R. Jeevaratnam Vs. The State of Madras
[1965] INSC 214 (13 October 1965)
13/10/1965 BACHAWAT, R.S.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SUBBARAO, K.
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION: 1966 AIR 951 1966 SCR (2) 404
CITATOR INFO:
R 1974 SC 136 (7)
ACT:
Disciplinary Proceedings-Inquiry-Same counsel
representing appellant as some others-No conflict of interest-Whether
reasonable opportunity to defend given.
Dismissal Order-With retrospective
effect-Effect of.
HEADNOTE:
Disciplinary proceedings were started against
the appellant, a Deputy Tahsildar, and three of his subordinates on charge of
accepting illegal gratification. On May 20, 1949, he was placed under suspension and relieved of his duties. The Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal directed
the consolidation and common hearing of the enquiries against the, appellant
and the other three civil servants. Although the Tribunal refused an earlier
application of the appellant for permission to engage counsel, at the hearing
of the enquiry on being told that he could engage the same counsel who appeared
for the other three civil servants, the appellant engaged that counsel and was
represented by him throughout the enquiry. The, Tribunal declined to grant a
prayer of the appellant on June 13, 1949, to grant an adjournment of the hearing
and the enquiry was held on June 13, 14 and 15.
Upon the Tribunal recommending the appellants
dismissal and after He had been served with a show cause notice and had replied
thereto, on October 17, 1950, the Government directed, that he be dismissed
from service with effect from May 20, 1949;.
The appellant then instituted a suit and
sought a declaration that the, order dated October 17, 1950 was illegal and
void. The trial court dismissed the suit and this decision was affirmed on
appeal by the High. court.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant
that in view of the, refusal of the appellant's prayer to engage counsel of his
own choice and of his prayer for adjournment on June 13, he had been denied a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges; and furthermore,
that the order of dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with
retrospective effect from the date of suspension was illegal and in-operative.
HELD : (i) The appellant had been given a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges. [206 D] There was
no conflict of interests between the appellant and the other three civil
servants; there was nothing to show that the, counsel representing the other
three was unable to conduct the appellant's defence properly. [206 C] (ii) The
order of dismissal as from October 17, 1950, was valid and effective. [207 A]
An order of dismissal with retrospective effect is, in substance, an order of
dismissal as from the date of the orderwith the superadded direction that the
order should operate as from an; anterior date. The 205 two parts of the order
are clearly severable. Assuming that the second part of the order is invalid,
there is no reason why the. first part of the order should not be given the
fullest effect. [207 G-H; 208 Al Hemanta Kumar v. S. N. Mukherjee, (1953) 58
C.W.N. 1referred to. Abdul Hamid v. The District School Board, 24Parganas
(1957) 61 C.W.N. 880: Sudhir Ranjan Haldar v. State of W. Bengal A.I.R. 1961
Cal. 626, 630 : disapproved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 232 of 1964.
Appeal from the Judgment and order dated the
23rd October, 1960 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 237 of 1958.
R. Thiagarajan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the
appellant.
A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bachawat J. The appellant held the post of Deputy Tahsildar in the Revenue
Department of the Government of Madras. Disciplinary proceedings were started
against him on twelve charges of acceptance of illegal gratification during his
office as Special Loans Deputy Tahsildar, Cuddalore, South Ascot District.
Disciplinary proceedings were started against three of his subordinates also on
similar charges.
On May, 20, 1949, he was placed under
suspension and relieved of his duties. The Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal
directed the consolidation and common hearing of the enquiries against the
appellant and the other three civil servants. The appellant asked for
permission to engage a counsel at the enquiry. By an order dated May 31, 1949,
the Tribunal refused to give the permission. The enquiry was held on June 13,
14 and 15. At the hearing, the other three civil servants were represented by
counsel, Sri.
Kalyanasundaram. On June 13, the appellant
prayed for an adjournment. The Tribunal declined to grant the adjournment and
told the appellant that he was at liberty to engage Sri.
Kalyanasundaram as his counsel. The appellant
thereupon availed himself of the services of Sri. Kalyanasundaram, and was
represented by him throughout the enquiry. On June 30, the Tribunal submitted a
report stating that the charges against the appellant were proved and
recommending his dismissal. On September 16, the Government issued a notice to
him asking him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. On
November 12, 1949, he submitted his written representation. On October 17,
1950, the Government directed 206 that he be dismissed from service with effect
from May 20, 1949. The appellant instituted the suit asking for a declaration
that the order dated October 17, 1950 dismissing him from service is illegal
and void. The trial Court dismissed the suit, and, this decree was affirmed on
appeal by the High Court of Madras. The appellant now appeals to this Court by
special leave.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that in
view of the refusal of the appeal's prayer for engaging a counsel of his own
choice and his prayer for adjournment of the hearing on June 13, 1949, the
appellant had been denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against
the charges. We are not inclined to accept this submission. There was no
conflict of interests between him and the other three civil servants. Counsel
representing the other three civil servants was allowed by the Tribunal also to
represent him.
The enquiry continued for three days. It is
not proved that counsel was unable to conduct the defence properly. Even in his
written representation dated November 12, 1949, the appellant did not allege
that he was prejudiced in his defence. We are satisfied that the appellant had
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges.
Counsel for the appellant next contended that
the order of dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with retrospective
effect is illegal and inoperative. Counsel for the respondent submitted (1) the
order of dismissal with retrospective effect as from the date of the suspension
is valid in its entirety, and (2) in any event, the order is valid and
effective as from October 17, 1950. The High Court accepted the first
contention, and declined to express any opinion on the second contention. In
our opinion, the second contention of the respondent is sound, ,and in this
view of the matter, we decline to express any opinion on the first contention.
Counsel for the appellant conceded that if the respondent's second contention
is accepted, the appeal must fail.
The order dated October 17, 1950 directed
that the appellant be dismissed from service with effect from the date of his
suspension, that is to say, from May 20, 1949. In substance, this order
directed that ( 1 ) the appellant be dismissed, and (2) the dismissal do
operate retrospectively as from May 20, 1949. The two parts ,of this composite
order are separable. The first part of the order ,operates as a dismissal of
the appellant as from October 17, 1950.
The invalidity of the second part of the
order, assuming this part to be invalid, does not affect the first part of the
order. The order 207 of dismissal as from October 17, 1950 is valid and
effective. The appellant has been lawfully dismissed, and he is not entitled to
claim that he is still in service.
We may now notice the cases relied on by
counsel for the appellant. In Hemanta Kumar v. S. N. Mukherjee(1), the Calcutta
High Court had occasion to consider an order dated April 29, 1952 by which a
civil servant had been placed under suspension with retrospective effect from
January 16, 1951. While holding that the order of suspension for the period,
January 16, 1951 up to April 28, 1952 was invalid and should be quashed, the
Court held that the order of suspension was valid and effective as and from
April 29, 1952 and this part of the order should be upheld. As a a matter of
fact, the validity of the suspension as from April 29, 1952 was not even
questioned by counsel for the parties.
Far from supporting the appellant, this
decision is against him on the point under consideration. In Abdul Hamid v. The
District School Board, 24-Parganas(2), the Calcutta High Court had occasion to
consider an order dated April 18, 1952 discharging a teacher employed by a
District School Board from service with effect from July 15, 195 1, the date on
which he had been arrested in connection with a pending criminal case against
him. While holding that the dismissal from the period from July 15. 1951 up to
April 17, 1952 was invalid, the High Court also held that the order of
dismissal was entirely bad and was not effective even from April 18, 1952. The
High Court observed:
"It appears to me that when the real
intention of the Board was to discharge the petitioner with effect from the
date when he was put under arrest it is not within the jurisdiction of the
Court to substitute a different intention and maintain the order of discharge
in a modified form. The order must stand or fall In toto. In this view of the
matter it appears to me that the order of discharge as passed by the Board
cannot stand." Our attention is drawn to similar observations in Sudhir
Ranjan Haldar v. State of West Bengal("). With respect, we are unable to
agree with this line of reasoning. An order of dismissal with retrospective
effect is, in substance, an order of dismissal as from the date of the order
with the superadded direction that the order should operate retrospectively as
from an anterior date. The two parts of the order are clearly severable.
Assuming that the second (1) (1953) 58 C.W.N. 1.
(2) (1957) 61 C.W.N. 880.
(3) A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 626,630.
208 part of the order is invalid, there is no
reason why the.
first part of the order should not be given
the fullest effect The Court cannot pass a new order of dismissal, but surely
it can give effect to the valid and severable part of the order.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There
will be no order ,as to costs. The appellant is exempted from paying court
fees.
Appeal dismissed.
Back
