The State of Punjab Vs. Nathu Ram
[1961] INSC 203 (1 May 1961)
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR SUBBARAO, K.
CITATION: 1962 AIR 89 1962 SCR (2) 636
CITATOR INFO :
R 1963 SC1901 (15) R 1964 SC 215 (10) D 1965
SC1049 (10) R 1965 SC1531 (16) F 1966 SC1427 (7,8) R 1972 SC1181 (16,26,30) R
1973 SC 655 (7) R 1975 SC 733 (30) E 1979 SC1393 (3,21,22,23) RF 1990 SC 723
(12)
ACT:
Abatement of appeal-joint decree in favour of
respondents Death of one of the respondents in appeal-Failure to bring, legal
representative on record-Whether the appeal abates as a whole-Test-Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), 0. 22, r. 4.
HEADNOTE:
The Punjab Government acquired certain
parcels of land belonging to two brothers Land N who refused to accept the
compensation offered to them and applied to the Government of Punjab under r. 6
of the Punjab Land Acquisition ( Defence of India) Rules, 1943, to refer to
arbitration their joint claim based on the allegation that the land belonged to
them jointly. The State Government referred the matter to an arbitrator as
required under r. 10 who passed an award in favour of both L and N ordering
inter alia payment of an amount higher than what was offered to them by the
Government. The Government appealed against the said award to the High Court.
During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court respondent L died and
as no application for bringing on record his legal representative had been made
within the time limit, the High Court dismissed the appeal holding that the
appeal had abated against L and that its effect was that the appeal against N
also abated.
Held, that there can be no question of
abatement of appeal against the correspondents of the deceased respondent as
Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for the same
but in certain circumstances the appeal cannot proceed against them and such a
result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal.
If the Court can deal with the matter in
controversy so far as regards the rights and interest of the appellant and the
respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the
appeal and decide it; otherwise it will have to refuse to proceed further with
the appeal and therefore dismiss it. Ordinarily, the consideration which will
weigh with the court in deciding upon the question whether the entire appeal
had abated or not will be whether the appeal between the appellants and the
respondents other than the deceased respondent can be said to be properly
constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision
of the controversy before the court and the tests to determine this have been
described thus: (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the court's
coming to a decision which will be in conflict with the decision between the
appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the
court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had
become 637 final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant
and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the
action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still
before the court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if
the appeal succeeds, be ineffective that is to say it could not be successfully
executed.
The abatement of an appeal against the
deceased respondent means not only that the decree between the appellant and
the deceased respondent has become final but also as a necessary corollary that
the appellate court cannot in any way modify that decree directly or
indirectly.
When the decree in favour of the respondents
is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the respondents other than the
deceased respondent cannot be proceeded with if the appeal against the deceased
respondent has abated.
In the present case the appeal against N
alone was not properly constituted when the appeal against L had abated and the
State appeal against N alone could not proceed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 635 to 641 of 1957.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
September 8, 1954, of the Punjab High Court in Regular First Appeals Nos. 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48 of 1949.
R. Gopalakrishnan, T. M. Sen and R. H.
Dhebar, for the appellants.
Darya Dutt Chawla, for the respondents.
1961. May 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957 is an appeal, by
certificate, and raises the question regarding the effect of the abatement of
the appeal, by the State of Punjab, against Labhu Ram, one of the respondents,
on the State appeal against Nathu Ram, co-respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957 also
raise the same question between the same parties.
The facts leading to the appeal are that the
Punjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu
Rain and Nathu Ram, for different military purposes, under the Defence of India
Act, 81 638 1939 (XXXV of 1939). Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to
accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the
Punjab Government, through the Collector, under r. 6 of the Punjab Land
Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943, hereinafter called the Rules, as
amended by the Notification of the Punjab Government No. 1444-HM44/19124, dated
10th March, 1944, and published in the Punjab Gazette, Part 1, dated 17th
March, 1944 (Home Department). The State Government referred the matter to an
arbitrator as required under r. 10, who, after enquiry, passed an award
ordering the payment of an amount higher than what was offered by the Collector
and also ordered the payment of certain amount on account of incometax which
would be paid on the compensation received. The State Government appealed
against the award to the High Court of Punjab. During the pendency of the
appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died. The High Court, holding that
the appeal abated against Labhu Ram and that its effect was that the appeal
against Nathu Ram also abated, dismissed the appeal. It also dismissed the
cross-objections. The State Government applied for a certificate of fitness of
the case for appeal to this Court and the High Court granted it, as questions
of great private and public importance were involved.
It is not disputed that in view of 0. XXII,
r. 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated
against Labhu Ram, deceased, when no application for bringing on record his
legal representatives had been made within the time limited by law. The Code
does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents.
Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the
co-respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against
the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the
result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been,
consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle.
It will serve no useful purpose to consider
the cases.
Suffice it to say that when 0. XXII, r. 4
does 639 not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the corespondents
of the deceased respondent, there can be no question of abatement of the
appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain
circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them
cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed.
Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal.
The same conclusion is to be drawn from the
provisions of 0. 1, r. 9, of the Code which provides that no suit shall be
defeated by reason of the mis-joinder or non-joiner of parties and the Court
may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the
rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore,
that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the
rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the
deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it.
It is only when it is not possible for the
Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further
with the appeal and therefore dismiss it.
The question whether a Court can deal with
such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no
exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible
or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the
considerations which weigh with the Court in deciding upon this question are
whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the
deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the
necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the Court. The
test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not
proceed with an appeal (s) when the success of the appeal may lead to the
Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the
appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the
Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had
become final with respect to 640 the same subject matter between the appellant
and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the
action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still
before the Court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if
the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be
successfully executed.
There has been no divergence between the
Courts about the Court's proceeding with the appeal between the respondents
other than the deceased respondent, when the decree in appeal was not a joint
decree in favour of all the respondents. The abatement of the appeal against
the deceased respondent, in such a case, would make the decree in his favour
alone final, and this can, in no circumstances, have a repercussion, on the
decision of the controversy between the appellant and the other decree holders
or on the execution of the ultimate decree between them.
The difficulty arises always when there is a
joint decree.
Here again, the consensus of opinion is that
if the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the other
respondents also will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a
result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent.
Different views exist in the case of joint decrees in favour of respondents
whose rights in the subject matter of the decree are specified.
One view is that in such cases, the abatement
of the appeal against the deceased respondent will have the result of making
the decree affecting his specific interest to be final and that the decree
against the other respondents can be suitably dealt with by the appellate
Court. We do not consider this view correct. The specification of shares or of
interest of the deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the decree and
the capacity of the joint decree holder to execute the entire decree or to
resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed
in his favour. The abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree
between the appellant, and the deceased respondent has become final, but also,
as a necessary corollary, 641 that the appellate Court cannot, in any way,
modify that decree directly or indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in
the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondents, the
appellate Court cannot determine anything between the appellant and the legal
representatives which may affect the rights of the legal representatives under
the decree. It is immaterial that the modification which the Court will do is
one to which exception can or cannot be taken.
It is therefore necessary to determine, on
the facts of this case, whether the State appeal could proceed against Nathu
Ram. The award of the arbitrator in each of these cases was a joint one, in
favour of both the respondents Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. To illustrate the form
of the award, we may quote the award for the year 1945-46 in the proceedings
leading to Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957. It is:
"On the basis of the report of S. Lal
Singh, Naib Tehsildar (Exhibit P. W. 9/1) and Sheikh Aziz Din, Tehsildar,
Exhibit P. W. 9/2, the applicants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,140 on account
of rent, plus Rs. 3,872-8-0 on account of Income-tax etc., due to the inclusion
of Rs. 6,193-8-0 in their total income, plus such sum as the petitioners have
to pay to the Income-tax Department on account of the inclusion of Rs. 4,140 in
their income as awarded by this award." The result of the abatement of the
appeal against Labhu Ram is therefore that his legal representatives are
entitled to get compensation on the basis of this award, even if they are to be
paid separately on calculating their rightful share in the land acquired, for
which this compensation is decreed. Such calculation is foreign to the appeal
between the State of Punjab and Nathu Ram, The decree in the appeal will have
to determine not what Nathu Ram's share in this compensation is, but what is
the correct amount of compensation with respect to the land acquired for which
this compensation has been awarded by the arbitrator. The subject matter for
which the compensation is to be calculated is one and 642 the same. There
cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same
parcel of land. The appeal before the High Court was an appeal against a decree
jointly in favour of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The appeal against Nathu Ram
alone cannot be held to be properly constituted when the appeal against Labhu
Ram bad abated.
To get rid of the joint decree, it was
essential for the appellant, the State of Punjab, to implead both the jointdecree
holders in the appeal. In the absence of one joint decree holder, the appeal is
not properly framed. It follows the that State appeal against Nathu Ram alone
cannot proceed.
It is however contended for the State that
according to the entries in the village records, Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram had
equal shares in the land acquired and that therefore the appeal against Nathu
Ram alone can deal with half the amount of the award. We do not agree. The mere
record of specific shares in the revenue records is no guarantee of their
correctness. The appellate Court will have to determine the share of Nathu Ram
and necessarily the share of Labhu Ram in the absence of his legal
representatives. This is not permissible in law. Further, the entire case of
Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, in their application to the Government for the
appointment of an arbitrator, was that the land jointly belonged to them and
had been acquired for military purposes, that a certain amount had been paid to
them as compensation, that they received that amount under protest and that
they were entitled to a larger amount mentioned in the application and also for
the income-tax they would have to pay on account of the compensation received
being added to their income. Their claim was a joint claim based on the
allegation that the land belonged to them jointly. The award and the joint
decree are on this basis and the appellate Court cannot decide on the basis of
the separate shares.
The State objected before the arbitrator, and
urges before us, that under the rules, the joint application of Labhu Ram and
Nathu Ram should have been 643 treated as separate applications with respect to
the correctness of the compensation payable to each of them respectively and
that the arbitrator should have made separate awards with respect to such
separate claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram. The necessary corollary of such a
contention for the State is that the abatement of the appeal against Labhu Ram
will not make infructuous the appeal against Nathu Ram.
The respondent urges that the Punjab Land
Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, do not contemplate separate applications
by the persons interested in the compensation on account of the acquisition of
a particular parcel of land.
The arbitrator did not agree to deal with the
claims of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram separately. He, however, did not decide the
question on the basis of the land belonging jointly to the two brothers as
members of the joint Hindu family. He however held that the expression 'a
person interested' in r. 3, included all persons claiming an interest in the
compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of the land and that r.
18 permitted the joinder of applications for joint enquiry when each case
rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land
included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into
consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu
Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax.
He therefore used his discretion and ordered
the application to be proceeded with jointly.
In view of our opinion on the main point, we
do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint
application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu
Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for
compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of
the decree challenged.
We therefore see no force in this appeal and
dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other 644 connected appeals,
viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957.
Appeal dismissed.
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