Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co.,
Ltd. Vs. Shri Rameshwar Dyal & ANR  INSC 211 (22 November 1960)
CITATION: 1961 AIR 689 1961 SCR (2) 590
workman--Interim reinstatement by Tribunal--If valid--The Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 33A.
One Sharda Singh, respondent, who was an
employee of the appellant-mills was dismissed for disobeying the orders of the
managing authority. He filed an application before the Industrial tribunal
under S. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, contesting his dismissal on
various grounds, whereupon the tribunal passed an order to the effect that as
an interim measure the respondent be permitted to work in the appellant mills
and if the management failed to take him back his full wages be paid from the
date he reported for duty. The appellant mills then filed a Writ Petition
before the High Court contesting the interim order of the Tribunal and the High
Court held that the interim relief granted to the respondent was justified. On
appeal by a certificate of the High Court, Held, that the interim order passed
by the tribunal reinstating the respondent was erroneous. Such an interim
relief could not be given by the Tribunal as it would amount to prejudging the
respondents' case and granting him the whole relief at the outset without
deciding the legality of his dismissal after hearing the appellant employer.
The Management, Hotel Imperial and Ors. v.
Hotel Workers' Union, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 1342, and Punjab National Bank v. All
India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation, A.I.R.
1960 S. C. 160, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 353 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
April 22, 1958, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Writ
No. 257-D of 1957.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S.
N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the Appellant.
G. S. Pathak, R. L. Anand and Janardan
Sharma, for the respondent No. 2.
591 1960. November 22. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the
Punjab High Court. Sharda Singh (hereinafter called the respondent) was in the
service of the appellant-mills. On August 28, 1956, the respondent was
transferred from the night shift to the day shift in accordance with para 9 of
the Standing Orders governing the workmen in the appellant mills. At that time
an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant-mills and their
workmen. The transfer was to take effect from August 30, 1956; but the
respondent failed to report for work in the day shift and was marked absent. On
September 1, 1956, he submitted an application to the General Manager to the
effect that he had reported for duty on August 30, at 10-30 p.m. and had worked
during the whole night, but had not been marked present. He had again gone to
the mills on the night of August 31, but was not allowed to work on the ground
that he had been transferred to the day shift. He complained that he had been
dealt with arbitrarily in order to harass him. Though he said that he had no
objection to carrying out the orders, he requested the manager to intervene and
save him from the high-handed action taken against him, adding that the mills
would be responsible for his wages for the days he was not allowed to work.
On September 4, 1956, he made an application
to the industrial tribunal, where the previous dispute was pending, under s.
33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947, (hereinafter called the
Act) and complained that he had been transferred without any rhyme or reason
from one shift to another and that this amounted to alteration in the
conditions of his service, which was prejudicial and detrimental to his
interest. As this alteration was made against the provisions of s. 33 of the
Act, he prayed for necessary relief from the tribunal under s. 33-A. On
September 5, 1956, the General Manager replied to the letter of September 1,
and told the respondent that his transfer from. one shift to the other had been
ordered on 592 August 28, and he had been told to report for work in the day
shift from August 30; but instead of obeying the order which was made in the
normal course and report for work as directed he had deliberately disobeyed the
order and reported for work on August 30 in the night shift. He was then
ordered to leave and report for work in the day shift.
He however did not even then report for work
in the day shift and absented himself intentionally and thus disobeyed the
order of transfer. The General Manager therefore called upon the respondent to
show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
wailfully refusing to obey the lawful orders of the departmental officers and
he was asked to submit his explanation within 48 hours. The respondent
submitted his explanation on September 7, 1956.
Soon after it appears the appellant-mills
received notice of the application under s. 33-A and they submitted a reply of
it on October 5, 1956. Their case was that transfer from one shift to another
was within the power of the management and could not be said to be an
alteration in the terms and conditions of service to the prejudice of the
workman and therefore the complaint under s. 33-A was not maintainable.
The appellant-mills also pointed out that a
domestic inquiry was being held into the subsequent conduct of the respondent
and prayed that proceedings in the application under s. 33-A should be stayed
till the domestic inquiry was concluded.
No action seems to have been taken on this
complaint under s. 33-A, for which the appellant-mills might as they had prayed
for stay However, the domestic inquiry continued and on February 25, be partly
responsible of those proceedings.
against the respondent 1957, the inquiry
officer reported that t e charge of misconduct was proved. Thereupon the
General Manager passed an order on March 5, 1957, that in view of the serious
misconduct of the respondent and looking into his past records, he should be
dismissed; but as an industrial dispute was pending then, the General Manager
ordered that the permission of the industrial tribunal should be taken before
the order of dismissal was 593 passed and an application should be made for
seeking such permission under s. 33 of the Act.
In the meantime, a notification was issued on
March 1, 1957, by which 10th March, 1957, was fixed for the coming into force
of certain provisions of the Central Act, No. XXXVI of 1956, by which ss. 33
and 33-A were amended. The amendment made a substantial change in s. 33 and
this change came into effect from March 10, 1957. The change was that the total
ban on the employer against altering any condition of service to the prejudice
of workmen and against any action for misconduct was modified. The amended
section provided that where an employer intended to take action in regard to
any matter connected with the dispute or in regard to any misconduct connected
with the dispute, he could only do so with the express permission in writing of
the authority before which the dispute was pending; but where the matter in
regard to which the employer wanted to take action in accordance with the
Standing Orders applicable to a workman was not connected with the dispute or
the misconduct for which action was proposed to be taken was not connected with
the dispute, the employer could take such action as he thought proper, subject
only to this that in case of discharge or dismissal one month's wages should be
paid and an application should be made to the tribunal before which the dispute
was pending for approval of the action taken against the employee by the
employer. In view of this change in the law, the appellant-mills thought that
as the misconduct of the respondent in the present case was not connected with
the dispute then pending adjudication, they were entitled to dismiss him after
paying him one month's wages and applying for approval of the action taken by
Consequently, no application was made to the
tribunal for permission in accordance with the order of the General Manager of
March 5, 1957, already referred to. Later, on April 2, 19579 an order of
dismissal was passed by the General Manager after tendering one month's wages
to the respondent and an application was made to the authority concerned for
approval of the action taken against the respondent.
594 Thereupon the respondent filed another
application under s. 33-A of the Act on April 9, 1957, in which he complained
that the appellant-mills had terminated his services without the express
permission of the tribunal and that this was a contravention of the provisions
of s. 33 of the Act; he therefore prayed for necessary relief. On April 18,
1957, an interim order was passed by the tribunal on this application by which
as a measure of interim relief, the appellant mills were ordered to permit the
respondent to work with effect from April 19 and the respondent was directed to
report for duty. It was also ordered that if the management failed to take the
respondent back, the respondent would be paid his full wages with effect from
April 19 after he had reported for duty. On May 6, 1957, however, the
application dated April 9, 1957, was dismissed as defective and therefore the
interim order of April 18 also came to an end. On the same day (namely, May 6,
1957), the respondent made another application under s. 33-A in which he
removed the defects and again complained that his dismissal on April 2, 1957,
without the express previous permission of the tribunal was against s. 33 and
prayed for proper relief.
It is this application which is pending at
present and has not been disposed of, though more than three years have gone
by. It is also not clear what has happened to the first application of
September 4,1956, in which the respondent complained that his conditions of
service had been altered to his prejudice by his transfer from one shift to
Applications under s. 33 and s. 33-A of the
Act should be disposed of quickly and it is a matter of regret that this matter
is pending for over three years, though the appellant mills must also share the
blame for this state of affairs' However, the appellant-mills gave a reply on
May 14,1957, to the last application under s. 33-A and objected that there was
no breach of s. 33 of the Act, their case being that the amended s. 33 applied
to the order of dismissal passed on April 2, 1957. Further, on the merits, the
appellant-mills' case was that the dismissal was in the circumstances
595 The matter came up before the tribunal on
May 16, 1957. On this date, the tribunal again passed an interim order, which
was to the effect that as a measure of interim relief, the respondent should be
permitted to work from May 17 and the respondent was directed to report for
duty. It was further ordered that in case the management failed to take him
back, they would pay him his full wages with effect from the date he reported
Thereupon the appellant-mills filed a writ
petition before the High Court. Their main contention before the High Court was
two-fold. In the first place it was urged that the tribunal had no jurisdiction
to entertain an application under s. 33-A of the Act in the circumstances of
this case after the amended sections 33 and 33-A came into force from March 10,
1957. In the alternative it was contended that the tribunal had no jurisdiction
to pass an interim order of reinstatement or in lieu thereof payment of full
wages to the respondent even before considering the questions raised in the
application under s. 33-A on the merits. The High Court held on the first point
that in view of s. 30 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, No. XXXVI of 1956, the present case would be governed by s. 33
as it was before the amendment and therefore the tribunal would have
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint dated May 6, 1957, under s. 33-A of the
Act. On the second point, the High Court held that the order of the tribunal
granting interim relief was within its jurisdiction and was justified. In
consequence, the writ petition was dismissed.
Thereupon the appellant-mills applied and was
granted a certificate by the High Court to appeal to this Court; and that is
how the matter has come up before us.
The same two points which were raised in the
High Court have been urged before us. We are of opinion that it is not
necessary in the present case to decide the first point because we have come to
the conclusion that the interim order of May 16, 1957, is manifestly erroneous
in law and cannot be supported. Apart from the question whether the tribunal
had jurisdiction 596 to pass an interim order like this without making an
interim award, (a point which was considered and left open by this Court in The
Management of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union (1)), we are of opinion
that where the tribunal is dealing with an application under s. 33-A of the Act
and the question before it is whether an order of dismissal is against the
provisions of s. 33 it would be wrong in law for the tribunal to grant
reinstatement or full wages in case the employer did not take the workman back
in its service as an interim measure. It is clear that in case of a complaint
under s. 33-A based on dismissal against the provisions of s. 33, the final
order which the tribunal can pass in case it is in favour of the workman, would
be for reinstatement.
That final order would be passed only if the
employer fails to justify the dismissal before the tribunal, either by showing
that proper domestic inquiry was held which established the misconduct or in
case no domestic inquiry was held by producing evidence before the tribunal to
justify the dismissal: See Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. AllIndia Punjab
National Bank Employees' Federation (2), where it was held that in an inquiry
under s. 33-A, the employee would not succeed in obtaining an order of
reinstatement merely by proving contravention of s. 33 by the employer.
After such contravention is proved it would
still be open to the employer to justify the impugned dismissal on the merits.
That is a part of the dispute which the tribunal has to consider because the
complaint made by the employee is to be treated as an industrial dispute and
all the relevant aspects of the said dispute fall to be considered under s.
33-A. Therefore, when a tribunal is considering a complaint under s. 33-A and
it has finally to decide whether an employee should be reinstated or not, it is
not open to the tribunal to order reinstatement as an interim relief, for that
would be giving the workman the very relief which he could get only if on a
trial of the complaint the employer failed to justify the order of dismissal.
The interim relief ordered in this case was that the work (1)  1 S.C.R.
(2)  1 S.C.R. 806.
597 man should be permitted to work: in other
words he was ordered to be reinstated; in the alternative it was ordered that
if the management did not take him back they should pay him his full wages. We
are of opinion that such an order cannot be passed in law as an interim relief,
for that would amount to giving the, respondent at the outset the relief to
which he would be entitled only if the employer failed in the proceedings under
s. 33-A. As was pointed out in Hotel Imperial's case (1),ordinarily, interim
relief should not be the whole relief that the workmen would get if they
succeeded finally. The order therefore of the tribunal in this case allowing
reinstatement as an interim relief or in lieu thereof payment of full wages is
manifestly erroneous and must therefore be set aside. We therefore allow the
appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as well as of the tribunal dated May 16, 1957, granting interim relief.
Learned counsel for the respondent submitted
to us that we should grant some interim relief in case we came to the
conclusion that the order of the tribunal should be set aside. In the
circumstances of this case we do not think that interim relief to the
respondent is justified hereafter. As we have pointed above, applications under
33 and 33-A should be dealt with
expeditiously. We trust that the applications dated September 4, 1956, which appears to have been overlooked and of May 6, 1957, will now be dealt with expeditiously and finally disposed of by the tribunal, as all applications under s.
33-A should be. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.
(1)  1 S.C.R. 476.