Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. Vs. C.
Chandrasekaran & Ors [1963] INSC 245 (9 December 1963)
09/12/1963 GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
CITATION: 1965 AIR 107 1964 SCR (5) 869
CITATOR INFO:
RF 1968 SC1461 (4,7) RF 1975 SC 818 (6) F
1975 SC1867 (2) F 1978 SC 949 (5)
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) s. 47(1)
(a) and Constitution of India, Art. 226.-Consideration in granting permit
Meaning of Public interest-If writ of certiorari can be issued on questions of
fact.
HEADNOTE:
The Regional Transport Authority granted one
stage carriage permit to the appellant. On appeal, the State Transport Appellate
Tribunal took the view that the appellant was a monopolist over a distance of
18 miles which was a part of the route in question and so, it rejected the
application for a permit made by the appellant and granted the permit to
respondent no. 1 over the route in question. It is against this order of the
Appellate Tribunal that the appellant preferred a writ petition before the High
Court. The single Judge, who heard the writ petition, quashed the order of the
Appellate Tribunal. This order was challenged by respondent no. 1 by preferring
an appeal under the Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the said High
Court. The Division Bench affirmed the order of the Appellate Tribunal and set
aside the order of the single Judge on the ground that the single Judge was not
justified in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution of
India.
Hence this appeal.
Held: (i) In granting a permit, the
appropriate authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act are required to consider
the interests of the public generally under s. 47(1)(a) of the Act. In dealing
with this aspect of the matter, it would not be irrelevant for the appropriate
authority to hold that if any applicant is or would be in the position of a
monopolist if a permit was granted to him, he would be liable to neglect the
interests of the public and may not be very keen on taking all steps to keep
his service in good and efficient order. Therefore, it cannot be said that in
taking into account the fact that the appellant was a monopolist on a part of
the route, the Appellate Tribunal has been influenced by any irrelevant fact.
R.K. Ayyaswami Gounder v. M/s. Sundambigai
Motor Service, Dharampura. C.A. No. 198 of 1962 decided on 17th September, 1962
relied on.
(ii) It is true that the administrative
directions issued by the Government under s. 43(a) have no force of statutory
rules and are, therefore, not binding; but that does not mean that the
consideration that the granting of a monopoly to a bus-operator may be
prejudicial to public interest, becomes irrelevant only because it has been
included or is implied in the administrative instructions. The said
consideration has to be taken into account not because it has been included in
the administrative instructions, but because, by itself, it is a relevant
consideration under s. 47(1) (a) of the Act.
M/s. Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State of
Madras, [1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 227, relied on.
(iii) In dealing with the applications under
Art. 226 in cases of this kind, it is necessary to bear in mind that the High
Court is not exercising the jurisdiction of an Appellate court in the matter.
In entertaining writ petitions, the High Court must not lose sight of the fact
that decisions of questions of fact under the Motor Vehicles Act have been left
to the appropriate authorities which 871 have been constituted into quasi
judicial Tribunals in that behalf, and so, decisions rendered by them on all
questions of fact should not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction
conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226, unless the well recognised tests
in that behalf are satisfied. If the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal
which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from infirmities which would
justify the issue of a writ under the well recognised principles laid down by
judicial decisions in that behalf, the High Court should and ought to interfere
but the writs of certiorari should not be issued merely on the ground that all
relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the Appellate
Tribunal or that the High Court would have taken a different view on the
evidence adduced in the proceedings.
(iv) There can be little doubt that if a
decision of a quasi-. judicial Tribunal is challenged before the High Court
under Art. 226 and it is shown that the said decision is based on irrelevant
considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law, a writ will
undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But the order passed by the Appellate
Tribunal in the case does not suffer from any such infirmity. In the present
case, the Division Bench was right in holding that the Single Judge should not
have issued a writ in favour of the appellant.
R.v. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the
Eastern Province of England, Ex parte Grant, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 1015 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 26, 1963, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 20
of 1962.
G.S. Pathak, K.K. Venugopal and R.
Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
M.C. Setalvad, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent No. 1.
December 9, 1963. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-This appeal has been brought to this Court
by special leave and it has been filed against the decision of the Division
Bench of the Madras High Court by which the order passed by a learned single
Judge of the said High Court directing the issue of a writ of certiorari in
favour of the appellant Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd.
872 has been reversed. It appears that the
Regional Transport Authority, Thanjavur called for applications for the grant
of one stage carriage permit between Mannargudi and Nagapattinam. The distance
between these two places is 34 miles. Four applicants applied for a permit on
this route.
They were the appellant, Raman & Raman
(P) Ltd., Balasubrahmanya Udayar, and respondent No. 1 C. Chandrasekaran.
The Regional Transport Authority considered
the merits of these four applicants and assigned them marks as a result of
which a permit was granted to the appellant on the ground that it got the
highest number of marks.
This order was challenged by the three
applicants whose applications for permit had been rejected by the Regional
Transport Authority. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras
(hereinafter called the 'Appellate Tribunal') considered the merits of the four
applicants for itself, assigned them marks and ultimately came to the
conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to a permit.
The judgment of the Appellate Tribunal shows
that though as a result of the marks assigned by it to the respective
applicants, the appellant and Raman and Raman (P) Ltd.
secured 4 marks each and the two other
competitors 31/2 and 3 1/4 marks respectively, the Appellate Tribunal took the
view that the appellant was a monopolist over a distance of 18 miles which was
a part of the route in question, whereas Raman & Raman (P) Ltd. had a near
monopoly or predominant influence over the remaining part of the distance which
was 16 miles, and so, it rejected the application for a permit made by the
appellant and Raman & Raman (P) Ltd. and granted the permit to respondent
No. 1 over the route in question.
It is against this order of the Appellate
Tribunal that the appellant preferred a writ petition before the Madras High
Court (No. 25 of 1959). Srinivasan J. who heard the writ petition came to the
conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had signally failed to consider the
relevant evidence, and so, this order needed to be corrected 873 by a writ of
certiorari. Accordingly, a writ of certiorari was ordered to be issued as
prayed for by the appellant.
This order was challenged by respondent No.1
by preferring on appeal under the Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the
said High Court. The Division Bench has taken the view that having regard to
the reasons given by the Appellate Tribunal in support of its conclusion that
the appellant was not entitled to a permit, Srinivasan J. was not justified in
issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the result,
the order passed by Srinivasan J. was reversed and the writ petition filed by
the appellant was dismissed. It is against this order that the appellant has
come to this Court in appeal. Respondents 2 and 3 are State Transport Appellate
Tribunal, and the Regional Transport Authority respectively and they have been
impleaded because the order passed by respondent No. 2 was questioned in the
writ proceedings and is the subject-matter of the present appeal.
It is common ground that over a distance of
18 miles in the first sector of the route in question, the appellant runs seven
buses and no other bus runs on that sector of the route, so that in respect of
this sector, the appellant is a monopolist. It is also common ground that over
the second sector of the route consisting of 16 miles Raman & Raman (P)
Ltd. runs nine buses, whereas two buses are run by two other permit-holders;
and that means that Raman & Raman (P) Ltd.
can be described as a near monopolist on that
part of the route. It is in the light of these two admitted facts that the
Appellate Tribunal took the view that the monopolist and the near monopolist
should not be given permits, because granting them permits would not be in the
interests of the public. That is how respondent No.1 came to be given a permit
by the Appellate Tribunal.
Before dealing with the points raised by Mr.
Pathak in this Court on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to indicate
briefly the findings recorded 874 by Srinivasan J. and the Division Bench which
heard the appeal against his decision. Srinivasan J. agreed with the contention
of respondent No. 1 that the question as to whether any applicant for a permit
is a monopolist is not irrelevant having regard to the provisions of s.
47(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act (No. 4 of 1939). He, however, took the view
that in assessing the value of the said consideration, the Appellate Tribunal had
failed to consider the fact that between the monopolist appellant and the near
monopolist Raman & Raman (P) Ltd. there would be keen competition on the
route in question, and so, the argument that a monopolist would tend to ignore
the public interest for want of competition with anybody else was not valid in
the present case. In the opinion of the learned Judge, the Appellate Tribunal
had also failed to take into account the fact that between Tiruvarur and
Nagapattinam there is a parallel railway which also offers some competition to
the bus-operators. In the result, the learned Judge was satisfied that in
rejecting the application for a permit made by the appellant, the Appellate
Tribunal had been influenced mainly by the abstract concept of monopoly and its
adverse effect on public interest. That, in brief, is the basis of the order
passed by the learned Judge quashing the decision of the Appellate Tribunal.
On the other hand, when the matter went
before the Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench took
the view that the Appellate Tribunal had referred to the existence of the
amenity of the railway service parallel to the route and it observed that
merely because the Appellate Tribunal had not marshalled all the reasons in
support of its conclusion, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to
exercise its special jurisdiction under Art.226.It noticed the fact that in
support of the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal there were other valid
reasons which the judgment indicated, and so, it was held that the learned
Judge was in error in issuing a writ of certiorari in the present case.
875 Mr. Pathak contends that the Division
Bench was in error in reversing the conclusion of the learned single Judge.
There can be no doubt that in granting a
permit, the appropriate authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act are required
to consider the interests of the public generally under s. 47(1) (a), and in
assessing the merits of an individual applicant for a permit on any route, it
would be open to the appropriate authority to enquire whether the service which
the individual applicant would render to the public if he is given a permit
would be efficient and satisfactory or not. In dealing with this aspect of the
matter, it would not be irrelevant for the appropriate authority to hold that
if any applicant is or would be in the position of a monopolist if a permit was
granted to him, he would be liable to neglect the interests of the public and
may not be very keen on taking all steps to keep his service in good and
efficient order. Absence of any competition from another bus-operator on the
route is likely to develop a feeling of complacence in the monopolist and that
is a factor which the appropriate authority can certainly take into account.
Therefore, it cannot be urged that in taking into account the fact that the
appellant was a monopolist on a part of the route, the Appellate Tribunal has
been influenced by any irrelevant fact, vide R.K. Ayyaswami Gounder v. M/s.
Soudambigai Motor Service, Dharampura & Others(1).
In this connection, Mr. Pathak has invited
our attention to the fact that the Madras Government has issued certain
administrative directions under s. 43(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act and it has
been held by this Court in M/s. Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras
& Ors. (2) that the said administrative directions have no legal force and
cannot be said to be binding on the appropriate authorities.
The argument is that in the relevant
administrative orders in regard to the assignment of marks in respect (1) A.
No. 198 of 1962 decided on 17.9.1962.
(2) [1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 227.
876 of the merits of the several applicants
for permit, it seems to have been assumed that a person owning in re than five
buses may not get more marks though up to five buses owned by a single applicant
appropriate marks are assigned; and Mr. Pathak urges that the policy underlying
this administrative rule appears to be to discourage monopoly in road
transport; but this policy is enunciated by an administrative rule which has no
legal or binding force, and so, it is urged that the Appellate Tribunal was in
error in referring to the consideration that the appellant was a monopolist on
a part of the route. This argument is entirely misconceived. It is true that
the administrative directions issued by the Government under s. 43(a) have no
force of statutory rules and are, therefore, not binding;
but that does not mean that the consideration
that the granting of a monopoly to a bus-operator may be prejudicial to public
interest, becomes irrelevant only because it has been included or is implied,
in the administrative instructions. If on the merits, the said consideration is
relevant, and we have already held that it is relevant, we do not see how the
fact that the said consideration has also been included in the administrative
directions would make it irrelevant. The said consideration has to be taken
into account not because it has been included in the administrative
instructions, but because, by itself, it is a relevant consideration under s.
47 (1) (a).
In dealing with applications for writs of
certiorari under Art. 226 in cases of this kind, it is necessary to bear in
mind that the High Court is not exercising the jurisdiction of art Appellate
Court in the matter. There is no doubt that in granting or refusing permits to
applicants, the appropriate authorities are discharging a very important and a
very onerous quasi-judicial function. Large stakes are generally involved in
these applications, and so, it is of utmost importance that the appropriate authority
should consider all the relevant facts carefully and in its order should set
out concisely and clearly the reasons in support 877 of its conclusions. It is
hardly necessary to emphasise that applicants for permits whose applications
are rejected should be satisfied that all points urged by them in support of
their respective claims have been duly considered before the matter was
decided. Even so, it would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court to
issue a writ of certiorari mainly or solely on the ground that all reasons have
not been set out in the judgment of the appropriate authority. In entertaining
writ petitions, the High Court must not lose sight of the fact that decisions
of questions of fact under the Motor Vehicles Act have been left to the
appropriate authorities which have been constituted into quasi-judicial
Tribunals in that behalf, and so, decisions rendered by them on all questions
of fact should not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction conferred
on the High Courts under Art. 226, unless the well-recognised tests in that
behalf are satisfied. In the present case, we have no doubt that the Division
Bench was right in holding that Srinivasan J. should not have issued a writ in
favour of the appellant.
We have carefully considered the order
delivered by the Appellate Tribunal and we see no justification for the
criticism made against that order that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal
proceeded solely on the ground of the abstract concept of the evil effects of
monopoly. The order has referred to the railway which runs parallel to the
route and the order has taken into account the fact that the appellant is a
monopolist on a part of the route and Raman & Raman (P) Ltd. is a near
monopolist on the remaining part of the route. Srinivasan J. thought that in
dealing with the matter, the Appellate Tribunal ignored the fact that there was
bound to be some kind of competition between the monopolist and the near
monopolist. On the merits, we find some difficulty in acceding that a
theoretically possible competition between the monopolist and the near
monopolist can have any relevance or validity in the present case. A passenger
who wants to travel more than 18 miles 878 of the route which is covered by the
monopoly of the appellant would naturally prefer to go by the appellant's bus
all the way, because in trying to take advantage of the near monopolist's
service on the second sector of the route he would have to face the risk of not
having a continuous journey. A competition between the monopolist on the first
sector of the route who would have run his buses on the whole distance if he
was granted the permit, and the near monopolist so far as the second sector of
the route is concerned, is itself a matter of a purely theoretical character.
There would be obvious difficulties and causes of inconvenience for through
passengers to take advantage of this hypothetical competition. If the argument
as to the competition between the two powerful operators has to be factual and
effective, it must mean that permits should have been granted to both of them
over the whole route, and that clearly would mean that smaller operators would
be excluded.
We are not suggesting that this consideration
itself is decisive we are only pointing out that the ultimate decision of the
Appellate Tribunal must have been the result of a proper assessment of all the
relevant factors, and so, it would not be safe to issue a writ of certiorari
against its decision because some reasons which were urged before the High
Court had not been expressly considered by the Appellate Tribunal. Speaking
generally and in a broad way, we do not think it could be seriously denied that
encouraging bus-operators who do not own a fleet of buses and discouraging
monopoly on the route is consistent with the interests of the general public
which is of paramount importance under s. 47(1)(a), of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Besides, the Division Bench has also referred
to some other aspects of the matter which would indicate that the Appellate
Tribunal was right in not granting a permit to the appellant. In cases of this
kind, the High Court should naturally be slow in exercising its jurisdiction
under Art.
226. If the order passed by the Appellate
Tribunal which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from infirmities which
would justify the issue of a writ under 879 the well-recognised principles laid
down by judicial decisions in that behalf, the High Court should and ought to
interfere but the writs of certiorari should not be issued merely on the ground
that all relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the
Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would have taken a different view on
the evidence adduced in the proceedings.
In support of his case that the impugned
order was properly set aside by Srinivasan J., Mr. Pathak has relied upon the
decision of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the
Eastern Province of England, Ex parte Grant. (1) In that case the Court of
Appeal was called upon to consider whether the discretion vested in the
Tribunal under s. 25(1) (a) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, had been
validly exercised. The test prescribed by s. 25(1)(a) was that the landlord
should show that the carrying out of the purpose for which he proposed to
terminate the tenancy in question is desirable in the interests of efficient
farming, whether as respects good estate management or good husbandry or
otherwise. In coming to the conclusion that the said requirement had not been
satisfied, the Tribunal appears to have relied substantially on the fact that
the tenants sought to be dispossessed had been in possession of the lands for
many years. It appears that the Court of Appeal took the view that the real
grounds for the Tribunal's decision on the section 25 point which appeared from
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the statement were ambiguous and to some extent in
conflict with each other. Besides, the effect which would result if the
landlord's request was granted on the tenants' other land which had influenced
the Tribunal was, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, irrelevant in
considering the applicability of s. 25(1)(a).
In other words, the Court of Appeal held that
the decision of the Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that it rested at least
on some invalid and irrelevant grounds, and that is why a writ of certiorari
was ordered to be (1) [1956] 3 All E.R. 321.
880 issued. There can be little doubt that if
a decision of a quasi-judicial Tribunal is challenged before the High Court
under Art. 226 and it is shown that the said decision is based on irrelevant
considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law, a writ will
undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But the order passed by the Appellate
Tribunal in the present case does not suffer from any such infirmity.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the decision in the case of ex parts Grant on
which Mr. Pathak relies, does not assist his case.
The result is, the appeal fails and is
dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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