 695 1971
SCC (2) 706
CITATOR INFO:
RF 1992 SC1932 (5)
ACT:
Arbitration Act (10 of 1940), Sch. 1, para.
4--Appointment of umpire by arbitrators-Whether consent of umpire
necessary-Disagreement between arbitrators what is.
HEADNOTE:
Disputes having arisen between the appellant
and the respondent, they were referred to arbitration in accordance with an
arbitration agreement. The arbitrators entered upon the reference andalso
appointed an umpire. After the time for making the award had expired the
appellant took the stand that one of the arbitrators would be biased in favour
of the respondents. The respondents therefore called upon the arbitrators to
refer the matter to the umpire and also wrote to the umpire and the umpire
entered upon the reference. Thereafter, the appellants filed applications under
s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The High Court held that the umpire rightly
entered upon the reference, and extended the time to enable the umpire to make
an award.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that
: (1) the appointment of the umpire was not valid because the consent of the
appointee was not obtained,; and (2) under cl. 6 of the Arbitration agreement
the operation of para 4 Sch. I of the Arbitration Act was excluded, and the
umpire could enter upon the reference only in the event of a difference arising
between the arbitrators and the arbitrators referred the matter to the umpire.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : (1) There is a distinction between
appointment and acceptance of an office. The question of effectiveness or
perfection is ordinarily subsequent to appointment. The scheme of arbitration
proceedings indicates that the appointment of an umpire and the acceptance of office
are two separate matters arising at different stages in the proceedings. [699
H; 700 A: 704 E] When the arbitrators are required to appoint an umpire it only
means that the arbitrators are to concur in appointing the umpire. There is no
particular method of appointment of an umpire though the usual method is by
writing.
Arbitrators who are required to appoint an
umpire are under no obligation to obtain the approval of the choice of the
person by the parties who appointed the arbitrators. If any party is
dissatisfied with the choice it will not affect the validity of the
appointment; nor is the appointment conditional upon the acceptance of
appointment by the umpire. The necessity for communication of appointment to
the parties as well as to the appointee depends on the language of the
arbitration clause. The Arbitration Act does not say that the appointment of
umpire by the arbitrators is to be made only after obtaining the consent of the
appointee. [700 D-E; 701 D-F; 704 D-E] When the umpire assumes his office he
accepts the appointment. Acceptance may be express or implied. It need not be
in writing; it may be evidenced by conduct. It may also be evidenced by
proceeding with 696 the arbitration. When the umpire is called upon to proceed
in terms of the appointment he will either assent expressly or by conduct to
act, or he will decline to act. [704 A-B, D, E-F] Mirza Sadik Husain v.
Mussamat Kaniz Zohra Begam, L.R. 38 I.A. 181, applied.
Ringland v. Lowndes, (1863) 15 C.B. (N.S.)
173; 143 E.R. 749 and Tradax Export S.A. v. Vokswagenwerk A.G. [1970] 1 All
E.R. 420, explained and distinguished.
(2) (a) Paragraph 4 of the first schedule
provides that if the arbitra-delivered to any party to the arbitration
agreement or to the umpire a notice in writing stating that they cannot agree,
the umpire shall forthwith enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators.
'Mere is no intention in cl. 6 of the agreement to exclude the operation of this
paragraph. On the contrary the agreement shows that the intention of the
parties was that when the arbitrators allowed time to expire without making the
award the umpire should enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators.
[704 H; 705 A-C] (b) In the present case, the
arbitrators, by reason of the attitude of one of the parties could not agree to
proceed with the matter. Where one of the arbitrators declines to act and the
other is left alone in a case of this type, it will amount to disagreement between
the arbitrators. [705 FG] (c) Failure to make an award in time where the
agreement prescribed time does in. certain circumstances, amount to
disagreement. [705 D-E] Iossifoglu v. Counmantaros, [1941] 1 K.B. 496 and
Russel on Arbitration, 18th Ed. pp. 205, 208, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 2441 and 2442 of 1968.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated October 17, 1968 of the Bombay High Court in Arbitration
Petitions Nos. 49 and 50 of 1968.
I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No.
2441/1968).
V. M. Tarkunde and I. N. Shroff, for the
appellant (in C.As. Nos. 2442 of 1968).
S. V. Gupte, B. R. Agarwala for the
respondent (in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered to
Ray, J. These two appeals are by special leave against I the judgment dated 17
October, 1968 of the High Court at Bombay determining under section 33 of the Arbitration
Act that the umpire rightly entered upon the reference and further extending
the time till 31 December, 1968 for making an award thereof by the umpire.
Two questions arise for consideration in
these appeals.
First, whether there can be any valid
appointment of umpire by arbitrators without obtaining consent of the appointee
to be an umpire. Second, on the construction of the arbitration agreement in
the present case was the operation of paragraph 4 of Schedule: I of the Arbitration
Act excluded with the result that the umpire could enter upon the reference
only in the event of a difference arising between the arbitrators.
On 26 April, 1967 there was an arbitration
agreement between the partnership firm of Indian Engineering Company and
Keshavsinh Dwarkadas Kapadia. Kapadia had appointed M/s. Chetan Trading Company
as the sole selling agent of Kapadia's, several products including aluminium
and copper wire by an agreement dated 16 September, 1965. Chetan Trading
Company in their turn appointed Indian Engineering Company as their sole
selling agent in respect of aluminium and copper wires. Chetan Trading Company
terminated their agreement with Indian Engineering Company. Kapadia also
terminated the sole selling agency with Chetan Trading Company Indian
Engineering Company contended that on the termination of the sole selling
agency between themselves and Chetan Trading Company Indian Engineering Company
became the sole selling agent of Kapadia in terms of the agreement' dated 16
September, 1965. Indian Engineering Company claimed damages against Kapadia for
breach of the agreement.
Kapadia claimed damages and moneys from
Indian Engineering Company. 'Disputes arose between the parties. These disputes
were referred to arbitration in accordance with the agreement dated 26 April,
1967.
There was a similar arbitration agreement
between Chetan Trading Company and Indian Engineering Company on 5 June, 1967
in respect of their disputes and claims against each other. The arbitration agreement
and the arbitrators were identical in both the cases.
Clauses 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the arbitration
agreement which are relevant for the purposes of the present appeals are as
follows:Clause (1): All the disputes and differences arising out of or in
relation to the said Sole Selling Agency Agreement be and they are hereby
referred to the arbitration of the said Shri H. G. Advani and Shri J. N.
Gandhi.
Clause (2) That the arbitration shall be
governed by them provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Clause (5): The arbitrators shall make and
publish their award within four months from the date of their entering upon the
reference and they are hereby authorised to extend the said time from time to
time as may be required with the previous written consent of both the parties
hereto.
698 Clause (6): The said arbitrators shall
before proceeding with the arbitration appoint an umpire and in the event of
any difference arising between them they shall refer the 'matter to the umpire
for his decision and award.
The arbitrators Messrs. Advani and Gandhi
held their first meeting on 12 September, 1967. At the said meeting before entering
upon the reference the arbitrators appointed an umpire in the following terms:
"Mr. Porus Mehta failing him Mr. Murzban
Mistry appointed umpire".
On 11 January, 1968 the time laid down by
clause (5) of the agreement for making the award expired. On 14 January, 1968
the respondents wrote to the appellants to obtain the necessary extension of
time for making the award. The appellants did not comply with the request and
on 6 March, 1968 wrote to the arbitrators that Mr. Advani one of the
arbitrators would be biased in favour of the respondents. Thereafter, the
respondents through their solicitors called upon the arbitrators to refer the
matter to the umpire and also by a separate letter called upon the umpire Mr.
Porus A. Mehta to enter on the reference as umpire appointed by the
arbitrators. Mr. Mehta fixed a meeting on 27 May, 1968.
The appellants raised certain objections. The
meeting was adjourned. Another meeting was fixed on 17 June, 1968. At the
meeting held on 17th June, 1968 Mr. Mehta gave certain directions in regard to
the proceedings and instructions thereof and fixed 12 July, 1968 for hearing.
The appellants by letter dated 12 July, 1968 addressed to Mr. Mehta contended
that the consent of the umpire was not obtained before his appointment and
therefore there was no valid appointment of the umpire. Mr. Mehta fixed the
meeting on 13 July, 1968 and decided to proceed with the arbitration and
adjourned the meeting to 20 July, 1968. The appellants obtained an adjournment
on the ground that the appellants wanted to file a petition challenging the
appointment of Mr. Mehta as an umpire. Mr. Mehta adjourned the matter till 30
July, 1968.
In this context of events the appellants
filed applications under section 33 of the Arbitration Act which resulted in
the order appealed against.
Three contentions which had been advanced An
the High Court were repeated here. First, that the arbitrators before proceeding
with the reference did not obtain consent of the umpire to his appointment as
umpire, and, therefore, there was no appointment of umpire. Secondly, under
clause (6) of the arbitration agreement operation of paragraph 4 of Schedule I
of the 699 Arbitration Act was excluded and the umpire could enter upon the
reference only in the event of a difference arising between the arbitrators on
their disagreement. No difference arose between the arbitrators in the present
case but only time for making the award expired. Therefore, the umpire had no
right to enter upon the reference. Thirty under clause (6) of the arbitration
agreement, the umpire had no right to enter upon the reference unless the
arbitrators referred the matter to the umpire. The High Court relied on the
decision of the Judicial Committee in Mirza Sadik Husain v. Mussanmat Kaniz
Zohra Begam and Anr.(1) (38 I.A. 181) and held that the umpire signified the
consent by taking up the office and the umpire rightly entered on the
reference. The High Court held that the contingency provided for in paragraph 4
of Schedule I to the Arbitration Act was not excluded. The High Court however
said that if the High Court was wrong in the view that paragraph 4 of Schedule
I to the Arbitration Act was not excluded, expiry of time to make an award
could not be regarded as a disagreement between the arbitrators. The third
contention of the appellants was also rejected by the High Court on the ground
that clause (6) of the arbitration agreement in the present case did not apply
when the arbitrators did not make an award within time.
Counsel for the appellants contended that the
words 'if any appointed arbitrator or umpire I neglects or refuses to get'
occurring in section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 mean that one can refuse
to act only after one has accepted the appointment. This contention was
supported by relying on the following observation in Russell on Arbitration,
18th Edition, at page 212:
"Acceptance of offices:-Acceptance of
the office by the arbitrator appears to be necessary to perfect his
appointment. It has been so decided in the case of an umpire, and it would seem
to be only reasonable that an appointment should not be considered effective
until the person appointed has agreed either expressly or tacitly to exercise
the function of the office".
Two decisions are cited in Russell in support
of the view expressed by the author. These decisions are: Ringland v. Lowndes
(7 ) (1863) 15 C.B.(N.S.) 173=143 E.R. 749 and Tradax Export S. A. v.
Volkawagenwerk 3 A.G.', (1969) 2 O.B.
599. The decision in Tradax Export case
(supra) has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal as will appear in (1970) 1
A.E.R. 420.
It is important to notice the distinction
between appointment and acceptance of office. The present appeals concern the
appointment of an umpire. The questions of effectiveness or per700 fection of
appointment are by the nature of things subsequent to appointment unless the
agreement or the statute provides otherwise. Arbitrators and umpire too are
often appointed by the parties. Sometimes an umpire is appointed by arbitrator.
The constitution of the arbitral body and the manner in which the appointments
are made are primarily dealt with in the arbitration agreement or else the Arbitration
Act will apply. In some cases, the appointment of arbitrator may require
special consideration.
If, for instance, two arbitrators are
required to be appointed one by each party an appointment of arbitrator by a
party is not complete without communication thereof to the other party. The
reason in the words of Lord Denman is this : 'Neither party can be said to have
chosen an arbitrator until he lots the other party know the object of his
choice" (See Thomas v. Fredricks) ( 1 847) 10 Q.B. 775). Where each party
was to appoint a valuer by 31 May, 1847 and one of the parties nominated a
referee late on 31 May and sent by that night's post a notice thereof to the
defendant who received it on 1 June, it was held that the plaintiff had not
nominated a referee by 31 May. (See Tew v. Harris (1848) 11 Q.B. 7).
The necessity for communication of
appointment of arbitrator to the parties as also to the appointee depends often
on the languae of the arbitration clause. In the Tradax Export case, (supra)
the arbitration clause was as follows :".......... Any claim must be made
in writing and claimant's arbitrator appointed within three months' of final
discharge and where this provision is not complied with the claim shall be
deemed to be waived and absolutely barred".
This is described as the usual Centrocon
arbitration clause in charterparty agreement. It is noticeable that in the
Centrocon arbitration clause the claimant is required to appoint an arbitrator
within three months of final discharge of cargo or else the claim is barred. An
effective appointment of an arbitrator in such a clause is necessary to
constitute arbitral authority within the stipulated time to prevent the claim
from being barred. Therefore, in such a clause not only communication to the
appointee but also the acceptance of office by the appointee is essential for
effective appointment of arbitrator within the meaning of the clause. A mere
nomination or appointment unknown to the appointee was held not to be an appointment
far less an effective appointment of arbitrator within the meaning of that
clause. The appointment will be effective only when the appointed arbitrator
accepts office and is armed with the duty and authority of an arbitrator. Even
in such a clause the stage of effective appointment will be when he has
indicated his willingness to act in that matter.
701 In the Tradax Export case (supra) the
charterers gave notice of appointment to the arbitrator. Three months expired
The other side contended that there was no appointment of arbitrator within the
stipulated time. The arbitrator was not set in motion. Neither was the
arbitrator clothed with the mandate of arbitration nor was the machinery of
arbitration invoked by the charterers. The appointment of an arbitrator there
had to be perfected and implemented by calling upon the appointee to act. In
the Tradax Export case (supra) the Court of Appeal observed that if an
application under section 27 of the English Arbitration Act, 1950 had been
made, the court would have, granted relief as explained in Liberian Shipping
Corporation 'Pegasus' v. A. King & Sons Ltd. (1967) 2 Q.B. 86. Section 27
of the English Arbitration Act is a special provision conferring power upon the
court to extend the time for commencement of arbitration proceedings where in
the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be, caused. This
aspect indicates that in the Centrocon clause commencement of proceedings by
effectiveappointment is vital and that is why relief against rigour of time
clauses is granted under section 27 of the English Arbitration Act, 1950.
In the present appeals, the reference was to
arbitrators and they were required to appoint an umpire. The appointment of an
umpire by two arbitrators means that the arbitrators are to coneur in
appointing an umpire. There is no particular method of appointment of an umpire
prescribed by the Act.
The usual method of appointment of an umpire
by the arbitrators is in writing. Arbitrators who are required to appoint an umpire
are under no obligation to obtain the approval of the choice of the personnel
by the parties who appointed the arbitrators. If any party is dissatisfied with
the choice that will not affect the validity of the appointment (See Oliver v.
Collings (1809) 11 East 367-103 E.R. (1045).
The appointment by arbitrators of an umpire
should be the act of the will and judgment the two. Such an appointment is to
be one of the choice and not of chance. [See Re.
Cassell (1829) 9 B & C 624==109 E.R.
232]. If an umpire declines the office the appointment is ineffectual. Ile
arbitrators in such a case can make another appointment of an umpire if the
arbitration agreement empowers them to do SO Or the court can appoint an umpire
in lieu of an appointed umpire who refuses to act. Declining the office will be
refusal to act.
It is, therefore, apparent that appointment
of umpire is something different from the acceptance of office by the umpire.
The arbitrator Or umpire assumes his office when he accepts the appointment. There
is no NO authority for the proposition that consent of the appointee is
required before an umpire is appointed by the arbitrators. The observations in
Russll on arbitration. 18 th Ed.
702 at page, 212 do not support that
submission. The decision in Ringland v. Lowndes supra) which is referred to in
Russell had very special features. Under the Public Health Act, 1848 a disputed
claim to compensation was to be settled by arbitration. Arbitrators were
required to make an award within 21 days after the appointment or within
extended time, if any. If arbitrators neglected or refused to appoint an umpire
for seven days after being requested so to do by any party the court of quarter
sessions would on the application of such party appoint an umpire. In that case
arbitrators were appointed in January, 1861. The arbitrators refused to appoint
an umpire. The plaintiff applied at the Easter sessions to appoint an umpire
but failed in consequence of want of a notice of his intention to make such
application. The plaintiff thereafter gave the required notice and the second
application was made at the Midsummer sessions. One Johnson was named as
umpire. But as his consent had not been obtained no formal appointment was
made. A third application was made at the Michaelms sessions and Johnson was on
14 October appointed umpire and accepted the appointment. The question for
consideration was whether the appointment of the umpire was at the Midsummer
sessions or at the Michaelmas sessions. Under the statute the award was, to be
made within three months from the umpire,s appointment. The umpire madean award
on 30 December, 1861. If the appointment was in the Midsummer sessions the
Award would be bad.
It will appear from the report (15 C.B '
(N.S.) 173 at pp.
178, 179 and 196-143 E.R. 4 749 at pp. 752
and 759) that it was the duty. and practice of the clerk of the peace to make
an, entry of the acts and proceedings of the court from Which the orders of the
court were subsequently formally drawn up and no order would in the course of
practice be formally drawn up unless the assent of the umpire to act had been
previously obtained. Counsel for the board in Ringland's case did not strongly
press the objections that' an order 'was made at the Midsummer sessions because
there was no formal order of the Court in Midsummer 'sessions.
The decision in Ringland v. Lowndes (supra)
went up on appeal as will, appear from, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 514.=144, E.R.
207, The appeal, however was on actual
decision in Tringland,s case (supra) ;is 'to whether a party who attended
before, an, arbitrator under protest, crossexamined adversary's witnesses and
called witnesses did not preclude himself from afterwards objecting that the
arbitrator was proceeding without authority it will appear at conceded that the,
appointment of Johnson as an umpire took Place the October sessions. the
special provisions of the statute, the mode. of making an application to the
court of quarter Sessions, me practice of the court in regard to drawing up of
703 orders for appointment of umpire and the specific requirement of consent of
the appointee to an order for appointment of umpire are all special and
peculiar features in Ringland v. Lowndes (supra) to support the view that
acceptance of umpirage is necessary for the appointment of the umpire.
The decision of the Judicial Committee in
Mirza Sadiq Husain v. Musammat Kaniz Zohra Begam (supra) was on the meaning of
the words 'refuses to act' occurring in section 510 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1882. That section conferred power on the court to appoint a new
arbitrator or umpire "if the arbitrator or the umpire refuses to
act". The, Judicial Committee did not accept the construction put upon the
words 'refuses to act' by the High Courts in India that the power of the court
under section 5 10 to appoint a new arbitrator in place of another arises only
when that other had first consented to act and thereafter refused or became
incapable.
The Judicial Committee said "it appears
to their Lordships that when an. arbitrator is nominated by parties, his
refusal to act is signified as clearly by his refusal to accept nomination as
by any other course he could pursue.
His refusal to act necessarily follows, for
he has not performed the first action of all, namely, to take up the office by signifying
his assent to his appointment Their Lordships do not enter at length,into the
matter as it appears that any other construction would open the way to an easy
defeat of the provisions of the statute".
Under section 8 of the Arbitration Act ,1940
if any umpire refuses to act and the arbitration agreement does not show that
it was intended that the vacancy should not be supplied, and the parties or the
arbitrators as the case may be, do not supply the vacancy any party may take
recourse' to the provisions of the statute for appointment of umpire.
The construction which the Judicial Committee
put upon the words 'refuses to act' in Mirza Sadik Husain's case (supra)
applies to the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940. Where the
arbitrators appoint an umpire upon the condition of the umpire's acceptance of
office, the arbitrators wilt have power to reappoint an umpire if the post is
refused. 'Where, again, the arbitrators appoint an umpire, without any such
condition of acceptance of office, and the appointee declines the office, the,
arbitrators in accordance with their powers under the arbitration agreement ea
appoint an umpire again. The court has also power to appoint in lieu of an
appointed umpire who refuges to act, as stated in section 8 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940. In all these cases the appointment of an. umpire becomes effective
by acceptance of the office. Thereupon the power of appointment is exhausted.
If the appointed person 704 after acceptance of office refuses to act or will
not act the parties have to take recourse to the court.
When the umpire assumes his office he accepts
the appointment. The acceptance may be express or implied. Ile acceptance need
not be in writing. It may be evidenced by conduct. It may be also by proceeding
with the arbitration.
In Mirza Sadik Husain's case (supra) both the
parties by agreement appointed arbitrators to settle their respective rights.
One of the arbitrators refused to act. The respondents in that case declined to
nominate another arbitrator in their behalf-. The Judicial Committee said that
this declinature was within their rights, the reason being that the arbitrator
refused to accept office or to act after he had been appointed. The arbitrators
in the present case completed their appointment of umpire before entering on
the reference. Thereafter, it remained for the umpire to act or to refuse to
act.
The question of acceptance of appointment of
umpire arises with reference to the stage when he is called upon to act.
The Arbitration Act, 1940 does not say that
appointment of umpire by arbitrators is to be made only after obtaining consent
of the appointee. The arbitrators here appointed an umpire before entering on
the reference: The appointment was not conditional upon the acceptance of
appointment by the umpire. The scheme of arbitration proceedings indicates that
the appointment of umpire and the acceptance of office are two separate matters
arising at different stages in the proceedings. When the umpire is called upon
to proceed in terms of the, appointment he will either assent expressly or by
conduct to act or he will decline to act.
The High Court was correct in holding that
there was a valid appointment of the umpire and the umpire rightly entered upon
the reference. Ile umpire's authority commenced when he entered upon the
reference on being asked to proceed with the reference.
The other contention on behalf of the,
appellants that paragraph 4 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act, 1940
was excluded by clause (6) of the arbitration agreement in the: present case is
unsound. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration
agreement, unless a different intention is expressed therein, shall be deemed
to include the provisions set out in the First Schedule in so far as they are
applicable to the reference. Paragraph 4 of the First Schedule provides that if
the arbitrators have allowed their time to expire without making an award or
have delivered to any party to the arbitration 705 agreement or to the umpire a
notice in writing stating that they cannot agree, the umpire shall forthwith
enter on the reference in lieu of the arbitrators. Clause (6) of the
arbitration agreement does not state that only in the event of a difference
arising between the arbitrators there shall be a reference to the umpire. There
is no intention in the agreement to exclude the operation of paragraph 4 of the
First Schedule to the Arbitration Act. In the present case the agreement
provided for appointment of umpire. The agreement also provided for making of
the award by the arbitrators. It is, therefore, apparent that the intention of
the parties was that when arbitrators would allow their time to expire without
making the award the umpire would enter on the reference in lieu of the
arbitrators.
The High Court expressed the view that if the
arbitrators allowed the time to expire that by itself would not amount to
disagreement between the arbitrators. As to what constitutes disagreement
cannot be laid down in abstract or inflexible propositions. It will depend upon
the facts of the case as to whether there was a disagreement. The High Court
did not agree with the view expressed in Russel on Arbitration, 18th Ed. at
pages 205 and 208, that failure to make an award in time where the agreement
prescribed time in which the arbitrators award is to be made would amount to
disagreement. In Lossifoglu v. Counmantaro [1941] 1 K.B. 396 the arbitration
clause provided "in case the arbitrators so appointed disagree they shall
appoints an umpire". One of the arbitrators repeatedly endeavoured to
arrange a meeting with the other, but failed to arrange such a meeting. The
arbitrator then unsuccessfully attempted to obtain consent of the latter to the
appointment of umpire.
Thereafter, application was made to the court
for the appointment of umpire. Disagreement between the arbitrators may take
various shapes and forms. In the present case the arbitrators by reason of
attitude of a party in correspondence addressed to the arbitrators could not
agree to proceed with the matter. Where one of the arbitrators decline to act
and the other is left alone it will in a case of this type amount to
disagreement between the two arbitrators. In the Present case, there was
disagreement between the arbitrators. Time to make the award also expired.
Therefore, from both points of view the umpire had authority to inter upon the
reference.
For these reasons, we are of opinion that the
High Court was correct in making the order. The appeals are dismissed.
The order of the, High Court is upheld, In
view of the fact that the time granted by the High Court till 31 December, 1968
for making the award cannot apply, the umpire Porus A..
Mehta is I-L3Sup.Cl/72 706 granted time for
three months to make the award. Three months will run from the date of service
of this order by any party to these appeals. The appellants will pay one set of
hearing fee to the respondents.
V.P.S Appeals dismissed.
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