Tej Kiran Jain & Ors Vs. N.
Sanjiva Reddy & Ors [1970] INSC 137 (8 May 1970)
08/05/1970 HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHAH, J.C.
HEGDE, K.S.
GROVER, A.N.
RAY, A.N.
DUA, I.D.
CITATION: 1970 AIR 1573 1971 SCR (1) 612 1970
SCC (2) 272
ACT:
Constitution of India, Article
105(2)--Speeches made in Parliament by member--Extent of immunity from any
action in courts--Supreme Court appeal--Notice of lodgment--Effect of.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants filed a suit for demages in
respect of defamatory statements alleged to have been made by the respondents,
who were members of Parliament, on the floor of the Lok Sabha during a calling
attention motion. The High Court dismissed the suit holding that no proceedings
could be taken in a court of law in respect of what was said on the floor of
Parliament in view of Art. 105(2) of the Constitution. However, it certified
the case as fit for appeal to this Court under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the
Constitution.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants
by reference to the observations of this Court in Special reference No. 1 of
1964 dealing with the provisions of Art. 212, that the immunity under 'that
Article was against an alleged irregularity of procedure but not against an
illlegality, and contended that the same principle should be applied in the
present case to determine whether what was said was outside the discusion on a
calling attention motion; that the immunity granted by Art. 105(2) was to what
was relevant to the business of Parliament and not to something which was
irrelevant.
HELD : The Article confers immunity inter
alia in respect of "anything said..........in Parliament". The word
"anything" is of the widest import and is equivalent to 'everything'.
The only limitation arises from the words 'in
Parliament' which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the course of
the business of Parliament.. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and
its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that
business was immune from proceedings in any court. [615 E] Obiter : Under the
Rules of this Court an appeal has to be lodged after the certificate is granted
and a notice of lodgment of the appeal is taken out by the appellants to inform
the respondents so that they may take action considered appropriate or
necessary. After service of notice this Court treats the appeal as properly
lodged and can proceed to hear it when time can be found for hearing.
The notice which is issued is not a summons
to appear before the Court; it is only an intimation of the fact of the
lodgment of the appeal. It is for the party informed to choose whether to
appear or not. Summonses issue to defendants, to witnesses and to persons
against whom complaints are filed in a criminal court. If a summons issues to a
defendant and he does not appear the court may take the action to be undefended
and proceeding ex parte may even regard the claim of the plaintiff to be
admitted. This consequence does not flow from the notice of the lodgment of the
appeal 613 in this Court. The Court has to proceed with the appeal albeit ex
parte against the absent respondent. If a summons is. issued to a witness or to
a person complained against under-the law relating to crimes, and the witness
or the person summoned remains absent after service a warrant for his arrest
may issue. [616 A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 2572 of 1969.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
August 4, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in Suit No. 228 of 1969.
P. N. Lekhi and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant.
Niren De, Attorney-General, L. M. Singhvi, R.
H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 6.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. This is an appeal from the order, August 4, 1969, of a Full
Bench of the High Court of Delhi, 'rejecting a plaint filed by the six
appellants claiming a decree for Rs. 26,000 as damages for defamatory
statements made by Shri Sanjiva Reddy (former Speaker of the Lok Sabha), Shri
Y. B. Chavan (Home Minister) and three members of Parliament on the floor of
the Lok Sabha during a Calling Attention Motion the High Court held that no
proceedings could be taken in a court of law in respect of what was said on the
floor of Parliament in view of Art. 105(2) of the Constitution. The High Court,
however, certified the case as fit for appeal to this Court under Art. 13 3 ( 1
) (a) of the Constitution and this appeal has been brought.
Notice of the lodgement of the appeal was
issued to the respondents in due course but they have not appeared. The Union
Government which joined, at its request, as a party in the High Court alone
appeared through the Attorney General.
We have not considered it necessary to hear
the Union Government.
The facts of the case, in so far as they are
relevant to our purpose, may briefly stated. The appellants claim to be the
admirers and followers of Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Goverdan Peeth, Puri. in
March, 1969 a World Hindu Religious Conference was held at Patna. The
Shankaracharya took part in it and is reported to have observed that
untouchability was in harmony with the tenets of Hinduism and that no law could
stand in its way and to, have walked out when the National Anthem was played.
On April 2, 1969 Shri Narendra Kumar Salve,
M. P. (Detul) moved a Calling Attention Motion in the Lok Sabha and gave 614
particulars of the happening. A discussion followed and the respondents
execrated the Shankaracharya. According to the appellants, the respondents
" gave themselves upto the use of language which was more common place than
serious, more lax than dignified, more unparliamentary than sober and jokes and
puns were bandied around the playful spree, and His Holiness Jagadguru
Shankracharya Ananta Shri Vibushit Swami Shri Niranjan Deva Teertha of
Goverdhan Peeth, Puri, was made to appear as a leperous (Sic) dog".
The appellants who hold the Shankaracharya in
high esteem felt scandalised and brought the action for damages placing the
damages at Rs. 26,000. The plaint was rejected as the High Court held that it
had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
,Article 105 of the Constitution, which
defines the powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its Members,
provides :
"105 (1) Subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure
of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament.
(2)No Member of Parliament shall be liable to
any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by
him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in
respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of
Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
(3)In other respects, the powers, privileges
and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees
of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament
by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, and at the
commencement of this Constitution.
(4)The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3)
shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the
right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of
Par615 liament or any Committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of
Parliament." The High Court held that in-view of clause (2) of the Article
no proceedings could lie in any court in respect of what was said by the
respondents in Parliament and the plaint must, therefore, be rejected.
Mr. Lekhi in arguing,this appeal drew our
attention to an observation of this Court special Reference No. 1 of 1964(1),
where this Court dealing with the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution
pointed out that the immunity under that Article was against an alleged
irregularity of procedure but not against an illegality, and contended that the
same principle should be applied here to determine whether what was said was
outside the discussion on a Calling Attention Motion. According to him the
immunity granted by the second clause of the one hundred and fifth article was
to what was relevant to the business of Parliament and not to something which
was utterly irrelevant.
In our judgment it is not possible to read
the provisions of the article in the way suggested. The article means what it
says in language which could not be plainer. The article confers immunity inter
alia in respect of 'anything said........ in Parliament". The word
'anything' is of the widest import and is equivalent to 'everything'. The only
limitation arises from the words 'in Parliament' which means during the sitting
of Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament. We are concerned
only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting
and its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that
business was immune from proceedings in any court. This immunity is not only
complete but is as it should be. It is of the essence of Parliamentary system
of Government that people's representatives should be free to express
themselves without fear of legal consequences. What they say is only subject to
the discipline of the rules of Parliament, the good sense of the members and
the control of proceedings by the Speaker. The courts have no say in the matter
and should really have none.
Mr. Lekhi attempted to base arguments upon
the analogy of an Irish case and another from Massachussetts reported in May's
Parliamentary Practice. In view of the clear provisions of our Constitution we
are not required to act on analogies of other legislative bodies. The decision
under appeal was thus correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed but there
shall he no order about costs.
(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 at 455.
616 Before we leave the case we wish to refer
to the notice of the lodgment of the appeal. The suit was for Rs. 26,000 and
the certificate was granted under Art. 133 of the Constitution by the High
Court. Under the Rules of this Court an appeal has to be lodged after the certificate
is granted and a notice of lodgment of the appeal is taken out by the
appellants to inform the respondents so that they may take action considered
appropriate or necessary. After service of notice this Court treats ,the appeal
as properly lodged and can proceed to hear it when time can be found for
hearing. Without the notice the case cannot be brought to a hearing. The notice
which is issued is not a summons to appear before the Court. It is only an
intimation of the fact of the lodgment of the appeal. It is for the party
informed to choose whether to appear or not. Summonses issue to defendants, to
witnesses and to persons against whom complaints are filed in a criminal court.
If a summons issues to a defendant and he does not appear the court may take
the action to be undefended and proceeding ex parte may even regard the claim
of the plaintiff to be admitted. This consequence doenot flow from the notice
of the lodgment of the appeal in this Court. The Court has to proceed with the
appeal albeit ex parte against The absent respondent.
If a summons is issued to a witness or to ,a
person complained against under the law relating to crimes, and the witness or
the person summoned remains absent after service a warrant for his arrest may
issue. We hope that these remarks will serve to explain the true position.
R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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