Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & ANR
Vs. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors [1969] INSC 126 (25 April 1969)
25/04/1969 HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M.
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA HEGDE, K.S.
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION: 1970 AIR 192 1970 SCR (1) 358 1969
SCC (2) 283
CITATOR INFO:
R 1970 SC1292 (7) RF 1971 SC 231 (6) R 1972
SC1061 (89,100,139,174) RF 1972 SC1148 (5) RF 1972 SC2205 (21) RF 1973 SC1461
(596) R 1974 SC1069 (63) RF 1975 SC1116 (3) RF 1975 SC2299 (190,607) R 1977
SC1686 (6) R 1978 SC 803 (26) R 1979 SC1550 (14,19) E 1984 SC1291 (12) RF 1984
SC1780 (11) F 1985 SC1683 (6,7) RF 1988 SC 587 (15) R 1989 SC 516 (30) F 1990
SC 781 (47)
ACT:
Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, s.
73-Levy of 'rate' on tax and buildings-'Rate' held not to include tax on
capital value or percentage of capital value-Defect sought to be removed by
Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act, 1963-Enactment
of s. 99 of Gujarat Municipalities Act to give power to municipalities to levy
tax on capital value or percentage of capital value of lands and
buildings-Power of State Legislature under item 49 List II of Seventh Schedule
to Constitution levy tax on capital value of buildings-Efficacy of Validating
Act-Principles on which retrospective validation can be upheld..
HEADNOTE:
Section 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs
Act, 1925 allows the municipality to levy 'a rate on building or lands or both
situate within the municipality'. The Rules under the Act applied the rates on
the basis of the percentage on the capital value of lands and buildings. In
Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmadabad, [1964] 2
S.C.R. 608 this Court held that the term 'rate' must be given the special
meaning it had acquired in English law and must be confined to an impost on the
basis of the annual letting value; it could not be validly levied on the basis
of capital value though capital value could be used for the purpose of working
out the annual letting value. Faced with this decision the Gujarat Legislature
passed the Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act,
1963. By s. 3 of this Act past assessment and collection of 'rate' on lands and
buildings on the basis of capital value or a percentage of capital value was
declared valid despite any judgment of a court or Tribunal to the contrary, and
future assessment and collection on the basis of capital value for the period
before and after the Validation Act was authorised. At the same time s. 99 was
enacted in the Gujarat Municipalities Act to provide for the levy of a tax on
lands and buildings "to be based on the annual letting value or the
capital value or a percentage of capital value of the buildings or lands or
both." Appellant No.1 was a company carrying on the manufacturers of
cotton goods at Broach. It was assessed for the assessment years 1961-62,
1962-63 and 1963-64 to a rate on lands and buildings under s. 73 of the Bombay
Municipal Boroughs Act on the basis of a percentage of the capital value. It
filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the said assessments. After
the Validation Act of 1963 was passed it amended the petitions to challenge the
validity and efficaciousness of s. 3 of the said Act. The High Court dismissed
the writ petitions. Appeals with certificate were filed before this Court.
HELD : (i) When a legislature sets out to
validate a tax declared by a court to be illegally collected under an
ineffective or invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be
removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most
important condition is that the legislature must possess the power to impose
the tax, for if it does not, the action must ever remain ineffective and
illegal. Granted legislative competence it is not sufficient to declare merely
that the decision of the 389 court shall not bind, for that is tantamount to
reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the legislature does
not possess or exercise. A Court's decision must always bind unless the conditions
on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not
have been given in the altered circumstances. [392 H-393 8] Ordinarily, a court
holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the
statute or the 'rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create
jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the
grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in
fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by providing
for jurisdiction where jurisdiction has not been properly invested before.
Sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing
provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand under
the re-enacted law. Sometimes the legislature gives it own meaning and
interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative
flat makes the new meaning binding on courts. The legislature may follow any
one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of
the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of
the law. [393B-D] Whichever method is adopted it must be within the competence
of the legislature and legal and adequate to attain the object of validation.
If the legislature has the power over the subject-matter and competence to make
a valid law, it can at. any time make such a valid law and make it
retrospectively so -as to bind even past transaction. The validity of a
Validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the legislature possesses the
competence which it claims over the subject-matter and whether in making the
validation it removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law
and makes adequate provisions in Validating law for a valid imposition of the
tax. [393D-F] (ii) After this Court's decision in Sudhir Chandra Nawn's case it
could no longer be questioned that the State Legislature had power under entry
49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to levy a tax on the
capital value of lands and buildings. It was open to the State legislature to
authorise the municipality to levy the same tax indicating the mode of levy.
This the legislature had done by enacting s. 99 of the Gujarat Municipalities
Act and by indicating the different modes which may be adopted in making the
levy, one such mode being a percentage of the capital value. [394C-E] Sudhir
Chandra Nawn v. Wealth-tax Officer, Calcutta, A.I.R.
1969 S.C. 59, applied.
(iii) The legislature by the Validation Act
provided for the following matters. First, it stated that no tax or 'rate by
whichever name called and laid on the capital value of lands and buildings must
be deemed to be invalidly assessed, imposed, collected or recovered simply on
the ground that a rate is based on the annual letting value.
Next it provided that the tax must be deemed
to be validly assessed, imposed, collected or recovered and the imposition must
be deemed to be always so authorised. The legislature by this enactment
retrospectively imposed the tax on lands and buildings based on their capital
value and as the tax was already imposed, levied and collected on that basis,
made the imposition, levy collection and recovery of the tax valid, notwithstanding
the declaration by the court that as 'rate', the levy was incompetent. The
legislature not only equated the tax collected to a tax on lands and buildings
which it had the power to levy, but also to a rate giving a new meaning to the
word 'rate' Sup.C.I/69-11.
390 and while doing so it put out of action
the effect of the decisions of the courts to the contrary. The exercise of
power by the legislature was valid because the legislature does possesses the
power to levy a tax on lands and buildings based on capital value thereof and
in validating the levy on that basis, the implication of the word 'rate' could
be effectively removed and the tax on lands and buildings imposed instead. The
tax therefore could no longer be questioned on the ground that s. 73 spoke of a
rate and the imposition was not a rate as properly understood but a tax on
capital value. [394F-395E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals.
Nos. 2197 and 2198 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
September 10, 1966 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos.
846 of 1963 and 765 of 1964.
A. K. Sen, A. K. Verma, D. Datta and Ravinder
Narain, for the appellants (in both the appeals).
M. C. Chagla and I. N. Shroff, for the
respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in both the appeals).
B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 3
(in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. These matters arise under Art. 226 of the Constitution and
are appeals by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat against its
judgment and order, September 10, 1966. The appellant No. 1 is a Company which
has spinning and weaving mills at Broach and manufactures and sells cotton yarn
and cloth. Respondent No. 1 is the Broach Borough Municipality constituted
under S. 8 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. In the assessments years
1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64 the Municipality purporting to act under s. 73 of
the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 and the Rules made thereunder imposed a
purported rate on lands and buildings belonging to the respondent at a certain
percentage of the capital value.
Section 73 of the Act allows the Municipality
to levy "a rate on buildings or lands or both situate within the municipal
borough". The Rules under the Act applied the rates on the basis of the
percentage on the capital value of lands and buildings., The assessments lists
were published and tax was imposed according to the rates calculated on the
basis of the capital value of the property of the appellant and bills in
respect of the tax were served. The writ petitions were filed to question the
assessment and to get the assessment cancelled.
During the pendency of the writ petitions the
legislature of Gujarat passed the Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities
(Validation) Act, 1963. As a result the writ petitions were amen391 ded and the
Validation Act was also questioned. The appellants also filed a second writ
petition questioning the validity of the Validation Act under Arts. 19(1)(f),
(g) and 265 of the Constitution. By the order under appeal here both the writ
petitions were dismissed although a certificate of fitness was granted.
The Validation Act was presumably passed
because of the, decision of this Court reported in Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas
v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmadabad(1). In that case the validity of the Rules
framed by the Municipal Corporation under s, 73 were called in question,
particularly Rule 350A for rating open lands which provides that the rate on
the area of open lands shall be levied at 1 per centum on the valuation based
upon capital value.
Dealing with the word 'rate' as used in these
statutes, it was held by this Court that the word 'rate' had acquired a special
meaning in English legislative history and practice and also in Indian
legislation and it meant a tax for local purposes imposed by local authorities.
The basis of such tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings. It was
discussed in the case that there were three methods by which the rates could be
imposed : the first was to take into account the actual rent fetched by the
land or building where it was actually let the second was,. where it was not
let, to take rent based on hypothetical tenancy, particularly in the case of
buildings; and the third was where neither of these two modes was available, by
valuation based on, capital value from which annual value had to be found by
applying suitable percentage which might not be the same for lands and
buildings. It was held that in S. 73 the word 'rate' as used must have been
used in the special sense in which the word was understood in the legislative
practice of India before that date. Rule350A Which laid the rate on land at a
percentage of the valuation based upon capital was therefore declared ultra vires
the Act itself. In short, the word 'rate' was given a specialised meaning and
was held to mean a kind of imposition the annual letting value of property, if
actually let out, and on a notional letting value if' the property was not let
out. The legislature of Gujarat then passed the Validation Act seeking to
validate the imposition or the tax as well as to avoid any future
interpretation of the Act on the lines on which Rule 350A was construed. The
Act came into force on January 29, 1964.
After defining the expressions used in the
Act and providing for its application, the Act enacted S. 3 which concerned
validation of impositions and collections of taxes or rates by Municipalities
in certain cases. That section reads as.
follows "3. Validation of imposition and
collection of taxes or rates by municipalities in certain cases.
(1) [1954] 2 S.C.R. 608.
392 Notwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal or any other authority, no tax
or rate assessed or purporting to have been assessed by a municipality under
the relevant municipal law or any rules made there under on the basis of the
capital value of a building or land, as the case may be or on the basis of a
percentage of such capital value, or recovered by the municipality commencement
of this Act shall be deemed to invalidly assessed, imposed, collected or
recovered by reason of the assessment being based on the capital value or the
percentage of the capital value, and not being based on the annual letting value,
of the building or land, as the case may be, and the imposition, collection and
recovery of the tax or rate so assessed and the provisions of the rules made
under the relevant municipal law under which the tax or rate was so assessed
shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall not be
called in question merely on the ground that the assessment of the tax or rate
on the basis of the capital value of the building or land, as the case may be,
or on the basis of a percentage of such capital value was not authorised by
law; and accordingly any tax or rate, so assessed before the commencement of
this Act and leviable for a period prior to such commencement but not collected
or recovered before such commencement, may be collected and recovered in
accordance with the relevant municipal law, and the rules made there under."
If this section is valid then the imposition cannot be questioned and the short
question which arises in this case is as to the validity of this section. It is
not denied that a legislature does possess the power to validate statutes and
to pass retrospective laws. It is, however,, contended that the Validation Act
is ineffective in carrying out its avowed object. This is the only point which
falls for consideration in these appeals.
Before we examine s. 3 to find out whether it
is effective in its purpose or not we may say a few words about validating
statutes in general. When a legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by
a court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the
cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can
be said to take place effectively. The most important condition, of course, is
that the legislature must possess the power to impose the tax, for, if it does
not, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal.
Granted legis393 lative competence, it is not
sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for
that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power
which the legislature does not possess or exercise. A court's decision must
always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally
altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered
circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because
the power to' tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are invalid or
do not sufficiently create the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared
illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable
of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes
this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been
properly invested before.
Sometimes this is done by re-enacting
retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making
the tax already collected to stand under the re-enacted law.
Sometimes the legislature gives its own
meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by
legislative fiat, makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature
may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise
the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after
the change of the law. Whichever method is adopted it must be within the
competence of the legislature and legal and adequate to attain the object of
validation. If the legislature has the power over the subject-matter and
competence to make a valid law, it can at any time make such a valid law and
make it retrospectively so as to bind even past transactions. The validity of a
Validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the legislature possesses the
competence which it claims over the subject-matter and whether in making the
validation it removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law
and makes adequate provisions in the Validating law for a valid imposition of
the tax.
The inquiry in this case may begin by asking
whether the legislature possesses competence to pass a law imposing a tax on
lands and buildings on the basis of a percentage of their capital value. If the
legislature possesses that power then it can authorise the Municipality to levy
that tax. To test the proposition we may consider s. 99 which has now been
enacted in the Gujarat Municipalities Act. It reads :
"99. Taxes which may be imposed.
(1) Subject to any general or special orders
which the State Government may make in this behalf and to the provisions of
sections 101 and 102, a municipality may impose for the purposes of this Act
any of the following taxes, namely:394 (i) a tax on buildings or lands situate
with in the municipal borough to be based on the annual letting value or the
capital value or a percentage of capital value of the buildings or lands or
both;
Learned counsel for the appellants did not
contend that this section was outside the powers of the legislature. In fact,
he could not, in view of entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. That entry reads : "Taxes on lands and buildings" and a
tax on lands and buildings based upon capital value falls squarely within the
entry. The doubt which is created by entry 86 of List I "Taxes on the
capital value of assets", no longer exists after the decision of this
Court in Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth-Tax Officer, Calcutta(1). In that case
the respective ambits of the two entries are explained. It is pointed out that
unlike the tax contemplated by _entry 49 (List II) the tax under entry 8 6 (List
1) is not a direct tax on lands and buildings but on net assets, the components
of which may be lands and buildings and other items of assets excluding such
liabilities as may exist. The incidence of the tax is not on lands and buildings
as units of taxation but on the net assets of which lands and buildings are
only some of the components. This is not the case under entry 49 (List 11)
where the tax can be laid directly on lands and buildings as units of taxation.
Therefore, a tax on lands and buildings is fully within the competence of the
legislature and it is open to it to authorise the municipality to levy the same
tax indicating the mode of levy. This the legislature has done by indicating
the different modes which may be adopted in making the levy, one such mode
being a percentage of the capital value.
The legislature in S. 73 had not authorised
the levy of a tax in this manner but had authorised the levy of a rate.
That led to the discussion whether a rule
putting the tax on capital value of buildings answered the description of the
impost in the Act, namely, 'a rate on buildings or lands or both situate within
the Municipal borough'. It was held by this Court it did not, because the word
'rate' had acquired a special meaning in legislative practice. Faced with this
situation the legislature exercised its undoubted powers of redefining 'rate'
so as to equate it to a tax on capital value and convert the tax purported to
be collected as a 'rate' into a tax on lands and buildings. The legislature in
the Validation Act, therefore, provided for the following matters. First, it
stated that no tax or rate by whichever name called and laid on the capital
value of lands and buildings must be deemed (1) A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 59.
395 to be invalidly assessed, imposed,
collected or recovreed simply on the ground that a rate is based on the annual
letting value. Next it provided that the tax must be deemed to be validly
assessed, imposed, collected or recovered and imposition must be deemed to be
always so authorised. The legislature by this enactment retrospectively imposed
the tax on lands and buildings based on their capital value and as the tax was
already imposed, levied and collected on that basis, made the imposition, levy
collection and recovery of the tax valid, notwithstanding the declaration by
the Court that as 'rate', the levy was incompetent. The legislature not only
equated the tax collected to a tax on lands and buildings, which it had the
power to levy, but also to a rate giving a new meaning to the expression
'rate', and while doing so it put out of action the effect of the decisions of
the courts to the contrary. The exercise of power by the legislature was valid
because the legislature does possess the power to levy a tax on lands and
buildings based on capital value thereof and in validating the levy on that
basis, the implication of the use of the word 'rate' could be effectively
removed and the tax on lands and buildings imposed instead. The tax.,
therefore, can no longer be questioned on the ground that S. 73 spoke of a rate
and the imposition was not a rate as properly understood but a tax on capital
value. In this view of the matter it is hardly necessary to invoke the 14th
clause of s. 73 which contains a residuary power to impose any other tax not
expressly mentioned.
In our judgment these appeals possess no
merits after the passing of the Validation Act and must be dismissed but in the
circumstances without any order about costs.
G.C. Appeals dismissed.
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