G. S. Ramaswamy & Ors Vs.
Inspector-General of Police, Mysore  INSC 9 (21 January 1964)
21/01/1964 WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION: 1966 AIR 175 1964 SCR (6) 279
D 1968 SC1210 (3) F 1972 SC 873 (9) RF 1979
State Police Service--Sub-Inspectors included
in eligibility list of Circle Inspectors--Reorganisation of States--Appointment
as Circle Inspectors in new State--Reversion on return of senior officers--If
reduction in rank--Mysore Seniority Rules, 1957, r. 2(c)--Hyderabad District
Police Manual, ss. 399, 403, 486.
All the petitioners were appointed
Sub-Inspectors in the former Hyderabad State. They were considered for promotion
as Circle Inspectors and their names were included in the eligibility list. On
account of the merger of certain areas of the former State of Hyderabad into
Mysore petitioners were transferred to Mysore. The petitioners were promoted ad
hoc Circle Inspectors from the eligibility list received from the former
Hyderabad State and they continued to act for varying periods as such. When
certain confirmed Circle Inspectors who were on leave or on deputation outside
the State returned to the new State, the petitioners were ordered to be
reverted. When that happened, the petitioners filed writ petitions in the
Mysore High Court in which they claimed that as they had been put in the
eligibility list by the former Hyderabad State, they were entitled as of right
to promotion as Circle Inspectors and to continue as such thereafter and the
order of their reversion amounted to reduction in rank. They prayed for a writ,
order or direction quashing the orders of reversion and directing the State
Government to continue them as Circle Inspectors and confirm them as such.
Their writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and they came to this
Court by special leave. They also filed writ petitions in this Court in
addition to the appeals. Two others who had not appealed against the orders of
the High Court also filed writ petitions in this Court.
The contentions raised before this Court were
that as their names were put in the eligibility list, they got an indefeasible
right to promotion as Circle Inspectors, that after promotion on a temporary or
officiating basis they got a right not to be reverted under any circumstances,
that as they had worked for more than two years on probation, they became
automatically confirmed under R. 486, that their reversions amounted to
reduction in rank in view of R. 2 (c) and that they should be considered senior
to other Circle Inspectors who were promoted after they were promoted as Circle
Inspectors and therefore they should not have been reverted but the other
Circle Inspectors who were promoted After them as Circle Inspectors should have
been reverted on the principle that junior most officiating persons must be
reverted. Dismissing the appeals and writ petitions, Held: The mere fact that a
Sub-Inspector's name is once put in the eligibility list does not give him an
indefeasible right to promotion as a Circle Inspector.
Moreover, after promotion on a temporary or
officiating basis, he does not get a right not to be reverted under any
Rule 486 does not contemplate automatic
confirmation after the probationary period of 2 years. The provision in the
rule that promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary
period, is qualified by the words "if they have given satisfaction".
The competent authority must be satisfied about their work and the order of
confirmation must be passed by that authority.
Reversion in the present case does not amount
to reduction in rank because the petitioners were never confirmed as Circle
Inspectors and had no right to that post and their reversion was on account of
exigencies of 281 service and not on account of any fault on their part.
Reversion on account of exigencies of service
as senior officers had come back from deputation or from leave, did not amount
to reduction in rank.
The petitioners could not rely on R. 2(c) in
the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the State after re-organisation
because promotions were made ad hoc without regard to inter se seniority of
officers from different States. It cannot be said that reversion of the
petitioners was on act of discrimination.
Sukhbans Singh V. State of Punjab, A.I.R.
1962 S.C. 1711, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION. Civil Appeal
Nos. 972-977 of 1963.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated April 3, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos.
1380, 1179, 1246, 1259 and 1312 of 1962.
AND Petitions Nos. 64, 90 to 94 and 173 and
174 of 1963.
Petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Purshottam Trikamdas and R. Gopalakrishnan,
for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 972-977/1963) and the petitioners (in
Petitions Nos. 64 and 90 to 94 of 1963).
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioners (in
Petition Nos. 173 and 174 of 1963).
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor General, B.
R. L. lyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent (In C.A. Nos. 972-977
of 1963 and Petitions Nos. 64 and 90 to 94 of 1963).
B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for
the respondent (in Petitions Nos. 173 and 174 of 1963).
January 21, 1964. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by WANCHOO J.-These appeals and writ petitions raise common
questions and will be dealt with together. The appeals arise out of six writ
petitions filed in the Mysore 282 High Court and six of the writ petitions
filed in this Court are by the same petitioners who applied in the Mysore High
Court. Two writ petitions (Nos. 173 and 174) have been filed by two others.
They also filed writ petitions in the High Court, though they have not filed
appeals from the decision of the High Court. They will all be referred to as
The case before the High Court was briefly
this. All the petitioners were appointed sub-inspectors in the former Hyderabad
State, under s. 6 of the Hyderabad District Police Act (No. X of 1329 Fasli).
Under r. 399 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual, issued by the Government
of Hyderabad Linder s. 10 of the Hyderabad District Police Act, posts of circle
inspectors were to be filled by promotion from the rank of sub-inspectors. The
subsequent rules provided for the procedure for this purpose. The names of
selected sub-inspectors who were considered fit for promotion were sent by the
Deputy Inspectors General of Police and the Commissioner of City Police of
Hyderabad to the Inspector General of Police. Thereafter a Board consisting of
the Inspector General of Police and all the Deputy Inspectors General of
Police, Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad and Assistant Inspector General
of Police interviewed the candidates and prepared an approved list of
sub-inspectors fit for promotion. This approved list used to be called the
eligibility list and promotions to the post of circle inspector used to be made
from this list. The case of the petitioners in the High Court was that their
names were included in the eligibility list published in the month of October
1956 before. the States Reorganisation Act (No. XXXVII of 1956) came into force
on November, 1, 1956.
They therefore contended that in view of the
entry of their names in the eligibility list they were entitled as of right to
promotion to the post of circle inspector as and when vacancies occurred. On
the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, certain areas from the
States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and the whole of Co-org were made part of
the new State of Mysore in addition to the existing State of Mysore. In
consequence, certain public servants belonging to these States from which areas
were added to the old State of Mysore were transferred to the new State 283 of
Mysore thus formed out of the old State of Mysore and the areas added to it.
Among these were the petitioners.
Under s. 115 of the States Reorganisation
Act, public servants so transferred were deemed to serve in connection with the
affairs of the principal successor State.
Provision was also made for the establishment
of one or more advisory boards for the purpose of assistance in regard to the
division and integration of services amongst the new states and the ensuring of
fair -and equitable treatment to all persons affected by the State
Reorganisation Act. Section 115 further provided that the conditions of service
applicable immediately before the appointed day (namely, November 1, 1956)
shall not be varied to the disadvantage of any person transferred to the new
State except with tile previous approval of the Central Government. Section 116
(1) provided for the continuance of public servants in the same posts; but
sub-s. (2) thereof laid down that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall prevent a
competent authority after the appointed day from passing in relation to any
such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or office, thereby
recognising the right of the successor State inter alia to transfer officers
anywhere in the new State after November 1, 1956.
The petitioners continued to serve in the new
State and as they were in the eligibility list referred to above they were
promoted as circle inspectors on various dates after November 1, 1956. It may
be mentioned that eligibility lists were received in the new State of Mysore
from all the States from which areas had been transferred to it under the
States Reorganisation Act and these lists continued to be acted upon as and
when vacancies arose in the cadre of circle inspectors. It also appears that
pending integration promotions were made from these eligibility lists ad hoc,
or as they were called "out of seniority", and continued to be so
made pending integration. The petitioners were thus promoted ad hoc circle inspectors
from the eligibility list received from the former Hyderabad State and
continued to act for varying periods as such. It appears further that the
petitioners were ordered to be reverted when certain confirmed circle
inspectors who were on leave or on deputation outside the State 284 returned to
the new State. Thereupon the petitioners filed writs before the High Court in
which they claimed that as they had been put in the eligibility list by the
former Hyderabad State, they were entitled as of right to promotion as circle
inspectors and to continue as such thereafter and the order of their reversion
amounted to reduction in rank.
They therefore prayed for a writ, order or
direction quashing the orders dated September 6, 1962, ordering their reversion
and directing the State Government to continue them as circle inspectors and to
confirm them as such.
Further during the course of arguments before
the High Court, reliance was placed on r. 2(c) of the Seniority Rules framed by
the Governor of Mysore in 1957 and the writ petitions before this Court are
mainly based on that seniority rule to which we shall refer in due course.
The case of the State Government was briefly
this. It was admitted that after November 1, 1956, these officers were
transferred to the new State of Mysore and eligibility lists were received from
all the States from which territories and officers were transferred to the new
State of Mysore. As however integration of various services was bound to take
time, the new State, by virtue of the powers conferred on it under the States
Reorganisation Act, started acting on the eligibility lists received from the
various States in anticipation of integration and promoting sub-inspectors to
the rank of circle inspectors from those eligibility lists on an ad hoc basis
and this was made clear in the various orders that were passed from time to
time by using the words "out of seniority" when such promotions were
made. Eventually a provisional integrated seniority list of all sub-inspectors
including those who were officiating as circle inspector (hereinafter referred
to as the provisional list) was prepared in February 1958. In 1962 when senior
circle inspectors returned to the State from deputation, some officiating
circle inspectors (other than the petitioners) were reverted. They filed writ
petitions before the High Court in 1962 contending that even though they had
been promoted later, they should not have been reverted in view of their
position in the provisional list and that that list should have been adhered to
and those junior to them in the provisional list should have been reverted.
This contention was accepted by the High 285 Court and in consequence
reversions began to be made in accordance with the provisional list in
compliance with the view taken by the High Court. That was why the, junior most
sub-inspectors according to the provisional list who were in the eligibility
list and who were officiating as circle inspectors were reverted. In
consequence -the petitioners were also reverted when senior officers came back
to the State. It was further urged that the eligibility lists gave no right to
the sub-inspectors whose names were borne on those lists to promotion as circle
inspectors, though it was not disputed that only those who were in the
eligibility lists could be promoted as circle inspectors. But the fact that a
sub-inspector's name was in the eligibility list did not confer any right on
him to promotion in view of the Rules. Further it was contended that
officiating circle inspectors could not claim confirmation as an automatic
right after they had worked for a certain number of years as such and that they
could only become confirmed circle inspectors when orders to that effect were
expressly made by the Government. In the present cases the petitioners were
never confirmed by the Government as inspectors. There was therefore no
question of any reduction in rank. It is not in dispute that the petitioners
were not reverted on account of any fault on their part; they had to be reverted
only because of exigencies of service as senior inspectors had come back to the
State from deputation or had returned from leave. It was urged that the
reversion in the present case could not amount to reduction in rank and was in
ordinary course due to exigencies of service. As to r. 2 (c) of the Seniority
Rules, the case of the Government was that that rule governed the seniority of
inspectors while they were acting as such and had nothing to do with the
question of reversion, and in any case considering that promotions had been
made after November 1, 1956 on ad hoc basis, the rule would not confer any
right on the petitioners and the Government was justified in following the
provisional list in view of the observations of the High Court referred to above.
It was therefore contended that the petitioners had no right to the posts from
which they were reverted and there was no reduction in rank and they were not
entitled to any benefit of r. 2(c).
286 The High Court accepted the contentions
raised on behalf of the State and dismissed the petitions. Thereupon special
leave was obtained by six of the petitioners in the High Court and that is how
we have six appeals before us. These six appellants have also filed six writ
petitions before this Court in addition to two other writ petitions filed by
two other petitioners in the High Court who had not filed appeals.
The first two questions that fall for
consideration are whether the fact that a sub-inspector's name is put in the
eligibility list gives an indefeasible right to him to promotion, and whether
after such promotion on a temporary or officiating basis he gets a right not to
be reverted under any circumstances. We are of opinion that the fact that a sub
inspector's name is in the eligibility list gives him no right of the kind
urged on behalf of the petitioners.
The rules in that behalf that are relevant
are 399 to 403 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual. Rule 399 provides that
vacancies in the rank of circle inspector are to be filled by the promotion of
selected sub-inspectors and r.
403 lays down that "no direct
appointments to the rank of Circle Inspector will be made". Rule 400
prescribes the procedure for putting the names in the eligibility list.
Rule 102 refers to sub-inspectors serving in
the C.I.D. Rule 401 lays down that sub-inspectors whose names are entered in
the approved list will be interviewed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police
in the course of his cold weather tour and each sub-inspector's work during the
year will be examined and report will then be made to the Inspector General of
Police whether the officer had maintained his fitness for promotion or not.
Thus r. 401 makes it clear that even after the sub-inspector's name is put in
the eligibility list, his fitness for promotion is to be decided year by year
and a report has to be made whether he has maintained his fitness for promotion
or not. This obviously means that where a sub inspector has not maintained his
fitness his name can be removed from the eligibility list. It follows therefore
that the mere fact that a sub inspector's name is once put in the eligibility
list does not give him an indefeasible right to promotion as a circle
inspector. Then there is r. 486 which governs promotions generally. It lays
down that promotion 287 cannot be claimed as a matter of right, though officers
and men of all ranks are entitled to expect promotion' if they have good
records, and if they are smart and efficient and have a thorough knowledge of
their duties. This again clearly shows that merely because a sub-inspector's
name is put in the eligibility list, he cannot claim promotion as a matter of
right. Rule 486 further provides that all officers who are promoted will be on
probation for a period of two years. They may be reverted at any time during
this period by the authority competent to promote them, if their conduct and
work are not satisfactory, or if they are found unsuitable for the appointment
to which they have been promoted. This clearly shows that even where a sub-inspector
has actually been promoted as circle inspector lie remains on probation for two
years and during that period he is likely to be reverted if his work and
conduct are not found satisfactory. This again negatives the contention on
behalf of the petitioners that they had an indefeasible right to promotion
because their names had been put on the eligibility list and that they could
not be reverted after they had once started acting as circle inspectors.
Lastly, r. 486 provides that promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of
their probationary period if they have given satisfaction. This clearly shows
that it is only when the probationary period is over and the promoted officer
has given satisfaction during the whole of that period that he will be confirmed.
It is clear therefore reading rr. 401 and 486 together that the mere fact that
a sub-inspector's name is put in the eligibility list does not give him any
indefeasible right to promotion. Further the fact that he is actually promoted,
temporarily or as officiating, does not give him any right to continuance even
during the period of two years' probation and he is liable to be reverted at
any time even during those two years if his work is found unsatisfactory; it is
only when the authority concerned has found that his work and conduct are
satisfactory during the probation period that he can be confirmed. The
contention of the petitioners that they had any right under the eligibility
list for promotion or that after they had actually been promoted, they had a
right to continue in the post of circle inspector, therefore, must be
288 It has further been urged on the basis of
r. 486 that as the petitioners had worked for more than two years on probation,
they became automatically confirmed under the said rule, and reliance is placed
on the following sentence in r. 486, namely, "promoted officers will be
confirmed at the end of their probationary period if they have given
The law on the question has been settled by
this Court in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab(1). It has been held in that
case that a probationer cannot after the expiry of the probationary period
automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of
course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a
result. Therefore even though a probationer may have continued to act in the
post to which he is appointed on probation for more than the initial 'period of
probation, he cannot become a permanent servant merely because of efflux of
time, unless the Rules of service which govern him specifically lay down that
the probationer will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of
probation is over. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners before us that
the part of r. 486 (which we have set out above) expressly provides for
automatic confirmation after the period of probation is over. We are of opinion
that there is no force in this contention. It is true that the words used in
the sentence set out above are not that promoted officers will be eligible or
qualified for promotion at the end of their probationary period which are the
words to be often found in the rules in such cases; even so, though this part
of r. 486 says that "promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of
their probationary period", it is qualified by the words "if they
have given satisfaction".
Clearly therefore the rule does not
contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years,
for a promoted officer can only be confirmed under this rule if he has given
satisfaction. This condition of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a
promoted officer can be confirmed under this rule and this condition obviously
means that the authority competent to confirm him must pass an order to the
effect that the probationay officer has given satisfaction and is therefore
confirmed. The petitioners therefore cannot (1) A.I.R. 1962. S.C. 1711.
289 claim that they must be treated as
confirmed circle inspectors simply because they have worked for more than two
years on probation; they can only become confirmed circle inspectors if an
order to that effect has been passed even under this rule by the competent
authority. The first contention therefore that the petitioners before us have an
indefeasible right to promotion once their names are put in the eligibility
list and that they are entitled to continue as circle inspectors thereafter if
they have once been promoted, on temporary or officiating basis, cannot be
This brings us to the next question whether
the reversion in the present cases can be said to amount to reduction in rank.
In view of what we have said above on the first point raised on behalf of the
petitioners, it is clear that the petitioners cannot be treated as confirmed
circle inspectors. It is not disputed that they have never been confirmed as
such. It is also not disputed that they have not been reverted on account of
any fault in their work.
The reversion has been made simply because
senior circle inspectors have come back to the State either from deputation or
from leave and they have to be accommodated.
Such reversion therefore cannot amount to
reduction in rank for two reasons, firstly, because the petitioners before us
were never confirmed as circle inspectors and had no right to that post, and
secondly, because the reversion is on account of exigencies of service and not
on account of any fault their part. Reversion on account of exigencies of
service, as senior officers have come back from deputation or from leave,
cannot in our opinion amount to reduction in rank. The contention of the
petitioner that by this reversion they have been reduced in rank therefore
The next point that has been urged is that in
any case till final integration of service -was made, the State Government was
not entitled to take into account the provisional list of sub-inspectors and
could only proceed to give promotions and to make transfers regionwise
according to the eligibility lists of former States from which the territories
came to the new State and if that was done the petitioners being senior in
their region could not be reverted. We are of opinion that there is no force in
this contention. It is 134-159 S.C.--19.
290 true that for some time the State
Government did proceed on this basis for there was no integrated list, whether
provisional or final, available; but that does not mean that under the law it
could not act on the provisional list once it was made till it was made final
or that there was any estopped against the State Government in view of its
having acted regionwise for some time. We have already indicated that
territories from four States came to the old State of Mysore to form the new
State of Mysore and that necessarily raised difficult question of integration,
and so the State Government made ad hoc promotions region wise or out of
seniority as was stated by it in various government orders.
But the State is bound to be treated as one
unit for purposes of administration. We may also refer to s. 116(2) of the
States Reorganisation Act, which makes it clear that after the appointed day
the whole State will be treated as one unit and nothing would prevent the
competent authority after the appointed day from passing in relation to any
such officer allotted to the new State any order affecting his continuance in
such post or office. We cannot therefore accept the contention that the State
Government was bound till the final list of integration was made, to make
transfers only region wise. We can see nothing in law which prevents the State
Government from proceeding according to the provisional list after such list
was prepared. We are of opinion that the view taken by the Mysore High Court in
the earlier writ petitions after the framing of the provisional seniority list
is correct and the State Government would be entitled to act on that list
subject of course to this that if the provisional list is in any way altered
when the final list is prepared, the State Government would give effect to the
final list. The contention of the petitioners that the State Government should
have continued to make promotions and transfers regionwise only even after the
provisional list was made therefore must fail. It may be added that the State
Government would be entitled and bound after the appointed day to treat the
State as one whole unit and make such orders of transfer, as it thought fit,
treating the whole State as one unit.
Lastly, we come to the contention based on r.
2 (c) of the Mysore Seniority Rules which was argued before the 291 High Court
at the hearing though it was not specifically raised in the petitions there and
this is the main basis of the writ petitions before us. The rule was
promulgated by the Governor of Mysore from February 1958 and is in these terms:"Seniority
inter se of persons appointed on temporary basis will be determined by the
dates of their continuous officiating in that grade and where the period of officiating
is the same the seniority inter se in the lower grade shall prevail." The
contention on behalf of the petitioners is that in view of this rule, they
should be considered senior to other circle inspectors who were promoted after
they were promoted as circle inspectors and therefore they should not have been
reverted but the other circle inspectors who were promoted after them as circle
inspectors should have been reverted, on the principle that junior-most
officiating person must be reverted.
Now r. 2(c) as it stands merely provides for
seniority between persons officiating in a higher rank when they are
officiating as such; it is not an express rule as to the manner in which
reversion should be made where reversions are necessary on account of
exigencies of service. The rule therefore cannot be held as expressly providing
for the principle of "last come first go" with which one is familiar
in industrial law. Strictly speaking therefore the petitioners cannot claim
that r. 2 (c) has been violated by their reversion, for it does not provide for
reversion and only provides for the seniority of officers who are officiating
in a higher grade. Even so, it may be conceded that when reversion takes place
on account of exigencies of public service, the usual principle is that the
junior-most persons among those officiating in clear or long term vacancies are
generally reverted to make room for the senior officers coming back from
deputation or from leave etc.
Further ordinarily as promotion on
officiating basis is generally according to seniority, subject to fitness for
promotion, the junior-most person reverted is usually the person promoted last.
This state of affairs prevails oridinarily unless there are extraordinary
circumstances, as in the present case. We have 292 already set out above that
the new State of Mysore was formed of the territories of the old State of
Mysore And the territories of four other States. The consequence of this was
that officers from the other States as well as from the old State of Mysore
became officers of the new State and the question of their integration inter se
had to be decided in accordance with s. 115 of the States Reorganisation Act.
That matter had to take time and therefore in
the interest of administration ad hoc promotions continued to be made by the
new State of Mysore after November 1, 1956. The result of this ad hoc promotion
was that the normal principle of promotion based on seniority subject to
fitness in a State where there is no question of integration could not work and
that is why we find that orders were passed by the new State promoting sub-inspectors
from various eligibility lists with regard to seniority inter se of officers
from various States. It was only in 1958 that the provisional list of
sub-inspectors was prepared. When this provisional list was prepared it was
found that the promotions which had till then been made out of eligibility
lists received from various States were not in accordance with the provisional
list and it so happened in many cases that sub-inspectors who were seniors in
the provisional list and who were also in the eligibility lists of the various
States were promoted after sub-inspectors who were junior in the provisional
list though they were also in the eligibility lists. It was because of these
special circumstances arising out of the provisional list which began to be put
into effect after 1958 that the situation arose that officiating inspectors who
had been officiating for a longer time had to be reverted before officiating
inspectors who had been officiating for a shorter time because of the seniority
in the provisional list. We are therefore of opinion that it was because of the
special circumstances after November 1, 1956 that the petitioners and those
like them who were really junior to other sub inspectors in the eligibility
lists came to be promoted earlier because there was no provisional list
available or in actual force when the promotions were made ad hoc and out of
seniority. It was only when the provisional list was made that inter se
seniority of officers coming from various States became prima facie known.
Therefore when reversions had 293 to be made de on account of exigencies of
service in accordance with the provisional list it was bound to happen in view
of the earlier ad hoc promotions that some officiating inspectors who had been
promoted earlier had to be reverted in preference to others who had been
promoted later in these circumstances. It cannot therefore be said in view of
the special circumstances prevailing in the State consequent on the States
Reorganisation Act that the departure from the normal method of reversion was
unjustified after the making of the provisional list. The petitioners therefore
cannot rely on r. 2(c) in the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the State
after the reorganisation because promotions were made ad hoc without regard to
inter se seniority of officers from different States. It is only because of
this special circumstance that it appears as if r. 2(c) is being disregarded in
the matter of reversion for the promotions were made without regard to
integrated seniority and resulted in sub-inspectors who were juniors in
integrated seniority being promoted earlier. We are therefore of opinion that
r. 2(c) does not strictly apply in the present case. But even on the basis that
the junior-most should first be reverted in case reversion has to take place on
account of exigencies of service, it cannot be said that the reversion of the
petitioners is an act of discrimination, for the affidavit on behalf of the
State Government shows that they are really junior-most in the provisional list
though they might have in the exceptional circumstances indicated above acted
longer as officiating circle inspector than others who have not been reverted.
We are therefore of opinion that the charge of discrimination based on the violation
of r. 2(c) cannot in the special circumstances of this case be sustained, for
it is not in dispute that they were the juniormost according to the provisional
list, when the orders of reversion were made.
The appeals and the writ petitions therefore
fail and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, we make no
order as to costs.
Appeals and petitions dismissed.