V. K. A. Ranganatha Konar Vs. The
Tiruchirappalli Municipal Council [1964] INSC 300 (18 December 1964)
18/12/1964 GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N.
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1966 AIR 65 1965 SCR (2) 645
ACT:
The Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921
(Mad. Act 3 of 1922), ss. 4(1) and 4(4)-Landlord to pay compensation to evicted
tenant for improvements on land-Decree in favour of landlord under s. 4(1) not
specifying time within which payment to be made-Payment not made within three
months- Provisions of s. 4(4) whether attracted Suit whether liable to be
dismissed.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was the tenant of respondent
No. 1 on a piece of land and had built a cinema house thereon. On the expiry of
the lease, respondent No. 1 filed a suit for rent and eviction against the
appellant and his sub-lessee. The suit was decreed. Under s. 4(1) of the Madras
City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921, the court determined the value of the
superstructures made by the appellant, and the decree said that possession of
the suit properties was to be delivered to respondent No. 1 on the latter
making payment of the compensation for the superstructures as determined by the
court. The decree did not specify the time during which the payment was to be
made. According to s. 4(4) of the Act the compensation money had to be paid
within three months of the passing of the decree in the landlord's favour,
otherwise the landlord'& suit would stand dismissed. Respondent No. 1 paid
the compensation money into court after the said period of three months had
expired and prayed to the court that the decree be amended by specifying the
time during which the payment was to be made. The court amended the decree by
inserting therein that the payment was to be made within three months from the
passing of the original decree. Thus respondent No. 1 remained in default under
s. 4(4) and the court dismissed the suit. Respondent No. 1 appealed to the High
Court which held that s. 4(4) did not come into play when the decree under s.
4(1) did not specify the period within which payment was to be made and its
decision went in favour of respondent No. 1. The appellant then applied for a
certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court which was granted.
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that
the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) is mandatory and any defect in the decree
which is passed under s. 4(1) cannot help the plaintiff-landlord to circumvent
the effect of the said provision. On behalf of the respondent No. 1 it was urged
that s. 4(1) should be read as controlling s. 4(4), first a decree must be
properly passed under s. 4(1) specifying the period of three months within
which the amount should be paid and then only s. 4(4) could be invoked.
HELD : The High Court was in error in
reversing the order passed by the trial court.
(i) The controversy had to be decided in the
light of the object of the Act. The object was clearly to give protection to
tenants who had taken open land on lease and had built superstructures on it in
the hope that as long as they paid rent they would not be evicted. [649 H] 646
(ii) Having regard to the mandatory terms in which s. 4(4) is couched it would
not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as controlling a. 4(4). The relevant
clause provides that the decree should direct that on payment by the landlord
into court, within three months, of the amount found due, the tenant shall put
the landlord into possession. The clause in respect of the payment by the
landlord into court within three months amount to a condition which has to be
satisfied by the landlord before the tenant is required to deliver to him
possession of the property in question. In other words, reference to the
payment by the landlord of the amount found due within the specific period in
s. 4(1) is not so much a direction issued by the court as specification of a
condition expressly and independently provided by s. 4(4).
[651 D-F] (iii) In s. 4(4) the expression
"the decree passed under sub-s. (1)" merely describes the sub-section
under which the decree is passed, the emphasis in the context being on the date
of the said decree and not so much on the strict compliance with the form
prescribed in s. 4(1). The logical way to reconcile s. 4(1) and s. 4(4) would
be to treat the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory and paramount and
read in the relevant portion of s. 4(1) accordingly.
Even if the decree does not mention that the
amount has to be paid within three months, the landlord's obligation to make
the payment within three months is still enforceable under s, 4(4); otherwise
defective decrees would deprive the tenants of the benefit intended to be
conferred on them by s. 4(4). [651 G652 E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 675 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
August 17, 1960 of the Madras High Court in Appeal Suit No. 92 of 1957.
T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and S.
Venkatakrishnan, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J. The short question which this appeal raises before us
relates to the construction of S. 4(1) read with S. 4 (4) of the Madras City
Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 (Madras Act III of 1922) (hereinafter called 'the
Act'). This question arises in this way. On September 1, 1944, respondent No.
1, Tiruchirappalli Municipal Council, leased T.S. No. 3283/1-A/2 to the
appellant, V. K. A. Ranganatha Konar, for a term of three years at a rent of
Rs.
100/- per month. On the premises thus let out
to him, the appellant erected a building for the purpose of exhibiting
cinematographic films. In 1945, he sub-leased the property to the second
respondent, A. Muthukumaran. In 1947, the lease was renewed for a period of
three years, and so, it expired on March 31, 1950. Nevertheless, the appellant
and respondent No. 2 continued in possession.
647 On December 23, 1954, respondent No. 1
instituted a suit for the eviction of the appellant and respondent No. 2 and
for arrears of rent. While the suit was pending the Act was extended to the
Municipal Town of Tiruchirappalli.
Accordingly, the value of the improvements
made by the appellant and respondent No. 2 was determined by the learned trial
Judge and declared to be Rs. 64,661-13-5 under s. 4(1) of the Act. On March 26,
1956, the trial Court passed a decree which, inter alia, provided "that
the defendants do put the plaintiff in possession of the suit properties
described hereunder on payment of Rs. 64,661-13-5 by the plaintiff to the first
defendant being the compensation for the superstructure belonging to the first
defendant." The appellant was the first defendant in the said proceedings.
This decree did not in terms direct
respondent No. 1 to say the, said amount within three months from its date, and
it is the commission to issue this direction which has caused the present
controversy between the parties.
On October 1, 1956, the appellant filed an
application I.A. No. 301 of 1956 inviting the attention of the Court to the
fact that respondent No. 1 had not made the deposit within three months from
the date of the decree, and claiming that by virtue of the provision prescribed
by s. 4(4) of the Act, the Court was bound to dismiss the suit filed by
respondent No. 1 for ejecting him and respondent No. 2. On November 5, 1956,
respondent No. 1 filed a counter to this interlocutory application. On the same
date, respondent No. 1. filed another interlocutory application praying that
the decree in question should be amended so as to specify the time within which
the deposit should be made. Pending these applications, on November 15. 1956,
respondent No. 1 sent a cheque to the Court in regard to the said amount .The
said cheque was duly cashed and the amount credited in the accounts of the
Court on November 20, 1956. On the date the trial Judge passed an order
directing that the decree should be amended by inserting a direction to the
effect that the deposit should be made before June 23, 1956, that is to say
within three months from March 26, 1956 on which date the original decree had
been passed. Since this amendment could not help respondent No. 1, the learned
trial Judge processed to pass an order dismissing the suit under the provisions
of s. 4(4) This order of dismissal was challenged by respondent No. 1 by an
appeal preferred before the Madras High Court. It was urged before the High
Court on behalf of respondent No. 1 that since the original decree did not give
a specific direction that the amount of compensation should be paid within
three months, the 648 provisions of s. 4(4) could not be invoked until the
decree was suitably amended. The argument was that it is only when the decree
makes a direction calling upon the plaintiff to deposit a certain amount by way
of compensation to the defendant-tenant within three months, that the
requirements of s. 4(1) are complied with. and it is only where a decree has
been properly drawn in accordance with the requirements of s. 4(1) that the
mandatory provisions of s. 4(4) could be invoked. In substance, the High Court
has accepted this plea, with the result that the appeal preferred by respondent
No. 1 has been allowed and the original decree passed on March 26, 1956, has
been confirmed. The result of this decision is that respondent No. 1 is at
liberty to take out execution for obtaining possession of the property. The
appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and
it is with this certificate that he has brought this appeal before us. On
behalf of the appellant, Mr. Tatachari has urged that the High Court's decision
under appeal proceeds on a misconstruction of the provisions contained in s.
4(4) read with s. 4(1) of the Act. He argues that the provision prescribed by
s. 4(4) is mandatory and any defect in the decree which is passed under s. 4(1)
cannot help respondent No. 1 to circumvent the effect of the said provision.
Before dealing with this point, it is
necessary to read s. 4(1) & (4). Section 4(1) reads thus "In a suit
for ejectment against a tenant in which the landlord succeeds, the court shall
ascertain the amount of compensation, if any, payable under section 3 and the
decree in the suit shall declare the amount so found due and direct that, on
payment by the landlord into court, within three months from the date of the
decree, of the amount so found due, the tenant shall put the landlord into
possession of the land with the building and trees thereon." Section 4(4)
provides "If the amount found due is not paid into court within three
months from the date of the decree under subsection (1) or of the interim order
under sub-section (2), or if no application is made under section 6, the suit
or application, as the case may be, shall stand dismissed, and the landlord
shall not be entitled to institute a fresh suit for ejectment, or present a
fresh application for recovery of possession for a period of five years from
the date of such dismissal." 649 Mr. Sastri for respondent No. 1 has
strenuously contended that in appreciating the effect of the two relevant
provisions, it is necessary to bear in mind that ultimately, the direction
contained in the decree must be enforced, and if the original decree did not
require respondent No. 1 to pay the compensation amount within three months,
the right of the appellant to recover that amount must inevitably be enforced
by execution proceedings under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. In the case
of such a decree, s. 4(4) cannot apply, because s. 4(4) postulates that a
proper and valid decree has been passed in conformity with the requirements of
s. 4(1) Section 4(4) provides a period of three months "from the date of
the decree under sub-section (1)"; it is the decree under ,sub-section (1)
which starts the period of limitation, and before a decree can be said to be a
decree under sub-section (1), it must comply with all the requirements
prescribed by the said sub-section; in the present case, the decree did not
specify that the amount in question should be paid within three months, and so,
it is not a decree properly passed under sub-section (1) and as such, s. 4(4) cannot
be invoked.
Mr. Sastri has put his argument in another
form. He con- tends that though the original decree passed between the parties
in the present proceedings did not comply with the requirements of s. 4(1)
inasmuch as it failed to specify the period of three months within which the
amount of compensation should be paid, it cannot be said to be a nullity; it is
a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, and so, when the
appellant seeks to invoke s.
4(4), what he is virtually asking the Court
to do is to ignore the fact that the decree did not direct respondent No. 1 to
pay the amount within three months, and in the absence of a direction in the
decree, it would not be permissible to the Court to enforce the provisions of
s. 4(4) against respondent No. 1. He would, therefore, read s. 4(1) as
controlling s. 4(4); first a decree must be properly passed under s. 4(1)
specifying the period of three months within which the amount should be paid,
and then s. 4(4) can be invoked. That is how Mr. Sastri has presented before us
his solution to the problem of construing section 4(1) and (4) together.
In dealing with this question, it is
necessary to bear in mind the object which the Act is intended to achieve. As
the preamble indicates, the Act was passed to give protection to certain
classes of tenants in areas to which it was extended. The Legislature thought
that it was necessary to give protection to tenants who had constructed
buildings on others' lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long
as they paid a fair rent for the land.
In 650 other words, the Legislature took the
view that in a large majority of cases where open plots were let out to the
tenants and the tenants, in their turn, invested money by constructing
buildings on the said plots in the hope that they would be allowed to remain in
possession of the leased property so long as they continued to pay a fair rent,
it was necessary to protect their tenancy rights. Though this Act was passed in
1922, it was not extended to the whole of the State of Madras; it has been
extended stage by stage to different areas. In fact, we have already seen that
the Act was extended to the municipal area of Tiruchirappalli while the present
suit between the parties was pending in the trial Court.
In order to carry out its object of affording
protection to the tenants, s. 3 has provided for the payment of compensation on
ejectment. It lays down that if a tenant is ejected, he would be entitled to
compensation for the value of the building which he might have constructed on
the plot let out to him. Section 3 deals with a question of compensation and
provides how it should be determined.
Section 4 then deals with the disposal of
suits for ejectment. Section 4(1) provides that if the landlord succeeds in
obtaining a decree for ejectment, the Court shall ascertain the amount of
compensation payable to the tenant, and the decree in the suit shall declare
the amount so found due and direct that, on payment by the landlord into court,
within three months from the date of the decree, of the amount so found due,
the tenant shall put the landlord into possession of the land with the building
and trees, thereon. Section 4(4) contains a mandatory provision that if the
amount found due is not paid within three months, the suit of the landlord
shall stand dismissed. We will presently deal with the question of construing
these two sub-sections. Meanwhile, we may refer to s. 10.
Section 10(1) provides that sections 4, 5, 6,
8, 9 and 9-A shall, inter alia, apply to suits in ejectment which are pending
or in which decrees for ejectment have been passed, but have not been executed.
Section 10(2) deals with cases in which decrees for ejectment have been passed,
but the amount of compensation has not been determined, and it provides that on
an application by the tenant, such amount would be determined in accordance
with s. 4. Section 10(3) deals with cases of decrees which are pending
execution; and it requires that the Court shall, on the application of the
tenant, recall execution orders, ascertain the amount of compensation, and pass
an interim order under s. 4. It will thus be clear that wherever the Act is
extended, the protec- tion afforded by the Act and the benefits conferred by it
can be claimed not only by tenants against whom suits are pending or 651 would
be filed in future, but also by tenants against whom decrees have already been
passed, but have not been fully executed. Section 10 clearly brings out the
fact that the policy of the legislature was to extend ample protection to the
tenants in the areas to which 'he Act would be extended from time to time.
Reverting then to the question of construing
s. 4(1) and (4), it would appear that what s. 4(1) purports to do is to require
that the decree in the suit to which it applies shall, in the first instance,
declare the amount found due by way of compensation. The said provision also
requires that .he decree shall declare that the tenant shall put the landlord
into possession of the land on payment by the landlord into court, within three
months from the date of the decree, of the amount found due. The two operative
parts of the decree as contemplated by s. 4(1) are : the declaration of the
amount due to the tenant, and the direction to the tenant to deliver possession
of the land to the landlord in case he paid into Court within three months of
the date of the decree the amount declared due. It is true that the decree
would state that the landlord has to pay the amount within three months from
its date; but having regard to the specific and mandatory terms in which s.
4(4) is couched, it would not be reasonable to construe s. 4(1) as controlling
s. 4(4). The relevant clause provides that the decree shall direct that on
payment by the landlord into Court, within three months, of the amount found
due, the tenant shall put the landlord into possession. The clause in respect
of the payment by the landlord into court within three months amounts to a
condition which has to be satisfied by the landlord before the tenant is
required to deliver to him possession of the property in question. In other
words, reference to the payment by the landlord of the amount found due within
the specified period in s. 4(1) is not so much a direction issued by the Court
as specification of a condition expressly and independently provided by s. 4(4).
The provision of s. 4(4) clearly shows that
if the amount found due is not paid within three, months, the suit of the
landlord shall stand dismissed. The opening clause of s. 4(4) shows that the
amount has to be paid within three months from the date of the decree passed
under sub-section (1). The expression "the decree under sub-section ( 1 )
" merely describes the sub-section under which the decree is passed, the
emphasis in the context being on the date of the said decree and not so much on
the strict compliance with the form prescribed by s. 4(1). If the decree is
passed under s. (1), its date is material for the purpose of deciding the
period beyond which s. 4(4) would come into operation. In other words, 652 as
soon as it is shown by a tenant that a decree has been passed under s. 4(1)
declaring the amount of compensation due to him from the landlord, he is
entitled to claim that he is no longer under obligation to deliver possession of
the property to the landlord, because three months have passed from the date of
the decree and the amount declared as compensation has not been paid to him. If
the decree happens to be defective in the sense that it does not reproduce the
requirement of s. 4(1) expressly in its terms, that would not take the case
outside the purview of s. 4(4).
We are inclined to think that having regard
to the mandatory terms used in s. 4(4), it would be illogical and unreasonable
to suggest that a defective decree like the present enables the landlord to
circumvent the provisions of s. 4(4). The applicability of s. 4(4) cannot be
repelled merely on the ground that the decree passed under 6. 4 (1 ) does not
specify the period of three months within which the amount found due has to be
paid. In our opinion, the logical way to reconcile S. 4(1) and S. 4(4) would be
to treat the provision prescribed by s. 4(4) as mandatory and paramount and
read the relevant portion of s. 4(1) accordingly. That is why even if the
decree does not mention that the amount has to be paid within three months, the
landlord's obligation to make the payment within three months is still
enforceable under s. 4(4), otherwise defective decrees would deprive the
tenants of the benefit intended to be conferred on them by s. 4(4). We are
therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in reversing the order
passed by the trial Court. Respondent No. 1 has not paid the amount within
three months from the date of the decree and the suit instituted by it shall
stand dismissed under s. 4(4).
The result is, the appeal is allowed, the
decree passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial Court
restored. In the circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to
costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
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