Johrimal Vs. Director of Consolidation
of Holdings, Punjab [1967] INSC 75 (28 March 1967)
28/03/1967 RAMASWAMI, V.
RAMASWAMI, V.
WANCHOO, K.N.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
CITATION: 1967 AIR 1568 1967 SCR (3) 286
ACT:
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948) Ss.
18, 36 and 42 and Rules 16(ii)-Scheme
confirmed-If can be varied by State-Procedure-Proprietors' Gher land taken and
formed into common pool Legality.
HEADNOTE:
A scheme was prepared and confirmed tinder s.
20 of the East Punjab Holdings ( Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation)
Act, 1948, providing that the owners of permanent ghers or enclosures would be
permitted to retain them in their possession. The respondent, tinder s. 42 of the
Act, reconsidered this matter and ordered that the plot of the appellant, who
had made a gher, should be kept for non-proprietors and consolidation records
should be changed 'to that effect.
The appellant successfully challenged the
respondent's order in a writ petition, which in appeal was reversed. In appeal
to this Court, the appellant contended that (i) the power of the State
Government under s. 42 was controlled by the procedure prescribed under s. 36
if it involved a variation of the confirmed scheme and the order of the
respondent wag ultra vires since the procedure contemplated by s. 36 had not
been followed, and (ii) the respondent's order was illegal as it violated s.
18(c) and Rule 16(ii) because under- Rule 16(ii) only a fraction of each proprietors'
land could be taken and formed into a common pool so that the whole may be used
for the common needs and benefits of the estate and there was no such reason
mentioned in the impugned order as required by s. 18.
HELD : (i) The power conferred on the State
Government by s. 42 is not controlled by s. 36 and the procedure of publication
and hearing objections contemplated by ss. 19 and 20 of the Act is not
necessary. Sections 36 and 42 envisage two different situations and the
intention of the Act is to give powers respectively to the Confirming Authority
and to the State Government to act under these sections in their discretion in
any particular case. The reason for two different provisions in ss. 36 and 42
of the Act is also clear for if a scheme is varied or revoked by the authority
confirming it, then the new scheme has to be published so that interested
parties may object and their objection ,decided by competent authorities set up
under the Act those decisions being finally appealable to the State Government.
But when a scheme is to be varied 'by the State Government itself under s. 42
of the Act, there is no requirement of the statute that the varied scheme
should be published. The State Government is only required to give notice and
to give an opportunity to the interested parties to be hear[( before the
variation is made. (293G-294B] (ii) The respondent's order was illegal. In view
of the decision in Ajit Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 143 the
wide interpretation of s. 18(c) would make the operation of the section
unconstitutional. It is I well established rule that a statute has to be so
read as to make it valid,, it has to be construed ut res magis valent quam
pareat. Applying the principle to the present case, it is manifest that 287 s.
18(c) must be read in a restricted sense and the authority of the Consolidation
Officer to reserve land for the common purpose under 18(c) of the Act must be
restricted and it must be held that the Consolidation Officer has power under
the section to take the land out of the common pool of the village only
according to the rateable share from the proprietors and other right-holders
for any common purpose including the extension of the village abadi. It is also
clear that the power of the ,State Government to make reservation of land for
common purposes under s. 42 is co- terminus with the power of the Consolidation
Officer under s. 18(c). [296G-297D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 153 of 1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
November 8, 1960 of the Punjab High Court in L. P. A. No. 284 of 1958.
Bishan Narain, B.R.L. Iyengar, S. K. Mehta
and K. L. Mehta,for the appellant.
Gopal Singh, S. P. Nayyar for R. N. Sachthey,
for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from the judgment of the
Punjab High Court dated Novemher 8, 1960 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 284 of
1956.
For the consolidation of land holdings in
village Kheowara, a scheme was prepared by the Consolidation Officer under S.
14 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (Act L of 1948), hereinafter called
the 'Act', and the scheme was confirmed by the Settlement Officer acting under
S. 20 of the Act. The scheme, among other things, provided that the owners of
permanent ghers or enclosures will be permitted to retain them in their
possession. One of the proprietors, Johrimal had made a gher in khasra No. 3942
and, under the scheme, this. was to remain with him. Para 7 of the Scheme which
was finalised under S. 20 of the Act provided as follows :
"The existing houses and permanent
enclosures shall be kept in the ownership and possession of those proprietors
who were owners in possession prior to the consolidation and in addition if
these persons so desire, they shall be entitled to be given additional area
upto one bigha for extension of the abadi. In the case of such persons of right
holders who have constructed houses or enclosures etc.
within the Shaimlat area they would keep them
in their possession but adjustment would be made out of their Khewat
land................
Later on the Director of Consolidation, to
whom the powers of the State Government under S. 42 of the Act had been
delegated 288 reconsidered this matter and ordered that this particular piece
of land i.e., khasra No. 3942 should be reserved for the extension of abadi for
non-proprietors. The Director of Consolidation accordingly ordered that instead
of being reserved for Johrimal, the plot should be kept for the non-
proprietors and the Consolidation records should be changed to that extent. The
order of the Director of Consolidation was dated March 8, 1957. Aggrieved with
this order, Johrimal applied to the High Court for grant of a writ under Art.
226 of the Constitution. The petition was heard by Grover, J. who allowed the
petition holding that the Director of Consolidation had no authority to make
any order contrary to the scheme without amending the scheme itself, and an amendment
of the scheme could be made only under s.
36 of the Act and not under s. 42 of the Act.
It was accordingly held that the order of the Director of Consolidation was
ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari.
Against this order the Director of Consolidation of Holdings appealed under cl.
10 of the Letters Patent. The appeal was
heard by a Full Bench which, by its judgment dated November 8, 1960, allowed
the appeal and reversed the order of the learned Single Judge and ordered that
the writ petition should be dismissed. The view taken by the majority of the
Judges of the Full Bench was that the impugned order amounted to an alteration
of the Consolidation scheme and the State Government had power, under s. 42 of
the Act as amended by the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) (Second Amendment and Validation) Act (Punjab Act 27 of 1960),
to make any change in the Consolidation scheme subject to the requirements of
that section. The present appeal is brought by Johrimal against the judgment of
the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court.
The Act was passed to provide for the
compulsory consolidation of agricultural holdings and for preventing the
fragmentation of agricultural holdings in the State of Punjab. Chapter III of
the Act deals with Consolidation of Holdings and it is provided by s. 14 that
the Government may either suo motu, or on application made, declare its
intention by notification to make a scheme for 'consolidation of holdings in an
estate or estates or part thereof as may be specified. The Consolidation
Officer is required to obtain the advice of the land owners and of the
non-proprietors and of the Gram Panchayat and he is thereafter directed to
prepare a Scheme for the consolidation of holdings. Section 15 requires the
Consolidation Officer to provide for the payment of compensation to any owner
who is allotted a holding of less market value than his original holding and
for the recovery of compensation from any owner who is allotted a holding of
greater market value than that of his original holding.
Under s. 19, the Consolidation Officer .shall
cause to be published the draft scheme of consolidation, and 289 Within 30 days
of such publication any person likely to be affected by such scheme may
communicate in writing to the Consolidation Officer, any objection relating to
it. The Consolidation Officer shall then consider the objections, if any and
submit the scheme with such amendments as he may consider to be necessary
together with his remarks on the objection to the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation). The scheme as amended shall then be published. Section 20
provides that if no objections are received to the draft scheme, the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation) shall confirm the scheme. If objections are received,
then the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) may either confirm the scheme, with
or without modifications, or refuse to confirm it. If the scheme is confirmed
it should be published. Section 21 relates to repartition to be carried out by
the Consolidation Officer in accordance with the scheme as confirmed under s.
20 and the boundaries of the holdings as demarcated are required to be shown on
the shajra which shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates
concerned. Any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written objections
before the Consolidation Officer who shall after hearing the appellant pass
such order as he considers proper. An appeal is provided from the order of the
Consolidation Officer to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). A person
aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) may appeal to
the State Government. Section 22 provides for the preparation of a new
record-of-rights by the Consolidation Officer in accordance with the provisions
contained in Ch. IV of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 for the area under
consolidation, giving effect to the repartition. Section 23 deals with the
rights to possession of new holdings.
Section 36 provides for the power to vary or
revoke the scheme and reads as follows :
"A scheme for the consolidation of
holdings confirmed under this Act may, at any time, be varied or revoked by the
authority which confirms it subject to any order of the State Government that
may be made in relation thereto and a subsequent scheme may be prepared,
published and confirmed in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 42 of the Act, as it originally stood, was to the following effect :
,,The State Government may at any time for
the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order
passed by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any
case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in
reference thereto as it thinks fit :
290 Provided that no order shall be varied or
reversed without giving the parties interested notice to appear and opportunity
to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the
proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration." Section 18 of
the Act is important and provides as follows "Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force, it shall be lawful for the
Consolidation Officer to direct- (a) that any land specifically assigned for
any common purpose shall cease to be so assigned and to assign any other land
in its place;
(b) that any land under the bed of a stream
or torrent flowing through or from the Siwalik mountain range within the State
shall be assigned for any common purpose;
(c) that if in any area under consolidation
no land is reserved for any common purpose including extension of the village
abadi or if the land so reserved is inadequate, to assign other land for such
purpose." Section 46 of the Act confers powers on the State Government to
make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and in particular to
provide for :
"(e) the manner in which the area is to
be reserved under S. 18 and the manner in which it is to be dealt with and also
the manner in which the village abadi is to be given to proprietors and
non-proprietors (including scheduled castes, Sikh backward classes, artisans
and labourers) on payment of compensation or otherwise;" On March 3, 1956
the Punjab Government, by a notification, added rule 16 to the Rules for
reservation of the abadi for the proprietors as well as the non-proprietors and
it read as follows :
"The area to be reserved for the common
purpose of extension of abadi for proprietors and non-proprietors under section
18(c) of the Act shall be reserved after scrutinizing the demand of proprietors
desirous of building houses and of non-proprietors including Harijan families
working as a agrarian labourers who are in need of a site for house.
The land reserved for extension of abadi shall
be divided into plots of suitable sizes. For the plots allotted to proprietors
area of equal value shall be deducted from their holdings but in the case of
non proprietors including Harijan families these shall be al- lotted without
payment of compensation and they shall 291 be deemed to be full owners of the
plots allotted to them." On April 9, 1957 the Punjab Government added rule
16(ii) which provided for reservation of lands for the Gram Panchayat. read as
follows :
"In an estate or estates where during
consolidation proceedings there is no shamlat deh land or such land is
considered inadequate, land shall be reserved for the village Panchayat, under
section 18(c) of the Act, out of the common pool of the village at a scale
prescribed by Government from time to time. Proprietary rights in respect of
land, so reserved (except the area reserved for the extension of abadi of
proprietors and non- proprietors) shall vest in the proprietary body of the
estate or estates concerned, and it shall be entered in the column of ownership
of record of rights as (jumla malikan wa digar haqdaran arazi hasab rasad
raqba). The management of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the
estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietary body and the
Panchayat shall have the right to utilize the income derived from the land so
reserved for the common needs and benefits of the estate or estates
concerned." In Munsha Singh v. State of Punjab(1), the Punjab High Court
declared rule 16(ii) as ultra vires. After the decision of that case the second
amending Act (27 of 1960) was passed.
It gave a legal cover to rule 16(ii) by
including in s. 2 of the Act the following "2(bb) 'Common purpose' means
any purpose in relation to any common need, convenience or benefit of the
village and includes the following purposes (i) extension of the village abadi;
(ii) provide income for the Panchayat of the
village concerned for the benefit of the village community;
(iii) village roads and paths; village
drains;
village wells, ponds or tanks; village water-
courses or water channels; village bus stands and waiting places; manure pits;
hada rori;
public latrines; cremation and burial
grounds;
Panchayat Ghar; Janj Ghar; grazing grounds;
tanning places; mela grounds; public places,
of religious or charitable nature; and (iv) schools and play,grounds,
dispensaries, -hospitals and institutions of like nature, waterworks or
tube-wells, whether such schools, play grounds, dispensaries, hospi- (1) I.L.R.
[1960] 1 Punjab, 589.
up. Cl/67-6 It 292 tals, institutions,
water-works or tube-wells may be managed and controlled by the State Government
or not." Section 2 of the amending Act (Act 27 of 1960) amended the
preamble and read as follows :
"Amendment of long title of East Punjab
Act L of 1948. In the long title of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and
Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the
principal Act), the words 'and for the assignment or reservation of land for
common purposes of the village' shall be, and shall be deemed always to have
been, added at the end." Section 4 added a new section 23-A which was to
the following effect :
,,Management and control of lands for common
purposes to vest in Panchayats.-As soon as a scheme comes into force, the
management and control of all lands assigned or reserved for common purposes of
the village under section 18 shall vest in the Panchayat of that village which
shall also be entitled to appropriate the income accruing therefrom for the
benefit of the village community, and the rights and interests of the owners of
such lands shall stand modified and extinguished accordingly." Section 5
amended s. 42 of the Act and was to the following effect "Amendment of
section 42 of East Punjab Act L of 1948. In section 42 of the principal Act,
for the words 'any order passed by any officer under this Act', the words 'any
order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer
under this Act', and for the words 'no order shall be varied' the words 'no
order, scheme or repartition shall be varied' shall be, and shall be deemed
always to have been, substituted." Section 6 provides for validation and
reads as follows :
"Notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court,- (a) where in
any scheme, made before the commencement of this Act, land has been reserved
for the Panchayat of the village concerned for utilising the income thereof, or
(b) where before such commencement the State Government or any authority to
whom it has delegated its powers has passed an order under section 42 of the
principal Act revising or rescinding a scheme prepared or 293 confirmed or
repartition made by any officer under that Act.
such reservation of land or such order, as the
case may be, shall be deemed to be valid, and any such scheme or order shall
not be questioned on the ground that such reservation of land could not be made
or, as the case may be, that under section 42 of the principal Act, the State
Government or such authority had no power to pass such order." On behalf
of the appellant Mr. Bishen Narain put forward the argument that the order of
the Director of Consolidation dated March 8, 1957 was an order varying para 7
of the confirmed scheme and no such variation could be made without following
the procedure laid down under S. 36 of the Act, viz., the requirement with
regard to the publication and hearing of objections contemplated in ss. 19 and
20 of the Act. To put it differently, the contention of the appellant was that
the power of the State Government under s. 42 was controlled by the procedure
prescribed under S. 36 if it involved a variation of the confirmed scheme and
the order of the Director dated March 8, 1957 was ultra vires since the
procedure contemplated by s. 36 of the Act has not been followed. In our
opinion, there is no justification for this argument. Section 42 of the Act as
amended by Act 27 of 1960 authorised the State Government to interfere with the
scheme of consolidation or repartition made under the Act. What the amending
Act has done is to substitute for the words 'any order passed by any officer
under this Act', the words 'any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or
repartition made by any officer under this Act'. Section 36 of the Act, on the
other hand, authorises the authority confirming a scheme to alter or revoke it
and in that case the new scheme must be published, objections heard and decided
and the scheme has to be confirmed once again in ac- cordance with the
procedure under ss. 19 and 20 of the Act.
In our opinion the power conferred on the
State Government under s. 42 is a separate power independent of S. 36 of the
Act which deals with the power of the authority confirming the scheme. There is
hence no force in the contention that the scheme of consolidation cannot be
varied by the State Government under S. 42 of the Act except in accordance with
s. 36 of the Act. The reason for the two different provisions in ss. 36 and 42
of the Act is also clear for if a scheme is varied or revoked by the authority
confirming it, then the new scheme has to be published so that interested
parties may object and their objection decided by competent authorities set up
under the Act, those decisions being finally appealable to the State Government.
But when a scheme is to be varied by the State Government itself under S. 42 of
the Act, there 294 is no requirement of the statute that the varied scheme
should be published, for the State Government is required to give notice and to
give an opportunity to the interested parties to be heard before the variation
is made. We are therefore of the opinion that the power conferred on the State
Government by s. 42 is not controlled by s. 36 and the procedure of publication
and hearing objections contemplated by ss. 19 and 20 of the Act is not
necessary. Sections 36 and 42 envisage two different situations and the
intention of the Act is to give powers respectively to the Confirming Authority
and to the State Government to act under these sections in their discretion in
any particular case. We accordingly hold that Mr. Bishen Narain is unable to
make good his argument on this aspect of the case.
We proceed to consider the next question
arising in this appeal, viz., whether the order of the Director dated March 8,
1957 is illegal because it violates s. 18(c) of the Act read with Rule 16(ii).
It was contended for the appellant that under Rule 16(ii) only a fraction of
each proprietor's land is taken and formed into a common pool so that the whole
may be used for the common needs and benefits of the estate. The argument was
stressed that Rule 16(ii) contemplates that all the proprietors and other right
holders of the land are entered in the column of ownership of the record of
rights according to the rateable share and therefore the land taken by each
proprietor should be according to the rateable share of the land possessed by
him in the total area of the village. It was pointed out that the order of the
Director dated March 8, 1957 does not indicate that the area taken from the
appellant was in proportion to the rateable share. It was also stated that s.
18(c) requires that before the Consolidation Officer directs reservation of any
land for the village abadi, no land should have been reserved for a common purpose
in the area under consolidation or the lands so reserved should have been
inadequate. It was pointed out that in the order of the Director there is no
mention that no land had been reserved for the common purpose in the village or
that the land so reserved in the scheme was inadequate. The opposite view-point
was presented by Mr. Gopal Singh on behalf of the respondents. It was contended
that s. 18(c) gives a wide power to the Consolidation Officer to reserve any
land for the common purpose including extension of the village abadi and there
is no requirement imposed in the section that the land reserved should be taken
from the proprietors and other right-holders in accordance with their rateable
share. It was contended by the respondents that no limitation should be placed
on the plain language of the section.
In our opinion, the argument put forward on
behalf of the appellant is well-founded and must be accepted as correct.
It is true that s. 18(c) confers a power on
the Consolidation Officer to reserve 295 the land of the proprietors for any
common purpose including the extension of the village abadi and there is no
express limitation in the language of the section to the effect that the land
to be taken from the proprietors and other right- holders should be according
to the rateable share. But the language of s. 18(c) should be interpreted in a
reasonable manner. The legislature could not have intended that land should be
taken from one proprietor only for common purposes. The intention must be that all
proprietors should contribute rateably for such purposes. This intention is
brought out by Rule 16(ii) and this is what s. 18(c) must be held to mean. In
this context reference should be made to the decision of this Court in Ajit
Singh v. The State of Punjab(1). The question at issue in that case was whether
the reservation of land for a common purpose under s. 18(c) of the Act amounted
to "acquisition by the State of any estate or rights therein" within
the contemplation of the second proviso to Art. 3 1 A(1) of the Constitution,
and if so, whether compensation should be paid to the proprietors for the land
reserved in the scheme for various purposes in accordance with the second
proviso to Art. 3 1 A(1) inserted by the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution.
It was held by the majority judgment of this Court that s. 18(c) must be
construed reasonably and that only a fraction of each proprietor's land was
taken and formed into a common pool, so that the whole may be used for the
common needs and benefits of the village. It was pointed out that the title
will vest in the proprietary body, the management of the land was done by the
Panchayat of the estate on behalf of the proprietary body and the land was used
for the common needs and benefits of the estates concerned. It was therefore
held that Rule 16(ii) only provides for adjustment of rights of persons holding
land so reserved in the interest of village economy and there was no
,acquisition of land' within the meaning of the second proviso to Art. 31- A(1)
and there was no question of paying compensation in cash to the proprietors for
such adjustment of rights. In the course of his judgment, Sikri, J., speaking
for the Court, observed as follows :
"In Attar singh v. The state of U.P.
(1959 supp S.C.R. 928 at p. 938) Wanchoo J., speaking for the Court, said this
of the similar proviso in a similar Act, namely, the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act (U.P. Act V of 1954) as amended by the U.P. Act XVI of 1957 :
'Thus the land which is taken over is a small
bit, which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything. These small bits of
lands are collected from various tenure-holders and consolidated in one place
and added to the land (1) [1967]2 S.C.R. 143.
296 which might be lying vacant so that it
may be used for the purposes of s. 14(1) (ee). A compact area is thus created
and it is used for the purposes of the tenure-holders themselves and other
villagers. Form CH-21 framed under r. 41(a) shows the purposes to which this
land would be applied, namely, (1) plantation of trees, (2) pasture land, (3)
manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation ground, (6) graveyards, (7)
primary or other school, (8) playground, (9) Panchayat ghar, and (10) such
other objects. These small bits of land thus acquired from tenure- holders are
consolidated and used for these purposes, which are directly for the benefit of
the tenure-holders. They are deprived of a small bit and in place of it they
are given advantages in a much larger area of land made up of these small bits
and also of vacant land.' In other words, a proprietor gets advantages which he
could never have got apart from the scheme. For example, if he wanted a
threshing floor, a manure pit, land for pasture, khal, etc., he would not have
been able to have them on the fraction of his land reserved for common
purposes.
Does such taking away of property then amount
to acquisition by the State of any land ? Who is the real beneficiary ? Is it
the Panchayat ? It is clear that the title remains in the proprietary body and in
the revenue records the land would be shown as belonging to 'all the owners and
other right holders in proportion to their areas'. The Panchayat will manage it
on behalf of the proprietors and use it for common purposes; it cannot use it
for any other purpose. The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived from the use
of and for common purposes. It is true that the non- proprietors also derive
benefit but their satisfaction and advancement enures in the end to the
advantage of the proprietors in the form of a more efficient agricultural
community. The Panchayat as such does not enjoy any benefit. On the facts of
this case it seems to us that the beneficiary of the modification of rights is
not the State, and therefore there is no acquisition by the State within the
second proviso." In view of this decision the wider interpretation of s. 1
8(c) for which Mr. Gopal Singh contends would make the operation of the section
unconstitutional. In a situation of this kind the principle to be applied is
clear. The principle is that if two constructions of a statute are possible,
one of which would make it intra vires and the other ultra vires, the Court
must lean to that construction 297 which would make the operation of the
section intra vires. The reason is that no intention can be imputed to the
Legislature that it would exceed its own jurisdiction. It is a well-established
rule that a statute has to be so read so as to make it valid; it has to be
construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat. Applying the principle to the present
case, it is manifest that s. 18(c) must be read in a restricted sense and the
authority of the Consolidation Officer to reserve land for the common purpose
under S.
18(c) of the Act must be restricted in the
manner indicated above, and it must be held that the Consolidation Officer has
power under the section to take the land out of the common pool of the village
only according to the rateable share from the proprietors and other
right-holders for any common purpose including the extension of the village
abadi.
It is also clear that the power of the State
Government to make reservation of land for common purposes under s. 42 is
coterminus with the power of the Consolidation Officer under s. 18(c) and it
follows therefore that the order of the Director dated March 8, 1957 is illegal
and ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of
certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
For these reasons we set aside the order of
the Punjab High Court dated November 8, 1960 and direct that a writ in the
nature of certiorari should be issued to quash the order of the Director of
Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab dated March 8, 1957 with regard to khasra No. 3942 reserving it for extension of abadi for non-proprietors. The appeal is
accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.
Y.P. Appeal allowed.
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