Balvantray Ratilal Patel Vs. The State
of Maharashtra [1967] INSC 295 (12 December 1967)
12/12/1967 RAMASWAMI, V.
RAMASWAMI, V.
SHAH, J.C.
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
CITATION: 1968 AIR 800 1968 SCR (2) 577
CITATOR INFO:
D 1970 SC 140 (5) R 1970 SC1494 (8)
ACT:
Power to suspend employee during
enquiry-Scope of-Whether employee entitled to full remuneration during period
of suspension or as determined under Rules 151 and 152, Chapter VIII, Bombay
Civil Service Rules.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was a member of the State
Medical Service and as such an employee of the respondent State. On a report
made in January 1950 by the Anti-Corruption branch, sanction was given in May
1950 for his prosecution under s. 161 Indian Penal Code for accepting a bribe
and the trial court convicted him of the offence in February 1951. In February
1950, he was suspended by an order of the Civil Surgeon pending further orders
and in August 1950,directions were given about the payment of subsistence
allowance to the appellant during the period of his suspension. Thereafter a
revision application against his conviction was allowed by the High Court and a
special leave petition to this Court was rejected. In February 1953 the
respondent State Government directed that a departmental enquiry should be held
against the appellant, as a result of which an order of dismissal was made
against the appellant on February 11, 1960. While the enquiry was going on the
appellant gave notice to the respondent under s. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code
and then filed a suit against the respondent praying for a declaration that the
order of suspension was illegal and inoperative in law and the appellant
continued in service as though no order for suspension had been made; he
therefore claimed remuneration and allowances with usual increments from the
date of his suspension till the date of his reinstatement. A Single Bench of
the High Court decreed the suit in the appellant's favour but a Division Bench
allowed an appeal and held that the respondent had inherent power to suspend
the appellant and to withhold full remuneration for the period of suspension
under r. 151 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules.
In the, appeal to this Court it was
contended, inter alia, on behalf of the appellant (i) that the power to suspend
is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant and
that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the
contract, or of an express term in the contract itself; in the absence of any
express provision either in the contract of employment or in the Bombay Civil
Service Rules, there was no power to suspend a public servant pending inquiry
into the allegations of his misconduct; and (ii) as the appellant was suspended
pending an inquiry into the charge for the criminal offence alleged to have
been committed by him and as the proceedings in connection with that charge
ended with the acquittal of the appellant by the High Court on February 15,
1952, the order of suspension must be deemed to have automatically come to an
end on that date and the appellant was entitled to full pay from then until
February It, 1960 when he was ultimately dismissed.
HELD : dismissing the appeal (i)The order of
the State Government dated February 13, 1950. suspending the appellant pending
enquiry into his conduct was valid. [586 B] L2Sup.C.11/ 86.
578 The general principle is that a employer
can suspend an employee pending an enquiry into his misconduct and the only
question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during the
period of such suspension. it is now well-settled that the power to suspend, in
the sense of a right to forbid a servant to work, is not an implied term in an
ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be
the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term
in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power either
as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute
would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if
he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to
pay wages during the period of suspension.
Where, however, there is power to suspend
either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed
there under, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending
the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is
not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. [582 D-G; 583
C-D] It is equally well-settled that an order of interim suspension can be
passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even
though there is no such term in the contract of appointment or in the rules,
but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the
period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which it could be
withheld. In this connection it is important to notice the distinction between
suspending the contract of service of an officer and suspending an officer from
performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is
subsisting. The suspension in the latter sense is always -an implied term in
every contract of service. When an officer is suspended in this sense it means
that the Government merely issues a direction to the officer that so long as
the contract is subsisting and till the time, the officer is legally dismissed
he must not do anything in the discharge of the duties of his office. In other
words, the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which,
because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey. [582 H; 583 A-C]
The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union, [1960] 1
S.C.R. 476, T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 750; R. P. Kapur v.
Union of India, [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431; Hanley v. Pease & Partners, Ltd.
[1915] 1 K.B. 698; Wallwork v. Fielding, [1922] 2 K.B. 66; Boston Deep Sea
Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell, [1888] 39 Ch. D.
339, referred to.
If there is no express term relating to
payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any
enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the
period of his interim suspension. [583 G-H] However, in the present case Rule
151 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules empowered the State Government to
withhold pay for the period of interim suspension but the Government servant
was entitled under that rule to a subsistence allowance at such rate as the suspending
authority may direct but not exceeding one-fourth of his pay. There was no
force in the contention that Rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Service Rules applies
only to a case where a Government servant is 'suspended by way of penalty and
not to a case of interim suspension. [585 D] R. P. Kapur v. Union of India, 5
S.C.R. 431, relied on.
(ii)The order of suspension dated February
13, 1950 recited that the appellant should be suspended with immediate effect
"pending further 579 orders". It is clear therefore that the order
could not be terminated automatically but only by another order of the
Government. Until therefore a further order of the State Government was made
terminating the suspension the appellant had no right to be reinstated in
service and to the remuneration claimed. [587 H] Narayan Prasad Rewany v. State
of Orissa, A.T.R. 1957 Orissa 51, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 442 of 1965.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
August 10, 1961 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 23 of 1960.
H.R. Gokhate, P. N. Duda, and J. B.
Dadachanji, for the appellant.
H. M. Seervai, Advocate-General for the State
of Maharashtra, R. Gopalakrishnan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by certificate, from judgment of the
Bombay High Court dated August 10, 1961 by which the appeal of the respondent
against the judgment of S. M. Shah, J. of that High Court was allowed and the
suit of the appellant was dismissed.
The appellant was a member of the Bombay
Medical Service, Class 11 and as such was an employee of the State of
Maharashtra. In 1943, the appellant was posted at the Civil Hospital, Ahmadabad
and on February 18, 1950 he was incharge of the Medico-Legal Section of that
hospital. On January 19, 1950, one Nabimahomed complained to Mr. Rathod,
Sub-Inspector of Police' Anti-Corruption Branch, Ahmadabad, 580 implicated by
the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Police and asking him to consider the representation
before giving his sanction for prosecution of the appellant and before making
an order of suspension. The Surgeon-General forwarded the report of
Sub-Inspector, Mr. Rathod as well as the representation of the appellant to the
State Government by his letter dated February 1, 1950. He requested the
Government that in the circumstances mentioned in the SubInspector's report
orders may be issued for placing the appellant under suspension. His
recommendation was approved by the Minister for Health and by the Chief
Minister. By a letter dated February 13, 1950, the Deputy Secretary to the
Government informed the Surgeon-General that the appellant should be suspended
with immediate effect pending further orders.. The Surgeon-General thereafter
issued an order to the Civil Surgeon, Ahmadabad dated February 16, 1950 that
the appellant should be placed under suspension pending further orders from the
date of the receipt of the memorandum. In pursuance of the directions received
by him from the Surgeon-General, the Civil Surgeon, Ahmadabad, issued the
following office order and sent it; to the appellant :
"Under orders from the Surgeon-General,
with the Government of Bombay, conveyed in his Memorandum No. S. 97/189/A dated
16th February, 1950, you are informed that you are suspended pending further
orders with effect from the afternoon of 18th instant.
You should hand over your charge to Mr. S. S.
Doctor, B.M.S. Class 11 at this hospital." On August 21, 1950 the
Government directed that the appellant should be allowed subsistence allowance
at Rs. 153-5-0 per mensem from the date of his suspension February 19, 1950 to
March 31, 1950, at Rs. 158-13-0 per mensem from April 1, 1950 to February 18,
1951 and at Rs. 119-2-0 per mensem from February 19, 1951 onwards. The
Government also directed that the appellant should be paid in addition Rs. 35/per
mensem as dearness allowance and Rs. 14/as house rent allowance during the
entire period of suspension. On May 6, 1950 sanction was given for the
prosecution of the appellant under s. 161, Indian Penal Code. On February 26,
1951 the appellant was convicted by the First Class City Magistrate at Ahmadabad
and sentenced to one day's imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The appellant
filed an appeal to the Sessions Court, but his appeal was dismissed.
Thereafter, the appellant took the matter in revision to the Bombay High Court.
The revision application was allowed and the conviction and sentence passed
against the appellant were set aside. On March 14, 1952, the appellant made a
representation to the Government praying that he should be reinstated in
service.
581 The Government, however, applied to the
High Court forleave to appeal to this Court against the decision if the High
Court and on the said application being rejected, the Government applied to
this Court for special leave to appeal. This Court rejected the application on
October 13, 1952. On November 27, 1952 the Government issued another order in
regard to the payment of subsistence allowance to the appellant. On February
20, 1953 the Government directed that a departmental enquiry should be held
against the appellant. The Civil Surgeon, Ahmadabad was appointed Inquiry
Officer and he was asked to complete the inquiry within three months and submit
his report to the Government through the Surgeon-General. For reasons which are
not apparent the departmental inquiry was delayed and ultimately an order of
dismissal was made against the appellant on February 11, 1960. Before the
conclusion of the departmental inquiry and while that inquiry was going on the
appellant gave a notice to the respondent under s. 80 of the Civil Procedure
Code. On April 11, 1953 the appellant brought the present suit against the
respondent praying for a declaration that the order of suspension was illegal
and inoperative in law and the appellant continued in service as though no
order for suspension had been passed. The appellant claimed remuneration and
allowances with usual increments from the date of his suspension till the date
of his reinstatement. The respondent controverted the allegations made in the
plaint and asserted that the suspension of the appellant was not illegal. Shah,
J. of the Bombay High Court before whom the suit was tried held that the
appellant was entitled to salary and allowances upto the date when he was
dismissed i.e., February 11, 1960.
He granted to the appellant a declaration
that the order of suspension was illegal and inoperative in law and the
appellant continued to be on duty till February 11, 1960 as though no order of
suspension had been made. He also granted a decree directing the respondent to
pay to the appellant Rs. 51,135.28 with interest on Rs. 43,223/at the rate of 4
per cent p.a. and the cost of the suit. The respondent appealed against the
judgment of the trial Judge.
The appeal was heard by a Bench consisting of
the Chief Justice and Mody, J. The Appellate Bench held that the respondent had
inherent power to suspend the appellant and to withhold full remuneration for
the period of suspension under Rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. The
Appellate Bench therefore held that the order of suspension made by the
respondent was legally valid as it was in exercise of the inherent power as
regards prohibition of work, and in exercise of its powers conferred by the
rules so far as the withholding of pay during enquiry against his conduct was
concerned. The Appellate Bench also held that the suit was barred under Article
14 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. For these reasons the
Appellate Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the trial
582 Judge and dismissed the suit and ordered the appellant to pay four-fifths
of the costs of the respondent through out.
The first question to be considered in this
appeal is whether Government had the power to suspend the appellant by its
order dated February 13, 1950 pending enquiry into his alleged misconduct. It
was contended on behalf of the appellant that the power to suspend is not an
implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant and that such a
power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or
of an express term in the contract itself. It was urged that there was no
express provision in the Bombay Civil Services Rules granting a power to the
Government to suspend a Government servant pending enquiry into the allegations
made against him. The argument was put forward that in the absence of any
express provision either in the contract of employment or in any statute or
statutory rules governing such employment, there was no power to suspend a
public servant pending inquiry into the allegations of his misconduct. We are
unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant as
correct. The general law on the subject of suspension has been laid down by
this Court in three cases, viz., The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v.
Hotel Workers' Union,(1) T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem,(2) and R. P. Kapur v.
Union of India(3). It is now well-settled that the power to suspend, in the
sense of a right to forbid a servant to work, is not an implied term in an
ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be
the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express, term
in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power either
as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute
would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if
he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to
pay wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to
suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules
framed there under, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily
suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the
servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. This
principle of law of master and servant is well-established: (See Hanley v. Pease
& Partners, Ltd., (4) Wallwork v. Fielding, (5) and the judgment of Cotton,
L. J. in Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell) (6). It is equally
well-settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the
employee while an inquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no
such term in the contract of appointment or in the rules, but in such a case
the employee would (1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476.
(3) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431.
(5) [1922] 2 K.B. 66.
(2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 750.
(4) [1915] 1 K.B. 698.
(6) [1888] 39 Ch. D. 339.
583 be entitled to his remuneration for the
period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which it could be
withheld. In this connection it is important to notice the distinction between
suspending the contract of service of an officer and suspending an officer from
performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is
subsisting.
The suspension in the latter sense is always
an implied term in every contract of service. When an officer is suspended in
this sense it means that the Government merely issues a direction to the
officer that so long as the contract is subsisting and till the time the
officer is legally dismissed he must not do anything in the discharge of the
duties of his office. In other words, the employer is regarded as issuing an
order to the employee which, because the contract is subsisting, the employee
must obey.
The general principle therefore is that an
employer can suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the
only question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during
the period of such suspension. If there is no express term relating to payment
during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or
rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his
interim suspension. On the other hand, if there is a term in this respect in
the contract of employment or if there is a provision in the statute or the
rules framed there under providing for the scale of payment during suspension,
the payment will be made in accordance therewith. This principle applies with
equal force in a case where the Government is an employer and a public servant
is an employee with this qualification that in view of the peculiar structural
hierarchy of Government administration, the employer in the case of employment
by Government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint
the public servant concerned. It follows therefore that the authority entitled
to appoint the public servant is entitled to suspend him pending a departmental
enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually
result in a departmental enquiry against him. But what amount should be paid to
the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of
the statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision
the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is
no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments
during the period of suspension. On general principles therefore the government
like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one
of two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or
pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. The
Government may also proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being
found guilty order suspension as a 584 punishment if the rules so permit. This
will be suspension as a penalty. As we have already pointed out, the question
as to what amount should be paid to the public servant during the period of
interim suspension or suspension as a punishment will depend upon the
provisions Of the statute or statutory rules made in that connection.
On behalf of the respondent Advocate-General
of Maharashtra relied upon Rules 151 and 152 of Ch. VIII of the Bombay Civil
Service Rules. These rules provide as follows:
"151. A Government servant under suspension
is entitled to the following payments :(a) In the case of a military officer
who is liable to revert to military duty, to the pay and allowances to which he
would have been entitled had he been suspended while in military employment.
(b) In any other case, to a subsistence grant
at such rates as the suspending authority may direct, but not exceeding onefourth
of the pay of the suspended Government servant.
Provided that the suspending authority may
direct that the Government servant under suspension shall be granted in
addition such compensatory allowances as the Government may sanction by general
or special order for issue under this proviso.
Note 1.-The grant of subsistence allowance
cannot altogether be withheld." "152. When the suspension of a
Government servant is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly
justifiable; or when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or
suspended is reinstated, the revising or appellate authority may grant to him
for the period of his absence from duty(a) if he is honourably acquitted, the
full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed,
removed or suspended and, by an order to be separately recorded any allowance
of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension; and
(b) if otherwise, such proportion of such pay and allowances as the revising or
appellate authority may prescribe.
585 In a case falling under clause (a), the
period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty. In a
case falling under clause (b) it will not be treat ed as a period spent on duty
unless the revising or appellate authority so direct........ Note 2Under this
rule the revising or appellate authority can convert a period spent under
suspension into one of leave admissible under the rules. The period of
suspension cannot, however, be converted into leave without pay except in
accordance with the conditions in Rule 752. Subsistence allowance paid under
this rule should be adjusted or recovered from the Government servant when the
period of suspension is-converted into leave with or without pay." On
behalf of the appellant Mr. Gokhale contended that Rule 151 applies only to a
case where a Government servant is suspended by way of penalty and not to a
case of interim suspension. We see no warrant for accepting this argument.
Suspension is used in Rule 151 in a general
sense and Rule 151 applies to all kinds of suspension, whether it is imposed by
way of penalty or as an interim measure pending departmental inquiry or a
criminal proceeding. We see no reason, either in the context or the language of
Rule 151, to place a restricted interpretation upon the meaning of the word
"suspension" in that rule. On the contrary, the language of Rules 153
and 156 suggests that the suspension contemplated by these rules includes not
only suspension by way of penalty but also interim suspension pending a
departmental inquiry or a criminal proceeding. Rules 153 and 156 state as
follows "153. Leave may not be granted to a Government servant under
suspension." "156. A Government servant committed to a prison either
for debt or on a criminal charge should be conssidered as under suspension from
the date of his arrest and therefore entitled only to the payments specified in
Rule 151 until the termination of the proceedings against him when, if he is
not removed or dismissed from service, an adjustment of his pay and allowances
should be made according to the conditions, and terms prescribed in rule 152
the full amount being given only in the event of the Government servant being
considered to be acquitted of \blame, or, if the imprisonment was for debt, of
its being proved that the Government servant's liability arose from
circumstances beyond his control." If the word "suspension" in
Rules 153 and 156 contemplates suspension pending an inquiry we see no reason
why it should be 586 given a different interpretation in Rules 151 and 152. We
are accordingly of the opinion that Rule 151 empowers the State Government to
withhold pay for the period of interim suspension but the Government servant is
entitled under that rule to a subsistence allowance at such rate as the
suspending authority may direct but not exceeding one-fourth of his pay. It
follows therefore that the order of the State Government dated February 13,
1950 suspending the appellant pending enquiry into his conduct was legally
valid and the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case must be
rejected. The view that we have expressed is supported by the ratio of the
principle of the decision of this Court in R. P. Kapur v. Union of India(1).
The question in that case arose with regard to the interpretation of
Fundamental Rule 53 which provided for payment to a Government servant under
suspension and which states as follows "53(1). A Government servant under
suspension shall be entitled to the following payments, namely :(i) in the case
of a Commissioned Officer of the -Indian Medical Department or a Warrant
Officer in Civil Employ who is liable to revert to Military duty, the pay and
allowances to which he would have been entitled had he been suspended while in
military employment;
(ii)in the case of any other Government
servant(a) a subsistence allowance at an amount equal to the leave salary which
the Government servant would have drawn if he had been on leave on half average
pay or on half pay and in addition, dearness allowance, if admissible on the
basis of such leave salary:
Provided that where the period of suspension
exceeds twelve months, the authority which made or is deemed to have made the
order of suspension shall be competent to vary the amount of subsistence
allowance for any period subsequent to the period of the first twelve months as
follows Fundamental Rule 54 is to the following effect:
"54(1) When a Government servant who has
been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended is re-instated or
would have been re-instated but for his retirement on superannuation while
under suspension. the authority competent to order the reinstatement shall
consider and make a specific order(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 431.
587 (a) regarding the pay and allowances to
be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty or
for the period of suspension ending with the date of his retirement on
superannuation as the case may be; and (b) whether or not the said period shall
be treated as a period spent on duty.
(2) Where the authority mentioned in subrule
(1) is of opinion that the Government servant has been fully exonerated or, in
the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the Government servant
shall be given the full pay and allowances to which he would have been
entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or
suspended, as the case may be.
It was held by the majority decision of this
Court that Fundamental Rule 5 3 contemplates all kinds of suspension, whether
it is a penalty or as an interim measure pending departmental inquiry or
criminal proceeding. It is manifest that Rules 151 and 152 of the Bombay Civil
Service Rules are couched in a similar language to that of Fundamental Rules 53
and 54 and it must be held for this reason also that Rules 151 and 152 of the
Bombay Civil Service Rules comprise in their scope both kinds of suspension,
whether it is a penalty or as an interim measure pending an inquiry into the
conduct of the Government servant concerned or criminal proceeding against him.
We proceed to consider the next question
arising in this case i.e., whether the order of suspension came to an end on
February 15, 1952 when the appellant was acquitted by the High Court in
revision and whether in consequence the appellant is entitled to full pay for
the period from February 15, 1952 to February 11, 1960 when he was ultimately
dismissed. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that he was suspended
pending an inquiry into the charge for the criminal offence alleged to have
been committed by him and as the proceedings in connection with that charge
ended with the acquittal of the appellant by the High Court on February 15,
1952, the order of suspension must be deemed to have automatically come to an
end on that date.
We see no justification for accepting this
argument. The order of suspension dated February 13, 1950 recites that the
appellant should be suspended with immediate effect "pending further
orders". It is clear therefore that the order of suspension could not be
automatically terminated but it could have only been terminated by another
order of the Government. Until therefore a further order of the State
Government was made terminating the suspension 588 ,the appellant had no right
to be reinstated to service. On behalf ,of the appellant reliance was placed on
the decision of the Orissa High Court in Narayan Prasad Rewany v. State of Orissa(1).
But the facts of that case are clearly to be distinguished. The order of
suspension in that case did not contain the phrase "pending further'
orders". Furthermore, the order of suspension was passed under R. 93A of
the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1, under which the Government servant could be
suspended during the periods when he was not actually detained in custody or
imprisoned. Having, regard to the terms of that rule it was held by the Orissa
High Court that the order ceased to be operative as soon as criminal
proceedings had terminated. In the present case, however, the appellant was not
suspended under any rule similar to rule 93A of the Orissa Service Code, Vol. 1
and the decision of the Orissa High Court has therefore no relevance. We are therefore
of the opinion that the order of suspension of the appellant made by the State
Government on February 13, 1950 did not come to an end on the date of the order
of acquittal made by the High Court and Counsel for the appellant is unable to
make good his submission on this aspect of the case.
It is not necessary for us to express any
opinion as to whether the suit is barred under Article 14 of the Schedule to
the Indian Limitation Act as we have held that the claim of the appellant is
devoid of merit.
For the reasons already expressed, we hold
that the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated August 10, 1961 is correct -and this appeal must be dismissed. In view of the circumstances of the case we do
not propose to make any order as to costs ,of this Court.
R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
(1) A.I.R. 4957 Orissa 51.
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