Biswambhar Singh & Ors Vs. State of
Orissa [1962] INSC 318 (16 November 1962)
ACT:
Sovereign-Zamindar whether
sovereign-Etates-IntermediariesConstitutionality of Act XVII of 1954-The Orissa
Estates Abolition Act, 1952 (Orissa 61 of 1952), ss. 2 (g), 2 (h).
HEADNOTE:
When the Orissa Estates Abolition Act came
into force in February 1952, the appellants along with another person moved the
High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionality
of the Act. The High Court held that the Act was valid and the lands of the
appellants could be taken over by the State. When the case came to this Court
in appeal, it held that the Act did not apply to the proprietors of Hemgir and
Sarpgarh as they were not intermediaries as defined in s. 2 (h) of the Act. The
Zamindar of Nagra was held to be an intermediary as he had acknowledged
overlordship of the Raja of Gangpur. The Orissa legislature passed Act XVII of
1954 and changed the definitions of estate' and intermediary' to cover the
cases of the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh.
The appellants, the Zamindars of Hemgir and
Sarpgarh, moved the High Court for a writ of mandamus against the State of
Orissa and the Collector of Sundargarh. The appellants claimed sovereign status
and contended that the Amending Act did not apply to them. Their petitions were
dismissed 363 by the High Court which held that as a result of historical
process the appellants had lost all vestiges of their sovereignty and become
subject to the laws promulgated by ruler of Gangpur and when that ruler merged
his State with the State of Orissa, the appellants 'were not better than mere
subjects and had absolutely no claims to sovereign power. The other contentions
raised by the appellants regarding discrimination etc. were also rejected by
the High Court. The appellants came to this Court after securing the
certificate.
Held, that the appellants or their ancestors
had ceased to be sovereigns on the eve of the merger of the State of Gangpur
with the State of Orissa and their position was that of intermediaries who held
or owned interests in land between the Raiyat and the State and their interests
in their lands could be acquired by the State under the Act.
Although there was no evidence of actual
conquest of the territory of the appellants by the Raja of Gangpur or the
active imposition of the sovereignty of the Raja over the territories in
question, as a matter of fact the former rulers of those territories had
submitted to the sovereignty of the Raja as a result of a continuous process.
The Raja of Gangpur exercised sovereign authority over those territories. The
outward symbols of sovereignty were that the laws of Gangpur State were in
force in Hemgir and Sarpgaph. The whole of the administrative control was in the
hands of the Raja of Gangpur. Neither in fact nor in law was there any vestige
left of the sovereignty of the appellants when the Raja merged his State with
the State of Orissa.
Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, [1954]
S. C. R. 842, Promod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa [1962] Supp. I S. C. R.
405, Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S. C. R. 303 and
Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1962] Supp. 3 S. C. R. 346, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 11 2 and 11 3 of 1960.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
April 25, 1957, of the Orissa High Court in 0. J. C. Nos. 164 and 181 of 1954.
N. C. Chatterjee, M. S. Mohanty, A. N. Singh
and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants.
364 C. B. Agarwala, R. Gopalakrishnan and R.
H. Dhebar, for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C. A. No. 112/60) and for the
respondents (in C. A. No. 113/60).
1962. November 16. The judgment of the Court
was delivered by SINHA, C. J.-These two appeals on certificates of fitness granted
by the High Court of Orissa raise the question of the constitutionality of the
Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act (Orissa XVII of 1954) amending the
main Act, the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Orissa 1 of 1952), which
hereinafter will be referred to as the Act. As the questions raised in the High
Court and in this Court are the same in both the appeals, they have been heard
together and this judgment will govern them both.
It appears that the two Zamindars of Hemgir
and Sarpgarh moved the High Court of Orissa under Art. 226 of the Constitution
for a writ of mandamus against the State of Orissa and the Collector of
Sundargarh, which is a district formed after Merger. Previously it was part of
the feudatory State of Gangpur. The two petitioners' Zamindaries covered about
540 sq. miles between them. The petitioners in the High Court in their
petitions, claimed a sovereign status and referred to a mass of historical
literature, including references to the Imperial Gazetteer by W. W. Hunter, Sir
Richard Temple's Treaties, Zamindaries, Chieftainships in Central Provinces,
and other official records. The High Court has found that the remote ancestors
of the petitioners were Bhuiyan Chiefs, who were the original settlers and who
had in course of time become the chieftains of the place, exercising sovereign
powers.
Subsequently, when the Rajput Rulers of
Gangpur settled in that area, these Bhuiyan Chiefs accepted the suzerainty of
those Rulers and gradually surrendered their sovereign 365 rights. They used to
pay annual "Takolis", which they originally paid as tributes to the
suzerain, but which later became indistinguishable from land revenue. Their
status vis-a-vis the Ruler of Gangpur remained undefined, though in successive
revenue settlements made by the Ruler of Gangpur, with the concurrence of the
then political Department, of the Government of India, they were described as
Zamindars, and 'Khewats' were issued to them. The High Court, on an examination
of the relevant evidence, came to the conclusion that these Zamindars
ultimately lost all vestiges of their sovereignty, and as a result of
historical process became subject to the laws promulgated by the Ruler of
Gangpur, and that when the Ruler merged his State with the State of Orissa,
with effect from January 1, 1948, these petitioners were no better than mere
subjects and had absolutely no claims to sovereign power. The High Court also
found that considerable forest areas formed part of the land which belonged to
them, and that these forest areas had no separate and distinct existence in the
eye of law. The High Court repelled the petitioners' contention that their
lands were not restates' as defined in Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution. The
High Court also rejected the contention that the Act, in so far as it applies
to the petitioners, was discriminatory. The High Court thus held that Art. 14
of the Constitution had not been contravened. It also held that the Act was not
void under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution. It further held that the so called violation
of Art. 17(2) of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
promulgated by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948,
to which India was a party, was not justiciable. In that view of the matter,
these petitions were dismissed and both parties were directed to bear their own
costs. The petitioner, in each case, moved the High Court and obtained the
necessary certificate for coming up in appeal to this Court. That is how these
appeals are before us.
366 This is not the first time that these
petitioners, now appellants in this Court, have figured as litigants in the
High Court and in this Court in respect of their respective lands. When the
Orissa Act 1 of 1952, the main Act, was enacted and came into force in February
1952, the Government of Orissa notified the petitioners' property also as
coming within the purview of the Act. The appellants along with another person
claiming the same rights, belonging to Nagra, moved the High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of the Act. Those
applications were heard by the High Court, and by majority it was held that the
Act was valid and that the lands belonging to the petitioners could be taken
over by the State, as a result of the operation of the Act. The petitioners in
the High Court preferred an appeal to this Court. The judgment of this Court is
reported as Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa(1) This Court allowed the
appeal of the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh on the ground that they were not
'Intermediaries' as defined in s. 2(h) of the Act. As regards the proprietor of
Nagra Zamindari, by a majority judgment, it was decided that he came within the
definition of an 'intermediary', and that, therefore, his land would come
within the definition of an 'estate', as defined in s. 2(g) of the Act. This
Court distinguished the case of Nagra from that of the other two on the ground
that the Zamindar of Nagra had acknowledged the over lordship of the Raja of
Gangpur. As a result of the decision of this Court, allowing the appeals of the
Zamindars of Hemgir and Sarpgarh and prohibiting the State of Orissa from
taking over possession of those two zamindaries under the Act, the Orissa
Legislature passed the Amending Act (XVII) of 1854 recasting the definition of
the two terms 'estate' and ,intermediary'. The amended definition of these two
terms is as follows :"(g) 'estate' includes a part of an estate and (1)
[1954] S.C.R. of 842.
367 means any land held by or vested in an
Intermediary and included under one entry in any revenue rolls or any of the
general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue-free lands, prepared and
maintained under the law relating to land revenue for the time being in force
or under any rule, order, custom or usage having the force of law, and includes
revenue-free lands not entered in any register or revenue-roll and all classes
of tenures o f under-tenures and any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar
grant ;
Explanation I-Land Revenue means all sums and
payments in money or in kind, by whatever name designated or locally known,
received or claimable by or on behalf of the State from an Intermediary on
account of or in relation to any land held by or vested in such Intermediary ;
Explanation II-Revenue-free land includes
land which is, or but for any special covenant, agreement, engagement or
contract would have been liable to settlement and assessment of land revenue or
with respect to which the State has power to make laws for settlement and
assessment of land revenue;
Explanation III-In relation to merged territories,
'estate' as defined in this clause shall also include any mahal or village or
collection of more than one such mahal or village held by or vested in an
Intermediary which has been or is liable to be assessed as one unit to land
revenue whether such and revenue be payable or has been released or compounded
for or redeemed in whole or in part." (h) 'Intermediary' with reference to
any estate 368 means a proprietor, sub-proprietor, landlord, land-holder, malguzar,
the kadar, gaontia, tenure-holder, under-tenure-holder and includes an inamdar,
a jagirdar, zamindar, Ilaquedar, Khorposhdar, parganadar, Sarbarakar and
Muafidar including the Ruler of an Indian State merged with the State of Orissa
and all other holders or owners of interest in land between the raiyat and the
state;
Explanation 1 Any two or more intermediaries
holding a joint interest in an estate which is borne either on the revenue-roll
or on the rentroll of another Intermediary shall be deemed to be one
Intermediary for the purposes of his Act;
Explanation II-The heirs and successors-in
interest of an Intermediary and where an Intermediary is a minor or of unsound
mind or an idiot, his guardian, Committee or, other legal curator shall be
deemed to be an Intermediary for the purposes of this Act.
All acts done by an Intermediary under this
Act shall be deemed to have been done by his heirs and successors-in-interest
and shall be binding on them." In the statement of objects and reasons for
amending the Act, it was indicated that these wide definitions of those two
terms were enacted so that the decision of this Court with particular reference
to these two properties may not stand in the way of acquiring them.
Though the arguments in the High Court
occupied a every large field, on these appeals Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the
appellants, has confined his submissions, in the ultimate analysis. to only one
point, namely, that even after the amendment of the Act 369 the legislature has
failed to achieve its objective of bringing the land of these two petitioners
within the mischief of the Act. In other words, the contention is that the
appellants were sovereign rulers whose States could not be taken over by the
State of Orissa even after the amendment of the Act, as aforesaid. The
definition of 'intermediary' in s. 2 (h) as amended, the argument proceeds
further, would not take in the appellants' properties so as to entitle the
State to acquire them, nor does the definition of 'estate' in the amended s. 2
(g) cover the interest of the appellants in their respective lands. It is,
therefore, necessary to find whether the interest of the appellants, in order
to be liable to acquisition under the Act, could come within the purview of the
definition of in termediary'. It is difficult to accede to the argument that
the all inclusive definition of "intermediary', as given in the amended
cl. (11) of s. 2 would not cover the interest of the appellants. If it is held,
as we must hold in agreement with the High Court, as will presently appear,
that the appellants were not holders of sovereign States, then the inference is
clear that they held or owned an 'interest in land between the Raiyat and the
State.' As admitted on all hands, they are not Raiyats. Then, whatever their
interest may be, whether as proprietors or tenure-holders or Inamdars or
Jagirdas or Khorposhdars, etc. etc., specifically mentioned in the definition,
they would come within the purview of the last clause and their interest would
be that of an intermediary, because they stand in between the state at the apex
and the cultivating Raiyat at the base. If the interest of these appellants is
not that of a sovereign State, they hold their property as intermediaries and
the payment which they used to make to the Raja of Gangpur, and later to the
State of Orissa, would be in the nature of land revenue.
The main argument, therefore, of Mr.
Chatterjee was directed to showing that the 370 appellants held the lands as
sovereign power, and that the Takoli which they paid to the Raja of Gangpur was
only in the nature of tribute and not land revenue. In our opinion, there is no
substance in this contention. It is true that there is no evidence of an act of
State in the nature of a conquest by the Raja of Gangpur or that the Raja
imposed his sovereignty on these principalities by force of arms or by express
agreement. It was, therefore, argued that there was no scope for applying the
doctrineof "act of State" to these principalities. There is a fallacy
in this argument. It was pointed out by this Court in Promod Chandra Deb v.
Stateof Orissa(1) that an act of State may be the taking over of sovereign
powers either by conquest or by treaty or by cession or otherwise. It may have
happened on a particular date by a public declaration or proclamation, or it
may have been the result of a historical process spread over many years, and
sovereign powers including the right to legislate in that territory and to
administer it may be acquired without the territory itself merging in the new
State. It has been found by the High Court that the various laws which were in
force in Gangpur State were in force in Hemgir and Sarapgarh also, by their own
force and not as a result of any agreement between sovereign States.
Furthermore the various departments of administration were also in the hands of
the staff maintained and supervised by the Ruler of Gangpur. Hence, at the date
of the merger of the Gangpur State in the State of Orissa, not even a vestige
of sovereignty was left with these appellants. It is, therefore, not necessary
to refer to a large mass of historical evidence which shows that at one time in
the ancient past these appellants or their ancestors were sovereign chiefs.
They may have occupied that position in the remote past, but as a result of
historical process spread over many years, those rights became vested in tile
Ruler of Gangpur not necessarily by express agreement but impliedly, by (1)
[1962] Supp. 1 S.C. R. 405, 434.
371 conduct, over a series of years. We are
concerned with the year 1947, and in that there is no evidence on behalf of the
appellants that they had any sovereign authority left in them. Their position
is analogous to that of the Bhomicharas of Rajasthan, dealt with by this Court
in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1) and that of the CisSutlej
jagir in Punjab, dealt with by this Court in Amarsarjit Singh v. State of
Punjab (2). Hence, even though there is no evidence of actual conquest of the
territory of the appellants by the Raja of Gangpur, nor of active imposition of
the sovereignty of that Raja over the territories in question, the fact remains
that as a result of a continuous process, the erstwhile rulers of these
territories submitted to the sovereignty of the Raja with the result that the
Ruler of Gangpur became, in effect, the sovereign power exercising his
sovereign authority over those territories also, and the outward symbols of
sovereignty were that the laws of Gangpur State were in force in Hemgir and
Sarpgarh areas also not by virtue of any orders of the appellants but by their
own force, as has been pointed out by the High Court on a consideration of all
the relevant evidence, which need not be recapitulated here.
The administrative control also had passed
into the hands of the Ruler of Gangpur. Hence, neither in fact nor in law was
there any vestige left of the sovereignty of the appellants by 1947 though it
may not be possible to determine by what exact process and by what exact date,
this transition was complete. Apparently it was spread over many years. We know
only this much that at the relevant date, i. e., at the end of 1947, and on the
eve of the integration of the State of Gangpur with the State of Orissa, the
territories in question were not sovereign states and had become part of the
territory of the Ruler of Gangpur. The law does not know any tertium quid
between a sovereign State and a State which is partly sovereign and partly not
so. The erstwhile rulers of these, (1) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 303. (2) [1962] Supp. 3
S.C.R. 346.
372 territories were either sovereigns in
their own rights or had become subjects of the Ruler of Gangpur, and all
indications are that the appellants had become subjects of the Ruler of Gangpur
before the latter's territory merged with the State of Orissa.
On the finding that the petitioners, or their
ancestors, had ceased to be sovereign States, on the eve of the merger of the
State of Gangpur with the State of Orissa, the petitioners' position would be
that of intermediaries who held or owned "interest in land between the
Raiyat and the state", within the meaning of s. 2 (h) of the Act, and the
'Takoli' paid by them to the Ruler of Gangpur and later to the State of Orissa
was land revenue within Explanation I read with Explanation III to s. 2 (g) which
defines "'estate". There is, thus, no escape from the conclusion that
their interest in their lands was liable to be acquired under the Act.
No other point was urged before us in support
of the appeals, and as the only point urged in this Court has no substance in
it, the appeals must be held to be without any merit. They are accordingly
dismissed with costs, one set of hearing fees.
Appeals dismissed.
Back