J. V. Gokal & Co. (Private) Ltd. Vs.
The Assistant Collector, of Sales-Tax (Inspection) & Ors  INSC 12 (25
25/01/1960 SUBBARAO, K.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR,
GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1960 AIR 595 1960 SCR (2) 852
Sales Tax-Sale in the course of import-Goods
on high seas- Transfer of shipping documents against Payment - Whether amounts
to delivery of goods-Whether transaction exempt from tax Constitution of India,
The petitioner who entered into contracts
with the Government of India for the supply of certain quantities of sugar of
foreign origin, placed orders with dealers in foreign countries and made
arrangements for transporting the goods to Bombay by engaging steamers. When
the goods were on the high seas and before the vessels arrived at Bombay
harbour, the petitioner delivered to the Government the shipping documents-
including the bill of lading pertaining to the goods and received the price.
After the goods reached the port, they were taken delivery of by the Government
of India after paying the requisite customs duties to the authorities concerned
For the assessment year 1954-55, the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax held that
sales tax was payable by the petitioner in respect of the transaction relating
to the sugar sold to the Government.
The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the
sales had taken place in the course of import and therefore they were not
liable to sales tax under Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution of India. But it
was contended for the Sales Tax Authorities that the sales were not in the
course of import and that, in any case, under the terms of the contracts the
intention of the parties was that notwithstanding the delivery of the bills of
lading against payment the property in the goods should not pass to the
Government till actual delivery was made.
Held: (1) that under Art. 286(1)(b) of the
Constitution of India the course of the import of the goods starts at a point
when the goods cross the customs barrier of the foreign country and ends at a
point in the importing country after the goods cross the customs barrier;
(2) that an importer can, if he receives the
shipping documents, transfer the property in the goods when they, are on the
high seas to a third party by delivering to him shipping documents against
payment and such a sale is one made in the course of import;
(3) that the delivery of a bill of lading
while the goods are afloat is equivalent to the delivery of the goods
Sanders Brothers v. Maclcan & Co., (1883)
11 Q. B. D. 327, relied on.
(4) that on a true construction of the
contracts in question the property in the goods passed to the Government of
India 853 when the shipping documents were delivered to them against payment;
and (5) that the sales in question took place in the course of.
import into India and were exempted from
sales tax under Art.286(1)(b) of the constitution.
State of Travancore-Cochi v. The Bombay Co.
Ltd.,  S.C. R. 1112, followed.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 38 of
1959. Petition under article 32 of the Constitution ofIndia for enforcement of
Purshottam Tricumdas, and 1. N. Shroff, for
the Petitioner.A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathi Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for
N. A. Palkhivala and I. N. Shroff, for
Interveners Nos. 1 to 3 The Bombay Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Bombay
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India
and T.M. Sen, for intervener No. 4 Attorney-General for India).
1960. January 25. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by SUBBA RAO, T.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for quashing the order of the first respondent dated February 9,
1959, setting aside the order of the second respondent allowing a deduction of
an amount of Rs.
1,86,42,730-15-0 from the Petitioners sales
tax turnover on the ground that the said amount was not liable to tax by virtue
of s. 46 of the bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Act III of 1953), (hereinafter
called the Act).
The material facts are not in dispute and
they may be briefly stated The petitioner is a private company within the
meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 and has its registered office at Kasturi
Buildings, Bombay -1 on March 24, 1954 and April 15, 1954, into two contracts
with the Government of India for selling to the latter two consignements of
sugar-one of 9500 Long Tons of sugar of Peruvian orgin and the other of 25000
metrice Tons of sugar of continental origin. To fulfil the terms of the
contracts, the petitioner placed order with dealers in foreign countries. The
following are the particulars relating to the first contract dated 854 March
24, 1954, for the supply of 9500 Long Tons of sugar:
(i) 3rd April Letter of Credit opened by the
(ii) 3rd May, 1954 S. S. Alba sails from
Salaverry (Peru) carrying 9782.01688 Long Tons of sugar.
(iii) 26th May, 1954 The petitioner delivered
to its Bankers, the Central Bank ofIndia Limited, Bombay, along with the
invoice for Rs. 50,35, 405-11-0 the Documents of Title (viz. the Bills of
Lading duly endorsed in favour of the Government of India., Ministry of Food
& Agriculture (Agriculture) to the above goods) together with other papers
(such as Certificates) and instructed the said Bankers to present the same to
the Government of India, and to collect the said amount of Rs. 50,35,405-11-0
from the Deputy Accountant General (Food & Rehabilitation),New
(iv) 7th June 1954 Payment made to
petitioner's Bankers by the Government ofIndia against delivery of Invoice and
Bills of Lading.
(v) 26 th June 1954 Date of arrival of S. S.
Alba at Bombay harbour.
The corresponding details -pertaining to the
second contract are as follows Vessel Vessel vassel S. S. Eleni S. S. S. S.
Inger Stathatos Giovanni Marie Amendola I. II. III. IV.
(1) 9910-858 9919-7158 4464-3I5 Total 24292 -
8888 Tons Tons. Tons. Tons (ii) 5/6th 5/6th 15/6th Letter of Credit opened
June, 954. June, 1954. June, 1954 by petitioner.
(iii) 10th 31st July, 31st July, Date of
Sailing of vessel July, 954. 1954. 1954, 855 Vessel Vessel Vessel S. S. Eleni
S. S. S. S. Inger Stathatos Giovanni Marie Amendola (1V) 22nd 12th August,16th
August,July, 1954. 1954- 1954.
The petitioner delivered to its Bankers, the
Bank of Baroda Limited, Bombay, along with its invoices for Rs.- 50,43,5o1-8-o,
Rs. 22, 69,800-13-0, Rs. 50,38, 997-14-o respectively the Documents of Title
(viz. the Bills of Lacling) duly endorsed in favour of the Government of India,
Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Agriculture) to the above goods together
with other papers (such as Certificates) and instructed the said Bankers to
present the same to the Government of India and collect the said amounts of Rs.
50,43, 501-8-0, Rs. 22,69, 800-13-o and Rs.
50,38, 997-14-0, from the Deputy Accountant General (Food & Rehabilitation)
New Delhi. .................................
(V)26th 18th August, 19th August, Payment
made to the July, 1954. 1954. 1954. petitioner's Bankers by .the Government of
India against delivery of Invoices and Bills of Lading.
(V1)12th 3rd Septem- 9th Septem- August 1954.
Date of arrival of Vessel at Bombay Harbour.
The foregoing particulars disclose that some
weeks before the vessel arrived at the Bombay harbour, i.e., when the vessels
were on the high seas, the Government of India received the documents of title,
including bills of lading, pertaining to the sugar purchased by them and paid
the price to the petitioner. Indeed after the goods reached the port, they were
unloaded, taken delivery of, and cleared by the Government of 109 856 India
after paying the requisite customs duties to the authorities concerned.
For the assessment year 1954-55 i.e., April
1, 1954 to March 31, 1955, the petitioner was assessed to sales tax by the
Sales Tax Officer, Licence Circle, Division 1, Bombay. In calculating the
turn-over of the petitioner, the Sales Tax Officer deducted the price of the
said two sales from the petitioner's turn-over. On January 31, 1958, the first
respondent, the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax, issued a notice to the
petitioner under s. 31 of the Act proposing to review the said assessment order
passed by the Sales Tax Officer. In due course the petitioner filed objections
and made his representations. The petitioner contended before the first
respondent that the notice should have been issued, if at all, under s. 15 and
not under s. 31 of the Act inasmuch as the sales had been disclosed to the
Sales Tax Officer and the deduction of the same had been allowed by him. it was
also pleaded that in any event the sales had taken place in the course of
import and therefore they were not liable to sales tax. The first respondent
rejected both the contentions and held that sales tax was payable in respect of
the said two transactions. He reassessed the petitioner to a total amount of
sales tax and general tax of Rs.10,22,850-12-0 less Rs. 315-3-0 already paid by
the petitioner, i.e., a sum of Rs. 10,22,535-9-0 and directed the second respondent,
the Sales Tax Officer, to issue a notice of demand for the said amount.
Pursuant to that order, the second respondent issued a notice dated February
14, 1959. The petitioner has filed the present petition for the issue of a writ
of certiorari cancelling the demand notice issued by the second respondent.
The learned Solicitor-General intervened on
behalf of the Union Government and Mr. Palkbivala intervened for interveners 1
to 3, and both of them supported the petitioner.
Mr. Purshottam Tricumdas, appearing for the
petitioner, raised before us the following contentions: (1) Under Art.
286(1)(b) of the Constitution, as it stood
before the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, the sales in question were
not liable to sales tax inasmuch as they took place in the course of import of
the 857 goods into the territory of India; (2) the said sales were exempted
from sales tax by the Bombay State under the explanation to Art. 286(1) of the
Constitution, as the goods were delivered for the purpose of consumption in
States other than Bombay; (3) the sales were effected outside the State of
Bombay i.e., New Delhi, and therefore they were also exempted under Art.
286(1)(a) of the Constitution; and (4) the first respondent could have only
interfered with the earlier order of assessment under s. 15 of the Act within
three years from the end of the assessment year 1954- 55, i.e., March 31, 1955,
and that the said period having elapsed, he had no power to interfere in
revision under s.
31 of the Act.
The first point is the most substantial one
in the case and if the petitioner succeeds on that point, no other question
would arise for consideration.
The first question turns upon the
interpretation of Art.
286(1)(b) of the Constitution before it was
amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956. The said Article read;
" (1) No law of a State shall impose, or
authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such
sale or purchase takes place- (b) in the course of the import of goods into, or
export of the goods out of, the territory of India. " Under this Article,
if the sales by the petitioner to the Government of India took place in the
course of the import. of the goods into the territory of India, the Bombay
State would have no power to impose sales tax on the said sales.
What does the phrase "in the course of
the import of the goods into the territory of India " convey ? The crucial
words of the phrase are " import " and " in the course of'.
The term "import" signifies
etymologically " to bring in ".
To import goods into the territory of India
therefore means to bring into the territory of India goods from abroad. The
words " course " means it progress from point to point ".
The course of import, therefore, starts from
one point and ends at another. It starts when the goods cross the customs
barrier in foreign country and ends when they cross the customs 858 barrier in
the importing country. These words were subject of judicial scrutiny by this
Court in State of Travancore- Cochin v. Shunmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory(1).
Construing these words, Patanjali Sastri
C.J., observed at p. 62:
The word " course " etymologically
denotes movement from one point to another, and the expression " in the
course of " not only implies a period of time during which the movement is
in progress but postulates also a connected relation.
" As regards the limits of the course,
the learned Chief Justice observed at p. 68:
" It would seem, therefore, logical to
hold that the course or the export out of, or of the import into the territory
of India does not commence or terminate until the goods cross the customs
barrier. " Das, J., as he then was, in his dissenting judgment practically
agreed with Patanjali Sastri, C. J., on the interpretation of the said words.
The learned Judge expressed his view at p. 92 thus:
"The word " course " conveys
to my mind the idea of a gradual and continuous flow, an advance, a journey, a
passage or progress from one place to another.
Etymologically it means and implies motion, a
forward movement. The phrase " in the course of " clearly has
reference to a period of time during which the movement is in progress.
Therefore, the words "in the course of the import of the goods into and
the export of the goods out of the territory of India " obviously cover
the period of time during which the goods are on their import or export journey
We respectfully agree with the aforesaid
observations of the learned Judges. The course of the import of the goods may
be said to begin when the goods- enter their import journey, i.e., when they
cross the customs barrier of the foreign country and end when they cross the
customs barrier of the importing country.
The next question is, when can it be said
that a sale takes place in the course of import journey ? This Court in State
of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. (2) held that a sale which
occasioned (1)  S.C.R. 53 (2)  S.C.R. 1112 859 the export was a
sale that took place in the course of export of the goods. If A, a merchant in
India, sells his goods to a merchant in London and puts through the transaction
by transporting the goods by a ship to London, the said sale which occasioned
the export is exempted under Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution from the levy
of sales tax. The same principle applies to a converse case of goods which
occasioned the import of the goods into India. This Court again in State of
Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (1) extended the
doctrine to a case of sale, or a purchase of goods effected within the State by
transfer of shipping documents while the goods were in the course of transit.
The decision dealt with three types of purchases, viz., (i) purchases made in
the local market;
(ii) purchases made in the. neighbouring districts
of an adjacent State; and (iii) imports from Africa. The imports from Africa
consisted of two groups-one group consisted of goods that were purchased when
they were on the high seas and shipped from the African ports to Cochin or
Quilon : we are not concerned with the other group. In the said case some
commission agents at Bombay arranged for the purchase on behalf of the
assessee, got delivery of the shipping documents at Bombay through a bank which
advanced money against the shipping documents and collected the same from the
assessees at destination. This Court, by a majority, held that, in respect of
the purchases falling under the first group of imports, the commission agents
acted merely as agents of the respondents therein and that the said purchases
occasioned the import and therefore came within the exemption. That was not a
case where the goods were sold by an importer in India to a third party when
the goods were on the high seas. It was a case where a party in Cochin
purchased goods which were on the high seas through his agent at Bombay and the
agent paid the price through a bank against the shipping documents. But the
learned Judge, Patanjali Sastri, C. J., expressing the majority view,
considered the scope of the exemption in all its aspects and, summarized the
conclusions thus at p. 69:
(1)  S.C. R. 53.
860 " Our conclusions may be summed up
as follows:- (1) Sales by export and purchases by import fall within the
exemption under article 286(1)(b) (2) Purchases in the State by the exporter
for the purpose of export as well as sales in the State by the importer after
the goods have crossed the customs barrier are not within the exemption. (3)
Sales in the State by the exporter or importer by transfer of shipping
documents while the goods are beyond the customs barrier are within the
exemption, assuming that the State power of taxation extends to such
transactions. " Das, J., as he then was, in his dissenting judgment,
agreed with Patanjali Sastri, C. J., on the third conclusion with which we are
now concerned.' The learned Judge put forward his view at p. 94 thus:
" Such sales or purchases, by delivery
of shipping documents while the goods are on the high seas on their import
journey were and. are well recognized species of transactions done every day on
a large scale in big commercial towns like Bombay and Calcutta and are indeed
the necessary and concomitant incidents of foreign trade. To hold that these
sales or purchases do not take place " in the course of " import or
export but are to be regarded as purely ordinary local or home transactions
distinct from foreign trade, is to ignore the realities of the situation. Such
a construction will permit the imposition of tax by a State over and above the
customs duty or export duty levied by Parliament. Such double taxation on the
same lot of goods will increase the price of the goods and, in the case of
export, may prevent the exporters from competing in the world market and, in
the case of import, will put a greater burden on the consumers. This will
eventually hamper and prejudically affect our foreign trade and will bring
about precisely that calamity which it is the intention and purpose of our
Constitution to prevent. " The learned Judge also in his judgment
elaborately considered the great hardship that would be caused to an Indian
importer if he was not permitted to sell the goods which were on the high sear,
by delivery of 861 shipping documents against payment. Though that case dealt
with a different situation, we agree with the learned Judge's observations that
an importer can, if he receives the shipping documents, transfer the property
in the goods when they are on the high seas to a third party by delivering to
him shipping documents against payment and such a sale is one made in the
course of import.
The legal position vis-a-vis the import. sale
can be summarized thus; (1) The course of import of goods starts at a point
when the goods cross the customs barrier of the foreign country and ends at a
point in the importing country after the goods cross the customs barrier; (2)
the sale which occasions the import is a sale in the course of import; (3) a
purchase by an importer of goods when they are on the high seas by payment
against shipping documents is also a purchase in the course of import and (4) a
sale by an importer of goods, after the property in the goods passed to him
either after the receipt of the documents of title against payment or
otherwise, to a third party by a similar process is also a sale in the course
The next question is whether the sales by the
petitioner to the Government of India are sales in the course of import.
From the facts narrated supra, it is seen
that the petitioner, pursuant to the earlier contracts entered into with the
Government of India, delivered the shipping documents, including the bill of
lading to the Government against payment when the goods were on the high seas.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it should be held that the sales fall
under the fourth principle and therefore they were sales that took place in the
course of import of the goods into India. A bill of lading is " a writing,
signed on behalf of the owner of the ship in which goods are embarked,
acknowledging the receipt of the goods, and undertaking to deliver them at the
end of the voyage subject to such conditions as may be mentioned in the bill of
lading'. It is well settled in commercial world that a bill of lading
represents the goods and the transfer of it operates as a transfer of the
goods. The legal effect of the transfer of a bill of 862 lading has been
enunciated by Bowen, L.J., in Sanders Brothers v. Madan & Co. (1) thus at
p. 341 "The law as to the indorsement of bills of lading is as clear as in
my opinion the practice of all European merchants is thoroughly understood. A
cargo at sea while in the hands of the carrier is necessarily incapable of
physical delivery. During this period of transit and voyage, the bill of lading
by the law merchant is universally recognised as its symbol, and the indorsement
and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a symbolical delivery of cargo.
Property in the goods passes by such endorsement and delivery of the bill of
lading, whenever it is the intention of the parties that the property should
pass just as under similar circumstances the property would pass by an actual
delivery of the goods. And for the purpose of passing such property in the
goods and completing the title of the indorsee to full possession thereof, the
bill of lading, until complete delivery of the cargo has, been made on shore to
some one rightfully claiming under it, remains in force as a symbol, and
carries with it not only the full ownership of the goods, but also all rights
created by the contract of carriage between the shipper and the shipowner. It
is a key which in the hands of a rightfull owner is intended to unlock the door
of the warehouse, floating or fixed, in which the goods may chance to be.
" We have quoted the passage in extenso as it clearly and fully states the
law on the subject. It is not disputed that the law in India is also similar to
that in England.
The delivery of the bill of lading while the
goods are afloat is equivalent to the delivery of the goods themselves. The
learned counsel concedes that ordinarily that will be so, but contends that in
the present case, the contract clearly indicates that the intention of the
parties was that till actual delivery was made the property in the goods would
not pass to the buyer. Both the contracts are similar in terms and they follow
the standard terms pres- cribed by the Government. The main terms of the
contracts may be summarized thus:
(1) (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 327.
863 The first clause defines the term
"sellers" to mean the party selling the sugar and the term "the
Government" to mean the President of India. Clause 2 prescribes that
suitable gunny bags approved by the Government should be used for importing
sugar. Clause 3 provides for inspection of quality, weight and packing of sugar
by the Government at the time of shipment. Clause 4 says that sugar shall be
shipped to particular ports. Clause 5 compels the sellers to engage steamers on
charter terms, empowers the Government to take delivery of the goods at the
port of discharge from the ship's rail and imposes the burden on the sellers to
meet the expenses of stevedoring, lighterage where necessary, hiring of cranes,
dock dues and pilotage. Clause 6 deals with the mode of payment for supplies
made; under that clause the sellers are to submit a bill for full payment of
cost and freight value to the Government in the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, New Delhi, duly supported by a complete set of clean on board
bills of lading consisting of three negotiable and three non-negotiable copies,
a certificate of origin of sugar, a certificate of quality, weight and packing,
a certificate from the ship- owners that the freight has been paid in full and
that the ship owners retain no lien whatsoever on the cargo on that account.
Under clause 6 (c) letter of credit shall be opened by the sellers at their
cost, and the Government of India agree to arrange for the foreign exchange as
necessary to the extent of the cost-and-freight-value of the quantity of sugar
purchased on the production of an import licence which will be issued on
application to the proper authority on their prescribed form. Clause 8 confers
on the Government a right, in the event of the sellers' failure to supply the
sugar in accordance with the terms of the contract, to recover any sum as
liquidated damages, and/or by way of penalty upto a prescribed amount. Clause 9
authorizes the Government, in the event of the sellers failing to observe or
perform any provisions of the contract, to terminate the contract forthwith.
Clause II under the heading "Force Majeure" confers on the Government,
in case delivery in whole or in part is prevented or delayed directly 110 864
or indirectly by any cause of Force Majeure, war, strikes, rebellion,
insurrection, political disturbances, civil commotion, fire or flood, on
account of plague or other epidemics, the right to cancel the contract for the
quantities so prevented or delayed. After the sellers entered into the
contracts, they obtained the requisite licences from the Government, opened
letters of credit, placed orders with foreign companies, engaged a steamer on
charter terms, took delivery of the goods from the foreign firms and, when the
goods were on the high seas, delivered the documents of title to the Central
Government against payment and the said Government, taking the licence from the
sellers, cleared the goods at the Bombay harbour.
Let us now scrutinize the terms of the
contract to ascertain whether they disclose any intention of the parties that
notwithstanding the delivery of the bill of lading against payment the property
in the goods should not pass to the Government. The circumstances under which
the contracts were entered into between the parties indicate that both the
parties were interested to see that property in the goods passed in the
ordinary way when the shipping documents were handed over to the Government
against payment. The sellers had to meet their liability to the foreign
companies with whom they opened letters of credit and the Government must have
been anxious to get the title to the goods so that the sellers might not divert
the goods towards their other commitments or to other buyers for more tempting
Under the contract every safeguard for
securing the goods of agreed specifications was provided for in the earlier
clauses and therefore there was no reason for postponing the passing of the
property in the goods to the buyer till the goods were actually delivered in
the port. The sellers on their side would have been anxious that the property
should pass when the goods were on the high seas, for otherwise they would be
compelled to pay sales tax. Nor are the clauses of the contracts relied upon by
the respondents inconsistent with the property in the goods passing in
accordance with the mercantile usage. The liability undertaken by the sellers
to meet the expenses relating 865 to stevedorage, lighterage where necessary,
hiring of cranes, dock dues and pilotage, at the time of delivery of the goods
on which reliance is placed to indicate a contrary intention, in our view, has
nothing to do with the question raised, for that liability can rest with the
sellers even after the property in the goods has passed to the buyers;
nor clauses 9 to 11 on which strong reliance
is placed by the learned counsel are inconsistent with the property in the
goods passing to the buyer; they could legitimately be made applicable to a
point of time when the property in the goods has not passed to the buyer. If
the sellers fail to observe the performance of any provisions of the contracts
before the property in the goods passed to the buyer, under clause 9 of the
contracts the buyer can cancel the contract.
So too, under cl. II, if any contemplated
mishap takes place on the high seas by force majeure, the seller shall send a
cablegram to that effect and the buyer is empowered to cancel the whole of the
contract or a part of it. This also applies to a point of time before the
property in the goods has passed to the buyer. If, on the other hand, the
seller delivers the shipping documents against payment and thereafter if he
does not deliver the goods at the port, the buyer may have other remedies for
the recovery of damages etc. But that right is not covered by either cl. (9) or
(II) of the contract. A scrutiny of all the
terms of the contract does not indicate the intention that the property in the
goods shall not pass to the buyer notwithstanding delivery of shipping
documents against payment.
Apart from the terms of the contract,
reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the
following circumstances: (i) the seller himself chartered the ship; and (ii)
the licence issued by the Government was made non-transferable. We do not see
how these two facts indicate the contrary intention. If the seller himself
chartered a steamer. when the goods he purchased were loaded in the ship, the
property in the goods passed to him and therefore he was in a position to sell
the same to the Government. The fact that the licence was non-transferable has
no relation to the property in the goods passing 866 to the Government. The
licence issued by the Govern- ment is an exercise of the statutory power under
the relevant Act. Whether the petitioner sold the goods to the Government or to
a third party, he had to obtain a licence. Indeed in the present case, the
licence was given to the seller with the express object of fulfilling the
contracts with the Government and was issued several days after the contracts
were executed, and indeed the Government took the licence from the seller and
cleared the goods through their officer.
For all the foregoing reasons we hold that
the property in the goods passed to the Government of India when the shipping
documents were delivered to them against payment.
It follows that the sale of the goods by the
petitioner to the Government of India took place when the goods were on the
That being so, the sales in question must be
held to have taken place in the course of the import into India and therefore
they would be exempted from sales tax under Art.
286(1)(b) of the Constitution.
In this view, no other question would arise
for consideration. in the result the order of the Assistant Collector of Sales
Tax is set aside and that of the Sales Tax Officer is restored. The respondents
will pay the costs of the petitioner.