Jagdish Prasad Alias Jagdish Prasad
Gupta Vs. State of West Bengal [1971] INSC 344 (13 December 1971)
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
DUA, I.D.
CITATION: 1972 AIR 2044 1972 SCR (2) 845 1972
SCC (1) 326
CITATOR INFO:
F 1973 SC1379 (9) RF 1976 SC 394 (15,17) E
1980 SC1141 (8)
ACT:
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
54-Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955-Appendix B A 17.06-Public
Analyst- Failure to report on all tests-Does not make report
ineffective-Section 16(i)--Sentence-Circumstances justifying
reduction-Sanction-Bengal Municipal Act, 1932.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, manager of an Oil Mill, was
convicted under s. 7(i)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,
1954, and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment.
His appeal to the Sessions Judge was without
success and a revision to the High Court, was also dismissed. In appeal to this
Court it was contended that (i) the sanction for prosecution did not show (a)
that the Chairman of the Muni- cipality had applied his mind before giving the
sanction, (b) that it was invalid since it was not granted by the local
authority, namely, the municipality and (e) that since the resolution of the
Municipality had authorised the Chairman to give the sanction, the new Chairman
could not avail himself of that authorisation and, therefore. the trial was
vitiated for want of valid and legal sanction;
(ii) the 'report of the Public Analyst was
not a proper report in law and was bad and incomplete for failure to carry out
all the tests required under A. 17.06 of Appendix B to the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules, 1955, and also for failure to disclose the data in the
report; and (iv) the sentence awarded was harsh for a first offender.
Reducing the sentence and dismissing the
appeal,
HELD : (i) Reading ss. 20 and 51 of the
Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, the Chairman of a municipality duly authorised by
the municipality can accord sanction for prosecution of offences under the Act.
The resolution of the Municipality authorising the Chairman to perform all the
functions and exercise the powers of the local authority within the meaning of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, is not to grant power to any
particular Chairman do nominee, but, is a general power exercisable by any
Chairman, for the time being, of the municipality. The High Court has rightly
pointed out that under s. 15(2) of the Bengal Municipality Act the Municipality
is a body corporate and it has perpetual succession and, as such, any
authorisation granted by it is not limited to the Chairman then in office but
will continue unless rescinded. [848 D; G-H] (ii) It is. true that the Public
Analyst in his report has only indicated the result of the three tests out of
which two tests were as indicated in A 17.06, while, only one, namely, the saponification
test, was said to have exceeded the maximum on the strength of which the Public
Analyst reported that the sample was adulterated. Omission to report on the
other four tests does not make the report ineffective or inconclusive. Even
assuming that the other four tests are normal, if the saponification test alone
did not conform to the standards indicated in A 17.06 of Appendix B to the
Rules, the sample cannot be said to have come up to the standard and,
therefore, it is adulterated.
It is in exercise of the powers conferred by
s. 23 (i) (b) that rule 5 was made authorising standards of quality of 846 the
various articles of food specified in Appendix B to the Rules. Standards having
been fixed, any person who deals in articles of food which do not conform to
them contravenes the provisions of the Act and is liable to punishment there under.
[849 A-C; 850 E] Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants Association and others
v. Union of India & Anr., A.I.R. [1971] S.C. 2346, referred to.
If the report of the Public Analyst was not
satisfactory it was open to the appellant to make an application for sending
the sample which was in his possession to the Director. If he had made such an
application and sent the sample under s.
13(2) the certificate granted by the Director
of the Central Food Laboratory would have superseded the report given by the
Public Analyst. This has not been done. In the circumstances he has been
properly convicted. [850 H] (iv) The reason for the legislature to make exception
to the minimum of six months rigorous imprisonment prescribed under s. 16(1) is
not that the offences specified are not considered to be serious, but the
gravity of the offences, having regard to its nature can be less if there are
any special or adequate reasons. In the present case having regard to the fact
that the appellant has been on bail since 1964 for a period of nearly seven
years, and also because not only the oil sample satisfied all the tests except
one but the main person concerned in the manufacture of the oil has been acquitted,
interests of justice would be served if the sentence of one year is reduced to
two months rigorous imprisonment and the appellant is further directed to pay a
fine of Rs. 1000/-. [851 F, H]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 50 of 1969.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
December 24, 1968 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revisions No. 235 of
1966.
Nur-ur-din Ahmed, S. C. Agarwal and Indiraj
Jaisingh, for the appellant.
S.P. Mitra and G. S. Chatterjee for Sukumar
Basu for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Jaganmohan Reddy, J. This appeal is by certificate under Art. 134(1) (c) of the
Constitution. The appellant is the Manager of Sree Krishna Oil Mills,
Midnapore, the proprietor of which was one Srilal Bajoria. Both these persons
were tried jointly for an offence under S. 7(1)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954-hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The
proprietor Srilal Bajoria was acquitted but the appellant was sentenced to one
year rigorous imprisonment. The offence in respect of which the appellant was
charged was that he being the Manager of the Oil Mills for manufacturing
mustard oil was responsible for the adulteration. On July 10, 1964, at about II
A.M. the appellant was going in a truck carrying 100 tins of mustard oil and
was stopped by the Food Inspector, Kharagpore Municipality. On being 847
questioned by the Food Inspector the appellant informed him that the oil which
he was carrying was manufactured at Sree Krishna Oil Mills, Midnapore. As the
Food Inspector suspected that this oil may have been adulterated, he took three
samples according to the provisions of the Act. He sent one sample to the
Public Analyst-one he kept with himself and the third he gave to the appellant.
The Public Analyst on examining the sample sent to him reported on August 5,
1964, that saponification value of the oil was 181.6, Iodine value 107.2 and B.
R. reading at 40'C was 60.1 and was of the opinion that the sample of mustard
oil was adulterated vide Ext. 5. After obtaining the sanction for prosecution
from the Chairman of the Municipality, the appellant was prosecuted before, the
Magistrate, 1st Class, Midnapore. He pleaded not guilty but on the evidence and
the report of the Public Analyst he was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
An appeal to the Sessions Judge was without success. Thereafter the appellant
filed a revision before the High Court and that was also dismissed.
Before us the learned counsel for the
appellant has urged similar points as were urged before the High Court, namely,
(i) that the trial was vitiated for want of valid and legal sanction; (ii) that
the report of the Public Analyst was not a proper report in law and cannot form
the basis of legal conviction; and (iii) that the Public Analyst's report Was
bad and incomplete for failure to carry out all the tests required under A.
17.06 of Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, and
also for failure to disclose the data in the report.
It is contended on behalf of the appellant
that the sanction to prosecute the appellant was given by the Chairman of
Kharagpore Municipality-Shri K C. Chaki-on August 19, 1964.
This sanction did not show (a) that tile
Chairman had applied his mind before giving the sanction; (b) that it was valid
as it was not granted by the Local Authority, namely, the Municipality; and (c)
that since the resolution of the Municipality had authorised the Chairman to
give the sanction, the new Chairman cannot avail himself of that authorisation
as by that time there were fresh elections and a new Chairman was elected.
Accordingly it is submitted that the sanction given by Mr. Chaki was not a
proper sanction.
It appears to us that the challenge to the
validity of the sanction is misconceived. As pointed out by the High Court, s.
51 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, enumerates the powers of the Chairman as
under:
"Save as hereinafter provided, the
Chairman shall for the transaction of the business connected with this Act or
for the purpose of making any order authorised 848 thereby, exercise all the
powers, vested by this Act in the Commissioners and whereby any other law power
is vested in the Commissioners for any purpose, the Chairman may transact any
business or make any order authorised by that law in the exercise. of that
power, unless it is otherwise expressly provided in that law." Section 20
of the Act provides for sanction of the Local Authority for prosecutions under
the Act which includes a Municipality. Reading these two provisions together
the Chairman of a Municipality duly authorised by the Municipality can accord
sanction for prosecution of offences under the Act. In compliance with the
aforesaid power under s. 51 of the Bengal Municipal Act, the Municipality by
resolution dated July 28, 1960 authorised the Chairman "to perform all the
functions and exercise the. powers of the Local Authority within the meaning of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954." (Exe. 7). This power, it
may be noticed, is not granted to any particular Chairman E.O nominee, but is a
general power exercisable by any Chairman for the time being of the
Municipality. It is true that a fresh election of the Chairman was held after
the resolution of the Municipality but that does not deprive the new Chairman
of the power to grant sanction in under that, resolution.
The appellant in Criminal Miscellaneous
Petitions Nos. 450 & 515 of 1970 seeks permission to allow him to adduce
additional evidence to show that there was another resolution by the Kharagpore
Municipality dated August 18, 1965, which had given a, fresh authorisation to
the Chairman to grant sanctions for prosecution under the Act which would show
that the previous authorisation was not really valid when sanction was given to
prosecute the appellant. Apart from the fact that, no case has been made out to
adduce any fresh evidence, the resolution itself has been passed after the
sanction for the prosecution was. given and even that resolution as can be
noticed is in similar terms to the earlier resolution passed by the
Municipality. This subsequent resolution does not in any way indicate that the
previous power could not be availed of by the Chairman who in fact had granted
the sanction. At, the most it may have been passed by way of abundant caution,
having regard to the contentions raised during the trial of the appellant. The
High Court has pointed out, and we think rightly, that under s. 15(2) of the
Bengal Municipal Act, the Municipality is a body corporate and it has perpetual
succession, if so any authorisation granted by it is not limited to the
Chairman then in office, but will continue unless otherwise rescinded.
Nextly it has been strenuously urged before
us on behalf of the appellant that the report of the Public Analyst is not a
complete report in that out of the seven tests that he had to make under 849 A
17.06 of Appendix B to the Rules he had only made three tests and secondly the
report does not give the basis on which. the Public Analyst came to the
conclusion that the sample of the mustard oil was adulterated. It is true that
the Public Analyst in his report has only indicated the result of the three
tests out of which two tests were as indicated in A 17.06 while only one,
namely, the saponification test was said to have exceeded the maximum on the
strength of which the Public Analyst reported that the sample was adulterated.
Omission to report on the other four tests does not, in our view make the
reporter ineffective or the report inconclusive. Even assuming that the other
four tests are normal, if the saponification test alone did not conform to the
standards indicated in A 17.06 of Appendix B to the Rules the sample cannot be
said to have come up to the standard and, therefore, it is adulterated.
An attempt was made to refer us to certain
technical books and the decisions in Jagadish Chandra Jain v. Corporation of
Calcutta(1) Messrs. Netai Chandra and Surendra Nath Dey v. Corporation of
Calcutta,(2) and In re. Perumal & Co.(3) for the proposition that the
standard prescribed by A 17.06 in Appendix B to the Rules is not conclusive
because in some places mustard can yield a higher reading. We cannot allow any
fresh evidence to be used, nor do we think that the decisions referred to, even
if they justify that contention, can alter or vary the standard fixed in
exercise of the powers conferred by the Act in Appendix B to the Rules.
Section 3 of the, Act authorises the Central
Government to constitute a Committee called the Central Committee for Food
Standards to advise the Central Government and the State Governments on matters
arising out of the administration of the Act and to carry out the other
functions assigned to it under the Act. Under s. 23 ( 1 ) (b) of the Act the
Central Government may, after consultation with the Committee and subject to
the condition of previous publication, make rules "defining the standards
of quality for, and fixing the limits of variability permissible in respect of,
any article of food." It is in exercise of this power that r. 5 was made
authorising standards of quality of the various articles of food specified in
Appendix B to the Rules. In view of this provision any article of food which
does not conform to the standards specified in Appendix B to the Rules which
under s. 2 (1) of the Act is said to be adulterated because "the quality
or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its
constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed
limits of variability." The contention that the standards cannot be conformed
to by an ordinary vendor who is not versed in the technicalities is also (1) 57
C.W.N. 839.
(3) A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 47.
(2) A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 65.
850 not of significance. In this regard it
was pointed out by Shah, J., as he then was, speaking for this Court in Andhra
Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants Association and others v. Union of India &
Anr. (1) :
"The various items in the Schedule
setting out standards of quality use technical expressions with which an
ordinary, retail dealer may not be familiar, and also set out percentages of
components which the dealer with the means at his command cannot verify. But by
s. 3, the Central Government has to set up the Central Committee for Food
Standards to advise the Central and the State Governments on matters arising out
of the administration of the Act.................. Under s. 23 ( 1 ) (b) the
Central Government makes rules prescribing the standards of quality and the
limits of variability permissible in any article of food. The rules are made
after consultation with the Committee for Food Standards. The standards set out
in the Appendix to the Rules are prescribed after consultation with the
Committee for Standards." It appears to us therefore that standards having
been fixed as aforesaid any person who deals in articles of food which do not
confirm to them contravenes the provisions of the Act and is liable to
punishment there under.
It was again urged that the Public Analyst
had not given the basis for his conclusion that the saponification test did not
conform to the standards specified in A 17.06 of Appendix B to the Rules which
contention is also not tenable. Under s. 13 (5) of the Act any document
purporting to be a report signed by a Public Analyst, unless it has been
superseded under sub-s. (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate
signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence
of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under the Act or under ss. 272 to
276 of the Indian Penal Code. Under the proviso to that sub-section any
document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central
Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated
therein. If the report of the Public Analyst was not satisfactory, it was open
to the appellant to have made an application for the sample which was in his
possession to be sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for
examination. If he had made such an application and sent the sample under s. 13
(2) the certificate granted by the (1) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2346.
851 Director of the Central Food Laboratory
would have superseded the report given by the Public Analyst. This he has not
done. In the circumstances he has been properly convicted.
Lastly it has to be considered whether the
sentence awarded in the circumstances requires any modification. It was urged
that the prosecution of the appellant was prior to the amendment of sub-s. (1)
of S. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act with effect from March 1,
1965, under which the sentence has to be a minimum of six months rigorous
imprisonment, but there is no such injunction under the unlamented section and
yet the maximum sentence has been awarded to the appellant which is harsh for a
first offender. Offences under the Act being antisocial crimes affecting the
health and well-being of our people, the Legislature having regard to the trend
of courts to impose in most cases only fines or where a sentence of
imprisonment was passed a light sentence was awarded even in cases where a
severe sentence was called for, a more drastic step was taken by it in
prescribing a minimum sentence and a minimum fine to be imposed even for a
first offence. An exception was however made in cases falling under sub-cl. (i)
of cl.
(a) of s. 16(1) and in respect of an article
of food which was considered to be adulterated under s. 2 cl. (i),(i) or
misbranded under S. 2 cl. (ix) or for an offence under sub- clause (ii) of
clause (a) of S. 16(1), in which case the Court is given the discretion, for
any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned, to award a lesser sentence
than six months or impose a fine lesser than one thousand rupees or of both
lesser than the minimum prescribed. If for the offence of which the appellant
is convicted even under the amended section a lesser sentence can be awarded,
if there were adequate and special reasons, it would be much more so under the un
amended section. The reasons for the Legislature to make the exception is not
that the offences specified are not considered to be serious, but the gravity
of the offence having regard to its nature can be less if there are any special
or adequate reasons.
In our view though offences for adulteration
of food must be severely dealt with, no doubt depending on the facts of each
case which cannot be considered as precedents in other cases, in this case
having regard to the fact that the appellant has been on bail since 1964 for a
period of nearly seven years, and also because not only the mustard oil sample
satisfied all the tests except one but the main person concerned in the
manufacture of the said oil has been acquitted, interests of justice would be
served if the sentence of one year is reduced to two months rigorous
imprisonment and the appellant is further directed to pay a fine of 852 Rs.
1,000/- failing which to be directed to undergo a further term of rigorous
imprisonment for one month. We accordingly so direct.
Subject to this modification, the appeal and
the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 450 and 515 of 1970 are dismissed.
K.B.N. Appeal and petitions dismissed.
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