Kameshwar Prasad & Ors Vs. The
State of Bihar & ANR  INSC 69 (22 February 1962)
22/02/1962 AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
CITATION: 1962 AIR 1166 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 369
Government Servant-Participation in strikes
or demonstrations-Rule prohibiting strikes or demonstrations pertaining to
conditions of service-Constructional validity of rule"Demonstration".
meaning of-Bihar Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956, r. 4-A-Constitution
of India, Arts.
19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1) (c),33,309.
By a notification dated August 16, 1957, the
Government of Bihar introduced r. 4-A into the Bihar Gevernment Servants'
Conduct Rules, !956, which provided "No Government servant shall
participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection
with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service. " The appellants
filed a petition before the High Court of Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution
of India challenging the validity of the rule on the grounds, inter alia, that
it violated sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) of Art. 19 and that, in consequence, the
rule was in excess of the rule making power conferred by Art. 309. The High
Court took the view that the freedom guaranteed under Arts. 19 (1) (a) and 19
(1) (c) did not include a right to demonstrate or to strike so far as servants
of Government were concerned, and that in any case, the impugned rule was saved
as imposing reasonable restrictions.
Held, that r. 4-A of the Bihar Government
Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, in so far as it prohibited any form of
demostration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing a breach
of public tranquillity, was violative of Arts. 19 (1) (a) and 19 (1)(b) of the
Constitution of India, and since on the language of the rule as it stood it was
not possible to so read it as to separate the legal from the unconstitutional
portion of the -.,,vision, the entire rule relating to participation in any
demonstration must he declared as ultra vires.
The Superetendant, Central Prison, Fetehgarh
v. Ram Manohar Lohia,  2 S. C. R. 821, relied on.
The Constitution has under Art. 33, selected
two of the Services under the State, the members of which might be 370 deprived
of the benefit of the. fundamental rights guaranteed to other persons and
citizens and also has prescribed the limits within which such restrictions or
abrogation might take place; but the other clausses of servants of Government
in common with other persons and citizens of the country cannot be excluded
from the protection of the rights guaranteed by part III by reason merely of
their being Government servants, -though on account of nature and incidents of
the duties which they have to discharge in that capacity, certain restrictions
on their freedoms might have to be imposed.
Held, further, that the rule in so far as it
prohibited strikes was valid, because there was no fundamental right to resort
to a strike.
All India Bank Employees Association v.
National Industrial Tribunal,  3 S.C.R. 269, followed.
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction : Civil Appeal.
No. 413 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
July 7 1958, of the Patna High Court in M. J. C.. No. 456 of 1957.
B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants.
S. P. Varrma, for the respondents.
B. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the Intervener
No. I (Union of India).
A' S. R. Chari " M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K.
Garg, D. P. Singh and S. C. Agarwal, for the Intervener No. 2 (E. X. Joseph).
1962. February 22. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal comes before us by virtue of a
certificate of fitness granted under Art. 132 of the Constitution by the High
Court of Patna. The question involved in the -appeal is a short one but is of
considerable public importance and of great constitutional significance. It is
concerned with the Constitutional validity of r. 4-A, 371 which was introduced
into the Bihar Government Servants'Conduct Rules, 1956, by a notification of
the Governor of Bihar dated August 16, 1957 and reads :
"4-A. Demonstrations and strikes. No
Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form
of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of
service." Very soon after this rule was notified the six appellants, the
first of whom is the President of the Patna Secretariat Ministerial Officers'
Association and the others are Assistants or Clerks under the Bihar State
Government, filed on August 26, 1957, a petition before the High Court of Patna
under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the rule on
various grounds including inter alia that it interfered with the rights
guaranteed to the petitioners by sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) of cl. (1) of Art.
19 of the Constitution of India and that in
consequence the rule was in excess of the rulemaking power conferred by Art.
309 of the Constitution which was the source
of the authority enabling service-rules to be framed. They prayed for an order
restraining the respondent-State from giving effect to the rule and to desist
from interfering with the petitioners' right to go on strike or to hold
demonstrations. The learned Judges of the High Court who heard the petition
were of the opinion that the freedom guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) and
19(1)(c) of the Constitution did not include a right to resort to a strike or
the right to demonstrate so far as servants of Government were concerned. The
learned Judges however, further considered the validity of the rule on the
assumption that the freedoms enumerated in sub-cls. (a) and (c) of Art.
19(1) did include those rights. On this basis
they held that the rule impugned was saved as being reasonable restraints on
these guaranteed freedoms.
372 The learned Judges therefore directed the
petition to be dismissed, but on application by the appellants they granted a
certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution to enable them to approach this
At this stage it is necessary to mention that
a similar conclusion as the one by the High Court of Patna now under appeal was
reached by the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay before whom the
constitutional validity of a, rule in identical terms as r. 4A of the Bihar
Rules was impugned.
The correctness of that decision is under
challenge in this Court in S.L. Ps. (Civil) Nos. 499 and 500 of 1961 and the
appellants in that appeal sought leave to intervene in this appeal and we have
permitted them to do so, and we heard Mr. Chari-learned Counsel for the
interveners in further support of the appeal.
Before entering on a discussion of the
arguments advanced before us it might be convenient to state certain matters
which are common ground and not in controversy :
(1) The impugned rule 4-A was framed under
Art. 309 of the Constitution which enacts, to quote the material words:
"309. Subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment,
and conditions of service of persons appointed, to public services.................
and provision is made by the proviso to the
Article for the Governors of States to make rules until ,,provision in that
behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate Legislature". We are'
drawing attention to the Article under which the rule is made for the purpose
of pointing out that the rulemaking power being subject to the Constitution,
the validity of the rule would have to be tested by the same criteria as are
applicable to all laws and subordinate legislation. In other words, if 373 there
are any constitutional limitations upon lawmaking, such of them as are
appropriate to the subject dealt with by the rule would be applicable to them.
(2)It would be seen that the rule prohibits
two types of activities, both in connection with matters pertaining to the
conditions of service (i) the holding of demonstrations, and (ii) resort to
strikes to achieve the purpose indicated.
This -Court had, in All India Bank Employees'
Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1) (Bank disputes Bombay etc.), to
consider the question as to whether the right to form an association guaranteed
by Art. 19(1) (c) involved or implied the right to resort to a strike and
answered it in the negative. In view of this decision learned Counsel for the
appellants, as also Mr. Chari for. the interveners confined their arguments to
the question of the legality of the provision as regards the right ,,,to hold
demonstrations". The validity of the rule therefore in so far as it
prohibits strikes, is no longer under challenge.
The argument addressed to us on behalf of the
appellants may be shortly stated thus : The servicerule being one framed under
Art. 309 is a "law" within the definition of Art.
13(3) of the Constitution and it would have
to be pronounced invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution . Art. 13(2).
Article 19(1) confers on all citizens the
right by sub-cl.
(a) to freedom of speech and expression, and
by sub-cl. (b) to assemble peacefully and without arms, and the right to
"demonstrate" would be covered by these two sub-clauses. By the mere
fact that a person enters Government service, be does not cease to be "a
citizen of India", nor does that disentitle him to claim the freedoms
guaranteed to every citizen. In fact, Art. 33 which enacts :
"Parliament may by law determine to (1)
CA, 154 of 1961 (Not yet reported).
374 what extent any of the rights conferred
by this Part shall, in their application to the members of the Armed Forces or
the Forces charged with maintenance of public order, be restricted or abrogated
so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of
discipline among them." obviously proceeds on the basis of persons in the
service of Government being entitled to the Protection of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and is inserted to enable
special provision being made for the abrogation, if necessary, of the
guaranteed freedoms in the case of two special services only, viz., the army and
the police force. The approach to the question regarding the constitutionality
of the rule should be whether the ban that it imposes on demonstrations would
be covered by the limitation of the guaranteed rights contained in Art. 19(2)
and 19(3). In regard to both these clauses the only relevant criteria which has
been suggested by the respondent-State is that the rule is framed -in the
interest of public order". A demonstration may be defined as "an
expression of one's feelings by outward signs". A demonstration such as is
prohibited by, the rule may be of the most innocent type peaceful orderly such
as the mere wearing of a badge by a Government servant or even by a silent
assembly say outside office hours-demonstrations which could in no sense be
suggested to involve any breach of tranquillity, or of a type involving
incitement to or capable of leading to disorder. If the rule had confined
itself to demonstrations of type which would lead to disorder then the validity
of that rule could have been sustained but what the rule does is the imposition
of a blanket-ban on all demonstrations of whatever type-innocent as well as
otherwise-and in consequence its validity cannot be upheld.
Before considering these arguments of learned
375 Counsel it is necessary to deal with the submission by Mr.
Sen who appeared for the Union of India who
intervened in this appeal which, if accepted, would cut at the root of the
entire argument for the appellant. He endeavoured to persuade us to hold that
though the power to frame Service Rules under Art. 309 was subject to the
the result that the rules so framed ought not
to -be contrary to any constitutional provision, still it did not follow that
every one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III could be claimed by
a Government servant. He urged that as a person voluntarily entered Government
service he must by that very act be demeed to have consented to enter that
service in such reasonable conditions as might be framed for ensuring the
proper working of the administrative machinery of the Government and for the
proper maintenance of discipline in the Service itself.
Under Art. 310 every office is held, subject
to the provisions of the Constitution, at the pleasure of the President or of
the Governor as the case may be, and provided a rule regulating the conditions
of service was reasonable and was calculated to ensure the purposes above named
he submitted that its reasonableness and validity could not be tested solely by
reference to the criteria laid down in cls.(2), (3) or (4) of Art. 19.
In this connection we were referred to a few
decisions of the American Courts for the proposition that the constitutionality
of special rules enacted for the discipline of those in the service of
Government bad to be tested by criteria different from those applicable to
ordinary citzens. Thus in Ex Parte: Curtis (1) the constitutionality of a law
prohibiting officers or employees of the United States from '(requesting,
giving to or receiving from any other officer or employee of the government any
money or property or other thing of value for political purposes," under a
penalty of being discharged and, on conviction fined, was upheld. In the
majority (1) 27 Law. Ed. 232, 106 U. S. 371.
376 judgment which was delivered by Waite,
C.J., the reasonableness of such a rule is pointed out. It is however manifest
that no fundamental right could be claimed to have been infringed by the
provision there impugned. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell(1), which was
another case to which our attention was invited, one of the questions raised
related to the validity of an Act of Congress (The Hatch Act, 1940) making it
unlawful for the employees in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to
take part in political campaigns and making the same the basis for disciplinary
departmental action. It was contended tbat this was an interference with the
right of free speech as well as with political rights. Keed, J., who spoke for
the majority observed:
"The interference with free expression
has to be seen in comparison with the requirements of orderly management of
administrative personnel....... .... We accept appellant's contention that the
nature of political rights reserved to the people are involved. The right
claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a party
official or worker to further his own political views. Thus we have a measure
of interference by the Hatch Act and the Rules with what otherwise would be the
freedom of the civil servant under the First Amendment.
And, if we look upon due process as a
guarantee of freedom in those fields, there is a corresponding impairment of
that right under the Fifth Amendment................ We do not find persuation
in appellants' argument that such activities during free time are not subject
to regulation even though admittedly political activites cannot be indulged in
during working hours. The influence of political activity by government
employees, if evil in its effects on the (1) 91 Law -Ed. 754, 330 U.S. 75.
377 service, the employees or people dealing
with them, is hardly less so because that activity takes place after
hours............ It is accepted constitutional doctrine that these fundamental
human rights are not absolutes............ The essential rights of the First
Amendment are subject to the elemental need for order without which the
guarantees, of civil rights to others would be a mockery".
Mr. Sen also referred us to Mc Auliffe v. New
Bedford (1) which is cited at p.791 in 91' Law. Ed. in support of the position
that servants of Government formed a class and that conditions of service
imposed upon them which are reasonable and necessary to ensure efficiency and
discipline cannot be questioned on the ground of their contravening any constitutional
guarantees. Mr. Sen drew our attention in particular to the following passage
in. the judgment of Holmes, J.:
"There is nothing in the Constitution or
the statute to prevent the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a
condition to the office of policeman, and making it part of the good conduct
required. The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, -but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for
hire in which the, servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right
of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the-implied terms of his contract.
The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him. On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable
condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us
reasonable, if that be a question open to revision here (The Police Regulation
prohibiting members of the department from soliciting money etc. for political
As regards these decisions of the American
Courts, it should be borne in mind that though the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United State reading "Congress shall make no
law......... abridging the freedom of speech........... appears to confer no
power on the Congress to impose any restriction on the exercise of the
guaranteed right, still it has always been understood that the freedom
guaranteed is subject to the' police power --the scope. of which however has
not been defined with precision or uniformly. It is on the basis of the police
power to abridge that freedom that the constitutional validity of lawa
penalising libels, and those relating to sedition, or to obscene publications
etc., has been sustained. The resultant flexibility of the restrictions that
could be validly imposed renders the American decisions inapplicable to and
without must use for resolving the questions arising under Art. 19(1)(a) or (b)
of our Constitution wherein the grounds, on which limitations might be placed
on the guaranteed right are set out with definiteness and precision.
Learned Counsel invited our attention also to
the decision of this Court in Balakotaiah v.Union of India (1) to a similar
effect. But it must however, be noted that in Balakotaiah's case the validity
of the rule was not challenged.
In further support of his submission that the
freedoms guaranteed to citizens by Art. 19 cannot in their very nature, be
applied to those who are employed in government service out attention was
invited to sub-cls. (d), (e) and (g) of cl. (1). It was said that a Government
servant who was posted to a particular place could obviously riot exercise the
freedom to move throughout the territory of India and similarly, his right to reside
and settle in any part of India could be said to be violated by his (1)
379 being posted to any particular place.
Similarly, so long as he was in government service he would not be entitled to
practicise any profession or trade and it was therefore urged that to hold that
these freedoms guaranteed under Art.
19 were applicable to government servants
would render public service or administration impossible. This line of
argument, however, does not take into account the limitations which might be
imposed on the exercise of these rights by cls. (5) and (6) under which res'
trictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by sub-cls. (d) and (g) may
be imposed if reasonable in the interest of the general public.
In this connection he laid stress on the fact
that special provision had been made in regard to Service under the State in
some of the Articles in Partlll-such as for instance Arts. 15, 16 and 18(3) and
(4)-and he desired us there from to draw the inference that the other Articles
in which there was no specific reference to Government servants were
inapplicable to them. He realised however, that the implication arising from
Art. 33 would run counter to this line of argument but as regards this Article
his submission was that it was concerned solely to save Army Regulations which
permitted detention in a manner which would not be countenanced by Art. 22 of
the Constitution. We find ourselves unable to accept the argument that the
Constitution excludes Government servants as a class from the protection of the
several rights guaranteed by the several Articles in Part III save in those
cases where such persons were specifically named.
In our opinion, this argument even if
otherwise possible, has to be repelled in view of the terms of Art. 33. That
Articleselects two of the Services under the State-members of the armed forces
charged with the maintenance of public order and saves the rules prescribing
the conditions of service in regard to them-from invalidity on the ground of
violation of-any of the fundamental 380 rights guaranteed by Part III and also
defines the purpose for which such abrogation or restriction might take place,
this being limited to ensure the proper discharge of duties and the maintenance
of discipline among them. The Article having thus selected the Services members
of which might be, deprived of the benefit of the fundamental rights guaranteed
to other persons and citizens and also having prescribed the limits within
which such restrictions or abrogation might take place, we consider that other
classes of servants of Government in common with other persons and other
citizens of the country cannot be excluded from the protection of the rights
guaranteed by Part III by reason merely of their being Government servants and
the nature and incidents of the duties which they have to discharge in that
capacity might necessarily involve restrictions of certain freedoms as we have
pointed out in relation to Art. 19 (1) (e) and (g).
The first question that falls to be considered
is whether the right to make a ",demonstration" is covered by either
or both of the two freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). A
"'demonstration" is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as
"an outward exhibition of feeling, as an exhibition of opinion on
political or other question especially a public meeting or procession". In
Webster it is defined as "a public exhibition by a party, sect or
society......... as by a parade or mass-meeting". Without going very much
into the niceties of language it might be broadly stated that a demonstration
is a visible manifestation of the feelings or sentiments of an individual or a
group. It is thus a communication of one's ideas to others to whom it is
intended to be conveyed. It is in effect therefore a form of speech or of
expression, because speech need not be vocal since signs made by a dumb person
would also be a form of speech. It has however to be recognised that 381 the
argument before us is confined to the rule prohibiting demonstration which is a
form of speech and expression or of a mere assembly and speeches therein and
not other forms of demonstration which do not fall within the content of Art.
19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b). A demonstration might
take the form of an assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the
person or authority to whom the communication is intended the feelings of the
group which assembles. It necessarily follows that there are forms of
demonstration which would fall within the freedoms guaranteed by Art.
19(1)(a) and 19(1) (b). It is needless to add
that from the very nature of things a demonstration may take various forms; It
may be noisy and disorderly, for instance stone throwing by a crowd may be
cited as an example of a violent and disorderly demonstration and this would
not obviously be within Art. 19(1)(a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and
orderly such as happens when the members of the group merely wear some badge
drawing attention to their grievances.
If thus particular forms of demonstration
fall within the scope of Art. 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b), the next question is
whether r. 4-A, in so far as it lays an embargo on any form of demonstration
for the redress of the grievances of Government employees, could be sustained
as falling within the scope of Art. 19(2) and (3).
These clauses run:
"19. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of
clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State
from making any law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to 382 contempt of court defamation
or incitement to an offence.
(3)Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said
clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes,
or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of public
order' reasonable restrictions on the exercise Of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause." The learned Judges of the High Court have, -as stated
earlier, upheld the validity of the rule by considering them as reasonable
restrictions in the interest of public order.
In coming to this conclusion the learned
Judges of the High Court did not have the benefit of the exposition of the
meaning of the expression in the interest of public order" in these two
clauses by this Court in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram
Manohar Lohia (1).
Speaking for the Court Subba Rao, J.,
summarised his conclusion on the point in these terms:
"Public order (Art. 19(2) and (3)) is
synonymous with 'public safety and tranquillity. It is the absence of disorder
involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals
such as revolution, civil strike, war affecting the security of the
State." The learned Judge further stated that in order that a legislation
may be "in the interests of public order" there must be a proximate
and reasonable nexus between the nature of the speech prohibited and public
order. The learned Judge rejected the argument that the phrase "in the
interests of public order" which is wider than the words ',for the
maintenance of public order" which were found in the Article as originally
enacted-thereby sanctioned the enactment of a law which restricted the right
merely because the speech had a tendency however (1) [1960) 2 S.C.R. 821.
383 remote to disturb public order. The
connection has to be intimate, real and rational. The validity of the rule now
impugned has to be judged with reference to tests here propounded.
If one had to consider the propriety of the
rule as one intended to ensure proper discipline apart from the limitations on
law-making, in a Government servant and in the context of the other provisions
made for the making of representations and for the redress of services,
grievances, and apart from the limitiations imposed by the Constitution there
could be very little doubt nor would it be even open to argument that the rule
now impugned was both reasonable and calculated to ensure discipline in the
Services and in that sense conducive to ensure efficiency in the Service.
Based on this aspect of the function of the
rule the argument as regards Art. 1 9(2) & (3) was put on a twofold basis:
(1) that the maintenance of public order was directly dependent upon the
existence of a body of Government servants who were themselves subject to
strict discipline. In other words, the maintenance of discipline among
Government servants not only contributed to the maintenance of public order but
was a sine qua non of public order. (2) The other aspect in which it was
presented was the negative of the one just now mentioned that if Government
servants were ill disciplined and were themselves to agitate in a disorderly
manner for the redress of their service grievances, this must lead to a
demoralisation of the public and would be reflected in the disappearance of
We find ourselves unable to uphold this
submission on behalf the State. In the first place we are not here concerned
with any rule for ensuring discipline among the police, which is the arm of the
law primarily charged with the maintenance of public order. The threat to
public order should therefore arise from the nature of the demonstration
prohibited. No doubt, if the rule were so framed 384 as to single out those
types of demonstration which were likely to lead to a disturbance of public
tranquillity or which 'Would fall under the other limiting criteria specified
in Art. 19(2) the validity of the rule could have been sustained. The vice of
the rule, in our opinion, consists in this that it lays a ban on every type of
demonstration--be the same however innocent and however incapable of causing a
breach of public tranquillity and does not confine itself to those forms of
demonstrations which might lead to that result.
Learned Counsel for the respondent and those
who supported the validity of the rule could not suggest that on the language
of the rule as -it stood, it was possible to read it as to separate the legal
from the unconstitutional portion of the provision. As no such separation is
possible the entire rule has to be struck down as unconstitutional.
We have rejected the broad contention that
persons in the service of government form a class apart to whom the rights
guaranteed by Part III do not, in general, apply. By accepting the contention
that the freedoms guaranteed by Part III and in particular those in Art.
19(1)(a) apply to the servants of government we should not be taken to imply
that in, relation to this class of citizen 'the ,responsibility arising from
official position would not by itself impose some limitations on the exercise
of their rights as citizens. For instance, s.54(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922,
"If a public servant discloses any particulars
. contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence affidavit,
deposition or record, he shall be punishable 'with imprisonment which may
extend to six months, and shall also be liable to fine." Section 128(1) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, enjoins on every officer, clerk,
agent etc. Who performs any duty in connection, with the 385 recording or
counting of votes at an election shall maintain the secrecy of the voting and
shall not communicate to any person any information calouluted to violate such
secrecy, and visits the breach of the rule by punishment with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three. months or with fine. It cannot be contended
that provisions on these or similar lines in these or other enactments restrict
the freedom of the officers etc. merely because they are prohibited from
communicating information which comes to them in the course of the performance
of the duties of their office, to others. The information having been obtained
by them in the course of their duties by virtue of their official position,
rules or provisions of the law prescribing the circumstances in which alone
such information might be given out or used do not infringe the right of
freedom of speech as is guaranteed by the Constitution.
We would therefore allow the appeal in part
and grant the appellants a declaration that r. 4A in the form in which it now
stands prohibiting "any form of demonstrations is violative of the
appellants' rights under Art. 19(1)(a) & (b) and should therefore be stuck
down. It is only necessary to add that the rule, in so far as it prohibits a
strike, cannot be struck (own since there is no fundamental right to resort to
a strike. As the appellants have succeeded only in part, there will be no order
as to costs in the appeal.
Appeal allowed in part.