Ram Gopal Vs. Anant Prasad & ANR
 INSC 45 (21 April 1959)
CITATION: 1959 AIR 851 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 692
CITATOR INFO :
R 1963 SC 64 (1,2,7)
Appeal-Maintainability-Permit to run stage
carriageApplication for renewal-New applicant's application for permit-Order by
State Transport Authority renewing Permit but no order passed on new
applicant's application Appeal to Appellate Tribunal against order granting
renewal-Whether appeal competent-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 Of 1939), ss. 47,
57, 58, 64.
The appellant who was the holder of a permit
to run a stage carriage, which was about to expire, made an application to the
State Transport Authority for its renewal for a further period. The respondent
made a representation against the renewal of the appellant's permit and also
applied for the grant of the permit to himself. The State Transport Authority
made an order in the terms " Renewed for three years " in respect of
the appellant's permit but no express order was made on the respondent's
application for the grant of the permit to him. On appeal by the respondent,
the Appellate Tribunal cancelled the appellant's permit and granted the permit
to the respondent. The appellant then moved the judicial Commissioner, Vindhya
Pradesh, for a 693 writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appellate
Tribunal on the ground that it disclosed an error on the face of it because
under the Act no appeal lay from the order that was passed by the subordinate
authority. The learned judicial Commissioner held that the appeal was competent
and dismissed the application for the writ. It was contended for the appellant
that the respondent's appeal to the Appellate Tribunal was not maintainable on
the grounds (1) that no express order was made against the respondent by the
State Transport Authority, and so s. 64(a) of the Act did not give him a right
of appeal and (2) that in view Of ss. 47, 57 and 58 Of the Act, the State
Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to consider the respondents application
or to make an order in respect of it after the appellant's permit was renewed,
and therefore could not make an order rejecting it. It was also contended that
s. 64 of the Act did not provide for an appeal by a person aggrieved by the
renewal of a permit unless he was one of those mentioned in cl. (f) of that
section which the respondent was not, and therefore even if an appeal by the
respondent was competent under s. 64(a) in such an appeal, the Appellate
Authority could not set aside the order of renewal.
Held: (1) that the order made by the State
Transport Authority in the present case did amount, infect, to a refusal to
grant the permit to the respondent. The respondent's appeal to the Appellate
Authority was therefore maintainable under s. 64(a) of the Act.
S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport
Authoyity, North Arcot, 2 M.L.J. 130, approved.
V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Regional
Transport Authoyity, Coimbatore,  S.C.R. 663, distinguished.
(2) that s. 58(2) Of the Act shows that an
application for the renewal of a permit and a fresh application for the same
permit have to be heard together, and that there was nothing in ss. 47 and 57,
indicating a contrary course.
(3) that cl. (f) of s. 64 Of the Act does not
in any way restrict the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant all reliefs in
an appeal under cl. (a) of the section.
Consequently, the order of the Appellate
Tribunal setting aside the order of renewal was valid.
Dholpur Co-operative Transport Etc. Union
Ltd. v. The Appellate Authority, Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, in so far
as it decided to the contrary, disapproved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 284 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April
21, 1956, of the former Judicial Commissioner's Court, Rewa, in Misc. Civil
Writ No. 27 of 1956.
Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
694 Bhagwan Das Jain, for respondent No. 1.
1959. April 21. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by SARKAR, J.-This appeal arises out of an application for a writ of
certiorari and involves questions of interpretation of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 (4 of 1939), by. which grants of permits to run stage carriages and all
matters connected therewith are governed.
The appellant was the holder of a permit to
run a stage carriage on a stretch of the public highway called the Rewa Singrauli
route, in the State of Vindhya Pradesh which is now merged in the State of
Madhya Pradesh. That permit was due to expire on December 11, 1955, and so on
September 12, 1955, he made an application for its renewal for a further
period. The respondent Anant Prasad who will be referred to as the respondent,
made a representation against the renewal of the appellant's permit. He also
applied for the grant of the permit to himself. On December 9, 1955, the State
Transport Authority, Vindhya Pradesh, made an order in the following terms:
" Renewed for three years ". It is not in dispute that the order
meant that the appellant's permit was renewed for three years. No express order
was made on the respondent's application for the grant of the permit to him.
The respondent preferred an appeal against
this order to the Vindhya Pradesh Transport Appellate Tribunal, the appellate
authority under the Act. It was contended by the appellant before the Appellate
Tribunal that the appeal was not competent. The Appellate Tribunal rejected
this contention and passed an order cancelling the Permit granted to the
appellant by the State Transport Authority and issuing the permit to the
The appellant then moved the Judicial
Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of
the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it disclosed an error on the face of
it because under the Act no appeal lay from the order that was passed by the
subordinate authority. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appeal
695 was competent and dismissed the application for the writ.
Hence the present appeal.
The question is, Did an appeal lie to the
Appellate Tribunal from the order made by the State Transport Authority in the
present case ? Section 64 of the Act contains the provisions for appeals.
Whether the appeal lay or not will have to be decided by reference to these
provisions. The portion of the section which will have to be considered is in
" Section 64. Any person(a) aggrieved by
the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a
permit,.................or (e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit,....or
(f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a
person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit
is aggrieved by the grant thereof .........." may...............appeal to
the prescribed authority The prescribed authority was as we have earlier
stated, the Appellate Tribunal. Clearly the respondent was not a person
contemplated by cl. (e) of the section. It is also not in dispute that he was
not one of those mentioned in cl. (f).
The respondent does not claim that any of
these clauses gave him the right of appeal.
He however claims a right of appeal under cl.
(a). In our view that claim is justified. He had applied for a permit and had
not got it. He was therefore a person aggrieved by the refusal to grant a
permit and clearly came within cl. (a). It is true that the order of the State
Transport Authority did not expressly refuse him the permit. But that no doubt
was the effect of the order that was made. He had made an application for the
grant of the permit to him and the application was disposed of without granting
him the permit but granting it to a competing applicant. There was only one
permit which could be granted 696 and the result of the order was to give it to
The permit was thereby necessarily refused to
the respondent. The fact that an express order was not made cannot operate to
his prejudice. In S. Gopala Reddi v. Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot
(1), in circumstances identical to those in the present case an order was made
by the Transport Authority in the same terms as we have here and it was said,
" The grant of a permit to one, would automatically mean the refusal of
the permit to the other ". We are in entire agreement with the view
expressed there. Therefore it seems to us that the respondent was a person who
had been aggrieved by the refusal to grant him a permit and the appeal by him
was fully competent.
But it was said on behalf of the appellant
that in the present case it would be wrong to imply an order refusing the
permit to the respondent for none such could be made under the Act and
therefore here there was no scope for applying s. 64(a). The contention was put
in this way: When there are a number of applications in respect of the same
permit, one of which is by way of renewal to which objections have been filed
and the others, fresh applications, the latter could not be taken up for
consideration till the former and the objections made to it had been
considered. If the objections to the renewal failed, the application for
renewal had to be granted and the fresh applications for permit could not then
be considered at all. If on the other hand, the objections to the renewal
succeeded, the renewal could not be granted and the choice had then to be made
from the new applicants for the permit. In the present case the objection to
the renewal of the applicant's permit raised by the respondent failed and the
appellant's permit was in consequence renewed. Therefore the respondent's
application for a permit, which was an application for a new permit, never fell
to be considered and that is why no order on it was made at all.
We think this contention completely lacks
substance. It was said that was the result of ss. 47, (1)  2 M.L.J. 13o.
697 57 and 58 of the Act but we find nothing
in any of them to support it. Section 47 does not deal with the order in which
applications for the renewal or grant on a new permit are to be heard and does
not help at all Section 57 (3) provides that after an application for a permit
had been made others can make representations against it. These are the
objections to an application for the grant or renewal of a permit earlier
referred to. Sub-section (5) of s. 57 provides that the application for a
permit which includes an application for the renewal of a permit and the
representations against it shall be disposed of at a public hearing at which
the person making the application and the persons making the representations
shall be given an opportunity of being heard. But this does not show that all
other applications for the same permit and all other representations in
connection therewith, cannot be disposed of at the same hearing. Indeed, s. 58
(2) puts it beyond doubt that an application for renewal of a permit and the
fresh applications for the same permit have to be heard together.
That section so far as is relevant is in
Section 58 (2) A permit may be renewed on an
application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit:
Provided further that, other conditions being
equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new
applications for permits ".
The section therefore requires an application
for the renewal of a permit to be dealt with in the same way as a new
application for a permit. Such an application has therefore to be heard along
with new applications for the permit. Again, no question of giving an
application for renewal preference over new applications for permits which the
section requires to be given, can arise unless they are considered together. We
are therefore unable to hold that in the present case the 88 698 State Transport
Authority had no jurisdiction to consider the respondent's application or to
make any order in respect of it as it granted the appellant's application for
It follows that the order that was made
amounted in fact to a refusal to grant the permit to the respondent.
It was then said that a renewed permit was a
continuation of the old permit and hence once the old permit was renewed, no
question of considering the applications for new permit arose. We find nothing
to support this view. It is true that in V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Regional
Transport Authority, Coimbatore(1), this Court held that a renewed permit was a
continuation of the old permit but it did not hold that the appropriate
authority could not consider the applications for a fresh permit along with the
application for renewal of the permit. This case does not assist the appellant
It was then contended that s. 64 did not
provide for an appeal by a person aggrieved by the renewal of a permit unless
he was one of those mentioned in s. 64 (f), which the respondent was not, and
therefore even if an appeal by the respondent was competent under s. 64 (a), in
such an appeal the Appellate Tribunal could not set aside the order of renewal
made by the State Transport Authority. It was said that if in such an appeal
the order granting a renewal could be set aside, in effect an appeal against an
order renewing a permit would become competent though the law did not permit
this. We were referred to Dholpur Co-operative Transport Etc. Union Ltd. v. The
Appellate Authority, Rajasthan (2), in support of this contention. It was there
" Where an appeal has been made under
el. (a)against the refusal of a permit, the Appellate Authority will generally
have the right to give relief to the appellant by the grant of a permit, but
will not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person,
unless a foundation has been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for
an appeal provided (1)  S.C.R. 663.
(2) A.I.R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26.
699 by el. (f) by an objection of somebody
entitled to appeal under that clause. If such an objection has been made then
it does not matter whether that particular person appeals or not. In such a
case, on an appeal under s. 64(a), the Appellate Authority may consider the
objection of the nature specified in cl. (f) before the Regional Transport
Authority and give its own decision in the matter." It was said that the
respondent though he had filed objections was not a person who can claim a
right of appeal under el. (f) of s. 64. It was therefore contended on the
authority of the observations referred to above that no foundation had been
laid for an appeal provided by cl. (f) and so the Appellate Tribunal could not
cancel the permit granted to the appellant by the subordinate authority.
We are unable to agree that in an appeal
which is competent under cl. (a) of the section, the order renewing or granting
a permit cannot be set aside unless the case was such that an appeal under el.
(f) would have also been competent. So to hold would result in making the right
of appeal given by cl. (a) wholly infructuous in those cases where no relief
can be given in the appeal except by setting aside the order granting or
renewing a permit, for example, where there was only one permit to grant as in
the present case. Such an interpretation has to be rejected. It is based on cl.
But this clause cannot be construed in a
manner so as to render infructuous another clause in the same section. Nor do
we find anything in el. (f) to justify such a construction. The different
clauses in the section deal with different situations. Each is independent of
Clause (f) deals with a case where an
objection had been filed against the fresh grant or the renewal of a permit but
the permit has none the less been granted or renewed. The clause gives the
objector a right of appeal against the result of the rejection of his objection
if he is one of the persons mentioned in it. The clause gives him that right irrespective
of the fact whether he has a right of appeal under any of the other clauses or
not. It does not say that a permit granted or renewed cannot be questioned
except at the 700 instance of the persons mentioned in cl. (f); it does not
affect the right of appeal under the other clauses. If an appeal lies under any
of the other clauses, that of course must be an effective appeal and the
appellate authority must therefore have all powers to give the relief to which
the appellant is found entitled.
Again s. 64 is not concerned with defining
the powers of the appellate authority and does not purport to do so. Nor is
there anything in the Act to lead to the conclusion that an applicant for a
permit is bound to put in objections against the applications of competing
applicants for the grant or the renewal of the permit. The relief that can be
granted in an appeal by any person which is competent would not depend on
whether he bad put in objections against the applications of the competing
applicants or not.
We do not therefore think that cl. (f) of s.
64 in any way restricts the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant all proper
reliefs in an appeal competent under el. (a) of the section. If cl. (f) does
not so restrict the power of the Appellate Tribunal, nothing else has been
pointed out to us as having that effect. In our view, there is nothing in the
Act to prevent the Appellate Tribunal from setting aside the order of the State
Transport Authority renewinu the appellant's permit. We think the matter was
correctly put in S. Gopala Reddi's case (1) when it was said at p. 132:
"The appeal was, in our opinion,
perfectly competent as an appeal against the order of the Regional Transport
Authority, refusing to grant a permit. The fact that such an appeal involved an
attack on the order granting a renewal of a permit to the 4th respondent would
not prevent the appeal being what it was, viz., an appeal against a refusal to
grant a permit, to the appellant. The Central Road Traffic Board erred in
presuming that it was not open to them in the appeal to consider the merits of
the order granting renewal of the 4th respondent's permit. Indeed, the first
question which had to be determined in the appeal filed by the appellant would
be the propriety of the action of the Regional Transport Authority in granting
(1)  2 M.L.J. 130.
701 renewal to the 4th respondent. The filing
of the appeal by the appellant set at large the order of the Regional Transport
Authority granting the renewal." In the Dholpur Co-operative Transport
etc. Union Ltd.
case(') on which the appellant relies, no
objection had been filed against any of the competing applications for the
grant of a permit and it was held that the appellate authority had no power in
such circumstances on appeal by a person whose application for the grant of the
permit had been refused, to give relief by cancelling a permit granted by the
subordinate authority to one of the applicants. It was there thought that Nadar
Transport, Tiruchirapalli v. State of Madras (2) led to this conclusion. For
the reasons earlier mentioned we are unable to agree with this part of the
decision in the Dholpur Co-operative Transport etc.
Union Ltd. case (1). With the rest of the
decision there we are not concerned and as to that we do not say anything. We
also find nothing in the Nadar Transport case (2), to support the conclusion
arrived at in Dholpur Co-operative Transport etc. Union Ltd. case(1). In the
Nadar Transport case(2), on the contrary, it was observed that " see. 64,
sub-sees. (a) and (f) are intended in our opinion to apply to different
situations " and that " the power of the appellate authority is not
restricted in any manner either by the provisions of s. 64 or by any of the
rules made under the powers conferred by the Act ". It was there held that
in an appeal under s. 64 (a) no grounds other than those taken before the lower
authority could be canvassed. That does not lead to the conclusion that on
proper grounds all reliefs necessary to make the appeal effective cannot be granted.
We think that the Nadar Transport case (2) was misunderstood.
The result is that this appeal fails and it
is dismissed with costs.
(1) A. I. R. 1955 Rajasthan 19, 26.
(2) A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 1, 3.