Abdul Mateen Vs. Ram Kailash Pandey
& Ors [1962] INSC 221 (31 July 1962)
31/07/1962 WANCHOO, K.N.
WANCHOO, K.N.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1963 AIR 64 1963 SCR (3) 523
CITATOR INFO:
RF 1966 SC1780 (4) RF 1968 SC 410 (6) RF 1969
SC1130 (8) R 1970 SC1542 (3,9,15,18,60) R 1970 SC1704 (5,6,7,9) R 1972 SC2110
(2) R 1975 SC 386 (2) R 1978 SC 949 (2)
ACT:
Motor Vehicles-stage carriage
permits-Applications invited by Regional Transport Authority for two vacancies
Minister of Transport gave an additional permit-Whether legal Scope of 8.
64-A-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (4 of 1939), as amended by Bihar Amendment Act
No. XXVII of 1950, ss. 47, 48, 57, 64, 64-A.
HEADNOTE:
A new route was advertised by the Regional
Transport Authority and applications were invited for two permanent stage
carriage permits. The Regional Transport Authority granted the two permits to
the appellant and another person.
An appeal against that order failed. Sudhakar
Sharma, one of the respondents, moved the High Court under Art. 226 and the
order of the appellate authority was quashed. When the case went back to the
Appellate Authority, the permit granted to the appellant was cancelled and was
given to Sudhakar Sharma. The appellant made an application to the State Government
under s. 64- A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Bihar
Amendment Act No. XXVII of 1950. The Minister of Transport upheld the order of
the appellate authority cancelling the permit of the appellant and granting the
same to Sudhakar Sharma, but granted an additional permit to the appellant. Ram
Kailash Pandey filed a Writ petition in the High Court challenged the order of
the 524 Minister of Transport. He contended that the State Govern- ment had no
power when dealing with an application under s. 64-A to increase the number of
permits to be granted and the order granting the third permit to the appellant
was without jurisdiction. The High Court accepted the contention and set aside
that part of the order of the Minister of Transport by which he had granted a
third permit to the appellant. The appellant came to this Court by special
leave.
Held, that where a limit has been fixed under
s. 47 (3) by the Regional Transport Authority, and thereafter the said
authority proceeds to consider applications for permits under s. 48 read with
s. 57, the Regional Transport Authority must confine the number of permits
issued by it to those limits and on an appeal or revision by an aggrieved
person, the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority must equally be
confined to the issue of permits within the limits fixed under s. 47 (3). The
State Government cannot pass any order when exercising revisional authority
which the authority whose orders the government is revising, has no authority
to pass.
It may not be generally possible to conclude
from the number of vacancies shown in an advertisement that is the number of
fixed under s. 47 (3) by the Regional Transport Authority, but when it is a
case of a new route which is being opened for the first time and an
advertisement is issued calling for applications for such a new route
specifying the number of vacancies for it, it is reasonable to infer that when
the number of vacancies is specified, that shows the limit which must have been
decided upon by the Regional Transport Authority under s. 47(3).
Ban Gopal v. Anant Prasad, [1939] Supp. 2
S.C.R. 692 and Arunachalam Pillai v. Southarn Railways (Private) Ltd., [1960] 3
S.C.R. 764 followed.
Mohammad Luqman Sharif v. State Transport
Authority, A.I.R.
1961 All. 342, approved.
The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v. Shri
Nathu Ram Mirdha I. L. R. (1959) Raj. 120, reversed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 195 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated 1961, August 24 of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. No. 126 of
1961.
525 Basudeo Prasad, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal
and M. K. Ramamurthi for the appellant.
B. D. Sharma for respondent No. 1.
D. Goburdhan for respondent No. 2.
S. P. Verma for respondent No. 3.
1962. July 31. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment
of the Patna High Court. Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these.
It appears that a new route Gopalganj-Pahlezghat was advertised by the North
Bihar Regional Transport Authority in July 1957 and applications were invited
for permanent stage carriage permits and the advertisement stated that there
were two vacancies on the route. A number of persons applied for the two
permits and in January 1958, the Regional Transport Authority granted permits
to the appellant and another person. This order was taken in appeal to the
Appellate Authority, which however failed. Thereafter Sudhakar Sharma who is
one of the respondents, before us, moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution and in April 1960 the High Court quashed the order of the
Appellate Authority on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Ram Gopal v.
Anant Prasad.(1) The case then went back to the Appellate Authority for
rehearing. The Appellate Authority thereupon modified the order of the Regional
Transport Authority and the permit granted to the appellant was cancelled and
in his place a permit was granted to Sudhakar Sharma,; the permit granted to
the other person was not interfered with. Thereupon, the appellant made an
application to the State Government under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,
No.4 of 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by the Bihar
Amendment (1) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 692.
526 Act No. 27 of 1950, which provides that
"the State. Government may, on application made to it in this behalf
within 30 days of the passing of the order in the course of any proceeding
taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, call
for the records of such proceeding and after examining such records pass such
orders as it thinks fit". The application was heard by the Minister for
Transport and he upheld the order of the appellate Authority. At the same times
however, he took the view that "with the introduction of bus-service in
North Bihar, people are becoming more and more bus-minded as they have been
getting cheap and quick means of transport and therefore an additional service
could be allowed on this route, and that would add to the facilities provided
to the public without impairing in any way the effectively of the existing
service". Therefore, while upholding the order of the Appellate Authority
cancelling the permit of the appellant and granting a permit instead to
Sudhakar Sharma, he felt that the ends of justice would be met if an additional
permit was granted to the appellant, who had proved to be a desirable operator.
He therefore ordered that an additional service be allowed to the appellant for
the said route. Thereupon Ram Kailash Pandey who had also made an application
under s. 64-A and whose -application had been dismissed filed a write petition
before the High Court challenging the order of the Minister for Transport.
His main contention was that the grant of an
additional permit to the appellant was wholly unjustified, particularly in the
face of his far superior claim. To this petition the appellant as well as the
two persons to whom permits were granted and the State of Bihar, the Appellate
Authority as well as the Regional Transport Authority were made parties.
When the petition came to be heard before the
High Court it was contended that the 527 State Government had no power when
dealing with an application under s. 64-A, to increase the number of permits to
be granted from two which was the limit fixed by the Regional Transport
Authority, to three, and therefore, its order granting the third permit to the
appellant was without jurisdiction. This contention was accepted by the High
Court, and it set aside that part of the order by which a third permit was
granted to the appellant. But the High Court refused to interfere with the rest
of the order granting permits to the two other persons. Thereupon, the
appellant applied for a certificate to appeal to this Court, which was refused.
He then moved this Court for special leave, which was granted; and that is how
the matter has come up before us.
The main question for decision in this
appeal's whether the State Government acting under s. 64-A of the Bihar
Amendment Act had the power to increase the number of permits for which
application had been invited by the Regional Transport' Authority. It is
contended on behalf of the appellant that the State Government has the same
power under a. 64-A as the Regional Transport Authority has, as held by this
Court in RAM GOPAL'S CASE, and it was therefore open to the State Government to
increase the number of permits as the Regional Transport Authority would always
have the power to increase the number of permits whenever it thought necessary
to do so.
In order to appreciate the argument put
forward on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to refer to the scheme of
the Act in the matter of granting stage carriage permits. The scheme of the Act
for the control of transport vehicle is to be found in Chap. IV. Section 42
provides that no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the 528 use
of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a
permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport
Authority..." Section 43 gives power to the State Government to issue
directions to the State Transport Authority with respect to various matters
specified therein. Section 44 provides for the constitution of Regional
Transport Authorities and the State Transport Authority and powers thereof
Section 45 then provides that an application for a permit shall be made to the
Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the
vehicle and this is subject to two provisos, with which however we are not
concerned in the present appeal.
Section 46 then provides for the form in
which an application for a stage carriage permit shall be made. Then we come to
s. 47 (1) which lays down certain criteria which shall be taken into
consideration by a Regional Transport Authority while dealing with an
application for a stage carriage permit. Section 47(3) which is important gives
power to the Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage
carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may
be granted in the region or in and specified area or on any specified route
within the region, having regard to matter mentioned in sub s.(1)Section 48
then provides that subject to the provisions of s. 47, the Regional Transport
Authority may, on an application made to it under s. 46, grant a stage carriage
permit in accordance with the application or with such modification as it deems
fit or refuse to grant such a permit and also provides, subject to rules, for
conditions that may be attached to a permit. Section 57 provides for the
procedure in applying for and granting permits. Section 64 provides for an
appeal from certain orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority within
prescribed time and in the prescribed manner to the pres- 529 cribed authority.
Then comes s. 64-A, as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act providing for
revision by the State Government.
It will be clear from this scheme of the Act
that the main section for the grant of a stage carriage permit is s. 48 and in
passing an order granting or refusing to grant a stage carriage permit, the
Regional Transport Authority has to act subject to the provisions of s. 47.
Section 57 is a procedural section and provides for the procedure in applying
for and granting permits. The power of the Regional Transport Authority to
grant stage carriage permits is to be found in s. 48 and that power is subject
to the provisions of a. 47. Section 47 (1) lays down matters for which the
Regional transport Authority shall have regard when considering an application
far a stage carriage permit and s. 47 (3) gives power to the said authority
having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-s. (1) to limit the number to
stage carriages generally etc. It would be clear therefore that when the
Regional Transport Authority proceeds in the manner provided in S;. 57 to
consider an application for a stage carriage permit and eventually decides
either to grant it or not to grant it under s. 48 its order has to be subject
to the provisions of s. 47, including s. 47 (3) by which the Regional Transport
Authority is given the power to limit the number of stages generally etc.
Therefore, if the Regional Transport Authority has limited the number of stage
carriages by exercising its power under s. 47 (3), the grant of permits by it
under s. 48 has to be subject to the limit fixed under s. 47 (3). We cannot
accept the contention on behalf of the appellant that when the Regional,
Transport Authority following the procedure provided in s. 57, comes to grant
or refuse a permit it can ignore the limit fixed under s. 47 (3), because it is
also the authority making the order under s. 48. Section 47 (3) is concerned
with a general order 530 limiting stage carriages generally etc. on a
consideration of matters specified in s. 47 (1). That general order can be
modified by the Regional Transport Authority. if it so decides, one way or the
other. But the modification of that order is not a matter for consideration
when the Regional Transport Authority is dealing with the actual grant of permits
under s. 48 read with s. 57, for at that stage what the Regional Transport
Authority has to do is to choose between various applicants who may have made
applications to it under s. 46 read with s. 57. That in our opinion is not the
stage where the general order passed under s. 47 (3) can be reconsidered for
the order under s. 48 is subject to the provisions, of s. 47, which includes s.
47 (3) under which a general order limiting the number of stage carriages etc.
may have been passed. Section 57 (2) shows
that an application for permit may be made at any time not less than six weeks
before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect or if
the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such
applications, on such dates. All applications, whether received one way or the
other, have to be dealt with in the manner provided by s. 57 and the final
order for grant of stage carriage permit has to be passed under s. 48. But, at
that stage, as we have already pointed out, the Regional Transport Authority is
only considering whether the applications made before it are to be granted or
not and has to choose between various applicants where there are more
applicants than the number of vacancies which might have been advertised or there
are more applicants than the number limited under s.47 (3). The scheme of the
Act therefore is that a limit is fixed under s. 47 (3) and the applications
received are dealt with in the manner provided by s. 57 and permits can be
granted under s. 48 subject to the limit fixed under a. 47 (3).
531 Further, it will be clear from s. 64 that
the appeal there contemplated is by a person who is aggrieved by various orders
specified therein. Section 64 clearly does not contemplate any appeal from an
order under s. 47 (3) limiting, the number of stage carriages generally etc.
for that order being a general order cannot be a ground for grievance to any
individual who may have the right of appeal under s. 64. Therefore, when the
Appellate Authority deals with an appeal under s. 64 it is not sitting in
appeal on the general order passed under s, 47 (3) and has to deal with the
same matters with which the Regional Transport authority dealt with under s.
41, namely, to choose between various applicants in the matter of grant of
permits. Further, when under s. 64-A of the Bihar-Amendment Act, an application
is made to it, the State Government can call for the record of any proceeding
taken under Chap. IV by any authority or officer subordinate to it and pass
such order in relation to the case as deems fit.
It may be mentioned that s. 64-A as it now
stands in the Act is very different from s. 64-A as inserted by the Bihar
Amendment Act and there is no power in the State Government now to act under
the present s. 64-A. A question may very well arise whether s. 64-A as inserted
by Central Act No. 100 of 1956 has by necessary implication repealed s. 64- A
as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act. As the proceedings in the present case
began in 1957 Central Act 100 of 1956 would apply to these proceedings and
therefore if a. 64-A as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act is repealed by
necessary implication by s. 64-A as inserted by Central Act 100 of 1956, there
would be no power in the State Government to revise the order of the Appellate
Authority after 1956.
However, we need not consider this matter
further, as it was never raised in the High Court and shall Proceed 532 on the
assumption that s. 64-A of the Bihar Amendment Act applied.
Further, it is not necessary in the present
case to decide whether under s. 64-A as inserted by Central Act 100 of 1956 it
was open to the State Transport Authority to vary a general order passed under
s. 47 (3); we are here dealing with a revision based on an application made
under s. 64-A, as inserted by the Bihar Amendment Act by a person who was
aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority under s.
64. In such a case we are of opinion that the
power of the revisional authority is confined only to considering matters which
the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority could have
considered under s. 48 and a. 64. We have already pointed out that under s. 48
the Regional Transport Authority is to choose between various applicants in the
matter of granting permits or refusing to grant permits and under a. 64 the
power of the Appellate Authority is also limited to the same function on an
appeal by a person aggrieved as provided therein. Therefore, when a revisional
authority is dealing with an application under a. 64-A by a person who is
aggrieved by an order under a. 64, it is also confined within the same limits
within which the Appellate Authority acting under s. 64 and the Regional
Transport Authority acting under s. 48 are confined. This was the view taken by
this Court in Ram Gopal's case(1) and the same view has been reiterated in
A.S.T.Arunachalam Pillai v. Messrs. Southern Roadways (Private) Limited,
(2)where it was pointed out that though the words "as it deems fit"
in a. 64-A are wide in expression, they do not mean that the State Government
can pass any order when exercising revisional authority which the authority
whose orders the Government is revising has no (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 764.
(2) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 692.
533 authority to pass. The argument on behalf
of the appellant is that the Regional Transport Authority undoubtedly has the,
power to revise a general order passed under s. 47 (3) and therefore the
revisional authority when acting under s.
64-A would have power to go beyond the limits
fixed under a. 47 (3) and grant a permit eve a in excess of the number fixed
under a. 47 (3). There is a fallacy in our opinion in this argument. It is true
that the Regional Transport Authority has the power to revise the limit fixed
by it under a. 47 (3) but that power to revise the limit in our opinion is not
under s. 48, when it is dealing with the question of grant or refusal of
permits to individuals.
Section 48 is always subject to the
provisions of s. 47 and therefore must be subject to the limits which may be
fixed under s. 47 (3). The power to revise the limits under s. 47 (3) in the
Regional Transport Authority must not be confused with the powers which it has
when it is dealing with the grant or refusal of permits under a. 48. Therefore,
though it is true that the Regional Transport Authority can revise the general
order passed by it under s. 47 (3), that revision is a separate power in the
authority and not a power arising when it is dealing with individual permits.
Therefore, when an appeal is taken from an
order under s. 48 and a revision is taken by an aggrieved person under s. 64-
A, the power of the Appellate Authority as well as of the revisional authority
is as much subject to s. 47 (3) as the power of the Regional Transport
Authority under s. 48. This means that the Appellate Authority as well as the
revisional authority under s. 64-A when dealing with an appeal or a revision of
an aggrieved person with respect to grant or refusal of permits must act in the
same manner as the Regional Transport Authority and its order will be subject
to the same restriction namely, that it must act subject to the provisions 534
of s. 47) and if there is a limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority
under s. 473) that limit will apply equally to the Appellate Authority under s.
64 and to the revisional authority under s. 64-A, when the revisional authority
is dealing with the matter on an application by an aggrieved person. In the
present case, the Regional Transport Authority was dealing with certain
applications made to it on its advertisement for two vacancies on the route
concerned and had to choose between a large number of applications who had
applied for the two permits. It made a certain choice and passed an order under
s. 48. There were then appeals to the Appellate Authority which made a
modification in the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority; but both
these authorities proceeded on the basis that there were only two permits to be
issued, that being the number fixed under s, 47 (3). Then there was a revision
under the Bihar Amendment Act by one of the aggrieved persons, the grant of
permit to whom had been set aside by the Appellate Authority. In such a case
the revisional authority acting under a. 64-A could only consider the question
as to which persons should be chosen and could not go beyond the limits fixed
under a. 47 (3) by the Regional Transport Authority and increase the number of
permits to be issued from two to three.
We may in this connection refer to the
proviso to s. 57 (3) introduced in 1956 which lays down that where limits have
been fixed under s. 47 (3) the Regional Transport Authority may summarily
refuse applications for permit if the result of granting permits on such
application would be to increase the number of vehicles beyond the limit fixed
under s. 47 (3). This shows that the power under s. 48 read with the procedure
under s. 57 is to be exercised within the limits fixed under s. 47 (3) and it
is not necessary for the Regional Transport 535 Authority even to go through
the procedure provided under is. 57, if the vehicles operating on a particular
route are already equal to the number limited under s. 47 (3). This also shows
how an order under s. 48 read with s. 57 is subject to the provisions of s. 47
(3) and how when dealing with an application for permit under s. 48 read with
a. 57, the Regional Transport Authority is to act within the limits prescribed
under s. 47 (3) and the order under s. 47 (3) is not open to modification when
the Regional Transport Authority is acting under s.48 read with s.57, though as
we have said, it may be revised at any time by the Regional Transport Authority
if it properly comes to the conclusion that revision is necessary in view of
the factors specified in s. 47 (1).
We therefore agree with the High Court that
where a limit has been fixed under s. 47 (3) by the Regional Transport
Authority and thereafter the said authority proceeds to consider applications
for permits under s. 48 read with s.
57, the Regional Transport Authority must
confine the number of permits issued by it within those limits and on an appeal
or revision by an aggrieved person, the Appellate Authority or the revisional
authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits within the limits
fixed under s. 47 (3).
It is further contended on behalf of the
appellant that there were no limits fixed by the Regional Transport Authority
and therefore it was open to the State Government to increase the number of
permits from two or three. Now the usual manner in which a Regional Transport
Authority can fix a limit under s. 47 (3) is by a resolution. Similarly it can
vary those limits by another resolution. It is urged that there is no 536 proof
on the record that there was any such resolution under s. 47 (3) by the
Regional Transport Authority in this case.
it is true that there is nothing on the
record to prove that there was any resolution as such by the Regional Transport
Authority in this case limiting the number of stage carriages on this route to
two. But the High Court has held that the number can be deemed to have been
fixed in view of the advertisement issued by the Regional Transport Authority
calling for applications for two vacancies. This view of the High Court is
however strenuously challenged on behalf of the appellant. It may be conceded
that it may not be generally possible to conclude from the number of vacancies
shown in an advertisement of this kind that is the number fixed under s. 47 (3)
by the Regional Transport Authority.
There is, however, in our opinion, one
exception to this general rule, and that is when a now route is being
advertised for the first time. It is not disputed that in this case a new route
was being advertised for the first time and the advertisement said that there
were two vacancies for which applications were invited, In the case of a new
route it is clear that the Regional Transport Authority must have come to some
conclusion as to the number of stage carriages which were to be permitted to
operate on that route and the advertisement would only' be issued on behalf of
the Regional Transport Authority calling for applications for the number so
fixed. Therefore when it is a case of a new route which is being open for the
first time and an advertisement is issued calling for applications for such a
new route specifying the number of vacancies for it, we think, it is reasonable
to infer that when the number of vacancies was specified that shows the limit
which must have been decided upon by the Regional Transport Authority under s,
47 (3) ; otherwise, it is impossible to understand in the case of a new route
why 537 the advertisement was only for two vacancies and not (say) for four or
six. The very fact that in the case of a new route opened for the first time,
the advertisement mentions two vacancies shows that the Regional Transport
Authority must have decided before issuing the advertisement that on that route
the number of stage carriages will be limited to two under s. 47 (3). This is
also the inference which, the High Court has drawn in this connection, though
it has not specifically mentioned the fact that this was a case of a new route
opened for the first time. As we have said above., such an inference from the
advertisement would be justified in the case of a new route which is opened for
the first time. Where the advertisement is with respect to an old route the
fact that the advertisement mentions a particular number of vacancies would not
necessarily mean that was-the number fixed under a. 47 (3), for the number
fixed may be much more and there may be only a few vacancies because a few
permits had expired. Therefore, in the circumstances of this case we are of
opinion that it will be legitimate to infer as it was a new route opened for
the first time that when the advertisement was made for only two vacancies,
that was because the Regional Transport Authority had already decided to limit
the number of state carriages on this route only to two under s. 47 (3). Once
this is held, it follows that under s. 48, the Regional Transport Authority
could not grant more than two permits and there- fore the Appellate Authority
also could not grant more permits under s. 64; nor could the revisional
authority on an application made to it by an aggrieved person grant more
permits. We have already said that it is not necessary to decide in this case
whether it would be open otherwise to the revisional authority under s. 64-A as
inserted by Central Act 100 of 1956 to revise a general 538 order of the
Regional Transport Authority passed under s. 47 (3). We are in the present case
concerned only with a case where an order passed under s. 48 by the Regional
Transport Authority has been taken in appeal by an aggrieved person to the
Appellate Authority under a. 64 and thereafter the order of the Appellate Authority
has been taken in revision by an aggrieved person under s. 64-A as inserted by
the Bihar Amendment Act and in such a case the limit fixed under a. 47 (3)
would bind the Regional Transport Authority, the Appellate Authority as well as
the revisional authority and they cannot issue permits beyond the limits fixed
under s. 47 (3). We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was right on
the facts of this case in holding that the State Government bad no power to
increase the number of permits which bad been fixed at two by the Regional
Transport Authority under s. 47 (3) to three on the application of an aggrieved
person under s. 64-A arising from a proceeding before the Regional Transport
Authority under a. 48 and the Appellate Authority under s. 61.
We may point out that there has been a
difference of opinion between various High Courts on this question. The
Rajasthan High Court in The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v. Shri Nahtu Ram
Mirdha (1) has taken one view and the Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Luqman
Sharif v. State Transport Authority (2) has taken the contrary view. The
Rajasthan High Court held, dealing with s. 48 (a) of the Act (as it was before
the amendment of 1956) which is similar to s. 47 (3) after the amendment, that
under s.(48)(a) as it stood before the amendment, limiting of the number of
stage carriages On any specific route did not make the order of the Regional
Transport Authority a final decision binding on (1) I.L.R. (1959) Raj. 120.
(2) A.I.R (1961) All.342.
539 the appellate authority. The, Allahabad
High Court on the other hand held that, when an order limiting the number of
stage carriages had been passed under s. 48 (a) as it was before the amendment
of 1956, there could be no appeal against that order under s. 64 and therefore
the Appellate Authority on an appeal under s. 64 could riot refix the number of
stage carriages in respect of that route. We are of opinion, in view of what we
have said above and in the light of the limitations which we have indicated
above, that the view of the Allahabad High Court is correct.
Lastly, it is urged on behalf of the
appellant that respondent No. 1 who filed the writ petition in the High Court
had no locus stand. We are of opinion that there is no force in this
contention. Respondent No. 1 was contending in the High Court that he should
have been granted a permit and not the appellant. Therefore he had locus stand
to file the writ petition and it was during the consideration of that writ
petition that the point on which the appellant has lost, arose.
We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs to
respondent No. 2 (Sudhakar Sharma) as he alone supported the construction of
the High Court on the question of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
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