Babu Singh Vs. State of Punjab 
INSC 243 (28 August 1962)
of-Circumstances showing confession involuntary-Duty of Magistrate recording
confession Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898, ss.164(3), 364(3).
The appellants were tried for murder and for
concealing the dead, body. The evidence against them was their retracted
confessions and the recovery of the dead body at the instance of appellant Babu
Lal from his Kotha. The courts below held that the confessions were duly
recorded and were voluntary and relying upon them and on the evidence of the
recovery of the dead body convicted both the appellants under ss. 302 and 201
read with s.34, Indian Penal Code.
The appellants contended (i) that the
confessions were inadmissible as the provisions of s.364(3),Code of Criminal
Procedure, were not complied with in as much as the confessions were actually
reordered by the readers of the magistrate and the magistrate had not made any
memorandum of the examination as it proceeded, and (ii) that the confessions
were not voluntary. The respondent contended that the non-compliance with the
provisions of s.364(3) was cured by s.533 of the Code as the error had not
injured the accused as to their defence on merits and that the confessions were
Held, that the confessions were not voluntary
and could not be used against appellants. The investigating officer had kept
the appellants in police custody for several days even after a substantial part
of the investigation was over ;
there was no endorsement on the confession
showing how much time bad been given to the appellants before they made their
confessions ; less than 24 hours had elapsed between the time when the
appellants came out of police custody and the time when their confessions were
recorded ; the magistrate who recorded the confessions had taken part in
assisting the investigation by attesting the recovery memos ; in recording the
confessions the magistrate had adopted a somewhat casual attitude by
disregarding the provisions of s,164(3) and s.364(3) which provided valuable
safe gaurds to protect the 750 interests of innocent persons. Having regard to
these features, the confessions could not safely be treated as voluntary. After
exclusion of the confessions, the charge of murder could not be sustained
against the appellants.
But the conviction of Babu Lal under s.201
Indian Penal Code could stand on the basis of the recovery of the dead body at
his instance and of the evidence of the witnesses of the recovery.
Nazir Ahmed v. The King Emperor (1936) L. R.
63 1. A. 372 referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal Nos. 121 & 140/62.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and order dated March 6, 1962, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeals
Nos. 63 and 213 of 1962 and Murder Reference No. 10 of 1962.
O. P. Rana, for the appellants.
B. K. Khanna, R. H. Dhebar, R. N. Sachthey
and P. D. Menon, for the respondent.
1962. August 28. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR., J.-These two Criminal Appeals Nos. 121 and
140 of 1962, arise out of a criminal case in which the two appellants Babu
Singh and Babu Lal were charged with having committed offences under s. 302
read with s. 34 and a. 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case
against them was that on or about December 22, 1960, the two appellants
murdered Mahtab Singh in furtherance of their common intention and there. by
committed an offence under s. 302 read with s.34. The case further was that on
or about the day or the third week of January 1961, they did cause the evidence
of the said murder to disappear by burying the dead body of Mehtab Singh and
thereby committed an offence under s. 201 of the Code.
751 The victim Mehtab Singh was the father of
the appellant Babu Singh and Babu Lal is the friend of Babu Singh. It appears
that Mehtab Singh was living alone and that the relations between him and his
son Babu Singh were not cordial. In fact, Mehtab Singh had complained to the
police authorities that he apprehended danger from his son. The prosecution
case as it was laid before the trial court was that on December 22, 1960, the
two appellants entered the house in which Mehtab Singh lived. They caught hold
of Mehtab Singh while he was sleeping on a cot. Babu Singh sat on his cheat and
throttled him while his companion held the victim down.
The dead body of the victim was then packed
up in a gunny bag and concealed in a corner. Babu Singh who was familiar with
the house and its contents forced open a looked trunk and removed a bag
containing Rs. 1200/-. With this bag the culprits left the house Babu Singh
taking care to look the house before they left the scene of the offence. With
the money thus obtained, Babu Singh made several purchases.
Some days later Babu Singh with the help of
Babu Lal removed the dead of his father to the house of Babu Lal where it was
put underground in a kotha. That, in brief, is the prosecution case against the
appellants. The discovery of this offence was made in a somewhat unusual
manner. Babu Lal was arrested in connection with another theft case, and whilst
he was being interrogated in the course of the investigation of that offence he
made a disclosure statement and showed his willingness to make some
discoveries. He then took the police party to his house and as a result of the
statement made by him the kotha containing the dead body of Mehtab Singh was
dug up. On the same day, Babu Lal made another disclosure statement as a result
of which a pair of those, watch, radio, hundred rupees in currency notes and
some other articles were found. The prosecution alleges the these goods had
been purchased by Babu Singh 752 with the money he took away after murdering
his father and were kept in the house of Babu Lal.
Babu Singh who was arrested 'on 'January 22,
1961, made a similar disclosure statement which led to the discovery of shoes,
copper trunk and purhase receipt relating to the watch.
After these discoveries were made in
pursuance of the statements made by the appellants it is alleged that they
expressed a desire to make confessional statements, and so they were sent to
the magistrate on February 6, 1961. The learned magistrate directed that they
should be handed over to jail custody and accordingly they were taken to the
On February 7, 1961, both the appellants'
were produced before the said magistrate and their confessions were recorded.
In addition to the discovery made by the investigating officer. the prosecution
relied on these two confessions in support of their charge against the
It also appears that on January 15, 1961, a
telegram was sent addressed to the appellant Babu Singh described as Bhola Ram
from Patiala. This telegram purported to say Mehtab Singh seriously ill, send
Babu Singh". It was the prosecution case that this telegram had been
deliberately sent by Babu Lal and was addressed to Babu Singh in order to
conceal the commission of the principal offence of murder.
It is on this material that the prosecution relied
in support of its case against both the appellants in respect of the two
charges already specified.
The learned trial judge has accepted this
evidence and had attached no importance to the fact that the appellants
retracted the confessions made by them. Accordingly, he convicted both the
appellants under s. 302 read with s. 34 as well as. 201. Babu Singh was
sentenced to death for the offence, 753 of murder and to rigorous imprisonment
for 7 years for the offence under s. 201. Babu Lal was sentenced to
imprisonment for life for the offence under s. 302 read with s. 34 and 7 years
for the offence under a. 201.
The sentence of death imposed on Babu Singh
was submitted to the Punjab High Court for confirmation. The two appellants
also preferred appeals challenging the order of conviction and sentence passed
against them by the trial court. The High Court heard the said matters together
and concurred' with the view taken by the trial court. The High Court has hold
that the confessions were duly recorded by the magistrate, and that they were
voluntary and true. The High Court took into account the fact that the said
confessions had been retracted and so it proceeded to examine the question as
to whether they were corroborated. In dealing with this question, the High
Court took into account the discoveries made as a result of the statements made
by the two appellants and it held that the said discoveries corroborated the
two confessions. That is how the order of conviction and sentence imposed by
the trial Court on the two appellants were confirmed. It is against this
decision that the appellants have come to this Court by their two appeals.
Mr. Rana, for the appellants, contends that
the confessions on which the prosecution relies have not been proved in this
case. In the alternative he contends that having regard to the circumstances
under which and the manner in which the said confessions have been recorded,
they should not be treated as voluntary. Unfortunately, this aspect of the
matter has not, been considered by the High Court. The High Court has observed
that the confessions were duly recorded by the magistrate and it has held that
the appellants were given enough time to consider whether they should make the
confessions before the said confessions were 764 recorded. In coming to the
conclusion that the confessions had been duly recorded by the magistrate the
High Court appears to have relied on the statements made by Mr. Agnihotri, the
magistrate, in his examination-in chief and its attention does not appear to
have been drawn to the admissions made by the said magistrate in his cross-examination.
From the said admissions it is clear that in recording the said confessions the
procedure prescribed by s. 364 (3) of the Code has not been complied with, and
that naturally raises a very important issue in the present case.
It is to be regretted that though this aspect
of the matter obviously arises in view of the statements made by the magistrate
in his cross-examination, the High Court has not addressed itself to this point
and has not noticed the defect in the recording of the said confessions and its
effect before it decided to come to the conclusion that the confessions had
been duly recorded and were voluntary and true.
We have already stated that the appellants
were produced before the magistrate on February 6, 1961 and they were directed
to be sent to jail custody on the evening of February 6. On February 7, 1961,
their confessions were recorded during court hours. When the magistrate gave
his evidence to prove these confessions, he stated that the appellants were
produced before him on February 7, 1961, that he gave them one hour to consider
whether they should make the confessions and then he proceeded to record the
confession in question verbatim. "I verbatim recorded", says the
magistrate, "whatever the accused stated", and he adds ',the
statements were read over by me to the accused and he thumb-marked it after
admitting the same to be correct". It is this statement on which the High
Court appears to have acted in dealing with the question as to whether the
confess. ions had been duly recorded or not.
When the 755 magistrate was cross-examined in
regard to the recording of these confessions, be admitted that the confessions
had in fact not been recorded by himself The two confessions are Exhibits P. P.
and P. Q. and he stated that they were recorded by his Ahmad Reader. He was
asked whether he remembered which confession was recorded by which Reader and
he added that he could not say who wrote Ex. P. Q. or P. P.
The magistrate explained why he adopted this
course by saying that the statements were recorded by the Readar as a verbatim
record in urdu was required and he was not well conversant with Urdu writing.
Then he was asked whether he made a separate memorandum of the statement as
required by s. 364 (3) and he stated that he had not made such a memorandum. He
was further asked whether he remembered the sequence in which the statements
were recorded and he stated he did not remember the sequence. He was asked
whether he remembered where appellant Babu Singh was kept when Babu Lal made
his confession and where Babu Lal was kept when Babu Singh made his confession.
He stated he did not remember where the other appellant was it would thus be
seen that the confessions have not been recorded by the magistrate in his own
hand for the reason that he was not familiar with the writing in Urdu and that
means that the requirements of s. 364 (3) have not been complied with.
There is another aspect of the matter which
would be relevant in dealing with the question as to whether the confessions
can be safely taken to be voluntary in this case. It appears that the
Magistrate who is an Haqua magistrate of Ambala was directed by the Additional
District Magistrate to go to the police station at Ambala Cantonment on January
22, 1961, in connection with the recovery of the dead body. Accordingly, he
went to 756 the police station and he has attested the signatures of witnesses
of the disclosure document which led to the discovery of the dead body. He was
present when the statement was made by Babu Lal. He was present when the dead
body was recovered and he has attested the recovery memo. He has also attested
the other recovery memo which showed the discovery of other articles made in
pursuance of another statement made by Babu Lal. It is thus clear that the
magistrate who recorded the confessions had actively assisted the investigation
by attesting the recovery memos which naturally play an important part in the
This aspect of the matter has also not been
considered by the High Court.
It is unfortunate that though it was brought
out in the cross-examination of the Magistrate that the confessions had not
been recorded by the Magistrate himself, the prosecution did not examine the
officers of the court who actually recorded the said confessions, nor did the
trial court call upon the prosecution to examine those witnesses. The defence
examined Harbans Singh, one of the officers who recorded the confession of Babu
Lal. This witness stated that the two appellants were brought to the court of
the magistrate and that they made their confession on February 7, 1961. lie
stated that the confession of Babu Lai was recorded first and it was he who
wrote it down. Then he added that the statement of Babu Singh was recorded by
Rajinder Dat, Ahmad of the court. It would thus be seen that Rajinder Dat
Ahmad, who recorded the confessional statement of Babu Singh has not given
evidence and Harbans Singh has given evidence as a witness for the defence, It
is very much to be regretted that in a case of this kind where the appellants
are charged 757 with murder the prosecution should not have examined the
scribes who actually recorded the confessions. It is conceded by the Magistrate
that he was not familiar with the writing of Urdu and that indeed is his
justification for not recording the confessions himself. In such a case, it was
of utmost importance that the scribes should have given evidence and an
opportunity should have been given to the appellants to test by
cross-examination, the prosecution claim that their confessional statements had
been duly and properly recorded. That is the safeguard to which the appellants
were undoubtedly entitled. That is another aspect of the matter which has to be
borne in mind in dealing with the points raised before us by Mr. Rana.
If the Magistrate under whose supervision the
confessions were recorded has not complied with the provisions of s. 361(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, can it be said that the said confessions are
not proved or that the making of the confessions and their recording is
vitiated so as to make them inadmissible. The decision of this question would
naturally take us to three sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section
164 of the Code confers power on the magistrate specified in s. 164(1) to
record statements and confessions. Section 164(2) provides safeguard to protect
the interest of innocent persons. It lays down that such statements, meaning
the statements authorised to be recorded by a. 164(1), ,%hall be recorded in
such of the manners hereinafter prescribed for recording evidence as is, in the
opinion of the magistrate, best fitted for the circumstances of the case. Then
the section adds that such confessions shall be recorded and signed in the
manner provided in s. 364 and they shall then be forwarded to the magistrate by
whom the case is to be inquired into or tried. It would 758 thus be seen that
sub-s. (2) requires that the confessions should be recorded in the manner
prescribed by s. 364; that is one safeguard provided by this section.
Sub-section (3) then proceeds to provide further safeguards. It lays down that
the magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the
person making it that be is not bound to make a confession and that if be does
so it may be used as evidence against him and no magistrate shall record any
such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to
believe that it was made voluntarily; and it provides that when the confession
is recorded after following the procedure prescribed by it, the magistrate
shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect.
When we turn to s. 361 we find that sub-s(1)
provides for the recording of the confession in full in the manner prescribed
therein and for explaining the contents of the same to the accused in a
language which he understands, and the accused shall be at liberty to explain
or add to his answer. Subsection (2) lays down that when the 'whole of the
confession is made conformable to what he declares is the truth, the record
shall be signed by the accused and the magistrate, and the magistrate shall
certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and
hearing and that the record contains a full and true account of the statement
made by the accused. Sub-section (1) is important for our purpose. It provides
that in cases in which the examination of accused is not recorded by the
magistrate or judge himself he shall be bound as the examination proceeds to
make a memorandum thereof in the language of the court or in English, if he is
sufficiently acquainted with the latter language; and such memorandum shall be
written and signed by the magistrate or judge with his own band and annexed to
the record. It also 759 says that if the magistrate is unable to make a
memorandum as required he shall record the reason of such inability.
It would thus be clear that if a confession
is recorded. not by the Magistrate himself as required by s. 364 (1) it is
necessary that the magistrate should make a memorandum as the examination
proceeds and the memorandum should be signed by him. It' is conceded that in
the present case, the confessions were not recorded as required by s. 364 (1)
and, yet the safeguard prescribed by s. 364 (3) has not been complied with. Mr.
Rans contends that the failure to comply with the requirements of s. 364 (3)
makes the confessions inadmissible.
In dealing with this question we must consider
the provisions of s. 533 of the Code. It is on the provision of this section
that Mr. Khanna, for the respondent, relies.
Section 533 (1) lays down that if any Court
before which a confession recorded or purporting to be recorded under s.
164 or s. 1364 is tendered or has been
received in evidence finds that any of the provisions of either of such
sections have not been complied by the magistrate recording the statement, it
shall take evidence that such person duly made the statement recorded ; and it
adds that notwithstanding anything contained in s. 91 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 such statement shall be admitted if the error has not injured the
accused as to his defence on the merits. Mr. Khanna contends that the
magistrate has in fact given evidence in the trial court and the evidence of
the magistrate shows that the statement has been duly recorded ;
and he argues that unless it is shown that
prejudice has been caused to the accused the irregularity committed by the
magistrate in not complying with s. 364 (3) will not vitiate the confessions
nor will it make them inadmissible. There is some force in this contention, 760
In this connection it would be necessary to consider s. 80 of the Indian
Evidence Act as well. This section provides that whenever any document is
produced before any Court, purporting to be a record or memorandum of the
evidence, or of any part of the evidence, given by a witness in a judicial
proceeding or before any officer authorised by law to take such Evidence or to
be a statement or confession by any prisoner or accused person, taken in
accordance with law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or Magistrate or
by any such officer as aforesaid, 'the Court shall presume that the document is
genuine ; that any statements as to the circumstance under which it was taken,
purporting to be made by the person signing it, are true, and that such
evidence, statement or confession was duly taken. Mr. Khanna also relies on
this section in support of his argument that the confessions must be taken to
be proved in the light of the evidence given by the magistrate, and his
certificate appended to the confessions. It is open to argument whether s. 80
of the Evidence Act would be available in a case where the recording of the
confessions is irregular in the sense that s. 364 (3) has not been complied
with. But for the purpose of the present appeals we are prepared to assume in
favour of the prosecution that the confessions have been proved and may,
therefore, be considered on the merits if they are shown to be voluntary and
that is the alternative argument which has been urged before used Mr. Rana.
Now, in dealing with the question as to
whether the confessions are voluntary or not, we have to bear in mind some
broad features of this, case. The first important circumstance on which Mr.
Rana relies is that though both the appellants made discovery statements on
January 22, and though it appears that on that date the substantial part of the
investigation was really over, the investigation 761 officer kept both
appellants in police custody until February 6. It is true that an investigating
officer is entitled to keep an accused person in his custody if it is essential
to do so for the purpose of investigation subject to the conditions prescribed
by the Code of Criminal Procedure ; but where it appears that the investigating
officer has kept an accused person in the police custody even after a
substantial part of the investigation is over, the detention of the accused
person in police custody is a matter which has to be borne in mind in
considering the question as to whether the confessions substantially made by
the accused persons are voluntary or not. That is one important fact in favour
of the appellants.
The other fact which is equally important is
that the appellants were produced before 'the magistrate on February 6 in the
evening and they were sent to jail custody Thereafter they were brought back to
the magistrate's court on February 7 and the magistrate proceeded to record
their confessions. In his evidence the magistrate has stated that he gave them
one hour to consider whether the confessions should be made or not.
Unfortunately, the record of the confessional statements does not make any
endorsement to that effect. Usually, when a confession is recorded under s. 364
the magistrate makes an endorsement showing when the accused was arrested, when
he was brought before him and how much time he gave him to consider whether he
should make any confession or not. Amongst the many irregularities committed in
the recording of this confession in this ea-se, this one also is noticed that
there is no endorsement showing how much time was given to the appellants
before they made their confessions. The confessions were made on February .7
and the magistrate gave evidence in December. It is not easy to 762 appreciate
how the magistrate could have remembered that he gave the appellants one hours
time to consider. This comment falls to be made because when the memory of the
magistrate was tested in other particulars he pleaded his inability to make any
definite answer. Take for instance the question as to who recorded these
concessions. That was a matter of some importance and yet the magistrate stated
that he did not remember which Reader in his court recorded which confession.
The magistrate was also asked in what sequence the two appellants came and made
That again is a matter of some importance and
the magistrate said that he did not remember in what sequence the confessions
were made. The magistrate was asked where the other accused was when one was
making the confession and he stated he did not remember. It is in the light 'of
these admissions made by the magistrate in respect of the other impartent
details that we have to consider whether in the absence of any contemporaneous
evidence on the record his statement that one hour was given to the appellants
could be accepted without any reservation. Besides even if we assume that one
hour was given to the appellants that does not make up even 24 hour after the
accused came out of police custody. This Court has always emphasised the fact
that before confessions are recorded the magistrate who records the confessions
should satisfy himself that the accused person's mind has been freed from fear
or other complexes developed during police custody and generally 24 hours at
least should be allowed to lapse before a confession is recorded. There can of
course be no inflexible rule in the matter. In each case the magistrate had to
decide how much time should be given to the accused before his confession is
recorded. In the present case, having regard to the fact that the appellants
were 763 kept in police custody for a long period it seems 'to us that the time
given to them to consider whether they should make the confessions or not is
wholly insufficient and unsatisfactory. That is another fact on which Mr. Rana
is entitled to rely.
Then we have the third unusual feature in the
case and that is that the magistrate who recorded the confessions has taken
part in assisting the investigation by attesting recovery memos in two cases.
Mr. Khanna contends that there is no legal prohibition against a magistrate who
has attested the recovery memos from recording a confession.
That technically may be true, but the point
we are considering is not a matter of technicality; it is a matter of
propriety. The magistrate who recorded the confessions has stated that when the
appellants were brought before him he told them that he was independent of the
police and that they were free either to confess or not to confess. When the
magistrate has taken active part in attesting recovery memos, to the
unsophisticated appellants the claim made by him that he was independent of the
police may have struck as rather subtle. It would be recalled in this
connection that the Privy Counsel in the case of Nazir Ahmed v. Thee King
Emperor(J) has stated that "in their Lordship's view it would be
particularly unfortunate if magistrates were asked at all generally to act
rather as police officers than as Judicial persons". We are therefore
inclined to take the view that it is desirable that magistrates who take part
in attesting recovery memos should not record confessions by person accused of
the offence being investigated. It is conceivable that the investigating
department seeks the assistance of the magistrates in the matter of investigation
by requesting them to attest the recovery memos in order to give assurance and
authenticity to the investigation. But if that is done care should be taken to
see that 764 for recording concessions the accused persons are sent to some
other magistrate. That is another factor which has weighed in our minds in
dealing with the voluntary character of the confessions in the present appeals.
We have also been disturbed to notice that in
recording the confessions the magistrate has adopted a somewhat casual attitude.
It is unnecessary to emphasise that the safeguards provided by s. 164 (3) and
s. 364 (3) are valuable safeguards intended to protect the interest of innocent
persons. The recording of confession is a solemn and serious act. and so any
magistrate who records confessions must see to it that a tone of casualness
does not enter in the transaction. Having regard to the evidence given by the
magistrate in the present case we are constrained to observe that when got the
confessions recorded in the present case he was not fully conscious of the
solemnity and the seriousness of what he was doing.
That is another factor which has weighed in
Having regard to these features of the case
we are not prepared to uphold the finding of of the High Curt that the
confessions made by the appellants can be safely treated to be voluntary in the
present case. If the confessions are, therefore, excluded from consideration it
is impossible to sustain the charge of murder against either of the two
appellants. In a case where the charge of murder was founded almost exclusively
on the confessions it was necessary that the High Court' should have considered
these relevant factors more carefully before it confirmed the conviction of the
appellants for the offence' under s. 302 and confirmed the sentence of death
imposed on' Babu Singh.
In our opinion. if the concessions are left
out of consideration, the charge of murder cannot be sustained. The result is
the conviction of both the. appellants for the offence under s.302 read with
s.34 is set 765 aside and consequently the sentence imposed on them for that
offence is also set aside.
That takes us to the question whether the
alternative charge under s. 201 can be held proved. This charge is held
established against Babu Lal substantially because of the recovery of the dead
body in his house. That recovery is evidenced by a memo made in that behalf,
and the witnesses who were present at the time of, the recovery gave evidence
in support of the memo. The High Court has held, and we think rightly, that the
circumstances under which the dead body of Mehtab Singh was recovered, the time
at which was recovered and the statement made by Babu Lal prior to the said
recovery, all indicate that Babu Lal has committed the offence under s.201 I.
P. C. The same cannot, however, be said about the conclusion of the High Court
in respondent of Babu Singh. In dealing with the charge against Babu Singh
under s. 201, the High Court was no doubt influenced by its finding that Babu
Lal was quilty under s. 302/34. If that finding had been affirmed by us, there
would have been no difficulty in con., firming Babu Lal's conviction under s. 201,
because that finding was based on the two confessions made by Babu Lal and Babu
Singh. If we discord the confessions, then there is no evidence on which Babu
Singh can be convicted under s. 201. The recovery of certain articles purchased
by him with the money alleged to have been stolen by him from the house of his
father cannot, in law, justify the inference that he assisted the commission of
the offence under s. 201. Therefore, the conviction of Babu Singh under s.201
cannot be sustained.
It may be that Babu Singh and Babu Lal both
committed the offence under s.201 and it is not unlikely that both of them were
concerned with the main offence of murder. But in a criminal 766 trial, the
presumption of innocence is a principle of cardinal importance and so, the
guilt of the accused must in every case be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Probabilities however strong and suspicion
however grave can never take the place of proof. That is why we are satisfied
that the appeal preferred by Babu Singh must be allowed and be must be
acquitted of both the offences charged under a. 302/34 and s. 201 and ordered
to set at liberty. Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 1962 preferred by Babu Lal partly
succeeds. His conviction and sentence under a.' 302134 is set aside, but his
conviction under section 201 as well as the sentence of seven years imposed on
him for that offence are confirmed, Cr. A. 121 of 1962 allowed.
Cr. A. 140 of 1962 partly allowed.