Ram Gobinda Dawan & Ors Vs. Smt. Bhaktabala
 INSC 6 (8 January 1971)
CITATION: 1971 AIR 664 1971 SCR (3) 340 1971
SCC (1) 387
Practice-Res judicata- Land acquisition
proceedings-Claim of one party to compensation dismissed for
default-Acquisition of other plots -Interest of parties same-Claim of title-If
earlier decision operates as Yes judicata.
Certain plots in a Municipality were acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the predecessor of the appellants and
the predecessor of the respondents, each claimed the compensation. amount on
the basis of title. The matter was referred to the Court of the District Judge.
The claim of the predecessor of the respondents was dismissed for default and
the claim of the predecessor of the appellants was therefore upheld. Certain
other plots pertaining to the same title and interest were later .acquired and
the question arose as to whether appellants or respondents were entitled to the
compensation. Since the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the
two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved, the
appellants pleaded that the earlier decision by the District Judge operated as
HELD : The earlier decision did not operate
as res judicata against the respondents inasmuch as the matter was not heard
and finally decided on merits after contest. If a matter was heard and finally
decided on merits, then such a decision operates as res judicata, even though
an appeal against the decision was dismissed on a preliminary ground such as
limitation default in printing, or default of appearance, because, it amounts
to the appeal having been heard and finally decided on the merits whatever
might have been the ground of dismissal of the appeal, and has the effect of
confirming the decision of the trial court on merits. But if there had been no
contest, no hearing and final decision by any court, at any stage, the decision
would not operate as res judicata. [350 A-E] Rai Lakshmi Dasi & Ors. v.
Banamali Sen & Ors.,  S.C.R. 154, Putavarthi Benkata Subba Rao &
Ors v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao & Ors  2 S.C.R. 310 and Sheodan Singh
v. Smt. Daryao Kunwar,  3 S.C.R. 300, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 436 and 437 of 1967.
Appeals from the judgment and decrees dated
March 27, 1962 ,of the Calcutta High Court in First Appeals Nos. 311 and 312 of
D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants (in all
The respondent did not appear.
341 The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by Vaidialingam, J. These two appeals on certificate are directed against the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated March 27, 1962 in First Appeals from
the Original Decree Nos. 311 and 312 of 1956.
Two plots of land bearing No. 936 of Mouza
Asansol and plot No. 9202 of Monza Asansol Municipality were acquired under the
Land Acquisition Act. The notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
dated December 13, 1947 was published in the Calcutta Gazette of 25th December,
The declaration under s. 6 dated December 30,
1947 was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 8th January, 1948. For plot No.
936 of Monza Asansol measuring about 31 acres, the Land Acquisition Collector
awarded a total compensation of Rs. 1707/- including Rs. 13/ 1/6 on account of
the landlord's interest. The entire compensation in respect of this plot was
directed to be paid to Bhaktabala, Dasi, the sole respondent in Civil Appeal
No. 436 of 1967. In respect of plot No. 9202 of Mouza Asansol Municipality, the
Land Acquisition Officer awarded as compensation a sum of Rs.
825/15/6 including Rs. 6/5/6 on account of
the landlord's interest. This entire amount of compensation was directed to be
paid to Bhaktabala Dasi and her sister Subasini Dasi.
It may be mentioned that Bhaktabala Dasi is
the first respondent and on the death of Subasini Dasi, her son Sunil Kumar
Roy, who has been impleaded in the proceedings is the second respondent in
Civil Appeal No. 437 of 1967. Before the Land Acquisition Collector, in respect
of both these plots, one Kashi Nath Dawn claimed title to the land and as such
to the entire compensation amount.' The appellants in these two appeals are the
legal representatives of Kashi Nath Dawn.
The case of Kashi Nath Dawn was that both the
plots of land belonged to Panchanan Roy, husband of Subasini Dasi, against whom
a money decree had been obtained by one Jatin Kumar Roy. In execution of the
money decree (Execution Case No. 120 of 1929, Subordinate Judge's Court,
Asansol), the decree-holder brought these two items and certain other
properties to sale. Kashi Nath Dawn claimed to have purchased these items in
the Court sale and obtained the sale certificate Ex. 2. The sale was confirmed
on November 27, 1930 and delivery of possession was also taken on December 10,
1930. It was on the strength of this purchase in Court auction that Kashi Nath
Dawn claimed title to the two plots.
The case of Bhaktabala Dasi, who alone
contested the claim of Kashi Nath Dawn was briefly as follows : Panchanan Roy
had 342 no title to the properties and that on the other hand they belonged to
Ramanugraha Roy, who died leaving his widow.
Manmohini and three daughters, Santabala,
Subasini and Bhaktabala. On the death of Ramanugrah a Roy, his widow Manmohini
succeeded to the property as life estate holder.
As Santabala died shortly after her father's
death, the properties devolved on the other two sisters namely, Subasini and
Bhaktabala, on the death of Marnmohini Panchanan Roy had married Santabala and
on her death he married her sister Subasini. Panchanan Roy during the life time
of his mother-in-law Manmohini was allowed to manage the properties. In the
settlement proceedings of 1918-21 he surreptitiously got his name recorded as
owner of one half share in the ,estate of his father-in-law in Monza Asansol
and of the entire interest in Monza Asansol Municipality.
Panchanan Roy was never in possession and
enjoyment of the properties whereas Manmohini Dasi during her life time and on
her death her 'daughter Subasini and Bhaktabala were in possession and
enjoyment. There was a partition between the two sisters of Monza Asansol
property and in consequence plot No. 936 of Monza Asansol was obtained as her
share by Bhaktabala Dasi. It was on this basis that Bhaktabala Dasi claimed
exclusive title to plot No. 936 and the right to receive the entire
compensation amount for that land. She claimed that in respect of plot No. 9202
of Mouza Asansol Municipality, she and her sister Subasini Dasi, had a title to
half share each and asserted the right to receive com- pensation on that basis.
In view of the dispute regarding right to
receive the compensation amount, the Land Acquisition Collector referred the
matter to the Additional District Judge, Burdwan for determination of the said
dispute. The stand taken before the Land Acquisition Collector was reiterated
before the learned Additional District Judge. With. reference to plot No. 936
of Monza Asansol, the learned Additional District Judge held that Panchanan Roy
had wrongfully and fraudulently got recorded his name as owner of the half
share when he was managing the property on behalf of his mother-in-law
Manmohini widow of Ramanugraha Roy. The Court further held that Panchanan Roy
was never in possession and enjoyment of both the plots in question. Regarding
plot No 9202 of Monza Asansol Municipality, it was held that long before the
sale in Execution Case No. 120 of 1929, the Katiyans and the maps had been
published and they conclusively show that Monza Asansol Municipality was a
Monza different from Monza Asansol with different J.L.
number. The sale certificate Ex. 2 under
which Kasbi Nath Dawn claimed title was scrutinized by the Court which held
that the description of the various items clearly showed that no land of Monza
Asansol Municipality was included therein. The Court did not also I accept the
claim of Kashi Nath 343 Dawn that for the purpose of C. S. operation only the
lands within Mouza Asansol Municipality were separately recorded and that they were
also included within Monza Asansol. In this view the learned Additional
District Judge held that Kashi Nath Dawn did not purchase in the court sale any
plot of land within Monza Asansol Municipality and as such he had no title to
plot No. 9202. The court accepted the plea of Bhaktabala Dasi that she and her
sister Subasini Dasi were entitled to the compensation amount in equal shares.
Finally the Additional District Judge held
that Kashi Nath Dawn was not entitled to claim any portion of the compensation
amount in respect of the two plots.
Kashi Nath Dawn filed two appeals before the
Calcutta High ,Court, being First Appeals Nos. 311 and 312 of 1956. As the Land
Acquisition Collector had made separate references in respect of each of the
plots and as the two references were disposed of separately, though by a common
judgment, two appeals were filed in the High Court. The First Appeal No. 311 of
1956 related to plot No. 936 and First Appeal No.
312 of 1956 related to plot No. 9202. At this
stage it may be mentioned that Civil Appeals No. 436 and 437 of 1967 against
the decision of the High Court in First Appeals Nos.
311 and 312 of 1956 respectively. The High
Court did not -agree with the learned Additional District Judge that Panchanan
Roy had fraudulently got his name entered in the settlement register as owner
of half share in plot No. 936.
It is the view of the High Court that the
plea set up by Bhaktabala Dasi that she was absolutely entitled to the said
item has not been substantiated. The High Court held that the settlement
register established that Panchanan Roy's name has been recorded as owner of
half share and Manmohini as the owner of another half share in the properties
owned by Ramanugraha Roy in Monza Asansol and that there was no fraud on the
part of Panchanan Roy in having his name so entered. The High Court further
held that in the court sale, Kashi Nath Dawn had purchased the half share owned
by Panchanan Roy in Monza Asansol and as such he had title to half share in
plot No. 936 notwithstanding the fact that Kashi Nath Dawn was not able to
establish that Pancbanan Roy was in possession and actual enjoyment of his half
In this view the High Court modified the
decree of the learned Additional District Judge and held that in respect of plot
No. 936 both Kasbi Nath Dawn and Bhaktabala Dasi were entitled to half share
each and in that proportion were also entitled to the compensation amount. As
the full right of Kashi Nath Dawn in plot No. 936 was not recognised by the
High Court, Civil Appeal 436 of 1967 has been filed.
Regarding plot No. 9202 the High Court agreed
with the Land Acquisition Court and held that in the court sale, Kashi 344 Nath
Dawn had not purchased any property in Mouza Asansol Municipality and therefore
he had no. title thereto. The claim that Panchanan Roy was in possession of
this plot was also rejected. A plea of res judicata raised by Kashi Nath Dawn
based upon Ex. 7 the decree of the Land Acquisition Case No. 242 of 1938, with
reference to plot No. 9202, was also rejected by the High Court. The request
for adducing additional evidence made on behalf of Kashi Nath Dawn was also
rejected by the High Court. In consequence First Appeal No. 312 of 1956 was
dismissed against which Civil Appeal No. 437 of 1967 has been filed.
We will first take up the claim of full
ownership made by Kashi Nath Dawn in respect of plot No. 936 of Monza Asansol,
which is the subject of Civil Appeal No. 436 of 1967.
Mr. Dr. N. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the
appellants, who, as we have stated earlier, are the legal representatives of
deceased Kashi Nath Dawn, urged that the High Court should have accepted the
plea made by Kashi Nath Dawn that he was entitled to the full ownership of this
plot. The counsel urged that the relevant entries in the settlement registers'
have not been properly construed 'by the High Court. According to him all the
rights which Ramanugraha Roy had in plot No. 936 of Monza Asansol had accrued
to Panchanan Roy, whose rights had been purchased by Kashi Nath Dawn in court sale.
The High Court having held that there was no fraud perpetrated by Panchanan Roy
in having his name entered in the settlement registers, the full rights of
Panchanan Roy in plot No. 936 as the original owner and of Kashi Nath Dawn as
purchaser in court sale should have been upheld.
We are not inclined to accept this contention
of the learned counsel. No doubt, the learned District Judge held that
Panchanan Roy fraudulently got his name entered in the settlement registers
when he was in management of the properties during the life time of Manmohini,
widow of Ramanugraha Roy. This finding was not accepted by the High Court. The
High Court has considered the recitals in Ex.
A, the Settlement Khatian No. 16 of Mauza
Asansol which is also a khatian in respect of the permanent tenure Jagir Nakari
Ramakrishna Roy. The High Court has adverted to the fact that in Ex. A the
holders are divided into 17 groups but the holders of 'ka' group were described
as Manmohini wife of Ramanugraha Roy and Panchanan Roy s/o Umesh Chandra Roy.
These two persons were also described as being entitled to 8 g. 1 k. 5 tils
each. Plot No. 936 has been found to be one of the plots recorded as in khas
possession of 'ka' group in Ex. A. It is on this basis that the High Court
differing from the learned District Judge held that Panchanan Roy had been the
owner of half 345 share in this plot and Kashi Nath Dawn as purchaser of this
half share of Panchanan Roy was entitled to half of the compensation amount.
Mr. Mukherjee was not able to satisfy as to how Kashi Nath Dawn was entitled to
full ownership of plot No. 936. We are in agreement with the decision of the
High Court on this point, and as such hold that there is no merit in Civil
Appeal No. 436 of 1967.
Coming to plot No. 9202 of Monza Asansol
Municipality Mr. D. N. Mukherjee raised two contentions : (i) the High Court
was in error in holding that Ex. 2, the sale certificate does not take in this
item and (ii) the claim of the respondent was barred by res judicate, by the
decree of the Land Acquisition Court Ex. 7 and the High Court was again in
error in holding that there is no bar of res-judicata.
So far as the first contention is concerned,
it is an attack on a finding of fact recorded by the High Court. We have
already pointed out that even the Land Acquisition Court held that Kashi Nath
Dawn did not purchase in the court sale any property of Panchanan Roy in Mouza
The High Court has agreed with this finding.
The entire claim of title in respect of both the items was based on the sale
certificate Ex. 2. Both the District Judge and the High Court have held that
what was sold in court sale was only the interest of Panchanan Roy in the
permanent tenure in respect of Mouza Asansol and not in respect of any other
Mouza. The High Court has further held that Mouza Asansol Municipality and
Mouza Asansol were different entities even from about 1896 and the court sale
which took place in or about 1930 related only to the properties in Mouza
The description of the properties given in
the sale certificate Ex. 2, according to the High Court, clearly establishes
that what was sold in court auction and purchased by Kashi Nath Dawn was only
the property that was situated in Mouza Asansol as defined by the District
Settlement Operations and not a different Mouza Asansol as it might have
existed prior to 1896. The High Court has -one more elaborately into this
aspect than the District Court and held that Kasbi Nath Dawn did not purchase
in the court auction any property of Panchanan Roy in Mouza Asansol
Municipality. We find no flaw in the finding of the High Court. Therefore, on
this finding it follows that Kashi Nath Dawn, through whom the appellants
claimed, had no right, title or interest in plot No, 9202.
Faced with this situation Mr. Mukherjee
raised his second contention that the claims of Bhaktabala Dasi and her sister,
Subasini Dasi were barred by res-judicata.
346 The bar of res-judicata is pleaded as
follows Certain other plots in Mouza Asansol Municipality were acquired under
the Land Acquisition Act and there was a dispute regarding the persons entitled
to compensation amount. Kashi Nath Dawn made a-claim for payment of the full
compensation as the owner of those plots. That claim was resisted by Subasini
Dasi and her sons and they claimed in turn to be entitled to the compensation
amount. But the Land Acquisition Court upheld the claim of Kashi Nath Dawn and
that decree has become final. Under Ex. 7 the title of Kashi Nath Dawn in the
properties of Mouza Asansol Municipality having been recognised, it was no
longer open to the respondents herein to urge that Kashi Nath Dawn had no title
to plot No. 9202, which is situated in Mouza Asansol Municipality. The High
Court had rejected this plea on the ground that the claims of Subasini Dasi in
the prior land acquisition proceedings having been dismissed for default, would
not prevent her from claiming title to other plots pertaining to the same
interest inasmuch as the question of ownership of the interest as a whole was 'not
heard and decided.
Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the
appellants attacks this reasoning of the High Court as fallacious. He urged
that Subasini Dasi and her sons having made a claim before the Land Acquisition
Court for payment of compensation on the basis of their title, which was
rejected are not entitled to, put forward any further claim to this item.
This plea of res-judicata raised by Mr.
Mukherjee has to be approached from two points of view : (i) as a bar against
Bhakta bala Dasi and (ii) as a bar against Subasini Dasi.
We have already referred to the case set up
by Bhaktabala Dasi regarding the interest of herself and her sister Subasini
Dasi in plot No. 9202. This case has been accepted by both the courts. From the
nature of the claim, it is clear that Bhaktab-ala Dasi was not claiming any
title through Subasini Dasi, on the other hand she was claiming half share in
her own right as the daughter of Ramanugraha Roy and according to her, her
sister Subasini Dasi was also entitled to an equal share. Bhaktabala Dasi, it
is admit- ted, was not a party to the decree Ex. 7. If that is so, there is no
question of any bar of res-judicata so far as half share of Bhaktabala Dasi is
concerned. Then the question is whether the claim of Subasini Dasi to half share
in this item is barred by Ex. 7. If the appellants' contention in this regard
is accepted they will be entitled to at least claim the half share of Subasini
Dasi in plot No.
9202. Now it is necessary to refer to the
nature of the proceedings covered by Ex. 7. Nine plots of land referred to
therein and situate in Monza Asansol Municipality appear to have been acquired
under the Land Acquisition Act for the expansion of a road level crossing.
There appear to have been disputes amongst various parties with regard to right
to receive compensa- 347 tion and therefore the matter was referred to the
Court of the District Judge. Burdwan in Land Acquisition Case No. 42 of 1938.
Neither the actual pleadings in order to ascertain the nature of the claim that
was made by the parties nor the judgment in the land acquisition case have been
filed in these proceedings. The only document that has been filed is the decree
Ex. 7. From the decree it is seen that Kashi Nath Dawn was party No. 7 and
Subasini Dasi and her sons were parties Nos. 9 to 12. Parties Nos. 9 to 12
claimed compensation amount as against party No. 7, and the claim of Subasini
Dasi was dismissed for default by the learned District Judge under Ex. 7 dated
March 3, 1939 and the result of the decision was that the claim of Kashi Nath
Dawn was upheld and that of Subasini Dasi and her sons was rejected, though on
Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the
appellants has urged that the same title to the property which was in dispute
and decided in Ex. 7 in favour of Kashi Nath Dawn again arises for
consideration in these proceedings. The title of Subasini Dasi having been once
rejected by the court cannot again be the subject matter of a fresh
adjudication. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee
that Ex. 7 operates as res-judicata in respect of the claim even of Subasini
Dasi and her sons in respect of half share claimed in plot No. 9202. Though it
is true that Subasini Dasi appears to have contested the claim of Kashi Nath
Dawn in the proceedings leading up to Ex. 7, in our opinion, it cannot be said
that in those proceedings the issue as to title was heard and finally decided.
We have already pointed out that the claim of Subasini Dasi was dismissed for
Mr. Mukherjee drew our attention to certain
decisions and urged that the decision of the Land Acquisition Court operates as
res judicata. He further urged that even though the property in the previous
land acquisition proceedings may have been of a very small extent, when once
the title to the compensation amount which really relates to the nature of the
title to the property has been raised and decided, that decision will operate
as res-judicata. The proposition enunciated by Mr. Mukherjee and set out, above
as such are beyond controversy but we are of the opinion that the facts before
us are totally different.
We will now advert to the decisions cited by
In Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamali
Sen and others(1) this Court had to consider the question whether a previous
decision on title in land acquisition proceedings operated as resjudicata in a
subsequent suit between the same parties when the (1)  .CR. 154.
348 question of title was again raised. The
facts in that case were briefly as follows : Certain properties were acquired
in land acquisition proceedings and there was a triangular contest about the
right to receive compensation between A and B, the rival claimants, and C, a
mortgagee from B. All the parties required the question of apportionment to be
referred to the Land Acquisition Court. The court decided the question of title
in favour of B after contest. This decision was confirmed by the High Court on
appeal. That means that the title of B and his mortgagee C to receive
compensation amount was upheld by the Land Acquisition Court and the High
Court. A took the matter to the Privy Council, which reversed the decision of
the High Court and the Land Acquisition Court and the title of B and C were
In a subsequent suit between the same parties
the question of title was again raised and this Court held that the decision of
the Privy Council operated as res-judicata in respect of the subsequent
proceedings notwithstanding the fact that B and his mortgagee C did not appear
before the Privy Council and their claim was rejected in default.
Considerable reliance has been placed by Mr.
Mukherjee on this decision in support of his contention that Ex. 7 though a
decision given against Subasini Dasi and her sons ill default of their
appearance operates res-judicata.
In our opinion, the decision of this Court
referred to above does not assist the appellants. It is now well established
that where a dispute as to title to receive compensation amount has been
referred to a court, a decree thereon not appealed from renders the question of
title res- judicata in a suit between the same parties to the dispute.
A party in such circumstances cannot be heard
to say that the value of the subject matter on which the former decision was
pronounced was comparatively so trifling that it was not worth their while to
appeal from it. It is true that the test of resjudicata is the identity of
title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property
involved in the two cases but the previous decision must be one on a title in
respect of which a dispute has been raised and which dispute was heard and
finally decided by the court.
It is interesting to note that though it was
urged that the decision of the Privy Council was given in default of appearance
of B and his mortgagee C and therefore the said decision will not operate as
res-judicata, this Court did not hold that a decision given even in the first
instance in default of appearance of a party will operate as res- judicata. On
the other hand, this Court categorically held that C, the mortgagee had fought
out the title of mortgagor B, both before the Land Acquisition Court and the
High Court and had obtained a judgment in his favour after a full contest.
349 It is the view of this Court that the
mere fact that the mortgagee did not choose to appear before the Privy Council
and the decision of the Privy Council was given in the absence of the
mortgagee, is of no consequence as the decisions of the High Court and the
District Court have been given after contest. Therefore it will be seen that
the decision of this Court relied on by Mr. Mukherjee is no authority for the
wide proposition that even if there has been no hearing and final decision by
any court at any stage, after contest, the decision will operate as res-
For an earlier decision to operate as
res-judicata it has been held by this Court in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and
others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao and others(1) that the same must have been on
a matter which was 'heard and finally decided'.
In Sheodan Singh v. Smt. Daryao Kunwar(2) the
question whether a decision given by the High Court dismissing certain appeal
on the ground of limitation or on the ground that the party had not taken steps
to prosecute the appeal operates as resjudicata, was considered by this Court.
In that case A had instituted against B two suits asserting, title to a certain
property. B contested those claims and also instituted two other suits to
establish his title to the same property as against A. A's suits were decreed
and B's suits were dismissed. B filed four appeals, two appeals against the
decision given in A's suits and two appeals against the dismissal of his two
suits. It is seen that all the appeals were taken on the file of the High Court
but the two appeals filed by B against the decision in the suits instituted by
him were dismissed by the High Court on the grounds that one was filed beyond
the period of limitation and the other for non-prosecution. At the final
hearing the High Court took the view that the dismissal of B's two appeals,
referred to above, operated as resjudicata in the two appeals filed by B
against the decision in A's suits on the question of title to the property. It
was urged before this Court on behalf of B that the dismissal of his appeals on
the grounds of limitation and non-prosecution by the High Court does not
operate as res-judicata as the High Court cannot be considered to have 'heard
and finally decided' the question of tit,--. This contention was not accepted.
This Court referred to instances where a former suit was dismissed by a trial
court for want of jurisdiction or for default of plaintiff's appearance etc.
and pointed out that in respect of such class of cases, the decision not being
on merits, would not be res-judicata in a subsequent suit. It was further
pointed out that none of those considerations apply to a case where a decision
is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and
the appeal is dismissed on some (1)  2.S.C.R.310.
(2)  3 S.C.R. 300.
350 preliminary ground, like limitation or
default in printing.
It was held that such dismissal 'by an
appellate court has the effect of confirming the decision of the trial court on
merits, and that it amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on
the merits whatever may be the ground.
for dismissal of the appeal".
It will be seen from the above reasoning that
in order to operate as res-judicata, the previous decision must have been given
after the matter was heard and finally decided on merits. This Court has
further held' that the High Court, in that case, when it dismissed the two
appeals in' question, though on a preliminary ground of limitation or default
in printing must be considered to have heard and finally decided on merits. Far
from supporting Mr. Mukherjee's contention that a decision given in default of
appearance under any circumstance, operates as res-judicata, the above decision
lays down clearly that a previous decision to operate as res-judicata must be
one in a case heard and finally decided on merits.
To conclude Ex. 7, in our opinion, does not
operate as res- judicata even against the claim of Subasini Dasi and her sons
inasmuch as the matter was not heard and finally decided on merits after
contest by the Land Acquisition Court. We have already pointed out that if the
plea of res- judicata is not accepted the decision of the two, courts,
regarding Subasini Dasi's having in plot No. 9202 half share will have also to
In the result the appeals fait and are
dismissed. As there is no appearance for the respondents, there will be no
order, as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeals dismissed.