Smt. Padmini Kunwar Ju Sahiba Vs.
State of Vindhya Pradesh [1961] INSC 58 (21 February 1961)
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
CITATION: 1961 AIR 1204 1961 SCR (3) 907
ACT:
Jagir Abolition-Jagirdar-Ijaredar, meaning
of-Lambardari lease, if Jagir-Vindhya Predesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land
Reforms Act, 1952(11 of 1952), S. 2(1)(C).
HEADNOTE:
In 1945 the Ruler of Panna granted a "
Lambardari lease in certain villages to the appellant. By a notification dated January
1, 1954, issued under the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms
Act, 1952, the respondent resumed the appellant's right. The appellant
contended that she was not a jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and the
notification was without the authority of law. The respondent contended that
the appellant was an " Ijaredar " and fell within the inclusive part
of the definition of " jagirdar " in s. 2(1)(c).
Held, that the appellant was not a jagirdar
and her right under the Lambardari lease could not be resumed under the
Abolition Act. In the context in which the word " Ijaredar " was used
in S. 2(1)(C) it meant a person holding an Ijara which was a lease or farm of
land revenue or other proprietary right as distinguished from other kinds of
leases. The Lambardari lease granted to the appellant was not a mere-farm of
land revenue but it conferred rights in the land itself. It was not a mere
Ijara, the appellant was not a mere " Ijaredar " and was not covered
by the definition of jagirdar in S. 2(1)(C).
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan
[1955]2 S.C.R.
303, applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 250 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
January 17, 1955, of the former Judicial Commissioner's Court, Vindhya Pradesh,
in Misc. Civil Writ Application No. 105 of 1954.
G, S. Pathak and G. C. Mathur for the
appellant. B., Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar for the respondent.
1961. February 21. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by 908 WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a, certificate granted by
the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh. The brief facts necessary for
present purposes are these: The appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of
the Constitution praying that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Panna,
issued on December 29, 1953, to the effect that the appellant's rights in
certain villages would be resumed from January-1, 1954, in pursuance of the
notification of the Government of Vindhya Pradesh dated December 20, 1953,
under s. 5 of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, No.
XI of 1952 (hereinafter called the Act) resuming all jagirs with a gross annual
income of Rs. 1,000/- or above, be quashed.
The appellant's case was that she was granted
as a special case a Lambardari lease in certain villages by His Highness the
Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945, for a period of thirty years and had
been in possession thereof in accordance with the terms of the lease. The
appellant contended that she was not a jagirdar within the meaning of the Act
and thus the said notification did not apply to her lands and the order issued
by the Deputy Commissioner under the said notification was therefore without
the authority of law and liable to be quashed. She contended further that she
was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations or orders governing
jagirdars in force in any part of the State, and therefore her lands could not
be resumed in the manner in which the resumption had been made.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the
State' and it was contended that the appellant was a jagirdar within the
meaning of that term in the Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that
the appellant was an Ijaredar and therefore a, jagirdar within' the meaning of
s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. In consequence he dismissed the petition. An
application was then made for a certificate to appeal to this Court, which was
granted and that is bow the appeal has come up before us.
The only question that falls for our decision
is whether the appellant can be said to be an Ijaredar 909 within the meaning
of s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. A jagirdar " is defined in s. 2 (1) (c) as
meaning any person recognised as a Jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations
or orders governing , Jagirdars in force in any part of the State and includes
an Ilakedar, a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar (in direct relation with the Government
or otherwise an ljaredar, an Ubaridar, a Zamindar, a, Muafidar and a Grantee of
Jagir land from a Jagirdar. " " Jagir land " is defined in s. 2
(1) (d) as meaning " any land in which or in relation to which any
jagirdar has rights as such in respect of land revenue or any other kind of
revenue." Under s. 5 of the Act it is provided that " as soon as may
be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by
notification in -the Official Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of any
class of jagir lands and different dates may be appointed for different classes
of jagir-lands.
" It was under this provision that the
notification resuming jagir-lands with a gross annual income of Re. 1,000/- or
above was issued.
It is not in dispute that the lands were not
granted to the appellant by the Ruler of Panna as a jagir. It is also not in
dispute that the appellant was not recognized as a jagirdar under any law,
rules, regulations or orders governing jagirdars in force in any part of the
State. The contention on behalf of the State was that the appellant is included
in the inclusive part of the definition of the word " jagirdar " in
s. 2 (1) (c) as she was an Ijaredar. Now the words used in the inclusive part
of the definition have not been defined anywhere in the Act. It appears that
some of those words are words of common use while others are not.
For example, the Rewa Land 'Revenue and
Tenancy Code deals with a Pawaidar, a sub-Pawaidar and Ilakedar who is a big
Pawaidar. It is not clear whether the other words used in the inclusive part of
the definition of " jagirdar " appear in any other laws in force in
the various States which amalgamated to form the State of Vindhya Pradesh,
though the word " Ubaridar " appears to. be somewhat uncommon and
must have some special local significance. It will 910 therefore be not
unreasonable to hold that where these words used in the inclusive part of the
definition appear in any law in force in any part of the State' they must have
that meaning; but if they do not appear in any such law they must be given
their ordinary meaning. The Judicial Commissioner in his judgment says that
" an Ijaredar as such has not been defined under any law relating to land
revenue and tenancy in force in any part of Vindhya Pradesh." Therefore,
the word "ljaredar" must be given its ordinary meaning. Now the
ordinary meaning of the word Ijara " from which the word " ljaredar
" is derived is a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right
as distinguished from a patta or lease of land for cultivation, though
sometimes it is used to indicate just a lease of land of any kind. The question
then is what meaning should be given to the word " ljaredar " in s. 2
(1) (c) of the Act. We are of opinion that considering the setting in which the
word " Ijaredar " has been used in the section, it must take colour
from it and cannot be held to mean any lease of land of whatever kind.
In the setting in which the word is used it
should in our opinion be confined to a person holding an Ijara which is a lease
or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as distinguished from other
kinds of leases of land.
The next question is whether the lease in
this particular case is a lease of land revenue or other proprietary right as
distinguished from lease of land of other kinds. The lease in the present case
is called a Lambardari lease, though it appears that the system of Lambardari
leases was abolished in the State of Panna long ago as appears from paragraph
(2) of Chap. II of the Revenue Administration Manual of the Panna State
prepared by J. E. Goudge, Settlement Officer, Bundelkhand States, in 1907. It
has been stated in that paragraph that " the system of Lambar- dari leases
has been abolished and rents will in future be realised by the Darbar direct
from each tenant through the zamindars of the village." Zamindar in' that
area is a petty village official for the purpose of collecting rents and has no
interest in the land from which 911 he collects rent. It does appear from this
paragraph that a Lambardari lease originally was a kind of lease of land
revenue ; but such leases were abolished in the area from which this case comes
long ago. It is true that this lease is called a Lambardari lease but the mere
name will not matter and we have to see whether this was a lease of land
revenue.
This brings us to the terms of the lease. The
lease starts by saying that the villages given in lease have an average annual
income -of Rs. 1,242/4/- payable in two instalments in the months of June and
December. The lease is to last for thirty years and the lessee has to pay the
entire amount (namely, Rs. 1,242/4/-): as lease money which will remain the same
for the whole period of thirty years. The lease also provides that if within
this time any settlement is made and the revenue is increased or the Lambardar
increases the income by inhabiting the villages, the Lambardar herself will be
entitled to reap this additional benefit. The lease further provides that if
for any reason the rent of land is decreased then the Lambardar will not be
entitled to any decrease in the lease money. It is clear from these terms, that
the Lambardar stood to gain nothing by this lease and no part of the land
revenue was left to her except where there was an increase in revenue on
account of a future- settlement" The, lease further provides that if
during the period of lease the Lambardar makes any improvements, i.e., plants,
groves and orchards, makes band" and band his (i.e., large and small dams)
she will be entitled at the end of the lease to sell or mortgage them and the
benefit of, the improvements will go to her. Lastly and this is an important
term of the lease-it is provided that the lessee's right to mortgage and sell
the lands will be governed by the laws of the State and: if the law is amended
afterwards it will be governed by the. amended laws. These clauses in- the
lease clearly show that what the appellant was getting was not merely a lease,
of land revenue but actual rights in the lands including the right to cultivate
them herself Reading therefore the lease as a whole it does not appear that it
is a mere lease of land revenue or other proprietary right. It is something
more and actually 912 gives the lessee the right to all lands which were not in
the actual cultivation of tenants at the time of the lease.
The lessee was entitled to make improvements,
to plant groves and orchards and to make dams- large and small. She was also
entitled to mortgage and sell the lands which she might bring into her own
cultivation in accordance with the laws of the State, It is difficult under the
circumstances to hold that this was a mere Ijara and the appellant was a mere
Ijaredar within the meaning of that word as mentioned above. There is a certain
element of lease of land revenue in this lease though that was not likely to
bring any profit to the appellant; but the lease is much more than a mere Ijara
of this kind and actually confers on the appellant rights in land not in the
actual cultivation of the tenants at the time of the lease. In the
circumstances we cannot agree with the learned Judicial Commissioner that the
transaction evidenced by this lease is a mere Ijara in the sense explained
above and the appellant is a mere Ijaredar who comes within the meaning of that
word in s. 2(1)(c).
The lease in our opinion confers rights in
lands and is much more than an Ijara. In the circumstances the appellant cannot
be held to be a mere ljaredar covered by the definition of that word as used,
in s. 2(1)(c). The case of the appellant in our opinion is similar to the case
put forward in Petition No. 392 of 1954 with respect to Khandela estate (see
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan(1)).
There also was an Ijara or lease on payment
of an annual assessment of Rs. 80,001 and it was held that it, was not covered
by the terms of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The
present case in. our opinion is similar and we are of opinion that the lease
granted in this case cannot make the appellant a more Ijaredar within the
meaning of that word in a. 2(1)(c). We therefore allow the appeal and set aside
the order of the Deputy Commissioner resuming the appellant's villages. The appellant
will get her cents from the State of Madhya Pradesh, which is the successor to
the State of Vindhya Pradesh.
Appeal allowed (1) [1955] a S.C.R. 367.
Back
