Chetkar Jha Vs. Viswanath Prasad Verma
& Ors [1970] INSC 134 (7 May 1970)
07/05/1970 SHELAT, J.M.
SHELAT, J.M.
MITTER, G.K.
CITATION: 1970 AIR 1832 1971 SCR (1) 586 1969
SCC (2) 217
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226-High
Court's powersCertiorari.
Patna University. Act.3 of 1962-Appointment
of ProfessorMaster's degree a necessary qualification-Whether degree must be in
same subject in respect of which appointment made Vice-Chancellor advertising
post after obtaining approval of Chancellor--Whether must again obtain approval
if revised advertisement to be issued-Public Service Commission when may be
asked to reconsider its recommendation. Minutes of Syndicate meeting-Effect of
correction--Correction of minutes relating to earlier resolution does not
result in fresh resolution.
HEADNOTE:
The Vice-Chancellor of Patna University after
obtaining the approval of the Chancellor for filling up the vacancy for the
post of Professor of Political Science by direct recruitment, got the post
advertised through the Bihar Public Service Commission. The Public Service
Commission issued an advertisement in which the required qualification was
"first or second class Master's degree in the subject." Since the
relevant University statute had no such requirement the Vice-Chancellor got
published through the Commission another advertisement in Which the
qualification mentioned was "first or second class Master's degree in
Political Science or in an allied subject." The Commission recommended the
name of respondent No. 1 for appointment after consulting two experts, only one
of whom was Present at a the interview, the other having sent his opinion by
post.
The Syndicate of the University at its
meeting of May 7, 1963 considered the Commission's recommendation. The minutes
of the meeting as originally recorded stated the resolution said to have been
passed by a majority of 9 to 8 in the following terms : "Not to proceed
with the question of making this appointment". Construing the Syndicate's
decision to mean that the said candidate had not been approved for appointment
the Vice-Chancellor requested the Public Service, Commission to reconsider its
recommendation.
This the Commission refused to do. At the
next meeting of the Syndicate on July 3, 1963, 16 out of the 17 members who had
attended the previous meeting were present. They authorised the correction of
the minutes of the last meeting to read "not to accept the recommendation
of the Commission" in place of the words "not to proceed with the
question of making his appointment". Thereafter by resolution it appointed
respondent No. 1 to the Post in question. The appellant made a representation
to the Chancellor of the University challenging the appointment. The Chancellor
purporting to act under s.9(4) of the Patna University Act 3 of 1962 annulled
the Syndicate's resolution making the appointment on the following grounds :
(i) that the revised advertisement was unauthorised inasmuch as itwas against
the statute and sought to amend it. as also because it was issued without the
prior approval of the Chancellor; (ii) that since only one of the experts
associated with the selection was present at the interviews s.26(2) of the Act
was violated: (iii) that the Vice-Chancellor's action in referring the. matter
for reconsideration by the Commission was without the authority of the
syndicate and was not warranted under s 26(4) (iv) 587 that under a prior
resolution of the syndicate a decision taken at its meeting could not be
revised for a period of six months there from; therefore its resolution of May
7, 1963 not accepting the recommendation regarding the respondent could not be
substituted by its resolution dated July 3, 1963 by which he was appointed.
Respondent No. 1 challenged the Chancellor's order in High Court which held it
to be invalid. In appeal by certificate,
HELD : (i) In a writ petition for certiorari
a superior court would not interfere on the mere ground of an error of fact or
even of law, but it: the error of law is apparent on the, record' or consists
of a misconstruction of a law on which assumption of jurisdiction is made which
otherwise does not exist. a certiorari can issue. In the instant case the
Chancellor on the four grounds on which he annulled the Syndicate's resolution
appropriated to himself the jurisdiction to interfere which he did not have
under s.
9(4) of the Act. The High Court rightly held
that the Chancellor's assumption of jurisdiction was based on a wrong
interpretation of the statute and that there was an apparent error of law on
the record. [592 D-E] (ii)Under s. 85 of the Patna 'University Act, 1962 until
statutes. Ordinances, Regulations and Rules were made under the Act,
Regulations made under the Bihar State University Act 14, 1960 were to continue
to be in force. That statute did not say that the Master's degree which a
candidate for the post of Professor was required to possess had to be 'in the
subject' for which the candidate would be appointed..
Therefore in issuing the revised
advertisement the ViceChancellor did not purport to modify or alter the statute
relating to the qualifications but on the contrary clarified the correct
position. The Chancellor could not on a wrong interpretation of the statute
hold that the revised advertisement was a modification of the statute. [592
G-H;
593 G-H] The Vice-Chancellor had obtained the
approval of the Chancellor for filling up the vacancy by direct recruitment and
also for the advertisement in terms of the statute.
Once such an approval had been obtained no
further approval was necessary for the various consequential steps which would'
have to be taken to bring about the appointment and fill up the vacancy
including revision of the advertisement for bringing it into conformity with
the statute. The Chancellor was therefore wrong in holding that the revised
advertisement required his approval. [594 D-G] (iii)Section 26(2) (iii) of the
Act does not say that the experts required to be 'associated' with the
selection had to be present at the interviews. No such reference could be drawn
from the provision that they would not have the right to vote. The Chancellor
was therefore in error when he held that the recommendation of the Commission
was invalid because one of the experts consulted was not present at the
interviews. [595 A-F] (iv)It is only when the Syndicate declines to accept the
recommendation of the Commission that the question of sending back the matter
for reconsideration arises under S.
26(4). There can be no question of sending
back the matter when the Syndicate either accepts the recommendation or decides
not to proceed with making the appointment. There was ample material on record
to show that on May 7, 1963 the Syndicate in fact decided not to accept the.
commission's recommendation. At its subsequent meeting the Syndicate corrected
the minutes to this effect. The Vice-Chancellor had rightly understood the
Syndicate's decision and for reconsideration. [595 H-596 E] 588 When a decision
is taken at a meeting and is minute and such minutes are signed by the Chairman
they become prima facie evidence of what took place at the meeting. After such
signature the minutes cannot be altered. But before the minutes are signed they
can be altered if found to be inaccurate or not in accord with what was
actually decided.
If ,,that were not so it would result in
great hardship and inconvenience for however inaccurate they are, they cannot
be altered to bring them in conformity with the actual decision. This was
precisely what was done at the meeting of July 3, 1963 [597 A-D] The view of
the Chancellor that the alteration of the minutes on July 3, 1963 constituted a
revision or rescission of the earlier decision or that such revision or
recession could not be made before the expiry of six months as provided by the
rule passed by the Syndicate. was unsustainable. [597 G-H]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.: CiVil Appeal
No. 2221 of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
March 8, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 1554 of 1964.
B. P. Jha, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, S. S. Jauhar, K. K. Sinha and
Manish Kumar Sinha, for respondent No. 1.
Sarjoo Prasad, R. N. Sinha and U. P. Singh,
for respondents Nos. 3 to 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J. This appeal, by certificate, is directed against, the judgment of
the High Court of Patna dated March 8, 1965, whereby it set aside the order of
the Chancellor of the University of Patna dated September 26, 1964 passed under
S.
9(4) of the 'Patna University Act, III of
1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
On the retirement of one Dr. Muhar as the
University Professor of Political Science a permanent vacancy occurred in that
post. The Vice-Chancellor of the University, after obtaining the approval of
the Chancellor for filling up the vacancy by direct recruitment, got the post
advertised through the Bihar Public Service Commission. In his letter
requesting the approval, the 'Vice-Chancellor had stated that he did not
propose to lay down any qualifications in addition to those prescribed under
the. relevant University Statute. The advertisement, as published by the
Commission, announced the necessary qualifications as under:
"First or second class Master's degree
in the subject of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a
foreign university . . . . ." 5 8 9 A little later, the Vice-Chancellor
got published through the Commission another advertisement amending the earlier
advertisement. The revised advertisement stated the required qualifications. as
under :
"First or second class Master's degree
in Political Science or in an allied subject like History or Economics of an
Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign
university-." As required by the Act, the State Public Service Commission
had to recommend name or names of the candidates for them appointment. For this
purpose two experts in the subject, Dr. M. P. Sharma of the Saugar University
and Dr. Bhaskaran of the Madras University, were to assist the Commission. At
the interviews of the candidates taken by, the Commission on March 4, 1963 Dr.
Sharma was present, but the other expert could not attend. His views,
therefore, had to be communicated to the Commission by post. The Commission
recommended respondent I herein as the candidate suitable for the post.
On May 7, 1963, the Syndicate of the
University which had by that time been constituted under the Act, held its
meeting to consider the Commission's recommendation. The minutes of the
meetings, as drawn up, stated the resolution said to have been passed by a
majority of 9 to 8 in the following terms "Not to proceed with the
question of making this appointment." As appearing from subsequent events,
it would seem that the said minutes were not correctly drafted. The ViceChancellor
also appears to have understood that the decision taken at the said meeting was
that the Commission's recommendation was not acceptable to the Syndicate and
not that the Syndicate was not to proceed with the question of making the
appointment. Accordingly, at his instance, the Registrar of the University, by
his letter dated June 11, 1963, informed the Commission that the Syndicate had
resolved not to accept its recommendation and he had, therefore, to request the
Commission to reconsider its aforesaid recommendation under s. 26(4) of the
Act. On June 22, 1963, the Commission wrote back to say that it found no reason
to reconsider its earlier recommendation. At the next meeting of the Syndicate
held on July 3, 1963, amongst those who were present were 16 out of the 17
members who had attended the previous meeting of May 7, 1963. When the minutes
of the previous meeting were placed for confirmation it was found that the
minutes as drafted, namely, "not to proceed with the question of making
this appointment" did not represent the resolution which was 590 actually
passed. Those words were, therefore, scored out and instead the words "not
to accept the recommendation of the Commissioner were substituted so as to
bring the minutes in conformity with the resolution actually passed.
Thereafter the meeting considered the Commission's
recommendation and appointed respondent 1 to the post of University Professor
for Political Science by a majority of 10 to 3 with four abstentions. That the
Vice Chancellor to let him have his comments on the points raised minutes as
drafted did not incorporate the resolution actually passed on May 7, 1963 is
indicated by the fact that in his representation to the Chancellor even the
appellant himself stated that the Syndicate on May 7, 1963 had decided not to
accept the Commission's recommendation. The appellant did not state in that
representation that the Syndicate had resolved not to proceed with the making
of the appointment.
Another circumstance indicating that the said
minutes were not correctly drafted was that while the items of confirmation
came up before the Syndicate on July 3, 1963, which, as aforesaid, was attended
by 16 out of the 17 members who had participated in the previous meeting, none
of those 16 members appears to have protested against the change in the
language of the minutes on the ground that the resolution then passed was that
the Syndicate would not proceed with the appointment, or that the resolution a
actually passed-was not one refusing to accept the Commission's recommendation
of respondent 1.
Against the resolution dated July 3, 1963
appointing respondent 1, the appellant and Dr. L. P. Sinha, the Head of the
Department of Political Science, made representations to the Chancellor.
Thereupon the Chancellor first called upon the Vice Chancellor to let him have
' his comments on the points raised in the said representations. On July 15,
1963, the Vice-Chancellor furnished his comments. Thereafter the Chancellor
issued show cause notice to the appellant and the Vice-Chancellor and after
receiving their replies as also the report of the Legal Affairs Committee
appointed by the Syndicate passed the impugned order under S. 9(4) of the Act
annulling the Syndicate's resolution of July 3, 1963 by which the appointment
of respondent I was made.
Shortly stated the grounds on which the
impugned order was passed were, :
(1)(a) that the revised advertisement, which
substituted the words "in the subject" by the words "in
Political Science or in any allied subject Eke History and Economics", had
the effect of amending the University Statute laying down the qualifications
for the post, that such an amendment could only be made by framing a new
statute under ss. 30 and 31 of the Act and not 591 unilaterally by the
Vice-Chancellor, and that therefore, the revised advertisement was invalid;
(b)that the words in the University Statute,
namely, that the University Professor "shall possess a first or second
class Master's degree" meant a Master's degree "in the subject";
consequently, the original advertisement was in conformity with the University
Statute relating to the qualifications, and therefore, the revised advertisement
by substituting the words "in the subject" by the words "in
political Science or in any allied subject" etc. had the effect of
amending the Statute and was unauthorised;
(c) that the revised advertisement was also
bad, in that, the Vice-Chancellor could not alter the original advertisement
without the previous approval of the Chancellor under s. 57 of the Act;.
(2)that s. 26(2) of the Act contemplates that
the Public Service Commission should take the assistance of two experts before
making its recommendation, that the section required that the experts should be
present at the time when the Commission took the interviews of the candidates,
that the interviews, in the absence of one of the two experts, were not valid,
that therefore, a recommendation based on such invalid interviews and following
such recommendation the appointment made by the Syndicate were both invalid;
(3)that on a recommendation made by the
Commission, the Syndicate had three options, (a) to accept it and proceed to
make the appointment, (b) to reject it and refer the matter to the Commission
for reconsideration, and (c) to give up the idea of making the appointment at
all; that it was only in the case of (b.) that the matter could be referred
back to the Commission under s. 26 (4). The Vice-Chancellor's action in
referring the matter for reconsideration by the Commission was without the
authority of the Syndicate and was not warranted under s. 26(4) :
(4)that under a prior resolution of the
Syndicate dated November 13, 1952, a decision taken at the meeting could not be
revised for a period of six months there from.
Consequently, the decision taken by the Syndicate
at its meeting on May 7, 1963 not to proceed with the appointment could not be
revised by the Syndicate before the expiry of six months, and that therefore,
the Syndicate's resolution of July 3, 1963 was invalid.
592 In the writ petition filed by respondent
against the impugned order of the Chancellor the High Court quashed the said
order and issued a certiorari on the ground that the order in question was
passed on an erroneous interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act and
the University Statute.
In challenging the correctness and validity
of the High Court's order, counsel for the appellant contended before us that
the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the certiorari as the impugned
order did not involve any question of either the assumption of excessive
jurisdiction or a refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any illegality in
procedure or any breach of the principles of natural justice. The High Court,
he argued, could not in exercise of its prerogative jurisdiction under Art. 226
interfere with or set aside the impugned order on the ground of a mistake even
if such a mistake was one of law, that is to say, in the Chancellor's
interpretation either of the University Statute or any of the provisions of the
Act. It is true that in a writ petition for certiorari a superior court would
not interfere on the mere ground of an error of fact or even of law, but if the
error of law is apparent on the record, or consists of a misconstruction of a
law on which assumption of Jurisdiction is made which otherwise does not exist,
a certiorari can issue. The question, therefore, is : whether in the instant
case that was the position ? The question, in other words, would be whether the
Chancellor, on the four grounds on which he annulled the Syndicate's
resolution, appropriated to himself the jurisdiction to interfere which he did
hot have under S.
9(4) of the Act.
Under s. 58 of the Act, until Statutes,
Ordinances, Regulations and Rules were made under the Act, Regulations made
under the Bihar State Universities Act, XIV of 1960, which were In force
immediately before the commencement of the present Act, were to continue to be
in force and were to be deemed to be Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and
Rules made under the corresponding provisions of this Act. Ch.
XII of the Statutes made under the earlier
Act and which was in force immediately before the commencement of the Act, was,
therefore, to continue in force and was deemed to have been made under the
present Act. Under that Statute, the qualifications for the post of a
University Professor were inter alia "a first or a second class Mastees
degree of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign
University". The Statute, it will be noticed, did not lay down that the
Master's degree had to be "in the subject" for which the candidate
would. be appointed.
Apparently, the question whether the
concerned candidate was proficient in the subject for which he had-applied for
appointment was left for decision by the appointing authority. Under Ch. XIV of
the Statute, whenever an 593 appointment had to be made the Vice-Chancellor had
the power with the approval of the Chancellor to decide whether the post should
be filled up by promotion or by direct recruitment.
There is no dispute that the Vice-Chancellor
had obtained such approval and the post was to be filled up by direct
recruitment. As required 'by s. 26(1) of the Act, appointments of teachers and
professors of the University could only be made on the recommendations made by
the State Public Service Commission. Accordingly, the Vice-Chancellor sent to
the Commission a requisition for advertisement for the post. In that
requisition he set out, without any words of, limitation or additional
qualifications, Ch. XII of the Statutes which laid down the qualifications. In
the advertisement issued 'by the Commission, however, that body introduced the
words "in the subject" announcing thereby that the candidate must
possess a first or second class Master's degree in Political Science. The
insertion of those words of limitation clearly was not in conformity either
with, the requisition sent by the Vice-Chancellor or with Ch. XII of the
Statute s and actually debarred candidates with first or second class Master's
degrees in subjects other than Political Science. Such a restriction was not
consistent with the Statute in Ch. XII laying down the qualifications.
It was obviously to correct this error on the
part of the Corn mission that the Vice-Chancellor caused the revised
advertisement to be, issued by the Commission in which it was clarified that candidates
not only with first or second class M. A'. degrees in Political Science but
those with such degrees in allied subjects such as History and Economics could
also apply. The record shows that this fact was explained to the Chancellor by
the Vice Chancellor and the then Chancellor had at that time raised no
objection.
As appears from the Vice-Chancellor's reply
to the show cause notice issued by the Chancellor, this very interpretation of
the Statute had been given in the past on a number of occasions and several
appointments had been made without any objection from anybody. The revised
advertisement was thus made to clarify the position that under the Statute
laying down the qualifications for the post it was not as if an eligible
candidate could be the one who held the M.A.
degree in Political Science only. Since the
post was for a professorship in Political Science, the revised advertisement
stated that candidates with first or second class M.A. degree in Political
Science as also in an allied subject could apply. In doing so the
Vice-Chancellor did not purport to modify or alter the Statute relating to
qualifications as was the view of the Chancellor, but on the contrary,
clarified the correct position and gave a correct interpretation to the Statute
in question. The Chancellor, therefore, could not, an a wrong 13Sup. Cl/70-9. 594
interpretation of the Statute, held that the revised advertisement was a
modification of that Statute, that it was, therefore, invalid, and that
therefore, he had the jurisdiction to nullify the Syndicate's resolution of
July 3, 1963 under S. 9(4) of the Act. Sec. 9(4) authorises the Chancellor to
nullify the Syndicate's resolution provided only if the Syndicate's proceedings
were not in conformity with the Act or the Statute.
Under S. 57 of the Act, which deals with
transitory provisions, the Vice-Chancellor had, for a period of six months from
the date of the commencement of the Act, the power to discharge all the
function of the University for carrying out the purposes of the Act and to
exercise powers and perform the duties of any officer or authority of the
University. subject, of course, to the previous approval of the Chancellor.
This provision was made to carry on the university and its functions till the
other authorities such as the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council
were duly constituted under the new Act. The appointment of a University
Professor in place of Dr. Muhar was obviously one of the functions of the
University, which, subject to the Chancellor's approval, had to be performed by
the ViceChancellor. Admittedly, the Vice-Chancellor had obtained such approval
for filling up the vacancy by direct recruitment and also for the
adver-tisement in terms of the Statute laving down the qualifications for the
post. Once, therefore, such an approval had been obtained, no further approval
would be necessary for the various consequential steps which would have to be
taken to bring about the appointment and fill in the vacancy. Furthermore, the
revision in the advertisement became necessary because the advertisement given
by the Commission was not in conformity with the University Statute and the
requisition made by the Vice-Chancellor for which he had already obtained the
Chancellor's approval. In other words, he had the advertisement revised so as
to bring it in accord with his requisition which was sanctioned by the
Chancellor. That could only be done by removing the limitation under which
contrary to the Statute only candidates with M.A. degrees in Political Science
could apply. The Chancellor, therefore, was in error in holding that the
revised advertisement required his approval and that in the absence of such
approval it was invalid or that the Commission's recommendation and the
appointment by the Syndicate based thereon were bad in law on that account.
The second ground on which the Chancellor'
nullified the appointment was, in our view, equally unsustainable. Under s.
26(2), the Commission had to have the assistance of two experts in the subject
for which an appointment was to be made. Cl. (iii)of that sub-section provides
that such experts "shall be associated" with the Commission, whose
duty it shall be to give, expert advice to the Commission but who shall have no
right to vote. The Chancellor, in our opinion, read more in this sub-section
than what it contains or requires. The subsection merely requires that the two
experts shall be "associated" with the Commission before it mad&
its recommendation. It does not say that such association can only be by their
presence at the time of the interviews. If that were so, it was easy for the
Legislature to provide that the expert or experts shall remain present at the
time of the interviews. The benefit of expert advice can be had both by the
experts remaining present at the time of the interviews and also by their
advice communicated to the Commission by post or otherwise. There is nothing in
cl.
(iii) suggesting that only the first method
was the one which was intended. On the contrary, the deliberate use of the word
"associated" indicates that the Legislature thought that such advice
could made available by both,. the methods.
The Legislature appears to have left the
method of obtaining such advice to the Commission for it is possible that by
making their presence at the interviews compulsory, the Commission might in
conceivable cases lose the benefit of really competent experts residing at
distant places, not to say of those outside the country. The, denial of the
right to vote to the experts has nothing to, do with their having to be present
or not. What is sought by the clause, is that even if the experts happen to be
present they cannot affect the decision of the Commission which is the
exclusive decision of that body. The Chancellor clearly misinterpreted cl.
(iii) of s. 26(2) when he thought that the denial of the right to vote to the
experts therein indicated that they were required to be present at the time of
the interviews. Admittedly, the Commission, as required by cl. (iii), had the
benefit of the advice of both the experts. The experts were, therefore,
"associated" with the Commission and consequently the requirements of
that clause were fulfilled, despite one of them not being present at the time
of the interviews. The Chancellor was, therefore, in error when he held that
the recommendation of the Commission was invalid, and therefore, the
appointment based on it was also. invalid.
Grounds 3 and 4 of the Chancellor involve a
common question and may conveniently be dealt with together. It is true, as the
Chancellor said, that on the recommendation made by the Commission the
Syndicate could adopt any one of the three courses, viz., to accept it, or to
decline to accept it and refer back the recommendation to the Commission for
reconsideration, or not to proceed with making the appointment. It is equally
true, that it is only in the case of the second course 'that the matter could
be sent back for reconsideration under s. 26(4), for, obviously in the case of
the syndicate accepting the recommendation or 596 refusing to proceed to make
the appointment, the question of sending back the matter for reconsideration
does not arise at all. The point for consideration, therefore, is : which
particular course did the Syndicate adopt at the meeting of May 7, 1963 ? There
is abundant material on record to show that on May 7, 1963 the Syndicate in
fact decided not to accept the Commission's recommendation. But the minutes, as
drafted-and placed for confirmation before the meeting of July 3, 1963, were not
only not in accord with that decision but through mistake or inadvertence had
recorded something quite different. This was found out when the minutes were
placed before the meeting for confirmation. They were, therefore, corrected by
scoring out the incorrect portion and substituting it by words incorporating
the decision that the Syndicate did not accept the Commission's recommendation.
As already stated, this position is borne out by the fact that though there
were present in that meeting as many as 16 members who had participated in the
previous meeting none of them protested to the alteration in the minutes nor,
did any one of them say that the decision taken on May 7, 1963 was not one of
refusal to accept the Commission's recommendation. Therefore, if the
Syndicate's decision was not to accept the Commission's recommendation it Lad
to refer under S. 26(4) the matter back to the Commission, the words of sub-s.
(4) of s. 26 in that regard being mandatory. 1. seems that the Vice-Chancellor
had also understood that the Syndicate's decision of May 7, 1963 was not to
accept the Commission's recommendation and it was because he had so understood
that he got the Registrar on June 11, 1963 to refer the matter back to the
Commission.
The question then is whether the minutes, as
drafted and placed before the meeting on July 3, 1963, could be altered as was
done on that day. The alteration clearly was not of a minor or a clerical error
but constituted a substantial change. Minutes of a meeting are recorded to
safeguard against future disputes as to what had taken place thereat.
They are a record of the fact that a meeting
was held and of the decision taken thereat. Usually they are written up after
the termination of the meeting, often from rough notes taken by the person who
is to draft them and then are placed before the 'next meeting for what is
generally known as "confirmation", though they are placed for
verification and not for confirmation. Indeed, there is no question of any
confirmation at the next meeting of a decision already taken, for, a decision
once taken does not require any confirmation. Accordingly, when minutes of a
meeting are placed before the next meeting the only thing that can be done is
to see whether the decision taken at the earlier meeting has been properly
recorded or not. The accuracy of the minutes and not the validity of the
decision is, therefore, before the meeting. Once a decision is duly taken it 5
9 7 can only be changed by a substantive resolution properly adopted for such a
change. When, therefore, a decision is taken and is minute and such minutes are
signed by the Chairman they become prima facie evidence of what took place at
the meeting. In the case of company meetings, every meeting of directors or
managers in respect of whose proceedings minutes have been so made is deemed to
have been properly held and convened and all proceedings had there to have been
duly had and all appointments of directors, managers or liquidators are deemed
to be valid unless the contrary is proved. (cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd
ed., vol. 6, p. 318). This is the position when minutes have been signed by the
Chairman. After such signature they cannot be altered. But before the minutes
are signed they can be altered if found to be inaccurate or not in accord with
what was actually decided. If that were not to be so, it would result in great
hardship and inconvenience, for, however, inaccurate they are, they cannot be
altered to bring them in conformity with the actual decision. [cf.
Talbot, W.F., Company Meetings, (1951 ed.),
p. 82]. This was precisely what was done at the meeting of July 3, 1963 and no
objection to the course adopted then by the Chairman and the Syndicate could be
validly taken particularly as none present then had raised any protest against
the alteration. The decision relied on by Mr. Jha in re Bother ham Alum and
Chemical Company(1) is altogether on a different question and cannot be of any
assistance.
Since the Vice-Chancellor was, right in his
understanding that what had been decided at the meeting of May 7, 1963 was not
to accept the Commission's recommendation and since such refusal to accept
meant under s. 26(4) that the matter should be sent back to the Commission for
recommendation, his action in asking the Commission to reconsider clearly fell
under s. 26(4) and could not be said to be unwarranted as the, Chancellor
ruled. Since that was actually the decision of the Syndicate, the
Vice-Chancellor was bound to follow it up by writing to the Commission to
reconsider its recommendation. It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the
Chancellor's observation that action was unwarranted as it was without the
Syndicate's sanction. Once the Syndicate had taken the decision of not
accepting the recommendation, it was obligatory under s. 26(4) to refer back
the matter to the Commission. The action taken by the Vice-Chancellor was
consequential and required no further sanction of the Syndicate. Equally
unsustainable was the view of the Chancellor that the alteration in the minutes
on July 3, 1963 constituted a revision or a recession of the earlier decision
or that such revision or remission could not be made before the expiry of six
months as provided by the rule passed by the Syndicate in 1952. In our view 598
the revised advertisement, the remission of the matter to the Commission, the
recommendation of respondent by the Commission and the proceedings of the
Syndicate's meeting of July 3, 1963 including the revision of the draft minutes
were all in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the University
Statutes and therefore the Chancellor had no jurisdiction under s. 9(4) of the
Act to annul the decision of the, Syndicate or the proceedings of the meeting
of July 3, 1963.
In the result, the High Court was right in
holding the annulling ,order of the Chancellor to be without jurisdiction as it
was passed ,on a wrong assumption of jurisdiction made on a misinterpretation
,of the Act and the University Statute. The High Court accordingly was
justified on that ground as also on the ground that there was an apparent error
of law on the record to quash the impugned order of the Chancellor. The appeal,
therefore, fails and is dismissed. Each party will bear his own costs.
G. C. Appeal dismissed.
Back
