Nirmala Bala Ghose & ANR Vs. Balai
Chand Ghose & Ors [1965] INSC 85 (29 March 1965)
29/03/1965 SHAH, J.C.
SHAH, J.C.
SUBBARAO, K.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
CITATION: 1965 AIR 1874 1965 SCR (3) 550
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1982 SC 98 (9)
ACT:
Religious Endowment--Debutter--Construction
of deed of settlement--Endowment whether partial. or complete--Tests for
deciding--Provision for maintenance of shebaits whether makes endowment
partial--Effect of invalidity of certain provisions of deed-Expanding income
and static expenses--Inference from--Right of joint shebait to appeal if
deities represented by guardian ad litem.
Code of Civil Procedure (5 of 1908)--Order 41
r.
33--Applicability of--When decree can be
amended in appeal in favour of non-appealing party.
HEADNOTE:
HELD: (i) The question whether a deed of
dedication creates an abosulte or partial dedication must be settled by a
conspectus of all the provisions of the deed. If the property is wholly
dedicated to the worship of the idol and no beneficial interest is reserved to
the settlor, his descendants or other persons, the dedication is complete: if
by the deed it is intended to create a charge in favour of the deity and the
residue vests in the settlor, the dedication is partial.
(ii) A reasonable provision for remuneration
maintenance and residence of the Shebaits does not make an endowment bad, for
even when property is dedicated absolutely to an idol, and no beneficial
interest is reserved to the settlor, the property is held by the deity in an
ideal sense. The possession and management of the property must, in the very
nature of things, be entrusted to Sitebait or' manager and nomination of the
settlor himself and his heirs with reasonable remuneration out of the endowed
property with right of residence in the property will not invalidate the
endowment. [556E-G] (iii) A provision for the benefit of persons other than the
Shebait may not be valid, if it infringes the rule against perpetuities or
accumulations, or rules against impermissible restrictions, but that does not
affect the validity of the endowment. The beneficial interest in the provision
found invalid reverts to the deity or the settlor according as the endowment is
absolute or partial.
If the endowment absolute and a charge
created in favour of other persons is invalid, the benefit will enure to the
deity, and will not revert to the settlor or his heirs.
[556G-H] (iv) There is no rule that when the
income is expanding and the expenses are static, leaving a substantial residue,
it must be presumed, notwithstanding the comprehensive and unrestricted nature
of the disposition, that the settlor intended to create only a charge in favour
of the deity. The question is always one of intention of the settlor to be
determined from a review of all the dispositions under the deed of settlement.
[560G] Surendrakeshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee and Anr. L.R. 19 I.A. 108,
explained.
Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v.
Brojonath Der and Ors. L.R. 64 I.A. 203 and Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew v. Sushila
Bala Desi and Ors. [1954] S.C.R. 407, relied on.
551 Per Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.--When the
guardian of the deities did not appeal against the finding of the trial court
that there was a partial dedication, it was not open to a joint Shebait who was
not a guardian, to appeal against the decree and contend that the dedication
was absolute.
When a party allows a decree of the court of
First Instance to become final, by not appealing against the decree, it would
not be open to another party to the litigation, whose rights are otherwise not
affected by the decree, to invoke the powers of the appellate court under o. 41
r. 33 to pass a decree in favour of the party not appealing so as to give the
latter a benefit which he has not claimed. [564D] Per Bachawat, J. (Partially
dissenting)--When the trial court decrees that the endowment in favour of the
deities was not absolute, and the guardian ad litem of the deities does not
appeal, it open to a joint shebait even when he is not a guardian to assail the
decree in appeal. [565A] Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Rani Hemanta
Kumari Debi, (1904) L.R. 31 I.A. 203, relied on.
Sihebaiti right is a right to property. This
right is affected by a declaration that the dedication in favour of the deities
is partial and not absolute. The shebaiti right in an absolute debutter is
different from the shebaiti right in a partial debutter. The joint shebait is
en- titled to defend his right even when the guardian of the deities does not
appeal. [565E, H] The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954] S.C.R. 1005, referred
to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 966 958 of 1964.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
September 23.
1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals
from Original Decrees Nos. 268 to 270 of 1957.
S.V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, A.K. Sen, and
D.N. Mukherji, for the appellants (in all the appeals).
A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and S.C. Majumdar, for
respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of SUBBA RAO and SHAH JJ. was
delivered by SHAH, J. BACHAWAT, J. partially dissented.
Shah, J. This group of appeals arises out of
suits Nos. 79 and 80 of 1954 and 67 of 1955 filed by the first respondent Balai
Chand Ghose (who will hereinafter be called "Balai") in the Court of
the Eighth Subordinate Judge, Alipore, District 24-Parganas, West Bengal. In
Suits Nos. 79 and 80 of 1954 Balai prayed that he be declared owner of the
properties described in the schedules annexed to the respective plaints. In suit
No. 67 of 1955 he claimed that it be declared that his wife Nirmala, is a
benamidar for him and that the deed of dedication dated September 15, 1944 did
not amount to an absolute dedication of the properties in suit to the deities
Sri Satyanarayan Jiu & Sri Lakshminarayan Jiu and that the plaintiff is the
sole Shebait of the two deities. The Trial 552 Court decreed suits Nos. 79
& 80 of 1954 holding that the plaintiff was the owner of the disputed
properties and the deed of endowment Ext. 11 (a) executed on March 8, 1939 by
Nirmala was "sham and colourable". In suit No. 67 of 1955 the
Subordinate Judge declared that Nirmala was a benamidar of Balai of the
properties in suit and the deed of endowment dated September 15, 1944, Ext. 11,
did not amount to absolute dedication of the properties to the deities Sri
Satyanarayan Jiu and Sri Lakshminarayan Jiu.
The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, modified the decrees passed by the
Trial Court. The High Court held that the deed Ext.
11(a) was not sham, but it amounted to a
partial dedication in favour of the deity Sri Gopal Jiu i.e. it created a
charge on the properties endowed for the purposes of the deity mentioned in the
deed. The decree passed in suit No. 67 of 1955 from which appeal No. 269 of
1957 arose was dismissed subject to the "clarification or
clarifications" that it created only a charge in favour of the city or
deities for the purposes recited therein and that subject to the charge, the
properties belonged to Balai. With certificates of fitness granted by the High
Court, these three appeals have been preferred.
[After stating the facts which gave rise to
the appeals His Lordship proceeded] We may briefly set out the terms of the
deed Ext. II(a).
It is described as a deed of dedication in
respect of immovable properties valued at Rs. 20,000 for the Seba of the deity.
After describing the properties it is recited that the settlor was in
possession and enjoyment of the properties and that she dedicated the properties
for Deb- Seba. The deed then recites that the settlor had been carrying on the
Seba of Sri Gopal Jiu installed by her husband, and that the properties
dedicated by her husband were not sufficient for satisfactorily carrying on the
Seba of Sri GopaI Jiu for ever and for perpetuating the names of her
father-in-law and mother-in-law and for carrying on the work of worship of the
deity of Sri Gopal Jiu regularly forever, the provisions then set out were
made.
The deed proceeds ,to state:
"I dedicate the above mentioned two
properties more fully described in the schedule below in order that the daily
and periodical Seba etc. of the said Sri Sri Gopal Thakur installed by my
husband may go on regularly. From this day they said two properties become the Debuttar
properties of the said 'deity Sri Sri Gopal Jiu Thakur and they vest in it in a
state absolutely free from encumbrances and defects. The said deity Sri Sri
Gopal Jiu becomes the full -owner of the said two properties. As to this
neither I nor any of my heirs and legal representatives in' succession shall
raise or be 553 entitled to lay any claim or demand at any time and even if it
be done it shall be wholly void and rejected".
Then the deed directs that "one good
temple and ornaments worth approximately Rs. 500/- for Sri Gopal Jiu Thakur
will be made out of the income of the Debuttar properties of Sri Gopal Jiu
Thakur and on the temple being constructed, the deity will be installed and
established therein and the expenses for worship etc. and entertaining Brahmins
and other expenses in connection with the ceremony shall be met out of the
income of the Debuttar properties of Sri Gopal Jiu Thakur". To meet the
expenses for the worship of the deity the properties described in the schedule,
it was directed, will be let out on rent and all the expenses of the deity will
be derrayed out of the rents, that the Shebait shall maintain proper accounts
of the income and expenditure and deposit in the deity's fund any surplus,
repair the houses yearly, pay municipal taxes etc., and out of the
accumulations from the surplus income purchase immovable properties in the name
of the deity and with the income erect a house at 153, Beliaghata Main Road and
deposit the rent from that house in the Debuttar fund. The deed gives detailed
directions with regard to succession to the Shebaitship. By the deed Nirmala
and her husband Balai were constituted joint Shebaits and it was directed that
after Nirmala's death Balai shall be the Shebait, and after his death his two
sons Paresh and Naresh will become Shebaits of the deity. The settlor expressed
the hope that the two Shebaits and their lineal descendants will live in the
same mess as members of the family and directed that anyone who separated in
mess will not be entitled to be a Shebait of the deity but if they separated in
mess for want of accommodation "out of their own accord and being
unanimous", and all the properties remain joint, they shall be entitled to
remain Shebaits. On the death of the two sons, Paresh and, Naresh, their sons
will become Shebaits in accordance with the shares of their respective fathers
in the Shebaitship, and if any of the sons have more than one son then all such
sons will together get their father's turn of worship and will act in accordance
with the terms of the deed and carry on the worship of the deity and that in
the absence of sons, the settlor's great grandsons will be appointed Shebaits,
and they will protect the Debuttar property. The deed then directs that the
daily Seba will be carried on in the same manner prescribed in the deed of
dedication relating to the Debuttar created by Balai and the daily and
periodical expenses for the worship of the deity will be met out of the
Debuttar properties dedicated by Balai. Provision was then made that on the
occasion of each of the festivals of Janmastami. Rasjatra and of Sri Gopal Jiu
Thakur a sum of Rs. 101/- will be spent by the Shebaits for entertaining
Brahmins and the poor. A monthly remuneration of Rs. 25/- is provided for the
person who acts as a Shebart and it is directed that so long as the sons shall
remain Shebaits in joint mess, they will get, for the 554 expenses of their
common family expenses four maunds of rice, two maunds of flour per month and
Rs. 2/- per day "for daily expenses". An additional amount of Rs.
10/- per month is directed to be spent on the Sankranti day i.e. on the last
day of each month and Rs. 51/~ on the occasion of Sivaratri out of the Debuttar
estate. All these expenses, it is directed, are to be met out of the house
rents and the monthly Ticca rent of the lands of the Bustee of the Debuttar
properties, but the Shebaits are not entitled to let out the house or land in
permanent rights to any one nor are they entitled to mortgage, make a gift of,
sell, encumber or transfer the same in any other manner, and if there be no
tenant in the house or the rent of the Bustee be not realised, the expenses of
the deities will be reduced and the Shebaits will get reduced remuneration
proportionately. Provision is made for the devolution of the office of Shebait.
Descendants in the female line are excluded from Shebaitship, until the entire
male line is extinct. Provision is also made for application of the
compensation received for Debuttar property: it is directed that out of the
amount of compensation immovable properties will be purchased by the Shebaits
in the name of the deity or the amount will be invested in Government paper in
the name of the deity, and out of the interest thereof disbursements directed
in the deed will be made. The deed then directs that the surplus amount
remaining after meeting the cost of worship will be accumulated. The Shebaits
are prohibited from residing in or otherwise using the houses appertaining to
the Debuttar estate and it is directed that if any one resides or uses it, he
will remain bound to pay proper rent. Paragraph 12 of the deed then provides:
"If in future the Shebaits be in want of
rooms for their residence then each of them will take three Cottahs of land
within the Bustee No. 153, Beliaghata Main Road beginning from the southern
extremity and after erecting houses thereon at his own expense will continue to
enjoy and possess the same down to his sons, sons and other heirs in succession
on payment of a rent of Rs. 2/- per Cottah per month to the Debuttar estate and
will pay for taxes, rents and repairs etc. of the said house from their
respective funds".
In the event of any Shebait dying sonless
after constructing a house, his widow will be entitled during her lifetime to
reside in the house and will also be entitled to get food and Rs. 5/- per month
as expenses. The deed then again states:
"Be it stated that no one will at any
time be entitled to make gift, sale or transfer in respect of the house built
in the said Bustee.
The said house will form a part of the
Debuttar estate and the Shebait will only remain in possession of the
same".
555 Finally, the deed states that to the
effect stated in the deed the settlor gives to Sri Iswar Gopal Jiu Thakur
installed by her husband "the properties etc. mentioned in the schedule
below".
In the preamble as well as in the operative
part of the deed, it is stated that the settlor has dedicated the properties
described in the schedule to the deed for the purpose of carrying on the
worship of Sri Gopal Jiu Thakur.
The deed expressly recites that the
properties have, by the deed of dedication, become the properties of the deity
and they vest in the deity absolutely free from all encumbrances, and that no
other person has any right therein. The deed undoubtedly contains some
inconsistent directions, but the predominant theme of the dedication is that
the estate belongs to the deity Sri Gopal Jiu and that no one else has any
beneficial interest therein.
The plea raised by Balai in the two suits was
that the deed of dedication Ext. 11 (a) was "a mere colourable one and was
never acted upon" and that by the deed a cloud was "cast on" his
title. The Trial Court accepted the plea. The High Court held that the deed was
valid, but thereby only a partial dedication was intended. That there is a
genuine endowment in favour of the deity Sri Gopal Jiu is now no longer in
dispute. The only question canvassed at the Bar is whether the dedication is
partial or complete. Balai contends that it is partial: the deity represented
by Nirmala contends that it is absolute. Where there is a deed of dedication,
the question whether it creates an absolute or partial dedication must be
settled by a conspectus of all the provisions of the deed. If the property is
wholly dedicated to the worship of the idol and no beneficial interest is
reserved to the settlor, his descendants or other persons, the dedication is
complete: if by the deed what is intended to create is a charge in favour of
the deity and the residue vests in the settlor, the dedication is partial.
Counsel for Balai contends that notwithstanding the repeated assertions in the
deed of dedication that the property was endowed in favour of Sri Gopal Jiu and
that it was of the ownership of the idol, the deed contained diverse directions
which indicated that the dedication was intended to be partial. Counsel relied
upon the following indications in the deed in support of the contention:
(1) A hereditary right was granted to the
lineal descendants of the settlor in the male line to act as Shebaits, and
provision was made for their residence, maintenance and expenses. This was not
restricted to the Shebaits only, but enured for the benefit of the members of
the Shebaits' families.
(2) The income of the endowed property was in
excess of the amounts required for the expenses of the deity. Expenses of the
deity were, it was contended, static, whereas the income was expanding, leaving
a large 556 surplus undisposed of. Provision was made for reducing the expenses
of the deity in the event of the income of the property contracting.
(3) The deed was supplementary to another
deed executed by Balai for the benefit of the deity, and the expenses of the
deity were primarily to come out of the property endowed under that deed.
(4) Direction for accumulation of income of
the property endowed, and other properties which may be acquired, without any
provision for disposal of the accumulation disclosed an intention on the part
of the settlor to tie up the property in perpetuity for the benefit of the male
descendants subject to a fixed charge in favour of the deity.
We do not propose to express any opinion on
the validity or otherwise of the directions, under which provision for
accumulation of income is made or benefit is given to persons other than the
Shebaits are concerned. This enquiry is only directed to the question whether
on the assumption that the directional are valid, they indicate an intention on
the part of the settlor to create merely a charge on the estate endowed, reserving
the beneficial interest in the settlor or her heirs.
A reasonable provision for remuneration,
maintenance and residence of the Shebaits does not make an endowment bad, for
even when property is dedicated absolutely to an idol, and no beneficial
interest is reserved to the settlor, the property is held by the deity in an
ideal sense. The possession and management of the property must, in the very
nature of things, be entrusted to a Shebait or manager and nomination of the
settlor himself and his heirs with reasonable remuneration out of the endowed
property with right of residence in the property will not invalidate the
endowment. A provision for the benefit of persons other than the Shebait may
not be valid, if it infringes the rule against perpetuities or accumulations,
or rules against impermeable restrictions, but that does not affect the
validity of the endowment. The beneficial interest in the provision found
invalid reverts to the deity or the settlor according as the endowment is
absolute or partial. If the endowment is absolute, and a charge created in
favour of other persons is invalid the benefit will enure to the deity, and not
revert to the settlor or his heirs.
Evidence about the income of the endowment in
favour of Sri GopaI Jiu is somewhat vague and indefinite. The deed of endowment
executed by Balai for the deity to which the present deed Ext. 11 (a) is
supplementary is not before the Court, and there is on the record no evidence
about the income from that endowment and the directions made thereunder. The
defect in the record is directly traceable to the nature of the plea raised by
Balai in the 557 Court of First Instance. He had pleaded that the endowment
Ext. 11 (a) made by his wife Nirmala was a "sham transaction" and was
not intended to create any interest in the deity: it was not the case of Balai
that the endowment though valid was partial and created a mere charge upon the
property in favour of the deity. Suits Nos. 79 & 80 of 1954 were tried with
suit No. 67 of 1955 and the question whether the endowment in favour of Sri
GopaI Liu was partial or absolute appears to have been raised without any
pleading in the former suits. There is, however, some evidence on this part of
the case, to which our attention has been invited, and on which the argument to
support the decree passed by the High Court is rounded by counsel for Balai.
Under the deed of dedication Ext. 11(a) "one good temple and ornaments
worth apapproximately Rs. 500" are to be provided for out of the property
endowed. Janamashtami, Rasjatra and other festivals are to be annually
celebrated and in respect of each of these festivals Rs. 101/- are to be
expended. The Shebait's remuneration is fixed at Rs. 25/- per month and for the
benefit of the family of the Shebait four maunds of rice, two maunds of Atta
and a sum of Rs. 2/per day for the daily expenses are provided. For performing
the Seba of Sri Satyanarayan Jiu on Sankranti day every month Rs. 10/- have to
be spent, and Rs. 51/- have to be spent on the Sivaratri day. Provision has
been made for paying Rs. 2/- per month to a pious widow of the family for
helping in the Puja and to a widow of a Shebait expenses at the rate of Rs.
5/- per month have to be paid. In the
aggregate, these would amount to Rs. 2,400/per annum at the rates prevailing in
1939.
Income at the date of the endowment from the
Bustee land 153/1 was estimated by Nirmala to be Rs. 50/- per month, and income
from the house Nos. 155 & 154/2 was estimated at Rs. 200/-. There is no
clear evidence about the Municipal or other taxes, rent collection expenses and
repairs. But on the materials found on the record, the plea that the income of
the properties was largely in excess of the total expenses to be incurred
cannot be accepted. The settlor had provided that if a Shebait is unable to
reside in the house, he will be entitled to get a plot of land out of premises
No. 153 at the rate of Rs. 2/- per month: whether this rent was nominal or
real, need not be investigated. If provision for residence of the Shebait can
be made under a deed of endowment without affecting its validity, a provision
whereby the Shebait will be entitled to use the land belonging to the deity at
specially low rates may not by itself amount to an impermissible reservation by
the settlor. The plea that this was a simulate endowment has been abandoned by
Balai. Assuming therefore that the charge for rent to be levied from the
Shebaits as monthly rental was nominal, the validity of the deed of dedication
will not on that ground be affected. Use of land in future by the Shebaits for
erecting houses will undoubtedly reduce the land available for letting out at
market P(N4SCI--9 558 rates. If the annual income of the deity was Rs. 3,000/-
per annum, and some income under the deed of endowment executed by Balai, and
the outgoing were Rs. 2,400/- beside taxes, collection charges for rents and
the expenses for repairs, it would be reasonable to hold that there was not
much disparity between the total income which the deity received in 1939 and
the estimated outgoing. The fact that on account of the pressure on land
increasing in the town of Calcutta, the rentals of immovable property may have
gone up later, will be irrelevant in deciding whether a substantial residue was
not disposed of by the deed. The direction in paragraph 6 of the deed that in
the event of the rent not being realised, the expenses of the deity will be
proportionately reduced and there will be proportionate reduction in the
remuneration to be paid to the Shebaits also acquires significance.
Whether the provision for accumulation of
income of the endowment is valid, does not call for determination in this case.
If there is an absolute dedication, but the direction for accumulation is
invalid, the benefit of the income will enure for the benefit of the deity
without restriction: the income will not revert to the settlor.
The High Court observed that the deed
commenced with what purported to be an absolute dedication to the deity, but it
was clear that the expenses for the Seba-Puja and other expenses of the deities
under the deed were not of an expanding character, there being specific
recitals in the deed which indicated that the dedication was merely
supplementary to the earlier deed of endowment by Balai for the Seba-Puja etc.
of the deity. The High Court observed:
"As a matter of fact there was specific
recital in the deed itself, which indicated that it was merely to be
supplementary to the earlier Debuttar deed of the husband Balai Chand Ghose,
for the purpose of enabling the said Sheba Puja etc. to be carried on regularly
and in a satisfactory manner. The expenses are practically all mentioned in the
deed itself and however elaborate they may be, having regard to the nature of
the properties and the estimate of the income, as appearing in the evidence
before us, it is difficult to hold that any large part of said income would be
spent on those expenses. This, undoubtedly, is a strong test in favour of
holding that what was merely the creation of a charge for those expenses out of
the properties, mentioned in the Schedule to the deed. Moreover under this deed
(Ext. II(a)) (Vide clause 3) so far as the daily and periodical Shebas were
concerned their expenses, or at least, the daily Sheba expenses, both fixed and
occasional, were to be met out of the husband's (Balai Chand's)' earlier
Debuttar 559 thus leaving practically not much pressure upon the properties
covered by this deed, Ext.
11 (a). It is true that in several places of
this deed (Ext. 11 (a), reference has been made to the income of the Debuttar
estate or advantages to the Debuttar estate or investment, in the Debuttar
estate, but they all, in the context, can be read as referring to the Debuttar
estate, which was created by the dedication in question, namely, the partial
Debuttar or the charge which was created in favour of the particular deity.
Where a charge is created and a dedication is
made, it will not be inappropriate to refer to the dedicated properties as
Debuttar, though only for the limited purpose of providing for that charge.
That, indeed, is the meaning of partial dedication, as understood in H indu
Law.
The mere use of the word 'Debuttar' would not
necessarily constitute a particular endowment an absolute Debuttar. On the same
principle and in same context, the payment of rent by the Shebaits, occupying
particular portion of the dedicated properties for purposes of their residence,
may also be explained. As a matter of fact on a reading of the entire deed, in
the light of the circumstances of this case and upon a full consideration of
the same, we are inclined to hold this deed, Ext. 11(a).
upon its true construction, did not create an
absolute Debuttar, but created only a charge in favour of the deity Sri Sri
Gopal Jiu, named therein, for the various services and other necessities,
referred to in several paragraphs of the said deed, Ext. 11(a)".
The High Court opined that because the income
of the endowed properties was large and was capable of continuous expansion,
and the expenses for the purposes of the deity were fixed, it may be inferred
that the settlor intended to create a mere charge and not an absolute
dedication in favour of the deity. In support of this proposition, the High
Court placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in
Surendrakeshav Roy v. Doorgasundan Dassee and Another(1). In that case Rajah
Bijoykeshav Roy bequeathed by his will property to a Thakur, to secure proper
performance of the Sheba and other ceremonies and directed his two widows each
to adopt a son, both of such sons being appointed Shebaits, subject to the
control of the widows during their minority, with monthly allowance from the
surplus income. The residue was not disposed of. Before the Judicial Committee
it was urged that all the property had been devised under the will of the Raja
to the deity and the heirs of the settlor had become Shebaits and were merely
entitled to manage the property in the usual way. In dealing with that
contention the Judicial Committee observed at p.
127:
(1) L.R. 19 I.A. 108, 560 "It is true
that by the first sentence of the will all is given to the Thakoor; and though
in the plaint the question is mooted whether the gift is made bona fide (and of
course such gifts may be a mere scheme for making the family property
inalienable), it has not been really disputed. Nor indeed could it well be
disputed in this case. For the last part of the will shews clearly enough that
the income was to be applied first in performing the sheba of the Thakoor who
is mentioned as the object of the gift, and of other family Thakoors, and in
meeting the prescribed monthly allowances, and in performing the daily and
fixed rites and ceremonies 'as they are now performed and met'. The testator
must have been well aware that after all these charges had been met there would
be a very large surplus. In fact he directs that out of the surplus each
adopted son shall receive Rs. 1,000/- monthly; but of the residue after that he
says nothing.
There is no indication that the testator
intended any extension of the worship of the family Thakoors. He does not, as
is sometimes done, admit others to the benefit of the worship. He does not
direct any additional ceremonies. He shews no intention save that which may be
reasonably attributed to a devout Hindu gentleman, viz. to secure that this
family worship shall be conducted in the accustomed way. by giving his property
to one of the Thakoors whom he venerates most. But the effect of that, when the
estate is large, is to leave some beneficial interest undisposed of, and that interest
must be subject to the legal incidents of property".
But the judgment does not lay down any rule
that where the income is expanding and the expenses are static, leaving a
substantial residue, it must be presumed, notwithstanding the comprehensive and
unrestricted nature of the disposition, that the settlor intended to create
only a charge in favour of the deity. The question is always one of intention
of the settlor to be determined from a review of all the dispositions under the
deed of settlement.
In Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v.
Brojonath Dey and Others(1) certain properties were dedicated by two brothers
to a domestic deity and it was directed that the right of Shebait should go to
their male heirs by primogeniture. In dealing with a dispute whether under the
deed of settlement, there was an absolute dedication to the deity, the Judicial
Committee observed at p. 211:
"The dedication is not invalidated by
reason of the fact that members of the settlor's family are nominated as (1) L.R.
64 I.A 203, 561 Shebaits and given reasonable remuneration out of the endowment
and also rights of residence in the dedicated property. In view of the
privileges attached to dedicated property it has not infrequently happened, as
the Law Reports show, that simulate dedications have been made, and a close
scrutiny of any challenged deed of dedication is necessary in order to
ascertain whether there has been a genuine divestiture by the settlor in favour
of the idol. The dedication, moreover, may be either absolute or partial. The
property may be given out and out to the idol, or it may be subjected to a
charge in favour of the idol.
'The question whether the idol itself shall
be considered the true beneficiary, subject to a charge in favour of the heirs or
specified relatives, of the testator for their upkeep, or that, on the other
hand, these heirs shall be considered the true beneficiaries of the property,
subject to a charge for the upkeep, worship and expenses of the idol, is a
question which can only be settled by a conspectus of the entire provisions of
the will', Pande Har Narayan v. Surju Kanwari (L.R. 43 1.A. 143). It is also of
importance to consider the extent of the property alleged to be dedicated in
relation to the expense to be incurred and the ceremonies to be observed in the
worship of the idol. The purposes of the ,dedication may be directed to expand
as the income increases, or the purposes may be prescribed in limiting terms so
that if the income increases beyond what is required for the fulfillment of
these purposes it may not be protected by the dedication".
In a recent judgment of this Court in Sree
Ishwar Sridhar Jew v. Sushila Bala Dasi and Others(1) it was observed.
that the question whether the idol itself is
the true beneficiary subject to a charge in favour of the heirs of the
testator, or the heirs are the true beneficiaries subject to a charge for the
upkeep, worship and expenses of the idol, has to be determined by a conspectus
of the entire deed or will by which the properties are dedicated and that a
provision giving a right to the Shebaits to reside in the premises dedicated to
the idol for the purpose of carrying on the daily and periodical worship and
festivals does not detract from the absolute character of a dedication to the
idol.
It is inexpedient to construe the terms of
one deed by reference to the terms of another, or to lay down general rules
applicable to the construction of settlements varying in terms. In construing a
deed, the Court has to ascertain the intention of the settlor, and for that
purpose to take into consideration all the (1) [1954] S.C.R. 407.
562 terms thereof. If, on a review of all the
terms, it appears that after endowing property in favour of a religious
institution or a deity, the surplus is either expressly or by implication
retained with the settlor or given to his heirs, a partial dedication may
readily be inferred, apparently comprehensive words of the disposition in
favour of the religious. endowment notwithstanding.
The terms of Ext. 11 (a) however disclose a
clear intention that the entire property was to belong to the deity and no one
else had beneficial interest or title thereto. The Shebaits and their
descendants are given a certain interest in tile property, but that direction
does not cut down the absolute interest conveyed to the deity, nor can it be
interpreted as reserving a beneficial interest in favour of the settlor or his
heirs. The direction operates to create a charge upon the estate of the deity,
and not to reduce the estate itself to a charge.
To recapitulate, therefore, the property is
dedicated absolutely for the deb-seba of the deity: no beneficial interest is
reserved to the settlor or his heirs: and the direction for accumulation of the
income does not affect the validity of that dedication. Provision for
maintenance and residence of the Shebaits being an ordinary incident of such a
dedication cannot be interpreted as restrictive of the estate of the deity. It
is unnecessary to decide whether the directions for appropriation of a part of
the income for persons other than the Shebails may be valid; if it be invalid,
the interest will revert to the deity and not to the settlor. It must,
therefore, be held that Ext. 11 (a) creates an endowment for the benefit of the
deity absolutely, subject to certain charges in favour of the Shebaits and the
descendants of the settlor.
It is unnecessary, in view of the course
which the proceedings in suit No. 67 of 1955 have taken, to set out the terms
of Ext. 11 executed by Balai and Nirmala on September 15, 1944. Suit No. 67 of
1955 was filed originally by Balai against the two deities Sri Satyanarayan Jiu
and Sri Lakshminarayan Jiu and Nirmala, and Balai sought to represent the two
deities. On an objection raised to the constitution of the action by Nirmala,
Sunil Sekhar Bhattacharjee was appointed guardian of the two deities for the
action. Bhattacharjee filed a written statement denying the claim made by Balai
and submitted mat the dedication in favour of the deity was absolute. An issue
was raised about the nature of the endowment and the Trial Court declared that
the endowment was partial and the beneficial interest remained vested in Balai.
The Trial Court had rejected the case of the deities that there was an absolute
dedication, and the guardian for the suit did not challenge that decree on
behalf of the two deities. Nirmala appealed and contended that there was an
absolute dedication in favour of the deity, but she did not represent the
deities and could not raise that claim, unless she got herself formally
appointed guardian of the deity by order of the Court. The High Court confirmed
the decree passed 563 by the Trial Court, subject to certain modifications
which are not material.
In this appeal, the two deities are also
impleaded as party respondents, but the deities have not taken part in the
proceeding before this Court, as they did not in the High Court. The decree
against the two. deities has become final, no appeal having been preferred to
the High Court by the deities. It is not open to Nirmala to challenge the
decree insofar as it is against the deities, because she does not represent the
deities. The rights conferred by the deed Ext. 11 upon Nirmala are not affected
by the decree of the Trial Court. She is not seeking in this appeal to claim a
more exalted right under the deed for herself, which may require reexamination
even incidentally of the correctness of the decision of the Trial Court and the
High Court insofar as it relates to the title of the deities. It was urged,
however, that apart from the claim which Nirmala has made for herself, the
Court has power and is indeed bound under O. 41 r. 33 Code of Civil Procedure
to pass a decree, if on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the deed,
this Court comes to the conclusion that the deed operates as an absolute
dedication in favour of the two deities. Order 41 r. 313, insofar as it is
material, provides:
"The Appellate Court shall have power to
pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and
to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require,
and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is
as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of
the respondents or parties although such respondents or parties may not have
filed any appeal or objection:" The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms
which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where
interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a
decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the
Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the Court reaches
a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the Court appealed from
and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to grant
relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by O. 41 r. 33 may
properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to
re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does
not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from.
The two claims made against Nirmala and the
deities in suit No. 67 of 1955, though capable of being joined in a single
action were distinct. Against the deities it was claimed that the property was
partially dedicated in their favour;
against Nirmala it was 564 claimed that she
was merely a benamidar for the settlor Balai and that she was not a Shebait
under the deed of settlement. The High Court has passed a decree declaring that
dedication in favour of the deities is partial and has further held, while
affirming her right to be a Shebait that Nirmala was merely a benamidar in
respect of the properties settled by the deed. There was no inconsistency
between the two parts of the decree, and neither in the High Court nor in this
Court did Nirmala claim a right for herself which was larger than the right
awarded to her by the decree of the Trial Court. In considering the personal
rights claimed by Nirmala under the deed Ext. 11, it is not necessary, even
incidentally, to consider whether the deities were given an absolute interest.
There were therefore two sets of defendants in the suits and in substance two
decrees though related were passed. One of the decrees can stand apart from the
other. When a party allows a decree of the Court of First Instance to become
final, by not appealing against the decree, it would not be open to another
party to the litigation, whose rights are otherwise not affected by the decree,
to invoke the powers of the appellate Court under O.
41 r. 33, to pass a decree in favour of the
party not appealing so as to give the latter a benefit which he has not
claimed. Order 41 r. 33 is primarily intended to confer power upon the
appellate Court to do justice by granting relief to a party who has not
appealed, when refusing to do so, would result in making inconsistent,
contradictory or unworkable orders. We do not think that power under O. 41 r.
33 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be
exercised in this case in favour of the deities.
Appeals Nos. 966 and 968 of 1964 must
therefore be allowed with costs throughout. It is declared that the properties
in deed Ext. 11(a) were absolutely dedicated in favour of the deity Sri Gopal
Jiu. Suits Nos. 79 & 80 of 1954 will therefore stand dismissed. This will,
however, be without prejudice to the concession made on behalf of Nirmala that
she was a benamidar of her husband Balai in respect of the properties settled
by the deed Ext. 11 (a).
Appeal No. 967 of 1964 will stand dismissed
with costs in favour of Balai.
Bachawat, J. I agree entirely with what has
fallen from my learned brother, Shah, J. with regard to the deed, Ext. 1 1(a),
and 1 agree that the deed creates an endowment for the benefit of the deity
absolutely, subject to certain charges in favour of the Shebaits and the
descendants of the settlor.
With regard to Ex. 11, my learned brother has
held that it is not open to Nirmala Bala to challenge the decree passed in Suit
No. 67 of 1955. With the greatest respect for my learned brother, I am unable
to agree with this conclusion.
The trial Court decreed that the dedication
under Ex. 11 is partial and not absolute, and I think it was open to Nirmala
Bala to challenge the decree in the 565 High Court, and on the appeal to the
High Court being dismissed, it is open to her to challenge the decree of both
the Courts by an appeal to this Court. It is true that the deities were
represented by independent guardians ad litem for the purposes of this
litigation. But Nirmala Bala is one of the joint Shebaits of the deity, and as
such, she has a right to assail the decree.
In Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v.
Rani Hemanta Kumari Deb(1), Sir Arthur Wilson observed:
"But assuming the religious dedication
to have been of the strictest character, it shall remain that the possession
and management of the dedicated property belong to the shebait.
And this carries with it the right to bring
whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such
right of suit is vested in the shebait, not in the idol".
As a joint Shebait of the deity, Nirmala Bala
has the right to file this appeal against the decree which declares that the
dedication is partial and not absolute. Such an appeal is necessary for the
protection of the property of the deity. The other Shebait and the deities are
parties to the appeal, and I am unable to hold that the appeal is not
maintainable at the instance of Nirmala Bala.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a Shebaiti
right is a right of property. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(3), B.K.
Mukherjea, J. observed:
"It was held by a Full Bench of the
Calcutta High Court [Monahai v. Bhupendra(3)], that Shebaitship itself is
property, and this decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh
v. Lal Behary(4), and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata(5). The effect of the
first two decisions as the Privy Council pointed out in the last case, was to
emphasis the proprietary element in the Shebaiti right and to show that though
in some respects an anomaly it was an anomaly to be accepted as having been
admitted into Hindu Law from an early date. This view was adopted in its
entirety by this Court in Angurbala v. Debabrata(6) .
It follows that the shebaiti right of Nirmala
Bala under the deed, Ex. 11 (a) is a right of property. This right is affected
by the declaration that the deed, Ex. 11(a) created a partial and not absolute
debuttar. The shebaiti right is an absolute debuttar is certainly different
from the shebaiti right in a partial debuttar. The decree (1) [1904] L.R. 31
I.A. 203, 210 (2) [1954] S.C.R. 1005, 1018.
(3) 60 Cal. 4.52.
(4) 63 I.A. 448.
(5) 70 I.A. 57.
(6) [1951] S.C.R. 1125.
566 under appeal therefore affects the
shebaiti right of Nirmala Bala. She is aggrieved by the decree, and is entitled
to challenge it in appeal.
In this view of the matter, I hold that the
appeal by Nirmala Bala from the decree in Suit No. 67 of 1955 is maintainable.
I would, therefore, have examined the contention of the appellant with regard
to Ex. 11 on the merits, and then disposed of the appeal. But as the majority
view is that the appeal is not maintainable, no useful purpose will be served
by an examination of the merits of the appellant's case with regard to Ex. 11.
ORDER Following the judgment of the majority,
Appeals Nos. 966 and 968 of 1964 are allowed with costs throughout. It is
declared that the properties in deed Ext. 11(a) were absolutely dedicated in
favour of the deity Sri Gopal Jiu.
Suits Nos. 79 & 80 of 1954 will therefore
stand dismissed.
This will, however, be without prejudice to
the concession made on behalf of Nirmala that she was benamidar of her husband
Balai in respect of the properties settled by the deed Ext. 11(a). Appeal No.
967 of 1964 is dismissed with costs in favour of Balai.
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