Jahiruddin Vs. K.D. Ratmi, Factory
Manager, The Model Mills Nagpur Ltd.  INSC 256 (22 November 1965)
22/11/1965 SATYANARAYANARAJU, P.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1966 AIR 907 1966 SCR (2) 660
D 1973 SC1227 (55) F 1975 SC2025 (6)
Central Province and Berar Industrial
Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (Act 23 of 1947), s. 16--Dismissal within
exemption in force--Withdrawal of exemption- Application to Labour Commissioner
for reinstatement--If lies.
The State of Bombay by a notification under
the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act 1958 declared a Mill a
'relief undertaking' and exempted it from the applicability of s. 16 of the
C.P. and Berar Industrial Dispute& Settlement-Act, 1947. During the period
the exemption was in force, the appellants-employees of the Mill abstained from
work and were dismissed for joining an illegal strike. After the exemption was
withdrawn and was no longer in operation, the employees filed applications
before the Labour Commissioner claiming reinstatement with back wages. The
Labour Commissioner allowed the applications. The Mill preferred revisions to
the Industrial Court which were allowed. In writ petitions filed by the
employees, the High Court confirmed the finding of the Industrial Court, that
the employees had no right to file applications under s. 16 and the
applications filed by them before the Labour Commissioner were not
In appeal to this Court.
HELD : The High Court was in error in holding
that the applications were not maintainable.
The right of an employee to claim
reinstatement on a wrongful dismissal existed de hors s. 16 of the Central
Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act.
Section 16 provides a forum for a dismissed
employee to claim reinstatement but does not create a right. The effect of an
exemption granted by the notification issued under the Bombay Relief
Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, is not to destroy the right but to
suspend the remedy prescribed by s. 16 for enforcing that right during the
period when the exemption remains in force. The right can be enforced by a
dismissed employee by restoring to the provisions of s. 16 of the Act provided
he makes the application within six months from the date of his dismissal. [668
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 156 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 12, 1963 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil
Application No. 315 of 1962.
V. P. Sathe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
661 M. N. Phadke, J. B. Dadachanji, O.C.
Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3.
N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Satyanarayana Raju, J. This is an appeal, by Special Leave,, against the
judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing an application
for the issue of a Writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution to
quash the order of the State Industrial Court at Nagpur.
For a proper appreciation of the questions
that have been raised in the appeal, it would be necessary to state the
material facts. The Model Mills, Nagpur (hereinafter referred to as the Mills)
is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. On
July 18, 1959, in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 18-A of the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, the Central Government took over the
management of the Mills and appointed the 3rd respondent as the authorised
Controller of the Mills. On March 25, 1960 the State of Bombay (now the State
of Maharashtra), in exercise of the powers conferred by ss. 3 and 4 of the
Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred
to as the Bombay Act) made a notification declaring the Mills to be a '
"relief undertaking" for a period of one year commencing from March
26, 1960 and ending with March 25, 1961. The appellants, eight in number, were,
at the relevant time, the permanent employees of the Mills. It would be
convenient to refer to them as "employees". On December 15, 1960,
when the notification made by the State Government under the Bombay Act was in
force, the employees abstained from work.
Thereupon, the 1st respondent who is the
Factory Manager of the Mills issued notices to the employees to show cause why
they should not be dismissed from service for joining an "illegal
strike". On January 6, 1961 the Factory Manager passed orders dismissing
the employees from service. On January 12, 1961 the employees filed an
application in the High Court of Bombay for the issue of a writ of mandamus
directing the employees to be reinstated in service. On April 4, 1961, the
exemption of the Mills from the application of s. 16 of the Central Provinces
and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act (XXIII of 1947) (herein- after
called the State Act) was made. On April 25, 1961 the employees filed
applications before the Assistant Commissioner Sup.CI./76-12 662 of Labour
claiming reinstatement with back wages. The High Court dismissed the Writ
Petition filed by the employees with liberty to file a fresh petition, if
necessary, since they were prosecuting their applications for relief of
reinstatement before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour.
In and by his order dated September 29, 1961,
the Assistant Commissioner allowed the applications filed by the employees. He
held that as there was no illegal strike the orders of dismissal were
unsustainable and should be set aside. He directed that the employees should be
reinstated with back wages. Against the orders passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, the Mills preferred applications in revision to the State
Industrial Court. By its order dated February 16, 1962, the Industrial Court
allowed the revision applications filed by the Mills on the ground that the
applications before the Assistant Commissioner were not maintainable. On the
merits, the Industrial Court agreed with the Assistant Commissioner that there was
no illegal strike. Aggrieved by the orders of the Industrial Court, the
employees filed an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for
the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of dismissal passed by
the Factory Manager and to direct their reinstatement with back wages. By its
judgment dated August 12, 1963 the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed
by the employees.
The High Court has held that the right to
claim reinstatement is not a right which is available to an employee under the
Common Law and that the relief of reinstatement is a special right which has
been conferred on an employee under S. 16 of the State Act. In the opinion of
the High Court, the essential pre-condition for an employee to claim relief
under S. 16 is that he is an employee in an industry to which that section is
applicable and in respect of which a notification under S. 16(1) also has been
The High Court has reached this conclusion by
reason of the fact that the State Government issued a notification exempting
the Mills from the operation of S. 16 of the State Act and that the exemption
was withdrawn only on April 4, 1961 while the employees were dismissed on
January 6, 1961.
In the opinion of the High Court, by reason
of the fact that s. 16 of the Act was not applicable, the dismissal of the
employees even if it was wrongful did not give them a right to claim TV
instatement and that to hold otherwise would be to give retrospective operation
to S. 16 of the State Act which became applicable to the Mills on and from
April 4, 1961 by reason of the withdrawal of the exemption. in the result, the
High Court confirmed the finding of the State Industrial Court that the
employees had 663 no right to file applications under s. 16 of the State Act and
the applications filed by them before the Assistant Commissioner were not
Now it is contended by Mr. V. Sathe on behalf
of the employees that though the industry was exempt from the operation of
certain sections including s. 16 of the Act, on the date when the appellants
were dismissed, there was an existing industrial dispute relating to an
industrial matter between the employees and the Mills on April 4, 1961, when
the notification withdrawing the exemption in favour of the Mills from the
operation of s. 16 of the State Act was issued by the Government, that on the
date when the employees filed an application under s. 16 before the
Commissioner of Labour, the period of six months provided by that section had
not elapsed and that therefore the employees could invoke the provisions of s.
16 and claim reinstatement. The learned counsel for the Mills, Mr. Phadke, has
endeavoured to support the judgment of the High Court and the reasons on which
its conclusions were rested.
The questions which arise for determination
in this appeal are :
1. Whether the right of a dismissed employee
to claim reinstatement, in appropriate cases, exists. de hors s. 16 of' the
State Act ?
2. Whether by reason of the State
Government's exemption of the industry from the operation of s. 16 on the date
when the employees were dismissed from service, their right to apply for
reinstatement ceased to exist ? For a proper determination of the above
questions, it is necessary to refer to the material statutory provisions.
The State Act became law on June 2, 1947. S.
15 of the State Act empowers the State Government to appoint any person as
Labour Commissioner for the State and he shall exercise all or any of the
powers of the Labour Commissioner. Now s. 16 of the State Act as it stood at
the relevant date provides as follows:
"(1) Where the State Government by
notification so directs, the Labour Commissioner shall have power to decide an
industrial dispute touching the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension of
an employee working in any industry in general or in any local area as may be
specified in the notification.
664 .lm15 (2) Any employee, working in an
industry to which the notification under sub-section (1) applies, may, within
six months from the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension,
apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation
for loss of wages.
The different powers that could be exercised
by the Labour Commissioner are then set out in sub-s. (3) : "On receipt of
such application, if the Labour Commissioner, after such enquiry as may be
prescribed, finds that the dismissal .... was in contravention of any of the
provisions of this Act or in contravention of a standing order.... he may
direct that the employee shall be reinstated forthwith or by a specified date
and paid for the whole period from the date of dismissal .... to the date of
the order of the Labour Commissioner".
It is common ground that s. 16 is made
applicable to the textile industry with effect from. March 1, 1951 by a
notification dated February 22, 1951. The provisions of s. 16 were thus
applicable to the Mills till March 25, 1960, on which date, however, the State
Government issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred under ss.
3 and 4 of the Bombay Act declaring the Mills to be a 'relief undertaking'. The
notification directed that the provisions of S. 16 of the State Act and Chapter
V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) (Lay-off and Retrenchment)
shall not apply to the Mills and that it shall be exempt there from. This
notification was extended by the State Government on March 8, 1961 for a
further period of one year. A subsequent notification dated April 4, 1961
issued by the State of Bombay amended the earlier notification by withdrawing
the exemption in so far as it related to s. 16 of the State Act.
The alleged participation by the employees in
an illegal strike occurred on December 15, 1960 and the 1st respondent
dismissed the employees in and by his order dated January 6, 1961. It was
during the period between March 25, 1960 and April 4, 1961 when the exemption
was in force that the incident which resulted in the Mills framing a charge
against the employees happened and the subsequent orders of dismissal were
It is submitted by the learned counsel on
behalf of the Mills that the right of an employee to claim reinstatement has
been granted by s. 16 of the State Act and since the Mills were exempt 665 from
the provisions of that section on the material dates the employee had no right
to claim reinstatement. The Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) came into
force on April 1, 1947. For our present purposes, it is not necessary to
consider whether the right to claim reinstatement by a dismissed employee existed
before the Central Act became law. The question about the jurisdiction of an
Industrial Tribunal to direct reinstatement of a dismissed employee was raised
as early as 1949, before the Federal Court in Western India Automobile
Industrial Tribunal, Bombay(1). In that case,
the Federal Court considered the larger question about the powers of industrial
tribunals in all its aspects and rejected the argument of the employer that to
invest the tribunal with jurisdiction to order reinstatement amounts to giving
it authority to make a contract between two persons when one of them is
unwilling to enter into a contract of employment at all. This argument, it was
observed, "overlooks the fact that when a dispute arises about the
employment of a person at the instance of a trade union or a trade union
objects to the employment of a certain person, the definition of industrial
dispute would cover both those cases. In each of those cases, although the
employer may be unwilling to, do, there will be jurisdiction in the tribunal to
direct the employment or non-employment of the person by the employer".
The Federal Court also added "The
disputes of this character being covered by the definition of the expression
'industrial disputes', there appears no logical ground to exclude an award of
rein- statement from the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal.
For nearly two decades the decision of the
Federal Court has been accepted without question. Therefore, after the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, at any rate, the right of a dismissed employee to claim
reinstatement in proper cases has been recognised. It is no doubt true that
under the Central Act the right to claim reinstatement has to be enforced in
the manner laid down by that statute, whereas under the State Act it is open to
an employee to claim reinstatement without the intervention of the appropriate
Government. This would not however make any difference.
It is argued that by reason of the exemption
granted by the Bombay State when it declared the Mills to be a relief
undertaking, rights and obligations which accrued to the employees or were
incurred by the Mills during the period of exemption, stood (1)  F.C.R.
666 abrogated. This takes us to the question
as to the legal effect of 'the exemption granted by the State of Bombay.
The notification issued by the State of
Bombay is in the following terms :
"The Government of Bombay hereby directs
that in relation to the said relief undertaking and in respect of the said
period of one year for which that relief undertaking continues as such, the
provisions of (i) Sections 16, 31 and 37, section 40 (in so far as it relates
to lock-out) and section 51 and section 61 [in so far as it relates to clauses
(b) and (c) of Rule 36 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes
Settlement Rules, 1949] Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XXIII of 1947 and
(ii) Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) shall not
apply and the said relief undertaking shall be exempt from the aforesaid
provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement
Act, 1947 (Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XXIII of 1947) and the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947)." The contention urged on
behalf of the Mills proceeds on the assumption that the right to claim
reinstatement has been granted by S. 16 of the State Act. As we have already
stated, S. 16 only recognises the right of a dismissed employee, in appropriate
cases, to claim reinstatement but does not confer the right. The section
provides the procedure for enforcing the right. In this view, the right of the
dismissed employee to claim reinstatement was in existence even during the
period of exemption, but only it could not be enforced under S. 16. Once the
exemption is withdrawn the status quo ante is restored and it is open to the
employee to file an application for reinstatement provided, however, his
application is within the period of six months from the date of his dismissal.
Under S. 4 ( 1 )(a), on a notification being
made, the industry becomes a relief undertaking and the laws enumerated in the
Schedule to the Bombay Act shall not apply. The Schedule specifies Chapter V-A
of the Industrial Disputes Act and S. 16 of the State Act. Section 4 ( 1 )(a)
(i) also provides that the relief undertaking shall be exempt from the
operation of the Acts mentioned in the Schedule.
Learned counsel drew a distinction between
the expressions exemption' and 'suspension' by relying upon the meanings given
to these words in the Oxford Dictionary.
'Exempton' means 667 'immunity from a
liability' whereas the word 'suspension' means 'put it off'. Basing himself on
the dictionary meanings, learned counsel for the Mills has contended that the
word 'exemption' is of a wider connotation than 'suspension' and means that the
industry shall be immune from the liabilities arising under the statutes
specified in the Schedule and that the order of dismissal having been passed
while the exemption was in force, the Mills were immune from liability to
reinstate the employees on their dismissal being held to be wrongful.
The order dismissing the employees was passed
on January 6, 1961 when the notification was in force. The employees filed
applications before the Commissioner of Labour on April 25, 1961. On the date
of their applications, the exemption granted to the Mills by the State
Government was no longer in operation. The decision in Birla Brothers, Ltd. v.
Modak(1) has firmly established the principle that for a dispute which
originated before the Industrial Disputes Act came into force but was in
existence on the date when that Act became law, the Act applied to the dispute
since it was in existence and continuing on that date and no question of giving
retrospective effect to the Act arose. At p. 22 1, the learned Chief Justice,
Harries, who spoke for the Court stated thus :
"In my judgment, the Act of 1947 clearly
applies to the present dispute without any question arising of giving the Act
any retrospective effect. It is true the dispute arose before the Act was
passed, but on April 1, 1947, when the Act came into force, the dispute was in
existence and continuing. The employees were on strike and the strike actually
continued until May 19, that is, five days after the Government made the order
referring the dispute to arbitration. In my judgment, the Act must apply to any
dispute existing after it came into force, no matter when that dispute commenced.
There is nothing in the Act to suggest that it should apply only to disputes
which originated after the passing of the Act. On the contrary, the opening
words of s.10 of the Act make it clear that the Act would apply to all disputes
existing when it came into force. The opening words of s. 10(1) are--- If any
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Goverment may, by
order in writing etc.
(1) L.L.R.  2 Cal. 209.
668 It seems to me that these words make it
abundantly clear that the Act applies to any industrial dispute existing when
it came into force and, therefore, the Act applies to this dispute." It is
argued by Mr. Phadke that the, notification dated April 4, 1961 withdrawing the
exemption is only prospective and no retrospective effect can be given to it.
This argument proceeds on a fallacy. There is no question of the notification
withdrawing an exemption being prospective or retrospective.
It is finally submitted by learned counsel
for the Mills that the validity of the order passed by the Factory Manager
dismissing the employees from service has not been determined by the High Court
and that the matter must be remitted to that Court for a consideration of that
We may point out that the Assistant
Commissioner of Labour has held that the dismissal is wrongful. This conclusion
is affirmed by the Industrial Court. The validity of the dismissal was
therefore finally concluded in favour of the employees. There is therefore no
question of the validity of the dismissal order now being considered by the
We may now summarise the conclusions reached
by us as a result of the above discussion. The right of an employee to claim
reinstatement on a wrongful dismissal exists de hors s. 16 of the State Act.
Section 16 provides a forum for a dismissed employee to claim reinstatement but
does not create a right. The effect of an exemption granted by the notification
issued under the Bombay Act is not to destroy the right but to suspend the
remedy prescribed by s. 16 for enforcing that right during the period when the
exemption remains in force. The right can be enforced by a dismissed employee
by resorting to the provisions of s. 16 of the Act provided he makes the
application within six months from the date of his dismissal. In the present
case, the appellants filed their applications within the period specified in S.
16 of the State Act. The High Court was in
error in holding that the applications were not maintainable.
In the result the judgment of the High Court
and the order of the Industrial Court are set aside and the award made by the
Assistant Commissioner of Labour is restored.
The appeal is allowed and the appellants will
have their costs in this Court paid by respondent No. 1.