State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors
Vs. Thakur Ganga Singh & ANR [1959] INSC 141 (26 November 1959)
SUBBARAO, K.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR,
P.B.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.
CITATION: 1960 AIR 356 1960 SCR (2) 346
CITATOR INFO :
R 1965 SC 682 (11)
ACT:
Supreme Court, Appellate jurisdiction
of-Special leave to appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution-Meaning of- Constitution of India,
Art. 132(2).
HEADNOTE:
The respondents filed a petition in the High
Court of Jammu Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the said
rule was ultra vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The appellants
filed an application in the High Court for a certificate under Art. 132(1) of
the Constitution which was rejected on the ground that no substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case.
Thereafter the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under Art. 132(2)
of the Constitution, which was granted with liberty to the respondents to raise
the question of maintainability of the appeal. There was no controversy between
the parties in regard to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, and
the dispute centered round the question whether the impugned rule stood the
test of reasonable classification. The respondents raised a preliminary
objection that special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution could be
granted by this court only if it was satisfied that the case involved a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and
that since, in the present case, the interpretation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution was not in dispute by reason of a series of decisions of this Court
and no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, could arise
for consideration, no special leave could be granted under the said Article.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants
that whenever a question of classification was raised that by itself involved
the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the impugned
classification were concerned.
Held, that the principle underlying Art.
132(2) of the Constitution is that the final authority of interpreting the
Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court. With that object that Article is
freed from other limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134 and the right of
appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of the
proceedings in a case involving only a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution.
The interpretation of a provision means the
method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood.
Where 347 the parties agree as to the true
interpretation of a provision or do not raise any question in respect thereof,
the case does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution. A substantial question of law cannot arise where that law has
been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court.
In the instant case, the question raised does
not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
T.M. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor General
in Council (1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1, Bhudan Choudury v. The State of Bihar,
[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, [1950] S.C.R.
869, Ram Krishna Dalmia v. justice Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279 and Mohammad
Haneef Quayeshi v. State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R.629, relied on.
& CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal No. 217 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated June 20, 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in Writ
Petition No. 108 of 1958.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of
India, N. S. Bindra, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the appellants.
R. K. Garg and M. K. Ramamurthy, S. N.
Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents.
1959. November 26. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by SUBBA RAO J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question
of the scope of Art. 132(2) of the Constitution.
The first respondent is one of the
shareholders of the second respondent, M/s. Jammu Kashmir Mechanics And
Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited Jammu (hereinafter called the
Society). The Society was registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative
Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi). They put in a number of applications
before the third appellant for the grant of stage carriage and public carrier
permits to them for various routes in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, but no
permits were granted to them on the ground that under r. 4- 47 of the Jammu 348
and Kashmir Motor Vehicle Rules (hereinafter called the Rules), service licence
could only be issued to a person or a company registered under the Partnership
Act and that, as the Society was neither a person nor a partner Ship, it was
not entitled to a licence under the Rules. The respondents filed a petition in
the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir under S. 103 of the Constitution of Jammu
& Kashmir challenging the vires of r. 4-47 of the Rules. To that petition
the appellants herein, viz., the Government of Jammu & Kashmir State, the
Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and the Traffic Superintendent,
were made party-respondents: The High Court held that the said rule was ultra
vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, and, on that finding directed a
writ of mandamus to issue against the appellants herein from enforcing the
provisions of the said rule. The appellants filed an application in the High
Court for a certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, but the High
Court rejected it on the ground that no substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter the
appellants applied for special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution and
this Court granted the same. The order giving the special leave expressly
granted liberty to the respondents herein to raise the question of the
maintainability of the appeal at its final hearing.
Learned Counsel for the respondents raises a
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. Shortly stated his
objection is that under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution special leave can be
given only if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution that
in the present case the interpretation Art. 14 of the Constitution has been
well-settled and put beyond dispute by a series of decisions of this court,
that, therefore, no question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution, much less a substantial question of law in regard to that
mattter, arises for consideration and that, therefore, no special leave can be
granted under the said Article.
349 This argument is sought to be met by the
learned Additional Solicitor-General in the following manner: Whenever a
question of classification is raised, it involves the interpretation of Art. 14
of the Constitution with reference to the classification impugned. To state it
differently, the argument is that the question in each case is whether the
classification offends the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14.
Therefore, whether a registered firm, a limited company and a person have equal
attributes is a question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Before considering the validity of the rival
contentions it would be convenient to ascertain precisely what was the question
raised in the High Court and what was the decision given thereon by it. The
argument advanced before the High Court on behalf of the Society was that under
r. 4-47 a licence can be issued only to a person or a firm registered under the
Partnership Act and not to a corporation registered under the Co-operative
Societies Act or otherwise, and, therefore, the said rule, being discriminatory
in nature, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate General
appearing for the appellants contended that under Art. 14 of the Constitution
rational classification is permissible and the legislature has framed the
impugned rule on such a basis, the object of which is to safeguard the interest
of the public. The High Court, after considering the rival arguments, expressed
the opinion that the said rule did not proceed on any rational basis of
classification and that, as a corporation had been arbitrarily singled out for
discriminatory treatment, the impugned rule offended the equality clause of the
Constitution. The appellants in their petition for special leave filed in this
Court questioned the correctness of the conclusion of the High Court. They
asserted that the said rule was based upon reasonable classification and
therefore could not be struck down as repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution.
In other grounds they elaborated the same point in an attempt to bring out the
different attributes of the two classes affording an intelligible differentia
for 45 350 classification. They clearly posed the question proposed to be
raised by them in the appeal as under Ground The Grouns iv: " The
aforesaid rule 4-47 (of the Motor Vehicles Rules) is based upon reasonable
classification and is and was perfectly intra vires and valid and could not be
struck down as repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India." Ground
vi: " There is a marked difference between a corporate body and
partnership registered under the Provisions of the Partnership Act and these
points of difference provide an intelligible differentia for classification.
The Hon'ble High Court has only referred to one point of difference and has
overlooked other points of distinction and has erred in striking down the
aforesaid rule 4-47." Ground viii : " Rule 4- 47 was framed in the
light of local conditions prevailing. Co-operative Societies and Corporations
in the matter of transport were not considered to be proper objects for the
grant of licence or permit.
The classification is rational and
reasonable. The exclusion of artificial persons from the ambit of the Rule is
natural and not discriminatory." The other grounds are only a further
clarification of the said grounds. In part It of their statement of case the
appellants stated as follows;
" It is now well-established that while
Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification
for the purpose of legislation." The respondents, in their statement of
case, accepted the said legal position but contested the position that there
was reasonable classification. It is therefore manifest that throughout there
has never been a controversy between the parties in regard to the
interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but their dispute centered only
on the question whether the impugned rule stood the test of reasonable
classification.
In the premises, can special leave be granted
to the appellants under Art 132(2) of the Constitution ? Article 132(2) reads:
,,Where the High Court has refused to give
such a certificate, the Supreme Court may, if it is 351 satisfied that the case
involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution, grant special leave to appeal from such judgment, decree or final
order." Under cl. (2) of Art. 132 there is no scope for granting a special
leave unless two conditions are satisfied: (i) the case should involve a
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution; and (ii) the said
question should be a substantial question of law. The principle underlying the
Article is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest
with the Supreme Court. With that object the Article is freed from other
limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134 and the right of appeal of the
widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a
case involving only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
the Constitution.
What does interpretation of a provision mean
? Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the
word is understood. The question of interpretation can arise only if two or
more possible constructions are sought to be placed on a provision-one party
suggesting one construction and the other a different one. But where the
parties agree on the true interpretation of a provision or do not raise any
question in respect thereof, it is not possible to hold that the case involves
any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. On an
interpretation of Art. 14, a series of decisions of this Court evolved the
doctrine of classification. As we have pointed out, at no stage of the
proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation of Art. 14 or the
principles governing the doctrine of classification have been questioned by
either of the parties. Indeed accepting the said doctrine, the appellants
contended that there was a valid classification under the rule while the
respondents argued contra. The learned Additional Solicitor General contended,
for the first time, before us that the appeal raised a new facet of the
doctrine of equality, namely, whether an artificial person and a natural person
have equal attributes 352 within the meaning of the equality clause, and,
therefore, the case involves a question of interpretation of "the
Constitution. This argument, if we may say so, involves the same contention in
a different garb. If analysed, the argument only comes to this: as an
artificial person and a natural person have different attributes, the
classification made between them is valid. This argument does not suggest a new
interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but only attempts to bring the
rule within the doctrine of classification. We, therefore, hold that the
question raised in this case does not involve any question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution.
Assuming that the case raises a question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, can it be said that the
question raised is a substantial question of law within the meaning of cl. (2)
of Art 14. This aspect was considered by the Federal Court in T. M.
Krishnaswamy,Pillai v. Governor General In Council (1). That decision turned
upon the provisions of s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The material S. 205: " (1) An appeal
shall lie to the Federal Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a
High Court if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or any Order in Council
made thereunder...." The Madras High Court gave a certificate to the
effect that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under s.
240(3) of the said Act, no person who was a member of civil service of the
Crown in India or held any civil post under the Crown in India could be
dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The
High Court, on the facts found, held that the appellant therein had been
offered A reasonable opportunity of showing cause within the meaning (1) (1947)
52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1.
part of that section says :
353 of the said section, but gave a
certificate under s. 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.In dealing
with the propriety of issuing the certificate in the circumstances of that
case, Zafrulla Khan, J., speaking on behalf the Court, concisely and pointedly
stated at p. 2 :
" It was urged before us that the case
involved a question relating to the interpretation of sub-section (3) of
section 240 of the Act. To the extent to which any guidance might have been
needed for the purposes of this case on the interpretation of that sub-section
that guidance was furnished so far as this Court is concerned in its judgment
in Secretary of State for India v. I.M. Lal [(1945) F.C.R.
103 The rest was a simple question of fact.
In our judgment no " substantial question of law " as to the
interpretation of the Constitution Act was involved in this case, which could
have formed the basis of a certificate under section 205(1) of the Act."
On the question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution this Court in
Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (1) explained the true meaning and scope
of that Article thus:
" It is now well-established that while
article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reason. able
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the
the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others
left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statue in question. The
classification may be founded on different bases: namely, geographical, or
according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that
there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the
Act under consideration." (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045,1049.
354 This in only a restatement of the law
that has been enunciated by this Court in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union
of India (1) and in other subsequent decisions.
The said principles were reaffirmed in the
recent decisions of this Court in Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (2 )
and in Mohammed Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar (3).
In view of the said decision there is no
further scope for putting a new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of
the Constitution vis-a-vis the doctrine of classification.
The interpretation of Art. 14 in the context
of classifi- cation has been finally settled by the highest Court of this land
and under Art. 141 of the Constitution that interpretation is binding on all
the Courts within the territory of India. What remained to be done by the High
Court was only to apply that interpretation to, the facts before it. A
substantial question of law, therefore, cannot arise where that law has been
finally and authoritatively decided by this Court.
In the result we accept the preliminary
objection and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. (2) [1959] S.C.R. 279.
(3) [1959] S.C.R. 629.
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