Om Prakash Gupta Vs. Rattan Singh
& ANR [1962] INSC 376 (17 December 1962)
ACT:
Rent Control-Penant availing benefit-Denying
relationship- Jurisdiction of Rent Controller-Delhi Rent Control Act (Act LIX
of 1958), s. 15.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was sought to be evicted by the
landlord on the ground that he had habitually defaulted in the payment of rent
as well as on the ground of the bonafide requirement of the land-lord for his
own occupation. He resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the premises
had been let to the 260 All India Postal R. M. S. Union for
office-cum-residential purposes and that the tenancy of the Union had not been
terminated and that the rent had not been demanded from the Union. The
appellant was directed to deposit the arrears of rent up-to-date as also to go
on depositing the future rent accruing due month by month. The respondent
applied under s. 15(7) of the Act for striking out the defence of the appellant
on the ground that he had failed to comply with the orders directing him to
deposit the rent. Rejecting the explanation of the appellant the Additional
Rent Controller ordered the defence of the appellant to be struck out on July
26, 1961, and proceeded to pass an ex-parte decree for eviction. The appellant went
in appeal against the order striking out the defence which was dismissed by the
Rent Control Tribunal both on the ground that it was barred by time as also on
merits on March 6, 1961. The appellant did not take the matter in further
appeal to the High Court.
Against the decree for eviction the appellant
went to the Rent Control Tribunal which dismissed the appeal. The appellant
went in further appeal to the High Court which also dismissed the appeal
summarily. On special leave, it was contended that the appellant having denied
the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, the Rent Controller
had no jurisdiction in the matter.
Held, that under the Rent Control Law, the
special tribunal has to proceed on the basis of the relationship of landlord
and tenant existing between the parties but a mere denial by the tenant of the
tenancy would not suffice to oust the jurisdiction of the special tribunal. It
is only when the tribunal comes to the conclusion that such a relationship did
not exist that it will have no jurisdiction.
Held, further, that the provisions of s. 15
read with the definition of "landlord" enable the Rent Controller to
determine the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant for the
benefit of the tenant and when a party has invited the Rent Controller to apply
the provisions of s. 15 for his benefit and the Rent Controller does so, he is
deemed to have decided such a person is a tenant. The proper course for a
person pleading that he was not a tenant would be to raise the plea and walk
out of the proceedings and not to submit to jurisdiction.
Held, further, that the appellant not having
taken the matter of striking out his defence under s. 15 (7) in appeal to the
High Court the question of his being a tenant or otherwise had become final and
could not be reagitated.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 541 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 31, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in
S. A. O. No. 86-D of 1962.
A.S. B. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, D. P. Singh
and B. K. Garg, for the appellant.
G. S. Pathak, F. C. Bedi and D. D. Sharma,
for respondents.
1962. December 17. The judgment of the Court
was delivered by SINHA, C. J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against
the judgment and order of a learned single judge of the Punjab High Court
summarily dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant, by his order dated May
31, 1962, from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated March 7, 1962, con-
firming that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dated July 27, 1961,
whereby he had directed the appellant to be evicted from the premises in
question.
It appears that the respondents are
admittedly the landlords of the premises, No. 24, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
Delhi.
The appellant claims to have been in
occupation of the premises since prior to 1950, at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-.
In 1955, the respondent had instituted a suit
for the eviction of the All India Postal & R.M.S. Union, and the appellant
was also impleaded as a party to the suit. The respondents, in 1958, made an
application for amendment of the plaint on the ground that they had come to
know that the last owner, the father of the first respondent, had let the
building to the appellant for his residential purposes and that the case should
proceed against him only. But the 262 Subordinate judge, before whom the suit
was pending, did not permit the amendment of the plaint but granted permission
to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh one, by his order dated
May 8, 1959. Thereafter, on February 25, 1960, the respondents made an
application before the Rent Controller, Delhi, for the eviction of the
appellant alone, without impleading the Union aforesaid as a party: The contention
of the appellant was that the premises had been let out by the father of the
first plaintiff-respondent to the All India Postal & R.M.S. Union for
office-cum- residential purposes and the tenancy of the Union had never been
terminated. The appellant also alleged that he was not a tenant and, therefore,
the application for his eviction was not maintainable. The petition for
eviction was founded on the allegation that the appellant as tenant had made
persistent default in the payment of rent and, secondly, that the premises were
bonafide required by the respondents for their own residence, as the first
respondent was about to leave the employment of a certain hospital which had
provided him with residential accommodation. That is to say, the petition for
eviction was brought under s.14(1)(a) & (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
(LIX of 1958)which will be referred to in the course of the judgment as the
Act.
The appellant besides denying his tenancy and
asserting the tenancy of the Union aforesaid stated that the respondents had
already got suitable accommodation and that their requirement of the premises
in question was not bonafide;
the notice of demand for payment of rent
served on the appellant was neither valid nor proper in law inasmuch as he was
not the tenant in respect of the premises, and that the notice of demand should
have been served on the Union. The appellant asserted that he was only a
licensee of the Union, and that there was no relationship of landlord and
tenant between him and the respondents. On April 2, 1960, the Additional Rent
Controller passed an order 263 directing the appellant to deposit the arrears
of rent from August 1,1958, up-to-date, at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month, and
future monthly rent, month by month, by the 15th of every following month. The
respondents made an application on May 16, 1961, under s. 15(7) of the Act for
striking out his defence against eviction on the ground that the tenant had
failed to make the payment or deposit, as directed by the order dated April 2,
1960, aforesaid. The appellant denied that he had made any default in the
regular payment of rent, but also asserted that if there was any such default
it was not intentional and was the result of a miscalculation. By his order
dated July 26, 1961, the Additional Rent Controller ordered the defence of the
appellant to be struck out. An appeal against the order striking out his
defence was made to the Rent Control Tribunal on September 15, 1961, which was
late by one day.
The learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as
time-barred, as also on merits, by its order dated March 6, 1962. By his order
dated July 17 , 1961, the Additional Rent Controller passed an ex-parte order
of, ejectment against the appellant holding that prima facie the relationship
of landlord and tenant had been established, on the basis of certain rent
receipts granted by the respondents to the appellant. He also held that the
respondents' personal bonafide need for accommodation had been established.
Appeal against that order was dismissed on March 7, 1962, by the Rent Control
Tribunal. On May 28, 1962, the appellant filed a second appeal in the High
Court of Punjab at Delhi against the order dated March .7, 1962, of the Rent
Control Tribunal, dismissing his appeal against the order of eviction. No
second appeal was taken to the High Court in respect of the dismissal of the
appeal relating to the order dated March 6, 1962, of the Rent Control Tribunal
dismissing his appeal in respect of the order of the Additional Rent Controller
striking out his defence. The second appeal was dismissed summarily by a 264
Single judge on May 31, 1962. The appellant moved this Court during the long
vacation and obtained an order from the learned Vacation judge granting special
leave to appeal, on June 5, 1962.
A preliminary objection was taken on behalf
of the landlord- respondent that no second appeal having been filed against the
order aforesaid of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his appeal in respect
of the order of the Additional Rent Controller striking out his defence, that
order had become final between the parties, and, therefore, this appeal was
incompetent. As will presently appear, this question is bound up with merits of
the appeal and has, therefore, to be determined not as a preliminary objection
but as one of the contentions between the parties, on the merits of the appeal
itself.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that
the authorities under the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings,
inasmuch as it was denied that there was any relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties.
Consequently, it was further contended, the
provisions of s. 15 (7) of the Act could not be applied against the appellant
in the absence of a finding that he was the tenant in respect of the premises
in question. It was also contended that the delay of one day made in preferring
the appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal should have been condoned, and the
order refusing condonation was vitiated by applying erroneous considerations.
Other contentions raised related to concurrent findings of fact of the Rent
Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal and we need not, therefore, take
notice of these arguments. The most important question that arises for
determination in this case is whether or not the Rent Control authorities had
jurisdiction in the matter in- controversy in this case. Ordinarily it is for
the Civil Courts to determine whether and, if so, what jural relationship
exists between the litigating 265 parties. But the Act has been enacted to provide
for the control of rents and evictions of tenants, avowedly for their benefit
and protection. The Act postulates the relationship of landlord and tenant
which must be a preexisting relationship. The Act is directed to control some
of the terms and incidents of that relationship.
Hence, there is no express provision in the
Act empowering the controller, or the Tribunal, to determine whether or not
there is a relationship of landlord and tenant. In most cases such a question
would not arise for determination by the authorities under the Act. A landlord
must be very ill- advised to start proceedings under the Act, if there is no
such relationship of landlord and tenant. If a person in possession of the
premises is not a tenant, the owner of the premises would be entitled to
institute a suit for ejectment in the Civil Courts, untrammelled by the
provisions of the Act. It is only when he happens to be the tenant of premises
in an urban area that the provisions of the Act are attracted. If a person
moves a Controller for eviction of a person on the ground that he is a tenant
who had, by his acts or omissions, made himself liable to be evicted on any one
of the grounds for eviction, and if the tenant denies that the plaintiff is the
landlord, the Controller has to decide the question whether there was a
relationship of landlord and tenant. If the Controller decides that there is
no-such relationship the proceeding has to be terminated, without deciding the
main question in controversy, namely the question of eviction. If on the other
hand, the Controller comes to the opposite conclusion and holds that the person
seeking eviction was the landlord and the person in possession was the tenant
the proceedings have to go on.
Under s. 15 (4) of the Act, the Controller is
authorised to decide the question whether the claimant was entitled to an order
for payment of rent, and if there is a dispute as to the person or persons to
whom the rent is payable, he may direct the tenant to deposit with him the 266
amount payable until the decision of the question as to who is entitled to that
payment. "Landlord" has been defined under the Act as a person who is
receiver or is entitled to receive the rent of the premises (omitting the words
not necessary for our present purposes). If the Controller comes to the
conclusion that any dispute raised by the tenant as to who was entitled to
receive rent had been raised by the tenant for false or frivolous reasons, he
may order the defence against eviction to be struck out (s. 15 (5)). Similarly,
if a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by s. 15 (2), the
Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed
with the hearing of the application for eviction (s. 15 (7)). Such an order
was, as already indicated, passed by the Rent Controller in this case. Now,
proceedings under s. 15 are primarily meant for the benefit of the tenant, and
the section authorises the Controller after giving the parties an opportunity
of being heard, to make an order directing the tenant to pay the amount found
on calculation to be due to the landlord or to deposit it with the Controller,
within one month of the date of the order. Such an order can be passed by the
Controller for the benefit of the tenant, only if the Controller decides that
the person against whom the proceedings for eviction had been initiated was in
the position of a tenant. Thus, any order passed by the Controller, either
under s. 15 or other sections of the Act, assumes that the Controller has the
jurisdiction to make the order, i. e., to determine the issue of relation-
ship. In this case, when the Controller made the order for deposit of the
arrears of rent due, under s. 15 (1), and on default of that made the order
under sub-s. (7) of s. 15, striking out the defence, the Controller must be
deemed to have decided that the appellant was a tenant. Such a decision may not
be res judicata in a regular suit in which a similar issue may directly arise
for decision. Hence, 267 any orders made by a Controller under the Act proceed
on the assumption that he has the necessary power to do so under the provisions
of the Act, which apply and which are meant to Control rents and evictions of
tenants. An order under s. 15 (1) is meant primarily for the protection and benefit
of the tenant. If the appellant took his stand upon the plea that he was not a
tenant he should have simply denied the relationship and walked out of the
proceedings. Instead of that, he took active steps to get the protection
against eviction afforded by Act, by having an order passed by the Controller,
giving him a locus penitential by allowing further time to make the deposit of
rent outstanding against him. The Controller, therefore, must be taken to have
decided that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties, and secondly, that the tenant was entitled to the protection under the
Act. It is true that the Act does not in terms authorise the authorities under
the Act to determine finally the question of the relationship of landlord and
tenant. The Act proceeds on the assumption that there is such a relationship.
If the relationship is denied, the authorities under the Act have to determine
that question also, because a simple denial of the relationship cannot oust the
jurisdiction of the tribunals under the Act. True, they are tribunals of the
limited jurisdiction, the scope of their power and authority being limited by
the provisions of the Statute. But a simple denial of the relationship either
by the alleged landlord or by the alleged tenant would not have the effect of
ousting the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act, because the simplest
thing in the world would be for the party interested to block the proceedings
under the Act to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant. The tribunals
under the Act being creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction and have
to function within the four- corners of the Statute creating them. But within
the provisions 268 of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and
their orders are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral
proceedings like a separate suit or application in execution proceedings. In
our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that as soon as
the appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant;
the jurisdiction of the authorities under the
Act was completely ousted. Nor is there any jurisdiction in the contention that
the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 15 of the Act had been erroneously applied
to the appellant. The orders under those provisions were for his benefit and he
must be deemed to have invited the Controller to pass those orders in his
favour. Otherwise, he should have walked out of the proceedings after
intimating to the Controller that he was not interested to contest the
proceedings in as much as he was not a tenant, and that a third party was the
tenant. This order, of course, will bind only the appellant and no one else,
and as he failed to take advantage of the order passed in his favour under s.
15 (7), he cannot make a grievance of it. Whether or not a delay of one day
should have been condoned was a matter of discretion with the appellate
authority, and it is not for this Court to say that this discretion should have
been exercised in one way and not in another. The crucial question is not
whether the delay is of one day or more, but whether or not there was any
justification for the delay. It is for the appellate authority to determine
whether or not the appellant had satisfied it as to the sufficiency of the
ground for condoning the delay. This question of condonation of delay is more
or less of academic interest only, because the Tribunal not only considered the
question of delay but also the appeal on its merits, and on merits also it came
to the conclusion that there was no ground for interference with the orders
passed by the Rent Controller. Hence, the question of condonation of delay is
of no importance in this case. What is of greater importance is the 269 merit
of the decision awarding possession to the landlord.
In this connection, it may be added that it
was a little inconsistent on the part of the appellant to have taken all the
advantages the Act affords to a tenant and then to turn round and to assert
that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter, because he was not.
the tenant.
The Rent Controller had to determine the
controversy as between the parties for the purposes of disposing of the case
under the Act. If the appellant really was a tenant, he has had the benefit of
the provision of the Act, including the six months' time as a period of grace
after an order of the Rent Controller granting the landlord's prayer for
eviction. If he was not the tenant, he has nothing to lose by the order of the
Rent Controller. These proceedings cannot affect the interest of one who is not
a party to the present case. Furthermore, a second appeal lay from the
appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal
against the order striking out his defence. No such second appeal was taken to
the High Court, though as already stated a second appeal was preferred against
the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the order
of eviction. The position is that the appellate order of the Rent Control
Tribunal, dated March 6, 1962, dismissing the appeal against the order striking
out his defence became final between the parties and is no more open to
challenge. Hence, it is no more open to the appellant to challenge the
jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act.
In our opinion, therefore, there is no merit
in his appeal.
It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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