Chaliagulla Ramachandrayya Vs. Boppana
Satyanarayana & Ors [1963] INSC 152 (10 May 1963)
10/05/1963 GUPTA, K.C. DAS GUPTA, K.C. DAS
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1964 AIR 877 1964 SCR (3) 985
ACT:
Part Performance -Transfer of interest in the
property under contract-Absence of registered instrument-Indian statutory
requirement-English Equitable Doctrine--Applicability Transfer of Property Act,
1882 (Act 4 of 1882), s. 53A.
HEADNOTE:
The plaintiffs brought a suit for partition,
two of them claimed to be the reversioners of Chandrappa and the third a
purchaser of the interest of the reversioners, defendants 4, 5 and 7. They were
thus entitled to a 5/6th share of the properties while the 6th defendant was
entitled as a reversioner of Chandrappa to the remaining 1/6th share. The
property was in the possession of the three sons of Nagayya, the first three
986 defendants, who denied these properties ever belonged to Chandrappa and
also that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 or defendants 4 to 7 were his reversioners.
The main defence was that even if the properties belonged to Chandrappa, the
defendants' father Nagayya became entitled to these as Chandrappa's illatom
son-in-law, on the basis that Chandrappa had brought Nagayya into his family
under an arrangement that the latter would marry his wife's sister's daughter
Mangamma and inherit the entire property after Chandrappa's death. The trial
court dismissed the suit. On appeal the High Court set aside the order and
decreed the suit. On certificate, the only contention, raised by the appellant
in this court was that even though specific performance had not been sought,
the contract itself would have the effect of transferring interest in the
property to Nagayya on Chandrappa's death.
Held that after enactment of s. 53A in the Transfer
of Property Act, the only case in which the English doctrine of equity of part
performance could be applied in India is where the requirements of s. 53A are
satisfied. In the instant Case, 53A has no application. It must be held
therefore that the considerations of equity cannot confer on Nagayya or his
heirs any title in the lands which under the statute could be conferred only by
a registered instrument.
The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed.
Challa Papi Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi,
(1872) 7 Mad. H C. R. 25; Bha'a Nahana v. Parbhu Hari, (1877) 2 I.L.R. Bom.
67; Asita, Mohan Ghosh Moulik v. Mohan Ghosh
Moulik, (1016) 20 G.W.N. 901; Venkatayyamma Rao v. Appa Rao, (1916) L. R. 43 1.
A. 138; Ariff v. Jadunath Majamdar, (1930) I.L. R. 58 Cal. 1235, held
inapplicable.
Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar, (1931) L. R. 58
I.A. 91, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 331 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
March 29, 1956, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 182 of
1950.
B. Manavala Chowdhry and B. K. B. Naidu, for
the appellants.
Narasiah Chowdhry and R. Gopalakrishnan, for
Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 8.
987 1963. May 10. The judgment of the Court
was delivered by DAS GUPTA J.-This appeal brought on a certificate granted by
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is against a decision of that Court reversing
a decree granted by the Subordinate judge, Masulipatnam, dismissing a suit for
partition.
Of the three plaintiffs who brought the suit,
two claimed to be the reversioners of Boppanna Chandrappa, to whom we shall
refer to as Chandrappa, and the third a purchaser of the interest of some of
the reversioners, viz., defendants 4, 5 and 7. According to the plaint the
three plaintiffs were thus entitled to a 5/6th share of the properties while
the 6th defendant was entitled as a reversioner of Chandrappa to the remaining
1/6th share. The property was however in the actual possession of the three
sons of Nagayya who were impleaded as the first three defendants.
In contesting the suit these defendants
denied that these properties had ever belonged to Chandrappa and further that
the plaintiffs 1 and 2 or the defendants 4, 5, 6 and 7 were his reversioners.
The main defence however was that even if the properties did belong to
Chandrappa, the defendant's father Nagayya became entitled to these as
Chandrappa's illatom son-in-law. The basis of this plea of illatom son-
in-lawship was said to be that Chandrappa had brought Nagayya into his family
under an arrangement that the latter would marry his wife's sister's daughter
Mangamma and help him in cultivation and management of the properties, in
consideration of which Nagayya would inherit the entire property after
Chandrappa's death.
The Trial Court held that all the suit
properties except a small portion did belong to Chandrappa 988 and the
plaintiffs would be entitled to 5/6th share of Chandrappa's properties and the
6th defendant to the remaining 1/6th share, on the death of Chandrappa's widow
Ramamma. He however accepted the defence case that Nagayya had become entitled
to the property on Chandrappa's death as Chandrappa's illatom son-in-law and
accordingly dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the High Court held that the
custom by which an illatom son-in-law inherited property could not be extended
to a case where the marriage took place not with the daughter of the owner of
the property but with some other relation of his. The High Court also rejected
an alternative plea that appears to have been raised before it that Nagayya
became entitled to the property on the basis of a contract between him and
Chandrappa. In this view of the law, the High Court set aside the order passed
by the Trial Court and decreed the suit.
It is no longer disputed before us that the
rights of an illatom son-in-law cannot be claimed by a person who under a
promise from the owner of the property that he would inherit the property
marries not the daughter but some other relation of the owner of the property.
'The alternative contention which was raised before the High Court has however
been repeated before us, It has been urged that there was a good and valid
contract between Chandrappa and Nagayya, that in consideration of Nagayya
marrying Mangamma and looking after Chandrappa's property, Chandrappa would
make him his heir and that the consequence of this contract was that Nagayya
became Chandrappa's heir. The question here is not whether on Chandrappa's
death Nagayya could have obtained specific performance of the alleged contract.
For, assuming that there was a contract as alleged and that it was a valid
contract, enforceable at law and also such of which specific performance could
989 have been obtained by proper proceedings in courts, the appellants' rights
would be to seek such specific performance. The contention on behalf of the
appellant is that even though specific performance has not been sought or given
the contract itself would have the effect of transferring interest in the
property to Nagayya on Chandrappa's death.
In support of this contention the learned
Counsel relied on three decisions of High Courts in India and also a decision
of the Privy Council. The first decision in point of time is the case of Challa
Papi Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi (1). The facts there were that the defendant's
father who was selected by Musalireddi, in pursuance of a special custom, as a
son-in-law who should take his property as if he was a son entered into
possession of the property on Musalireddi's death. lie then associated with
himself the plaintiff in the management of his property on promise of a share.
The plaintiff continued thus for many years, aiding in the management and
improvement of the property, until a short time before the suit was brought,
the first defendant turned the plaintiff out of doors and refused to give him
the promised share. The High Court of Madras held that the agreement by the
first defendant's father was to the effect that the plaintiff was being
admitted to the rights of a co- sharer and further, as there was a complete
adoption or ratification of the father's contract by the first defendant he
ought to be held to it and the plaintiff was therefore a co-sharer in the
property.
It has to be mentioned that this case was
decided long before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was enacted and the
question whether a written document was necessary for transfer did not come up
for consideration.
In Bhalla Nahana v. Prabhu Hari (2), which
was the next case cited, what happened was that one Gosai (1) (1872) 7 Mad.
H.C.R. 25.
(2) (1877) 2 I.L.R. Bom. 67.
990 Ramji induced the parents of the
defendant Prabhu Hari to give him in adoption by an express promise to settle
his property upon the boy but died before such settlement could be executed.
Nearly 30 years after his death Ramji's widow Bhani gave effect to her husband's
undertaking by executing a deed of gift of his property in her hands in favour
of Prabhu Hari. The reversioner to Gosai Ramji's estate con- tested in a suit
brought by him, the validity of this alienation. In holding that the alienation
was valid, the High Court of Bombay pointed out that the performance of a
husband's contracts was among the proper and necessary purposes specified by
Hindu jurists under which a widow could alienate property and said further that
the equity to compel the heir and legal representative of the adoptive father
specifically to perform his contracts survived and the property in the hands of
his widow was bound by that contract. Whether Prabhu Hari would have been
entitled to the property even in the absence of the deed of gift did not fall
for consideration in that case.
It also deserves to be Mentioned that this
case was also decided several years before the Transfer of Property Act came
into force.
In Asita Mohon Ghosh Moulik v. Mohan Ghosh
Moulik (1), one of the questions in dispute was whether the adopted son could
take an equal share with the son Answering the question in the affirmative, the
High Court of Calcutta after deciding that under the Hindu Law the adopted son
was entitled to an equal share, also referred to an Ikrarnama which had been
executed by the adoptive fatherland holding that the Ikrarnama was valid and
operative, said that even apart from the law, the adopted son, would be so entitled.
It is difficult to see how this can be of any
assistance in solving our present problem.
(1) (1916) 20 C.W.N. 901.
991 Lastly, the learned Counsel relied on the
decision of the Privy Council in Malraju Lakhmi Venkayyamma v. Ventaka
Narasimha Appa Rao (1). The main question in controversy in that case was
whether there was a completed contract by which the Rani, the former owner of
the property had agreed that the possession of the property would be given to
her niece Venkayyamma Rao immediately upon the expiry of her life interest. The
Privy Council held that there was such completed contract and directed the
Receiver to deliver possession "upon the terms of the contract now
affirmed".
It may be mentioned that this decision in
Venkayyamma Rao's Case (1), was among the authorities on which the Calcutta
High Court relied in Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar (2). The High Court held that
the result of equitable principles which had been applied in many cases in
England and were also applied by the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Rao' Case was
that the defendant had acquired the rights of a permanent tenant. When this
very case went up to the Privy Council in appeal (1), the High Court's decision
was reversed. The Privy Council pointed out that the dicta in Venkayyamma Rao's
Case did not mean "that equity can override the provisions of a statute
and (where no registered document exists and no registrable document can be
procured) confer upon a person a right which the statute enacts, shall be
conferred only by a registered instrument".
This decision of the Privy Council in Ariff
v. Jadunath Majumdar (2), was given in January 1931. Nearly two years before
that s. 53A had been enacted in the Transfer of Property Act introducing in a
limited form the doctrine of equity of part performance. There can, in our
opinion, be no doubt that after s. 53A was enacted the only case in which the
English doctrine of equity of part performance could (1) (1916) L. R. 43 I.A.
138.
(2) (1930) 1. L.R. 58 Cal. 1235.
(3) (1931) L. R. 58 1. A. 91.
992 be applied in India is where the
requirements of 53A are satisfied. Quite clearly, s. 53A does not apply to the
facts of the present case. It must therefore be held that the considerations of
equity cannot confer on Nagayya or his heirs any title in the lands which under
the statute could be conferred only by a registered instrument.
Our conclusion therefore is that the High
Court was right in holding that Nagayya or his heirs had acquired no right in
the property. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the
case, we make no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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