Naresh Chandra Ganguli Vs. The State of
West Bengal & Ors  INSC 93 (20 May 1959)
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L.
CITATION: 1959 AIR 1335 1960 SCR (1) 412
Preventive Detention--Object and ground of
such detention- Distinction--Ground Meaning of--Copy of order to be served on
detenu-Contents-Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (4 Of 1950), ss . 3,7.
The appellant was detained under s.
3(1)(a)(ii) of the Pre- ventive Detention Act, 1950. The copy of the grounds of
the order of detention served on him stated that he was detained as he had been
acting in a way prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by
the particulars stated in its four paragraphs. Paragraph 1 stated, inter alia,
that the appellant had, in a meeting of the refugees vilified the Prime
Minister of India for his unsympathetic attitude towards the sufferings of the
refugees and gave expression to violent feelings regarding his person while
referring to the recent Nehru-Noon Pact; paragraph 2 stated that he called upon
the members of his party to build up a strong movement against the
implementation of the pact and tried to rouse passion by alleging the Prime
Minister had no sympathy for West Bengal; paragraph 3 stated that at another
meeting he denounced the pact and stressed the need of forming a militia with
the youths of the country for the safety of the people living in border areas
and paragraph 4, that he intended -to proceed to Delhi on the date mentioned,
and was likely to instigate plans endangering the personal safety of the Prime
Minister. The High Court, on an application under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, while upholding
the order of detention, held that the said paragraphs were really not the
grounds of detention but merely pieces of evidence on which the only ground of
detention, namely, acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order,
was based, that paragraph 4 was merely an inference of fact having a bearing on
the ground of detention. It was contended, inter alia, on appeal that paragraph
4 was extremely vague and devoid of particulars, and that the allegations made
had no rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 of the Act and so
he was deprived of his right to make an effective representation.
All this was, however, denied on behalf of
Held, that the High Court had overlooked the
difference between the objects of detention specified in cls. (a) and (b) of s.
3(1) of the Act and the statement of facts which constitute the grounds
envisaged by S. 7 of the Act.
412 Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, read together, contemplate that the copy of the order
passed by the detaining authority under S. 3(2) Of the Act to be served on the
detenu should contain, (1) a preamble reciting in terms one or more of the
sub-clauses of cls. (a) and (b) of s. 3(1) as its object or objects, (2) the
grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact, which led to the
passing of the order of detention, informing the detenu as to why he was
detained, and (3) particulars, if and where necessary, but not those referred
to in sub-ss.
(3) and (4) Of s. 3 of the Act.
In the instant case, however, the error of
confusion made by the High Court could not invalidate its order since the
grounds of detention, characterised by the High Court as recitals of fact, read
together, were in no way ambiguous, indefinite or irrelevant to the object of
the detention, namely, the maintenance of public order and did not deprive the
detenu of his right of representation.
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhay
Vaidya  S.C.R.
Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu
Kashmir.  S.C.R. 948, held inapplicable.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 59 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the
January 8, 1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 126 of
AND PETITION No. 51 OF 1959.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for
the appellant and petitioner.
B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for the respondents.
1959. May 20. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by SINHA J.-This appeal, on a certificate of fitness granted by the
Calcutta High Court, is directed against the order of that Court, dated
January, 8, 1959, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 126 of 1958, refusing to
issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus in respect of one Ram Prasad Das
(who will hereinafter be referred to as 'the petitioner'). This Court, by an
order 413 dated April 20, 1959, directed that the application of the petitioner
under Art. 32 of the Constitution, for a similar writ in respect of the same
person, be posted for hearing immediately after the aforesaid criminal appeal,
and that it shall not be necessary that the petitioner be produced before this
Court at the time of the hearing of the writ petition. Hence, both the matters,
relating as they do, to the same subject-matter, have been heard together and
will be disposed of by this judgment.
It appears that Naresh Chandra Ganguli, an
advocate, practising in the Calcutta High Court, made an application under ss.
491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a friend, on behalf on the
petitioner, in detention in the Dum Dum Central Jail in 24 Parganas, under the
orders of the Government of West Bengal. The application was made to the
Calcutta High Court on the following allegations: The peti- tioner is the
Secretary of the West Bengal Committee of the Bharatiya Jana Sangha, one of the
four big political parties, as recognized by the Election Commission of India.
On or about October 7, 1958, towards evening,
when the petitioner was coming out of the Basanta Cabin, a tea stall, at the
crossing of the College Street and Surya Sen Street, after having addressed a
meeting at the College Square, he was stopped on the street by the police and
was taken to the office of the Special Branch (Police) on Lord Sinha Road.
From there, he was sent to the Dum Dum
Central Jail, where he was served with an order. being Order No. 83 dated
October 7, 1958, purporting to have been made by the Commissioner of Police,
Calcutta, under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act (No. IV, of
1950) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The order is in these terms:-
" ORDER Dated 7-10-58. No. 83.
Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the
person known as Sri Ram Prasad ]-)as, son of late Bepin Behari Das of Village
P-S-P Dist. and of 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta that with a view to
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial 414 to the maintenance of
Public Order it is necessary so to do.
Now therefore in exercise of the Powers
conferred by Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 (IV of 1950) 1
made this order directing that the said Sri Ram Prasad Das be detained.
Given under my hand and seal of office.
Sd/- Illegible, Commissioner of Police,
Calcutta." On or about October 8, 1958, the petitioner was served, in the
Dum Dum Central Jail, with a further order, being Order No. 85 dated October 8,
1958, which is as follows:
" Government of West Bengal.
Office of the Commissioner of Police,
Grounds for detention under clause (ii) of
clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act,
1950 (Act IV of 1950).
To Sri Rain Prasad Das S/O Bepin Behari Das,
of 6, Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.
You are being detained in pursuance of a
detention order made in exercise of power conferred by Section 3(2) (c) of the
P.D. Act 1950 (Act IV of 1950) on the ground that you are acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as evidenced by the particulars
given below:- 1.That on 13-9-58 you attended a meeting of Eastern Indian
Refugee Council held at the Refugee office at' 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane and
vilified Prime Minister of India for his allegedly turning a deaf ear to the
untold miseries of the refugees and while referring to the recent agreement
between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan you vented feelings of
violence against the Prime Minister of India by emphasising that in order to
save the refugees and the territories of the Indian Union, Sri Nehru should be
murdered, if necessary and so the need of another Nathuram Godse was felt now.
2. That in course of discussion with members
of your party on 17-9-58 at 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, you stated that the Indian
Prime Minister had made a Present of certain Indian enclaves to Pakistan in
pursuance of the policy of appeasement which has been initiated by the Late
Mahatma Gandhi and called upon the members to build uP strong movement against
the implementation of Nehru- Noon Pact. You also tried to. rouse passions by
alleging that the Indian Prime Minister had no sympathy for West Bengal.
3. That on 26-9-58 you attended another
meeting of the South Durtolla Branch of the Jana Sangha at Jatin Mitter Park,
where you denounced the aforesaid agreement between the two Prime Ministers and
stressed the need of forming a militia with the youths of the country for the
safety of the people living in border areas and urged all to enroll themselves
for the said purpose.
4. That you intend to proceed to Delhi on
9-10-58 and that you are likely to instigate plans which may adversely affect
the personal security of the Prime Minister of India.
Your action above is bound to result in the
maintenance of public order being prejudicially affected.
You are hereby informed that you may make a
representation to the State Government against the detention order and that
such representation should be addressed to the Assistant Secy. Home (Special)
Department, Government of West Bengal, and forwarded through the Supt. of the
Jail in which you are detained as early as possible.
You are also informed that u/s 10 of the P.D.
Act 1950 (IV of 1950) the Advisory Board shall, if you desire to be heard hear
you in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you
should intimate such desire in- your representation to the State Government.
Sd/- Illegible, Commissioner of Police,
Calcutta," 416 On or about October 11, 1958, the petitioner was served
with another order which is in these terms:
" Government of West Bengal.
Home Department, Special Section.
Order Calcutta, 11-10-58.
No. 1882 H. S.
In exercise of the power conferred by Section
3(2) of the Preventive Detention -Act, 1950 (IV of 1950), the Governor is
pleased to approve order No. 83 dated the 7-10-58 made under Section 3(2) of
the said Act by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta directing that Sri Ram
Prasad Das son of Late Bepin Behari Das of 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta be
By order of the Governor.
Sd/- Illegible, Dy. Secty. to the Govt. of
West Bengal." The petitioner made a representation in writing against the
order of detention aforesaid, denying and refuting the grounds of his
detention, set out above. He particularly denied the allegation contained in
ground No. 1 aforesaid, as totally false, and stated that there was no meeting,
as alleged, on September 13, 1958, and that he had not made any speech
attributed to him in the said ground. He also denied that he had advocated in
any meeting for the formation of a militia, as alleged. But he claimed that he
had a right to express his views about the policy of the Government or the
Prime Minister, relating to Pakistan and/ or about Nehru- Noon Pact or similar
other Agreements. He denied that he indulged in any violent speeches, or that
he tried to rouse passions. His further contention was that the ground No. 4
was extremely vague in the absence of any particulars about how, where and when
and in what manner, he was likely to instigate any plan which was to adversely
affect the personal security of the Prime Minister of India, and the nature or
particulars of any such contemplated plan.
In his application to the High Court, the
petitioner also submitted that the grounds supplied to him, had 417 no rational
connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 of the Act, and that, therefore,
he was deprived of his right to make an effective representation. He also
alleged that he was a member of a political party opposed to the party in
power, and held definitely pronounced views about the failure of the Government
to tackle the problem of refugees, as also about the relationship between the
Government and the State of Pakistan. He also claimed to be a leader of the
refugees, and as such, had been relentlessly criticising the policies of the
present Government. He further asserted that the order of detention passed
against him, was a clear case of political victimisation. He alleged further
that the order of detention, on the face of it, was malafide, and was a clear
infringement of his fundamental right to freedom of speech and association,
guaranteed by the Constitution.
On November 28, 1958, the petitioner was
brought to the Writers' Buildings in Calcutta, and placed before the Advisory
Board as constituted under the Act. The petitioner was heard in person by the
Advisory Board on that date, and on the next day, that is, November 29, 1958,
after the hearing by the Advisory Board, another order, being order No. 1967 H.
S., dated November 29, 1958, made by the Governor of West Bengal, was issued,
confirming the aforesaid order of detention No. 83 dated October 7, 1958, set
out above, and continuing the petitioner's detention till the expiration of 12
months from the date of detention.
On those allegations, the petitioner
submitted to the High Court that the orders aforesaid, relating to his
detention in the Dum Dum Central Jail, were"' illegal, invalid, ultra
vires, void and inoperative." An affidavit in opposition, on behalf of the
State of West Bengal and other opposite parties, was sworn to by the
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta-opposite party No. 3 in the case- In the
aforesaid affidavit, the deponent averred that he was satisfied on the records
and materials placed before him that the petitioner was a person likely to act
in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that with a
view to preventing him from doing so, it 418 was necessary to make the order of
detention on the grounds mentioned in the Order No. 85 dated October 8, 1958
(set out above). He also averred that the orders of detention aforesaid,
together with the grounds and all other relevant particulars, were reported by
him to the Government of West Bengal, which, after duly considering the same,
duly approved of the orders of detention. It was also stated in the affidavit
that the petitioner personally appeared before the Advisory Board on November
28, 1958, and the Advisory Board, upon a consideration of the records and
materials placed before it, and the representation made by the petitioner, and
after hearing the petitioner in person, reported to the Government' of West
Bengal that in the opinion of the Advisory Board, there was sufficient cause
for the -detention of the petitioner. The Commissioner of Police further stated
in the affidavit that he had duly passed and signed the orders of detention
after considering the records and materials in respect of the petitioner, in
exercise of the powers conferred under the Act, bona fide and without any
malice whatsoever, on being satisfied about the necessity of the said orders of
detention. He also stated that he denied all statements of facts to the
contrary, contained in the affidavit in support of the petition, and he
undertook to produce the original records in the Court at the hearing.
Allegations of victimisation on political grounds, and that the order of
detention was mala fide and in infringement of the fundamental rights of the
petitioner, were specifically denied.
The matter was heard by a Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court (Guha Roy and H. K. Sen, JJ.), which, by its order
dated January 8, 1958, discharged the Rule. In the course of its judgment, the
High Court made the following observations:- On a reading of the order however,
it is quite clear to us that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 do not state the grounds
of the order.
There is only one ground of the order and
that is that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order and the remaining paragraphs of the order make it
quite clear that what are stated 419 in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute
different pieces of evidence by which the authority making the order came to
the conclusion that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order and therefore should be detained under the
Act." Hence, the High Court, on a construction of s. 3 of the Act, came to
the conclusion that the grounds of detention in respect of the petitioner, were
not vague, and that the statement in para. 4 of the detention order No. 85
dated October 8, 1958, quoted above, was not a ground but only a piece of
evidence out of several such pieces of evidence on which the ground of
detention was based. It was further pointed out that para. 4 aforesaid, was not
by itself a ground of the order, but merely an inference of fact which had some
bearing on the ground of the order. The High Court also pointed out that there
was no ambiguity in the recitals, including these in para. 4 aforesaid. In that
view of the matter, the order of detention of the petitioner was upheld, and
the Court further held that the question whether the whole' order was bad on
the ground that one of the grounds was too vague, did not arise in the case.
The petitioner moved the Calcutta High Court
for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. The
Chief Justice of the High Court, delivering the order of the Division Bench of
that Court, granting the necessary certificate, observed that the view of the
High Court that para. 4 aforesaid, was not a ground of detention but only one
of the items of evidence in support of the ground, raised a serious question to
be determined by this Court, particularly because a view contrary to the one
taken by the High Court in the instant case, appeared to have been taken by
this Court and by the Calcutta High Court itself in a number of decisions. That
is how this appeal has come to this Court. Besides preferring the aforesaid
appeal, the petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution,
praying for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, and a Constitution Bench, by
its order dated April 20, 1959, directed that this appeal be posted for 420
hearing by a Constitution Bench, on May 11, 1959, on a cyclostyled paper book,
and that the filing of the petition of appeal and the statements of cases be
The Court further ordered that the
application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, be posted for hearing
immediately after the criminal appeal. That is how both the matters have been
placed one after the other for hearing before us.
The order under appeal takes the view that
the various grounds of detention, are stated in s. 3 (1)(a) (i) (ii) (iii) and
(b) of the Act, and that there can be no grounds apart from those. The High
Court then, on a reading of the Order No. 85, set out above, has held that
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not the grounds of detention, as contemplated by
s. 3 of the Act, but that they only constitute different pieces of evidence by
which the authority making the order came to the conclusion that the petitioner
was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, which
was the only ground on which the order of detention in question was founded.
The High Court was right in its literal construction of the order impugned in
this case, which proceeds to recite the four numbered paragraphs, preceded by
the introductory clause " as evidenced by the particulars given
below." But the case of The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya
(1), has laid it down that cl (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, confers two
distinct though interrelated rights on the petitioner, namely, (1) the right to
be informed of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and
(2) the right to be enabled, at the earliest opportunity, to make a
representation against the order. This Court further pointed out in that case,
that the grounds which have a rational connection with the objects mentioned in
s. 3, have to be supplied. As soon as that is done, the first condition of a
valid detention is complied with. The second condition of such a detention is
fulfilled only after the detenu has been supplied with such information as will
enable him to make a representation. If the information supplied in order to
enable a detenu (1) (1951) S.C.R. 167.
421 to make a representation, does not
contain sufficient particulars, the detenu is entitled to ask for further
particulars which will enable him to make a representation.
Therefore, if there is an infringement of
either of the two rights, and any one of the two conditions precedent to a
valid detention, as aforesaid, has not been fulfilled, the detenu has a right
to approach this Court for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. In other
words, the grounds for making an order of detention, which have to be
communicated to the detenu as soon as practicable, are conclusions of facts,
and are not a complete recital of all the relevant facts. Therefore, the
grounds, that is to say, those conclusions of facts, must be in existence when
the order of detention is made, and those conclusions of facts have to be
communicated to the detenu as soon as may be.
This Court, and naturally, the High Courts,
have treated the recitals in the orders of detention, with particular reference
to the several clauses and sub-clauses of s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act, as
stating the object to be achieved in making the order of detention. The order
of detention may also contain recitals of facts upon which it is based.
If the order of detention also contains the
recitals of facts upon which it is founded, no further question arises, but if
it does not contain the recitals of facts which form the basis of the
conclusions of fact, justifying the order of detention, then, as soon as may be
(now, under s. 7, within a maximum period of five days from the date of
detention), the person detained has to be informed of those facts which are the
basic facts or the reasons on which the order of detention has been made.
Section 3 of the Act requires the authority making an order of detention, to
state the fact of its satisfaction that it is necessary to make the order of
detention of a particular person, with a view to preventing him from acting in
a manner prejudicial to one or more of the objects contained in clauses and
sub- clauses of s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. Section 7 requires that the
person detained should be communicated the grounds on which the order of
detention has been made, so a,-, to afford him the earliest opportunity to make
a 422 representation against the order, to the appropriate Government. The
statement of facts contemplated by s. 7, would, thus, constitute the grounds,
and not the matters contained in one or more of the clauses and sub-clauses
under s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. Section 3 also requires that when an
order of detention has been made, the State Government concerned has to be
apprised of the order of detention as also of the grounds on which the order of
detention has been made, together with such other particulars as have a bearing
on the order and the grounds.
And finally,, after the order has been
approved by the State Government, that Government, in its turn, has to report
to the Central Government the fact of the detention, together with the grounds
on which the order of detention had been made; and such other particulars as,
in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the
order. Thus, on a consideration of the provisions of ss. 3 and 7 of the Act, it
may be observed that the detenu has to be served with a copy of the order
passed by the authority contemplated by sub-s. (2) of s. 3, containing,
firstly, recitals in terms of one or more of the sub clauses of cl. (a) and (b)
of s. 3(1), which we may call the 'Preamble', and secondly, the grounds
contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact which have led to the
passing of the order of detention, informing the detenu as to why he was being
detained. lf the grounds do not contain all the particulars necessary for
enabling the detenu to make his representation against the order of his
detention, he may ask for further particulars of the facts, and the authority
which passed the order of detention is expected to furnish all that
information, subject, of course, to the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 7 ; that
is to say, the person detained shall not be entitled to the disclosure of such
facts as the authority making the order, considers against public interest to
disclose. Thus, the order of detention to be served upon the person detained
would usually consist of the first two parts, namely, the preamble and the
grounds, but it may also consist of the third part, namely, the 423
particulars, if and when they are required or found to be necessary. But it has
to be noted that the particular,, referred to in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 3,
would not be identical with the particulars which we have called the third part
of the order. The State Government, as also the Central Government, would,
naturally, be placed in possession of all the relevant facts and particulars on
which the order of detention has been passed. But those particulars may contain
such details of facts as may not be communicated, in public interest, to the
From what has been said above, it is clear
that the High Court was in error in so far as it treated what we have called
the preamble' as the grounds of detention contemplated by s. 7 of the Act. But
this error, as will presently appear, has not affected the legality, propriety
or correctness of the order passed by the High Court in the habeas corpus
proceedings before it. The High Court, as already indicated, after making those
observations which we have held to be erroneous, proceeded further to say that
there was no ambiguity in the recitals of facts, as the High Court
characterised them and which we have called the grounds.
The contention raised before the High Court
has been repeated before us, that the grounds contained in para. 4, are vague
and indefinite, not enabling the person detained to make his representation. It
will appear from the paragraph aforesaid that the petitioner intended to
proceed to Delhi on October 9,1958, with a view to instigating plans against
the personal security of the Prime Minister. It is clear that the place, date
and purpose of the planned nefarious activity, have all been stated as clearly
as could be expected. But it was argued that it was also necessary to state the
details of the plan to be hatched in Delhi.
There are several answers to this contention.
Paragraph 4 has reference to something which was apprehended but lay in the
womb of the future. From the nature of the fact that it was not an event which
had already happened but what was apprehended to be in the contemplation of the
detenu and his associates, if any, no further details of the plan could
possibly be 424 disclosed. As was observed in the decision of this Court in The
State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1) (at pp.
184 and 185), vagueness is a -relative term.
Its meaning must vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.
What may be said to be vague in one case, may
not be so in another, and it could not be asserted as a general rule that a
ground is necessarily vague if the only answer of the detained person can be to
deny it. If the statement of facts is capable of being clearly understood and
is sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to make his
representation, it cannot be said that it is vague.
Further, it cannot be denied that particulars
of what has taken place, can be more definitely stated than those of events
which are yet in the offing. In the very nature of things, the main object of
the Act is to prevent persons from doing something which comes within the
purview of any one of the sub-clauses of cl. (a) of s. 3(1) of the Act.
It was next contended that some of the
grounds at least are irrelevant. This was not said of the first paragraph of
the grounds, set out above. It was said of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 that they are
irrelevant to the main object of the order of detention, namely, the
"maintenance of public order". In our opinion, there is no substance
in this contention either. All the statements in the four paragraphs of the
grounds, which have to be read together as being parts of a connected whole,
calling upon persons to " build up strong movement against the
implementation of Nehru-Noon Pact", and to "rouse passions by
alleging that the Indian Prime Minister had no sympathy for West Bengal",
cannot be said to be wholly unconnected with the maintenance of public order.
Similarly, denouncing the agreement between
the two Prime Ministers and stressing the need of forming a militia with the
youths of the country, cannot be said to have no repercussions on the maintenance
of public order. And lastly, any instigation against the personal safety of the
Prime Minister of India cannot but have a deleterious effect on the maintenance
of public order, (1) (1951) S.C.R. 167.
425 It was sought to be argued that any weak
link in the chain of facts and circumstances, said to have been the basis of
the order of detention, would affect the legality of the whole order. This
argument postulates that there are many grounds which are either vague or
irrelevant. In this connection, particular reliance was placed on the
observations of this Court in Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and
Kashmir (1), to the effect that if some of the reasons on which the order of
detention had been based, are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court
ought to quash the order, because it is not in a position to know which of the
reasons or the grounds, had operated on the mind of the authorities concerned,
when they decided the pass the impugned order. As already pointed out, no such
situation arises in this case, because, in our opinion, none of the grounds is
either vague or irrelevant. It may also be pointed out that the ground of
irrelevance wag not urged before the High Court, but even so, we allowed the
petitioner's counsel to urge that ground before us, and having heard him on
that aspect of the matter, we have no doubt that there is no justification for
the contention that any of the matters taken into consideration by the
authorities concerned in the matter of the detention of the petitioner, was
For the reasons given above, it must be held
that there is no merit in this appeal or in the application under Art. 32 of
the Constitution. They are, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal and application dismissed.
(1) (1956) S.C.R. 948.