Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. The State
of Andhra Pradesh & Ors [1959] INSC 104 (21 August 1959)
SUBBARAO, K.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
CITATION: 1959 AIR 1376 1960 SCR (1) 580
ACT:
Road Transport-Scheme of nationalisation-Chief
Minister, if can hear objections-Doctrine of bias-Motor Vehicles Act (IV of
1939 as amended by Act 100 of 1956, ch. IVA, s. 68D.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants were carrying on motor
transport business in Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh. The General Manager
of the State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for nationalisation of
motor transport and objections to the said scheme were invited. The appellants,
among others, filed their objections. The Secretary in charge of the Transport
Department gave personal hearing to the objectors and heard the representation
made on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking. The Chief Minister, who was
in charge of transport, passed the order approving the scheme.
The appellants moved this Court under Art. 32
of the Constitution for quashing the said scheme and this Court in Gullapalli
Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, previously decided,
held that the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department was incompetent
to hear the objections on the around that no party could be a judge in his own
cause and quashed the order approving the scheme.
Thereafter notices were issued by the
Government to the objectors. The Chief Minister himself heard the
representatives of the objectors and the Road Transport Corporation and passed
the order approving the scheme as originally published. The appellants moved
the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for writs of certiorari
quashing the order passed by the Government confirming the scheme and
subsequent orders Made by the Regional Transport Authority canceling their
stage carriage permits. The High Court rejected the petitions and the
appellants appealed.
It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf
that the same infirmity which attached to the Secretary in charge of the
Transport Department on the previous occasion, attached to the Chief Minister,
who was in charge of transport, and rendered him incompetent to hear the
objections.
Held, that the two well-settled principles of
the doctrine of bias that applied equally to judicial as well as quasijudicial
tribunals, were,-(i) that no man shall be a judge in his own cause and that (2)
justice should not merely be done but must also appear to be done. Any kind of
bias, therefore, in a judicial authority, whether financial or other, for or
against any party, or any position that might impute bias, must disqualify him
as a judge.
581 But when a State Legislature or the
Parliament, in transgression of the aforesaid principles, by statute empowers
an authority to be a judge in its own cause or decide a dispute in which it has
an official bias, such statute, unlike one passed by the English Parliament,
has to stand scrutiny in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The King v. Bath Compensation Authority,
[1925] 1 K.B. 685 and The King v. Leicester justices, [1927] i K.B. 557,
discussed.
In the instant case, however, the relevant
provisions of the Act do not sanction any transgression of the aforesaid principles
of natural justice or authorise the Government to constitute itself a judge in
its own cause. Nor could it be said that the State Government, in the present
case, acted in violation of the aforesaid principles.
Since the appellants never questioned the
competence of the Chief Minister to decide the objections on the last occasion
and obtained the judgment of this Court on that basis, it was not open to them
at this stage to reopen the closed controversy or take a contrary position.
The position of the Chief Minister was quite
distinct from that of the Secretary of the Department. While the Secretary of
the Department was its head and so a part of it, the Minister in charge was
only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that
Department. It was not, therefore, correct to say that the Chief Minister was a
part of the Department constituted as a Statutory Undertaking under the Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 198 to 200 of 1959.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated the
5th March 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Writ Petitions Nos. 1511
and 1512 of 1958 and 23 of 1959.
N. C. Chatterjee, G. Suryanarayana, K.
Mangach and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants.
D. Narasaraju, Advocate-General for the State
of Andhra Pradesh, D. Venkatappiah Sastry and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
1959. August 21. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by SUBBA RAO J.-These appeals on certificates are directed
against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh, at
Hyderabad, dismissing the petitions filed by the appellants under Art, 226 74
582 of the Constitution for issuing writs of certiorari to quash the orders of
the Government of Andhra Pradesh confirming a scheme of nationalization of
transport and the subsequent orders of the Regional Transport Authority
cancelling the appellants' stage carriage permits.
These appeals are the off-shoot of the
judgment of this Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation (1) delivered on November 5, 1958. The facts were fully
stated therein. It would be only necessary to recapitulate briefly the facts
relevant to the present enquiry: The appellants were carrying on motor
transport business for several years in Krishna District in the State of Andhra
Pradesh. Shri Guru Pershad, styled as the General Manager of the State
Transport Undertaking of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, published a scheme
for nationalization of motor transport in the said State from the date to be
notified by the State Government. Objections to the said proposed scheme were
invited by the State Government, and the appellants, among others, filed their
objections. On December 26, 1957, the Secretary in charge of the Transport
Department gave a personal hearing to the objectors and heard the
representations made on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking. The entire
material gathered by him was placed before the Chief Minister of the State in
charge of transport who made the order approving the scheme. The approved
scheme was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated January 9, 1958, and
it was directed to come into force with effect from January 10, 1958.
Thereafter the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport
Corporation, which was formed under the provisions of the Road Transport
Corporation Act, 1950, took over the Undertaking and proceeded to implement the
scheme under a phased programme.
The appellants moved this Court under Art. 32
of the Constitution for quashing the said scheme on various grounds. This Court
rejected most of the objections raised by the appellants except in regard to
two pertaining to the hearing given by the Secretary in charge (1) [1959]
S.C.R. (SUPPl) 319.
583 of the Transport Department which
resulted in the quashing of the order of the Government approving the scheme
and directing it to forbear from taking over any of the routes on which the
appellants were engaged in transport business.
After the said order, notices were issued by
the Government to all the objectors informing them that a personal hearing
would be given by the Chief Minister on December 9, 1958, and they were further
informed that they were at liberty to file further objections before November
30, 1958. The Chief Minister heard the representatives of the objectors and the
Corporation and passed orders dated December 19, 1958, rejecting the objections
filed and approving the scheme as originally published. The order approving the
scheme was duly published by the Government in the official Gazette oil
]December 22, 1958. On December 23, 1958, the Corporation applied to the Road
Transport Authority for the issue of permits for plying stage carriages and for
eliminating the permits granted to the private bus operators. On --December 24,
1958, the said Authority passed orders rendering the permits of the appellants
ineffective from December 24, 1958, and also issuing permits to the Corporation
in -respect of the routes previously operated by the appellants. The said
orders were communicated to the appellants on December 24, 1958, and they were
also directed to stop plying their buses from December 25, 1958, on their
respective routes. The appellants, who were aggrieved, by the orders of the
Government as well by the order of the Regional Transport Authority filed
petitions in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the
same.
The petitions were heard by a Division Bench
of the said High Court consisting of Chandra Reddy, C.J., and Srinivasachari,
J., who negatived the contentions raised by the appellants and dismissed the
petitions. Hence these appeals.
The arguments of Mr. Chatterjee, learned
Counsel for the appellants maybe summarized thus: (1) This Court held in
Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
that the (1) [1959] S.C.R. (SUPPL.) 319.
584 Secretary in charge of the Transport
Department was disqualified from deciding the dispute between the Department
and the private bus operators on the basis of the principle that a party cannot
be a judge in his own cause, and that, as the Chief Minister was in charge of
the portfolio of transport, the same infirmity attached to him also, and,
therefore, for the same reason he should also be disqualified from hearing the
objections to the scheme published by the Undertaking; and (2) the Chief
Minister by his acts, such as initiating the scheme, and speeches showed a
clear bias in favour of the Undertaking and against the private bus operators
and therefore on the basis of the principles of natural justice accepted by
this Court, he was precluded from deciding the dispute between the said
parties.
The learned Advocate-General sought to make
out a distinction between " official bias " of an authority which is
inherent in a statutory duty imposed on it and " personal bias " of
the said authority in favour of, or against, one of the parties and contended
that the mere fact that the Chief Minister of the Government had supported the
policy of nationalization, or even the fact that the Government initiated the
said scheme, did Dot disqualify him from deciding the dispute unless it was
established that he was guilty of personal bias, and that there was no legal
proof establishing the said fact.
At this stage, it would be convenient to
notice briefly the decisions cited at the Bar disclosing the relevant
principles governing the doctrine of bias ". The principles governing the
doctrine of bias " vis-a-vis judicial tribunals are well-settled and they
are : (i) no man shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice should not
only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The two maxims
yield the result that if a member of a judicial body is " subject to a
bias (whether financial or other) in favour of, or against, any party to a
dispute, or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist, he
ought not to take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal " ;
and that " any direct pecuniary
interest, however small, in the 585 subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify a
judge, and any interest, though not pecuniary, will have the same effect, if it
be sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias ".
The said principles are equally applicable to authorities, though they are not
courts of justice or judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding
the rights of others, i.e., authorities who are empowered to discharge
quasi-judicial functions. The said principles are accepted by the learned
Counsel on both sides; but the question raised in this case is whether, when a statute
confers a power on an authority and imposes a duty on it to be a judge of its
own cause or to decide a dispute in which it has an official bias, the doctrine
of bias is qualified to the extent of the statutory authorization. In The King
v. Bath Compensation Authority (1) the licensing justices of a county borough
referred the application for the renewal of the licence of a hotel to the
compensation authority of the borough and also resolved that a solicitor should
be instructed to appear before the compensation authority and oppose the
renewal of the licence on their behalf. The solicitor so instructed appeared
before the authority and supported the opposition, and in the result the
compensation authority refused the renewal subject to payment of compensation.
It may be mentioned that a majority of the justices who sat on the compensation
tribunal and voted against the renewal of the licence had as members of the
licensing committee been parties to the resolution referring the question of
renewal to the compensation authority. The Court of Appeal by a majority,
Atkin, L. J., dissenting, held that in view of the provisions of the Licensing
Act, 1910, the facts in that case did not disclose such bias or likelihood of
bias as would disqualify them from sitting on the tribunal. This decision was
reversed by the House of Lords on appeal (reported in 1926 A.C. 586). The House
of Lords held that the decision of the tribunal, whereon three justices who
referred the matter to the said authority sat, must be set aside on the ground
that no one can both be a party and a judge in the same cause, (1) [1925] 1
K.B. 685.
586 Viscount Cave, L.C., meets the argument
based upon the statutory duty thus at p. 592:
" No doubt the statute contemplates the
possibility of the licensing justices appearing before the compensation
authority and taking part in the argument; for it is provided by s. 19, sub-s.
2, that the compensation authority shall give any person appearing to them to
be interested in the question of the renewal of a licence, " including the
licensing justices," an opportunity of being heard. But the statute
nowhere says that justices who elect to appear as opponents of the renewal and
take active steps (such as instructing a solicitor) to take their opposition affective,
may nevertheless act as judges in the dispute,; and in the absence of a clear
provision to that effect I think that the ordinary rule, that no one can be
both party and judge in the same cause, holds good." This decision,
therefore, is an authority for the proposition that, unless the legislature
clearly and expressly ordained to the contrary, the principles of natural
justice cannot be violated. In The King v. Leicester Justices (1), a case also
arising under the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, the king's Bench
Division held that the mere fact that the licensing justice has originated an
objection to the renewal of a licence does not disqualify him by reason of
interest from sitting and adjudicating as a member of that authority upon the matter
of that licence. Salter, J., brought out the distinction between the Bath
Justices' Case (2) and the case before him in the following terms, at p. 565:
" The distinction is that, in that case,
Parliament had not sanctioned what was done; in this case it has." Dealing
with the argument that there was some, risk of bias if the statutory duty was
discharged, the learned Judge rejected it with the observation that " some
risk of bias is inseparable from the machinery which Parliament has set up
". At first sight this judgment appears to be inconsistent with the
decision (1) [1927] 1 K.B. 557.
(2) [1925] 1 K.B. 685.
587 of the House of Lords in Bath Justices'
Case(1), but a scrutiny of the latter case shows that in that case the
licensing justices had themselves actively opposed the renewal of the licence
before the compensation authority and instructed a solicitor to do so on their
behalf This is not a duty cast on them by the statute whereas the licensing
justices in dealing with an application for renewal of a licence and, when the
question of renewal was referred for decision to the compensation authority, in
sitting as members of that authority are merely carrying out the duties in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the legislature. These decisions
show that in England a statutory invasion of the common law objection on the
ground of bias is tolerated by decisions, but the invasion is confined strictly
to the limits of the statutory exception.
It is not out of place here to notice that in
England the Parliament is supreme and therefore a statutory law, however
repugnant to the principles of natural justice, is valid;
whereas in India the law made by Parliament
or a State Legislature should stand the test of fundamental rights declared in
Part III of the Constitution.
In the instant case the relevant provisions
of the Act do not sanction any dereliction of the principles of natural
justice. Under the Act a statutory authority, called the Transport Undertaking,
is created and specified statutory functions are conferred on it. The said
Undertaking prepares a scheme providing for road transport service in relation
to an area to be run or operated by the said Undertaking. Any person affected
by the Scheme is required to file objections before the State Government and
the State Government, after receiving the objections and representations, gives
a personal hearing to the objectors as well as to the Undertaking and approves
or modifies the scheme as the case may be. The provisions of the Act, therefore,
do not authorise the Government to initiate the scheme and thereafter
constitute itself a judge in its own cause. The entire scheme of the Act
visualises, in case of conflict between the Undertaking and the operators of
private buses, that the State Government (1) [1925] 1 K.B. 685.
588 should sit in judgment and resolve the
conflict. The Act, therefore, does not authorise the State Government to act in
derogation of the principles of natural justice.
The next question is whether the State
Government, in the present case, acted in violation of the said principles.
The argument that as this Court held in the
previous stage of this litigation that the hearing given by the secretary in
charge of the Transport Department offended the principles of natural justice,
we should hold, as a logical corollary to the same, that the same infirmity
would attach to the Chief Minister. This argument has to be rejected on two
grounds: firstly, for the reason that on the last occasion the appellants did
not question the right of the Chief Minister to decide on the objections to the
scheme and indeed they assumed his undoubted right to do so-but canvassed the
validity of his order on the basis that the secretary, who was part of the
Transport Department, gave the hearing and not the Chief Minister and,
therefore, a party to the dispute was made a judge of his own cause. If, as it
is now contended, on the same reasoning the Chief Minister also would be
disqualified from deciding the dispute, that point should have been raised at
that stage:
instead, a distinction was made between the
Secretary of a Department and the Chief Minister, and the validity of the order
of the Chief Minister was questioned on the basis of this distinction. This
Court accepted that argument.
Having obtained the judgment of this Court on
that basis, it could not be open to the appellants, at this stage, to reopen
the closed controversy and take a contrary position.
That apart, there are no merits in this
contention. There is a clear distinction between the position of a Secretary of
the Department and the Chief Minister of the State.
Under the Constitution, the Governor is
directed to act on the advice of the Ministers headed by the Chief Minister.
In exercise of the powers conferred by cls. 2
and 3 of Art.
166 of the Constitution the Governor of
Madras made rules styled as " The Madras Government Business Rules and
Secretariat Instructions", and r. 9 thereof 589 prescribes that without
prejudice to the provisions of r. 7, the Minister in charge of a department
shall be primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to
that department. The Governor of Andhra in exercise of the powers under the
Constitution, directed that until other provisions are made in this regard the
business of the Government of Andhra shall be transacted in accordance with the
said Rules. It is, therefore, manifest that under the Constitution and the
Rules framed there under a Minister in charge of a department is primarily
responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department, but
the ultimate responsibility for the advice is on the entire ministry. But the
position of the Secretary of a department is different. Under the said Rules,
the Secretary of a department is its head i.e., he is part of the department.
There is an essential distinction between the
functions of a Secretary and a Minister; the former is a part of the department
and the latter is only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business
pertaining to that department.
On this distinction the previous judgment of
this Court was based, for in that case, after pointing out the position of the
Secretary in that Department, it was held that "though the formal orders
were made by the Chief Minister, in effect and substance, the enquiry was
conducted and personal hearing was given by one of the parties to the dispute
itself ". We cannot, therefore, accept the argument of the learned Counsel
that the Chief Minister is part of the department constituted as a statutory
Undertaking under the Act.
The next question is whether the Chief
Minister by his acts and speeches disqualified himself to act for the State
Government in deciding the dispute. In the affidavit filed by Nageswara Rao,
one of the appellants herein, in respect of the writ petitions filed in the
High Court, he states in ground (8) of paragraph (14) thus:
" He (the Chief Minister) is the
Minister in charge of the Transport Department at whose instance the Scheme was
first published under Section 68C of the Act. He is not only the initiator of
the Scheme but also the person who is interested in its approval and 75 590
implementation. He has thus a direct and specific connection with the dispute
being a party thereto and he would be acting as a Judge in his own cause when
he gives a personal hearing and considers the objections." Mr. Chatterjee
contends that this allegation embodied in ground (8) has not been contradicted
by the respondents. It is not correct to say that these allegations went
unchallenged, for in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of
the State, we find the following statements:
" The contentions of the petitioner in
para. 14 of his affidavit are without substance. The scheme as approved by the
Government is neither illegal nor without jurisdiction." In sub-paragraph
(3) of paragraph 6, it is alleged:
" The allegations that the hearing and
determination of the questions in issue are not in accordance with law or
principles of judicial procedure, but only a farce gone through to satisfy the
direction of the Supreme Court, is not correct." Sub-paragraph (7) of
paragraph 6 reads:
" The Minister in charge i.e., the Chief
Minister can hear and decide. The State Government itself cannot be regarded as
interested in the cause and therefore disqualified to decide."
Sub-paragraph (8) of the said paragraph says:
" The contention that the Chief Minister
is not competent, to give the hearing and consider the objections inasmuch as
he is biassed and has also prejudged the issue, is not well founded. On facts
on 9-12-1958, there was no Road Transport Department at all but a Road
Transport Corporation, which is a completely autonomous body, with which the
Chief Minister has no concern. Hence on the date of the enquiry, the
Corporation being a completely autonomous body is an entirely independent body
altogether and hence there can be no question of bias to the Chief Minister
hearing the objectors. The bearing given by the Chief Minister is just like a
hearing of the court of law after remand 591 by a Superior
Court....................... The allegation that the Chief Minister had closed
his mind and was biased is absolutely baseless. He kept an open mind and
considered all the objections fully." The counter-affidavit further gives
in detail how the scheme was initiated by Guru Pershad and how the various
steps were taken in compliance with the provisions of the Act. It is therefore
clear that the Government did not accept the allegations made by the appellants
in their affidavits.
Whatever may be the policy of the Government
in the matter of nationalisation of the bus transport, it cannot be said that
the Chief Minister initiated the scheme in question.
The learned Counsel then relied upon certain
extracts from the reports published in the newspapers purporting to be the
speeches of the Chief Minister. Exhibit IV is said to be a summary of the
speech of the Chief Minister. made on October 14, 1957, and the relevant
portion thereof reads :
" I do not have any prejudice against
the Krishna District.
The bus transport in Telangana was
nationalised 25 years ago. The Bus Transport nationalisation was extended to
Krishna District since it is contiguous to Telangana in regard to transport
services. It will be extended to the other districts gradually. It requires 12
crores of rupees to introduce nationalisation in all the districts at the same
time. The Government is aware that Nationalisation of Bus Transport is not
profitable. But we should fall in line with other States and move with the
times. There are 360 buses in Krishna District. I cannot give an assurance that
all these would be taken over. It is regrettable that these should be subjected
to severe criticism when they are being done in public interest." This
speech only reflects the policy of the Government.
Exhibit V is said to be an extract from the
report of the Indian Express dated October 18, 1957. The material part of it
runs thus:
" Nationalisation of road transport
services in the Andhra area was a settled fact and there was absolutely no question
of going back on it ............
592 This speech also only states the policy
of the Government and has no reference to Krishna District or to the transport
services in that district. Exhibit VI is an extract from the report in the
Hindu dated October 25, 1957, wherein it is alleged that the Chief Minister'
made the following statement:
" Mr. N. Sanjiva Reddy, Chief Minister,
said here today that the nationalised road transport in Krishna would be
administered by a Corporation.
The Chief Minister, who was addressing a
press conference said: " There is no question of postponement of the
decision to nationalise bus transport in that district.........................
The Chief Minister said firmly that there was no public support to the contention
of the private bus operators that there should be no nationalisation."
This speech has a direct reference to the nationalisation of bus transport in
Krishna District and indicates a firm determination on the part of the Chief
Minister not to postpone it any further. Exhibit IX is an extract from the
report in the Indian Express dated December 13, 1957 and it reads:
" The Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister
Sanjeeva Reddy told pressmen here to-day that the State Government would go
ahead with the implementation of its decision to extend nationalisation of bus
transport to Krishna district from April I next." This also indicates the
Chief Minister's determination to implement the scheme of nationalisation of
bus transport in Krishna District from a particular date. Exhibit X is a report
in the Mail under date April 1, 1958, purporting to be a speech made by the
Chief Minister in inaugurating the first phase of the extension of the
nationalised road transport services to Guntur and Krishna Districts by the
State Road Transport Corporation. Relevant extracts of the speech read thus:
" He (the Chief Minister) considered the
implementation of the scheme simple first, but he regretted to find it
difficult since bus operators filed writ petitions in the High Court, raised a I
huge noise' and fought 593 till the very end against the scheme and finally
even approached the Congress President Mr. U. N. Dhebar to save
them....................................................
Mr. Sanjeeva Reddi affirmed that the
Government was determined to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus
transport services against all opposition and persons like him trained by the
late T. Prakasam were never afraid of opposition." If it had been
established that the Chief Minister made the speeches extracted in Exhibits VI,
lX and X, there would have been considerable force in the argument of the
learned Counsel for the appellants; but no attempt was made to prove that the
Chief Minister did in fact make those speeches. It is true that the extracts from
the newspapers were filed before the Chief Minister and they were received
subject to proof ; but no person who heard the Chief Minister making those
speeches filed an affidavit before him. The Chief Minister did not admit that
he made the statements attributed to him. The Chief Minister in his order
approving the scheme says:
" As regards the paper cuttings, I may
mention that in the course of a long and varied, political career I have made
hundreds of statements on many an occasion and many of them may be purely
personal opinions. Moreover, it is not always that the press people consult the
persons on the accuracy of the statements made before they are published. The
press cuttings filed before me are not communiques issued by the Government,
with the approval of the Government. They are published records of several
statements said to have been made by me on various occasions. It is common
knowledge press cuttings here and there, torn out of context, will give a
completely twisted picture and version of a man's real intentions. It is not
possible for me to state anything definite about the veracity of these
statements said to have been made by me at different points of time. It is
quite possible that I might have made many such, on many an occasion, and it is
also quite possible, that some points spoken here and there may have been
published with Headlines in the papers.
594 It is not possible nor desirable to treat
paper cuttings of statements said to have been made on several occasions as
legal evidence in a judicial enquiry." Notwithstanding the fact that the
Chief Minister did not accept the correctness of the statements attributed to
him in the newspapers, no attempt was made by the appellants to file any
affidavit in the High Court sworn to by persons who had attended the meetings
addressed by the Chief Minister and heard him making the said statements. In
the circumstances, it must be held that it has not been established by the
appellants that the Chief Minister made the speeches indicating his closed mind
on the subject of nationalisation of bus transport in Krishna District. If
these newspaper cuttings are excluded from evidence, the factual basis for the
appellants' argument disappears. We, therefore, hold that the Chief Minister
was not disqualified to hear the objections against the scheme of nationalisation.
A subsidiary argument is raised on the basis
of r. 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules. It is contended that the
Road Transport Authority made an order rendering that the permits of the
appellants ineffective without giving them due notice as required by that rule
and therefore the said order was invalid. Rule 11 of the said Rules reads:
" In giving effect to the approved
scheme, the Regional Transport Authority or Authorities concerned shall, before
eliminating the existing services or cancelling any existing permit or
modifying the conditions of the existing permit so as to (i) render the permit
ineffective beyond a specified date;
(ii) reduce the number of vehicles authorised
to be used under a permit; or (iii) curtail the area or route covered by the
permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified route:
give due notice to the persons likely to be
affected in the manner prescribed in these rules." 595 This rule will have
to be read along with s. 68-F, sub-s. 2, which reads:
" For the purpose of giving effect to
the approved scheme in respect of a notified area or notified route, the
Regional Transport Authority may, by order,(a) refuse to entertain any application
for the renewal of any other permit:
(b) cancel any existing permit;
(c) modify the terms of any existing permit
so as to(i) render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date:
(ii) reduce the number of vehicles authorised
to be used under the permit;
(iii) curtail the area or route covered by
the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified
route." A combined reading of s. 68F (2) and r. 11 makes it clear that the
order contemplated under the said subsection can be made by the Regional
'Transport Authority only after giving due notice to the persons likely to be
affected by the said order. On December 24, 1958, the Regional Transport
Authority made the following order:
" The permits of the following buses are
rendered ineffective beyond 24-12-1958, under section 68F (2)(c)(1) of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 (as amended by Act 100 of 1956) for the purpose of giving
effect to the approved scheme of Nationalisation in respect of the following
notified routes." The routes on which the appellants were operating their
buses were also included in the routes mentioned in the order. On December 24,
1958, the Regional Transport Authority issued an order to the operators
directing them to stop plying their buses on their respective routes from
December 25, 1958, and that order was served on the appellants on the same day
i.e., December 24, 1958. Though the learned Advocate-General suggested that the
provisions of r. 11 have been satisfied in the present case, we find it
impossible to accede to his contention. There are two defects in the procedure.
followed by the Regional 596 Transport Authority : (i) while the rule enjoins
on the Authority to issue notice to the persons affected before making the
relevant order, the Authority made the order and communicated the' same to the
persons affected; and (ii) while the rule requires due notice i.e., reasonable
notice., to be given to the persons affected to enable them to make
representations against the order proposed to be passed, the Regional Transport
Authority gave them only a day for complying with that order, which in the
circumstances could not be considered to be due notice within the meaning of
the rule. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the Regional Transport
Authority did not strictly comply with the provisions of the rule. But, in view
of the supervening circumstances, the High Court, while noticing this defect in
the procedure followed by the Regional Transport Authority, refused to exercise
its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Pursuant to the order of
the Regional Transport. Authority the appellants withdrew their vehicles from
the concerned routes and the vehicles of the Road Transport Corporation have
been playing on those routes. The judgment of this Court conclusively decided
all the questions raised in favour of the respondents, and if the order of the
Regional Transport Authority was set aside and the appellants were given
another opportunity to make their representations to that Authority, it would
be, as the High Court says, only an empty formality. As their vehicles have
already been withdrawn from the routes and replaced by the vehicles of the
Corporation, the effect of any such order would not only be of any help to the
appellant but would introduce unnecessary complication and avoidable confusion.
In the circumstances, it appears to us that
as the appellants have failed all along the line, to interfere on a technical
point of no practical utility is "to strain at a gnat after swallowing a
camel ". We cannot, therefore, say that the High Court did not rightly
exercise its discretion in this matter. The appeals fail and, in the
circumstances, are dismissed without costs.
Appeals dismissed.
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