Inder Lal Vs. Lal Singh [1962] INSC 48
(8 February 1962)
08/02/1962 GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SARKAR, A.K.
WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1962 AIR 1156 1962 SCR Supl. (3)
114
CITATOR INFO:
RF 1965 SC 677 (7) RF 1966 SC 773 (20) RF
1967 SC 808 (15) RF 1970 SC1231 (14) E 1970 SC2097 (262,313) RF 1971 SC1262
(17)
ACT:
Election-Corrupt Practice-False Statement in
relation to personal character or conduct of candidate Statement alleging
purchasing of votes-If relates to personal character-Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), s. 123 (4).
HEADNOTE:
Respondent 1 was declared elected to the
Legislative Assembly. His election was challenged, inter alia, on the ground
that he had committed the corrupt practice under S. 123 (4) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 of making false statements in relation to
the personal character or conduct of Respondent 2, a defeated candidate The
statements were contained in a pamphlet issued by the agent of Respondent 1
with his consent. Among other statements the pamphlet contained a false
statement that the Respondent 2 wits "purchaser of the opponents of the
Congress by means (if money". Respondent 1 contended that the statement
related to the public or political character of Respondent 2 and not to his
private character and did not fall within take mischief of s. 123 (4).
Held, that the statement related to the
personal character of Respondent 2 and Respondent 1 was guilty of the corrupt
practice under s. 123 (4) of the Act. The offending statement amounted to an
allegation that Respondent 2 bought the votes of the opponents of the Congress
by offering bribes. Bribery was itself a corrupt practice and an allegation of
bribery involved moral turpitude and clearly and unequivocally affected the private
character of Respondent 2.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 280 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 2, 1960, of the Rajasthan High Court in D. E. Civil Misc.
(Election) Appeal, No. 1 of 1960.
G.S. Pathak, A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N.
Andley and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.
G. C. Mathur, for the respondent No. 2.
1962. February 8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR., J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of
an election petition filed by the appellant challenging the validity of the
election of respondent No. 1, Lal Singh on several grounds. The appellant is an
elector in the Chittorgarh Constituency and the election which led to the
present petition was held in March. 1957, for the Rajasthan Legislative
Assembly from the said constituency. As a result of the election, respondent
No. 1 was declared to have been duly elected on the 11th March, 1957. He
secured 7272 votes whereas respondent No. 2 Laxman Singh s/o Maharawal Sir
Bijey Singh secured 7261 votes and respondent No. 3 Chhoga lal secured 569
votes. The appellant's case was that respondent No. 1's election wag invalid
inasmuch as he had practiced corrupt practices at the said election.
According to the appellant, respondent No. 1
procured or abetted or attempted to procure either by himself or by his agents
or by other persons with his connivance or that of his agents the reception of
invalid votes and as a result of the said votes, the result of the Election had
been materially affected The appellant stated in detail the manner in which the
said invalid votes bad been procured.
The appellant further pleaded that respondent
No. 1, his agents and other persons with the connivance of respondent No. 1 or
that of his agents published such 116 statements of facts (Exts. 3 & 6)
which were false and which they either believed to be false or did not believe
to "be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of
respondent No.2 which were likely to prejudice the prospect of respondent No. 2
at the election. It is on these two grounds that the appellant claimed a
declaration that the election of respondent No. 1 was invalid. He also claimed
that respondent No. 2 should be declared to have been validly elected.
Respondent No. 2 filed his written statement
supporting the petition but he did not appear before the Tribunal at the
hearing. Respondent No. 3 did not appear at all, while respondent No. 1 denied
all the allegations made by the appellant and contended that the election
petition filed by the appellant should be dismissed.
On the pleadings of the parties, the Election
Tribunal framed as many as 26 issues. In substance it held that the several
allegations made by the appellant in respect of the receipt of invalid votes
bad not been proved and so the first ground on which respondent No. 1's
election was challenged by appellant, could not succeed. In regard to the
second ground on which respondent No. 1's election was challenged by the
appellant, the Tribunal held that Ext. 3 had been published by the agent of
respondent No. 1 but not with his express consent and in regard to Ext. 6, the
Tribunal was not satisfied that, it had been published by respondent No. 1's
agent. That is how even the second ground made by the appellant disputing the
validity of respondent No. 1's election did not succeed. In the result, the
election petition was dismissed.
Against the said decision, the appellant
preferred an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court confirmed the
finding of the Tribunal on the first point in regard to the receipt of invalid
votes. It is true that the High Court was not 117 satisfied with the approach
adopted by the Tribunal in dealing with this part of the case and it thought
that some of the reasons given by the Tribunal in support of its conclusions
were not satisfactory. Even, so, the High Court felt that the final conclusion
of the Tribunal was, on the whole, correct and need not be reversed. Thus both
the Tribunal and the High Court have recorded findings against the appellant on
the first part of his case.
In regard to the second contention raised by
the appellant, the High Court has accepted the finding of the Tribunal about
the publication of Ext. 3. In regard to the other document Ext. 6, the High
Court has reversed the conclusion of the Tribunal and hold that the said
document had been published for the benefit of respondent No. 1 and differing
from the view taken by the Tribunal, the High Court has hold that the
Publication of both the pamphlets was with consent of respondent No. 1 and so
was outside the purview of s. 100(2) of the Representation of the People Act
1951 (43 of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act). Having thus found that the two
pamphlets had been published by the agent of respondent No.1 and with his
consent, the High Court preceded to examine the question as to whether the
material allegations made against respondent No. 2 by the said pamphlets were
true or false. The High Court bold that the said material allegations were
false and it came to the- conclusion that they were calculated to effect
prejudicially the prospects of the election of respondent No.2. The High Court
was however, not satisfied that the said allegations had relation to the
personal character or conduct of respondent No. 2 and so it held that the
corrupt practice alleged by the appellant against respondent No. 2 on the
strength of the said two pamphlets under s. 123(4) of the act had not been
proved., The result was that though the High Court differed from the Election
Tribunal in regard to some of the findings recorded 118 by the Tribunal on the
second ground, its ultimate conclusion was the same as that of the Tribunal.
The appeal preferred by the appellant was accordingly dismissed. It is against
this order that the appellant has come to this Court by Special leave.
In this appeal, the only question which we
are called upon to consider is whether the two pamphlets justify the contention
of the appellant that respondent No. 1 has committed a corrupt practice under
s. 153(4). The question as to whether respondent No. 1's election has been
materially assisted by the receipt of invalid votes, is concluded by concurrent
finding of' fact recorded against the appellant and so we have not allowed Mr.
Sastri to dispute the correctness of that finding.
Before dealing with the short point raised
for our decision under s. 123(4) of the Act, it is necessary to set out the
material portion of the pamphlets on which the appellant's case of corrupt
practice is based. The relevant portion in the pamphlet Ext. 3 to which
objection is taken by the appellant reads thus .- (1) Enemy of Democracy? (2)
Agent of the foreigners strangling the freedom of Bharat? (3) Supporter and
collaborator of the conspiracy of Pakistani attack on Bharat? (4) Bringer of
tyrannical rule of Rajas in Rajasthan? (5) Destroyer of Hindu Muslim unity by
raising the slogan of Ram Rajya? (6) Purchaser of the opponents of the Congress
by means of Money? 119 "Maharawal of Dangarpur, Shri Laxman Singh, who was
defeated in the last election by thousands of votes, has come to mislead the
people of Chittor, has come to push back the backward district of Chittor by
100 years, has come to destroy the peace and tranquility of Chittor under cover
of communal organisation, has come to provide means to the public to spend
their hard earned money on drinking orgies, has come to intensify again the
tyranny of Raja Maharajas in Rajasthan, has come to make a gift of Kashmir to
the aggressor Pakistan, has come to enslave India again by collaborating with
Pakistan and Pakistan's friends. He is a friend of Raja Maharajas and an enemy
of cultivators and laborers. He wants to grant land to Bhooswamis and thereby
oust the cultivators and wants to establish once more his pagent by
exploitation of the hard labour of cultivators." The other pamphlet
contains substantially the same portion and so it need not be reproduced.
It is urged for the appellant that in
describing respondent No. 2 as the agent of foreigners strangling the freedom
of Bharat. the personal character of respondent No. 2 has been falsely and
adversely criticised. The same comment is made in respect of the description of
respondent No. 2 as the supporter and collaborator of the conspiracy of
Pakistani attack on Bharat and in support of this argument, reliance has been
placed on the further statement in the pamphlet that respondent No. 2 had come
to make a gift of Kashmir to the aggressor Pakistan and had come to enslave
India by collaborating with Pakistan and Pakistan's friends. It is also argued
that describing respondent No. 2 as the purchaser of the opponents of the
Congress by means of money, attracts the provisions of 123 (4). It is mainly on
these three allegations in the 120 pamphlet that the case of the appellant
rests and the argument is that by making these allegations, the private
character of respondent No. 2 has been falsely vilified and that the said
vilification was reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of his
election.
On the other hand, for respondent No. 1 Mr.
Mathur who appeared amicus curaie at our request has contended that the three
allegations, though false, cannot be said to touch or effect the private
character of respondent No. 2. He has argued that in dealing with s. 123 (4), it
is necessary to make a distinction between the personal or private character or
conduct of a candidate and his public or political character. Mr. Mathur's
contention is that though the criticism made against respondent No. 2 by the
impugned pamphlet may be extravagant, unreasonable. and false, it is
nevertheless criticism made against him in his public and political character
and as such, a. 123 (4) cannot be invoked.
It is, therefore, necessary to determine the
true scope and effect of the relevant provision in a. 123 (4). Section 123
deals with corrupt practices and amongst them, is the corrupt practice
specified by subjection (4). That sub- section reads thus :- "The
publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, of any statement
of fact which is false, and which he either believes to be false or does not
believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any
candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or withdrawal, or retirement from
contest, of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice
the prospects of that candidates election." It would thus be seen that the
publication in question must be by a candidate or his agent or by any other
person ; the said publication should be 121 in regard to a statement of fact
which is false and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to
be true ;
that it must have relation to the personal
character or conduct of the candidate, or should have relation to the
candidature with drawl or retirement from contest of any candidate and that it
should be a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that
candidate's election. All the requirements of this subsection, except one, are
held to have been satisfied by the High Court. The only requirement of the
sub-section which has not been satisfied according to the High Court is that
the statement has no relation to the personal character or conduct of
respondent No. 2. Mr. Sastri contends that this finding of the High Court is erroneous
in law.
It would be noticed that in prescribing the
requirement that the false statement should have relation to the personal
character of the candidate, a distinction is intended to be drawn between the
personal character of the candidate and his public or political character. The
provision postulates that if a false statement is made in regard to the public
or political character of the candidate, it would not constitute a corrupt
practice even if it is likely to Prejudice the prospects of that candidate's
'election. This assumption is presumably based on the theory that the
electorate being politically educated and mature, would not be deceived by a
false criticism against the public or political character of any candidate. The
public and political character of a candidate in open to public view and public
criticism and even if any false statements are made about the political views
of a candidate or his public conduct or character, the electorate would be able
to judge on the merits and may not be misled the allegations by any false
allegations in that behalf. It is on this theory that false statements of fact
effecting the public or political character of a candidate are not brought 122
within the mischief of ss. 123(4). In order that the elections should be free,
it is necessary that the electorate should be educated on political issues in a
fearless manner and so, the Legislature thought that full and ample scope
should be left for free and fearless criticism by candidates against the public
and political character of their opponents.
But the position with regard to the private
or personal character of the candidate is very different. Circulation of false
statements about the private or personal character of the candidate during the
period preceding elections is likely to work against the freedom of election
itself inasmuch as the effect created by false statements cannot be met by
denials in proper time and so the Constituency has to be protected against the
circulation of such false statements which are likely to effect the voting of
the electors. That is why it is for the protection of the constituency against
acts which would be fatal to the freedom of election that the statute provides
for the inclusion of the circulation of false statements concerning the private
character of a candidate amongst corrupt practices. Dissemination of false
statements about the personal character of a candidate thus constitutes a
corrupt practice.
Though it is clear that the statute wants to
make a broad distinction between public and political character on the one hand
and private character on the other, it is obvious that a sharp and clear-cut
dividing line cannot be drawn to distinguish the one from the other, In
discussing the distinction between the private character and the public
character, sometimes reference is made to the "'man beneath the
politician" and it is said that if a statement of fact affects the man
beneath the politician it touches private character and if it affects the
politician. It does not touch his private character. There may be some false
statements of fact which clearly affect the private character of 123 the
candidate ; if, for instance, it is said that the candidate is a cheat or
murderer there can be no doubt that the statement is in regard to his private
character and conduct and so if the statement is shown to be false, it would
undoubtedly be a corrupt practice Similarly, if the economic policy of the
party to which the candidate belongs or its political ideology is falsely criticized
and in strong words it is suggested that the said policy and ideology would
cause the ruin of the country, that clearly would be criticism, though false,
against the public character of the candidate and his political party and as
such, it would be outside the purview of the statute. But there may be oases on
the border-line where the false statement may affect both the politician and
the man beneath the politician and it is precisely in dealing with cases on the
border-line that difficulties are experienced in deter- mining whether the
impugned false statement constitutes a corrupt practice or not. If, for
instance, it is said that in his public life, the candidate has utilised his
position for the selfish purpose of securing jobs for his relations, it may be
argued that it is criticism against the candidate in his public character and
it may also be suggested that it nevertheless affects his private character.
Therefore, it is clear that in dealing with corrupt practices alleged under is.
123(4) where we are concerned with border-line cases, we will have to draw a
working line to distinguish private character from public character and it may
also have to be borne in mind that in some cases, the false statement may
affect both the private and the public character as well.
In the present case, we are satisfied that
the allegation made in the pamphlet that respondent No. 2 is a purchaser of the
opponents of the Congress by means of money clearly attracts the 124 provisions
of ss. 123(4). In plain terms, the statement amounts to an allegation that
respondent No. 2 buys by offering bribes the votes of the opponents of' the
Congress.
Bribery is itself a a corrupt practice and if
it is said against a candidate that the practices the corrupt practice of
buying the votes of the opponents of the Congress by means of bribery, that
clearly and unequivocally affects his private character. Offering a bribe in an
election introduces an element of moral turpitude and it cannot be denied that
a person who offers bribe loses reputation as an individual in the eyes of the
public. The statement alleges that the bribes are offered by respondent No. 2
for the purpose of election and in that sense it may be that it is his public
character which is falsely criticised. But in our opinion, it would be idle to
contend that it is a false statement only against the public character of
respondent No. 2. Having regard to the moral turpitude involved in the offering
of the bribe, the statement in question undoubtedly affects his private character
as well.
Unfortunately, in dealing with this point,
the High Court does not appear to have considered this statement at all.
It has dealt with this problem in very
general terms. It has observed that the impugned statements all refer to the
Maharawal as one of those various persons of his class who as a body appear to
be responsible in the opinion of the writer for the political mischiefs
referred to in the statements, land that a general reading of the document
shows that the attack upon him is a part of a bigger Organisation of
individuals who do not appear to be as the writer thinks, well inclined towards
the progress of the country. It is perfectly true that in dealing with the
contention that the false statement contained in the pamphlet amounts to a
corrupt practice under as. 123(4), it is necessary to read the document as a
whole before determining the effect of any particular objectionable statement.
125 But reading the document as a whole, we
see no justification whatever for the view expressed by the High Court that the
criticism made in the document is, directed against a body of persons and not
against respondent No. 2 himself. The failure of the High Court to deal with
the several specific statements on which the argument of the appellant is
based, has introduced a serious infirmity in its final conclusion.
If only the High Court had considered whether
the allegation that respondent No. 2 was the purchaser of opponents of the
Congress by means of money, we are inclined to think that the High Court would
not have brushed aside. the appellant's case with the general observations
which it has made in its judgment. We are, therefore, satisfied that the
appellant is right in contending that the false statement of fact to which we
have just referred constitutes a corrupt practice under as. 123(4) of the Act.
In that view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the other
impugned statements of fact also ,attract the provisions of as. 123(4).
In the result we must reverse the finding of
the High Court that publication of the impugned pamphlets does not constitute a
corrupt practice under as. 123(4). The result of this conclusion inevitably is
that the election of respondent No. 1 must be declared to be invalid because
there is no doubt that the corrupt practice proved in this case falls under
section 191(b) and is outside the purview of section 100(2).
That takes to us the question as to whether
respondent No. 2 can be declared to have been validly elected at the election
in question. This question will have to be decided in the light of provisions
of section 101(b) of the Act. The said section provides, inter alia, that
"'if any person who has lodged a petition has, in addition to calling in
question the election. of the returned candidate, 126 claimed a declaration
that any other candidate has been duly elected and the Tribunal is of opinion
that but for the votes obtained by such returned candidate by corrupt practices
such other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes, the
Tribunal shall after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be
void declare such other candidate to have been duly elected." This
question has not been considered by the High Court and it cannot be decided
unless the relevant facts are examined on the merits and that normally would
mean our remanding the case to the High Court for the decision of the point in
accordance with law. We do not, however, propose to adopt such a course in view
of the fact that it would be futile to give any further 'lease of life to this
petition. The election which is challenged took place in 1957 and in fact we
are now on the verge of fresh elections which would take place this month That
is why we think it would serve no purpose in sending the matter back for the
decision of the question as to whether on the evidence adduced in the case,
respondent No. 2 can be declared to have been validly elected.
The result is, the appeal is allowed and the
election of respondent No. 1 is get aside. Since respondent No. 1 did not
appear, there would be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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