Sindhi Lohana Chaithram Vs. The State of
Gujarat [1967] INSC 80 (31 March 1967)
31/03/1967 BACHAWAT, R.S.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SHELAT, J.M.
CITATION: 1967 AIR 1532 1967 SCR (3) 351
CITATOR INFO :
R 1976 SC1697 (18)
ACT:
Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, s.
6(1) (i) and s.
7.Authority to Deputy Superintendent of
Police to issue search warrant to sub-inspector-Notification conferring such
authority whether must mention Deputy Superintendent by name -Presumption under
s. 7 when arises.
HEADNOTE:
Under s.(1) (i) of the Bombay Prevention of
Gambling Act,1887,a search warrant can be issued by a Deputy Superintendent of
Police especially empowered in this behalf. By a notification dated January 22,
1955 the Saurashtra Government empowered specially certain Assistant
Superintendents and Deputy Superintendents of Police Porbandar Division,
Porbandar, to authorise by issue of special warrants in each case a police
officer not below the rank of sub-inspector of police to do the various things
necessary in order to raid a house when the police officer suspected gaming to
be carried on and which house room or place was suspected as being used as a
common gaming house.
The appellant's house was raided by a
sub-inspector of police and on the basis of incriminating evidence the
appellant and six others were charged under ss. 4 and 6 of the Act. At the
trial the accused contended that shri Pandya the Deputy Superintendent of
Porbandar who issued the search warrant was not authorised to do so and
accepting their plea the magistrate acquired them. The High Court however took
the opposite view and convicted the accused.
The appellant came to this Court by special
leave.
HELD : (i) When a power is conferred on a
person by name or by virtue of his office the individual designated by name or
is the holder of the office for the time being is empowered specially. Judged
by this test the notification dated January 22, 1955 specially empowered Shri
Pandya holder of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar
to issue the search warrant under s. 6. [353F-G] Emperor v. Udho and Ors.,
A.I.R. 1943 Sind. 107, Emperor v. Savlaram Kashinath Joshi,49 B.L.R. 798, A1uga
Pilli v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 256, Mahomad Kasim & Anr. v. Emperor,
A.I.R. 1915 Mad. 1159, Slate of Mysore v. Kashambi, (1963) 2 Cr. L.J. 226,
State v. Judhabir Chetri, A.I.R.
1953 Assam 35, K. N. Vijayan v. v. State,
I.L.R. 1953 Trav.
Cochin 514 and Polublha Vajubha & Tapu
Rudu, A.I.R. 1956 Saurashtra 73, referred to.
(ii) The seizure of instruments of gaming in
the appellant's house under s. 6 raises i presumption under s. 7 that the house
was used as a common gaming house and the persons found therein were then
present for the purpose of gaming.
In, applying this artificial presumption the court
should act with circumspection. playing cards can be kept and used for innocent
pastime. The presumption can be rebuffed if from the prosecution evidence
itself it, is apparent that there was it reasonable probability of the playing
cards not being kept or used as means of gaining or for profit or gain of The
occupier of the house. In the present else the appellant could not successfully
rebut the presumption.
[354E-H] 352 No rejudice had been caused to
the appellant by the production of the notiphication dated January 22, 1955 for
the first time at the appellate stage, [355A]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No.
13 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 16, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
154 of 1962.
Daniel A. Latifi and K. K. Sinha, for the
appellant.____ Hans Ra Khanna and R. N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bachawat, J. The appellant and six other persons were charg- ed under ss. 4 and
5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act 1887. The sub-inspector of police
Shri Anjaria received information that the appellant was keeping a common
gaming house. He obtained a special search warrant from the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Porbandar, Shri S. M. Pandya, and raided the appellant's house in
Bantwa on June 4, 1961 at 1 p.m. The raiding arty found the door leadin- to the
upper floor closed. The inpmates pressed against the door from the inside and
did not open it until a blacksmith broke open the latch. Shri Anjaria seized
torn and burnt pieces of playing cards lying on the floor of the central room,
two packs of cards from a wall cabinet, some burnt cards lying on the floor and
in the folds of a bed in the drawing room, four jokers and three packs of cards
from trunks in the kitchen, some cash, burnt cigarette ends, bidis and matches
and empty cigarette cases. All the accused were found in the upper floor. The
appellant as the occupant of the house was charged under s. 4 of the Act and
the other six accused were charged under s. 5 of the Act. The learned
magistrate refused to raise a presumption under s. 7 of the Act on the ground
that Shri Pandya was not specially empowered by name to issue a search warrant.
He acquitted all the accused.
On appeal, the High Court held that Shri
Pandya as the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar was specially
empowered to issue the search warrant and the prosecution was entitled to the
benefit of the presumption under s. 7.
The High Court convicted the appellant of the
offence under s. 4 of the Act and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for one
month. The High Court convicted the other six accused under.,,. 5 of the Act
and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 200, in default simple
imprisonment for one month. The present appeal was filed by the appellant by
special leave.
A search warrant under s. 6(1)(i) of the Act
can be issued by a "Deputy Superintendent of Police especially empowered
by the 353.
State Government in this behaff". By a
notification dated January 22, 1955, the Saurashtra government empowered
specially certain assistant superintendents and deputy superintendents of
police including the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar Division,
Porbandar, to authorise by issue of special warrants in each case a police
officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector of police to do the various
things necessary in order to raid a house where the police officer suspected
gaming to be carried on and which house, room or place was suspected as being
used as a common gaming house. The magistrate relying upon Emperor v. Udho and
others(1), held that under s. 6, the officer must be specially empowered by
name. The High Court relying on Emperor v. Savlaram Kashinath Joshi, (2) held
that an officer may be specially empowered under s. 6 either by name or, in
virtue of his office. It is because of the conflict of opinion between the Sind
and the Bombay decisions that special leave was granted in this case.
Section 15 of the Bombay General Clauses Act
1904 shows that a person may be appointed to execute any function either by
name or by virtue of office. A person may therefore be empowered by name or by
virtue of his office of deputy superintendent of police to issue a special
search warrant.
Sec. 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling
Act requires that the deputy superintendent of police must be "specially
empowered" to issue the warrant. In Emperor v. Udho and others(1), the
expression "specially empowered" was interpreted to mean specially
empowered by name and not by virtue of his office, and an authorization of
"the deputy superintendent of police, Rohri" was said to be
insufficient for the purposes of s. 6. This decision does not lay down the
correct test. A person may be specially empowered not only by name but also by
virtue of his office. In Emperor v. Savlaram Kashinath Joshi(2) it was rightly
held that a notification authorizing the deputy superintendent of police of the
Poona city to issue a search warrant under s. 6 specially empowered the holder
of that office by virtue of his office to issue the warrant. We think that
where power is conferred on a person by name or by virtue of his office, the
individual designated by name or as the holder of the office for the time being
is empowered specially. Judged by this test, the notification dated January 22,
1955, specially empowered Shri Pandya as the holder of the office of the deputy
superintendent of police, Porbandar, to issue the search warrant under s. 6.
For the meaning of the expression
"specially empowered" re- ference is often made to s. 9(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which provides "in conferring powers under this
Code, the State Government may by order, empower persons specially by name or
(1) A.I.R. 1943 Sind 107.
(2) 49 B.L.R. 798.
354 in virtue of their office or classes of
officials generally by their official titles". In Aluga Pillai v.
Emperor1'), it was rightly held that an authorization of the second class
magistrate of Thirumangalam to try certain cases was a special empowering of
the person holding that office by virtue of his office within the meaning of s.
39(1).
On the question whether a notification
empowering all magis- trates of a certain class to try certain cases can be
said to empower specially every magistrate of that class to try those cases,
there is a conflict of opinion, see Mahomad Kasim and another v. Emperor(2),
State of Mysore v.
Kashambi(3). On the further question whether
a magistrate should be regarded as an office and not as an official for 'the
purposes of s. 3 9 ( 1 ) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is a sharp
conflict of opinion, see. State v. Judhabir- Chetri(4), K. N. Vijayan v. State
( 5 ) and Pollubha Vajudha and Anr-. v. Tapu Ruda(6). We do not ex- press any
opinion on those questions, as it is not the practice of this Court to express
opinion on questions which do not arise for decision. For the purpose of this
case, it is sufficient to hold that a notification conferring power on the
deputy superintendent of police of Porbandar to issue a search warrant
specially empowers the holder of that office by virtue of his office to issue
the warrant.
We hold that Shri Pandya as the holder of the
office of the deputy superintendent of police, Porbandar was specially
empowered under s. 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act by the
notification of the Saurashtra government dated January 22, 1955. It is
conceded that the notification continued to be in force after the merger of
Saurashtra with the State of Bombay. The seizure of instruments of gaming in
the appellant's house entered under s. 6 raises a presumption under s. 7 that
the house was used as a common gaming house and the persons found therein were
then present for the purpose of gaming. In applying this artificial pre-
sumption the Court should act with circumspection. Playing cards may be kept
and used for innocent pastimes. The presumption can be rebutted if from the
prosecution evidence itself it is apparent that there was a reasonable
probability of the playing cards not being kept or used is means of gaining or
for the profit or gain of the occupier- of the house. In the present case, the
appellant could not successfully rebut the presumption. The resistance to the
entry of the sub inspector and the attempt to burn, destroy and conceal the
playing cards fortified the presumption.
The explanation that the appellant had
invited friends and relatives on the occasion of his son's betrothal was not
convincing. We do not find any compelling reason for interfering with the
findings of fact by the High (1) A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 256. (2)A.I.R, 1915 Mad.
1159.
(3) [1963](2) Cr.L. J. 226. (4) A.I.R. 1953
Assam 35.
(5) [1953] I.L.R. Trav.-Co 514 (6) A.I.R 1956
Saurashtra 73.
355 No prejudice was caused to the appellant
by the production of the notification dated January 22, 1955 for the first time
at the appellate stage. His contention in the trial court was that such a
notification was not sufficient for raising the presumption under s. 7. This
argument was not tenable. He had ample opportunity for rebutting the
presumption arising under s. 7. Nor did he ask the High Court to give him any
further opportunity for this purpose.
Counsel sought to argue that the search
warrant was invalid as it did not ex-facie set out the authority under which it
was issued. The point was not taken either in the High Court or in the special
leave petition. We therefore indicated that we will not allow this point to be
raised.
The High Court rightly convicted the
appellant under s. 4 of the Act.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.
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