Raghunath Das Vs. Gokal Chand & ANR
[1958] INSC 55 (1 May 1958)
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
DAS, S.K.
SUBBARAO, K.
CITATION: 1958 AIR 827 1959 SCR 811
ACT:
Limitation-Suit for division of moveable property
by co- heir, if one for specific moveable property-" Specific moveable
Property ", Meaning of--Exclusion from computation of time covered by
execution proceeding--Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of -1908), Arts. 49, 120,
s. 14(1).
HEADNOTE:
The words " specific moveable property
" occurring in art. 49 Of the Indian Limitation Act can mean only such
specific items of moveable property in respect of which the plaintiff is
entitled to claim immediate possession in specie from the defendant who has
either wrongfully taken or is wrongfully withholding them from him.
A suit by one heir against the others for
recovery of his share of the moveable property of a deceased person is not one
for a specific moveable property wrongfully taken such as is contemplated by
art. 49 and must, in the absence of any other specific provision in the Act, be
governed by art. 12o and not art. 49 of the Indian Limitation Act. Mohomed
Raisat Ali v. Musummat Hasin Banu, (1893) L,R. 2o I,A. 155, relied on.
Consequently, in a case where the decree
passed upon an award, without specifying any particular G. P. Notes or dividing
them, directed the elder brother to transfer G. P. Notes of the value of Rs.
13,200 to the younger brother from out of the G. P. Notes of the total value of
Rs. 26,500 left by the father in the custody of the former, and the younger
brother, failing to obtain relief by way of execution of the decree, brought
the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, against the elder brother for
a division of the G. P. Notes and a direction on him that G. P. Notes of the
value of Rs. 13,200 might be transferred to him and claimed that the entire
period covered by the execution proceeding from its inception till the final
disposal by the High Court should be excluded in computing the period of
limitation :
Held, that the suit in substance was one for
the division of moveable property held in joint ownership and not for
possession of any specific. item of moveable property and as such was governed,
not by art. 49, but by art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act. Gopal Chandra
Bose v. Surendra Nath Dutt, (1908) 12 C.W.N. 1010, distinguished and held
inapplicable.
812 As the facts and circumstances of the
case satisfied the requirements of s. 14(1) Of the Indian Limitation Act in
computing the prescribed period of limitation the time covered by the execution
proceeding from its inception till its final disposal by the High Court must be
excluded.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 251 of 1954.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
April 22, 1952, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Regular First Appeal No. 1/E
of 1947 arising out of the judgment and decree dated July 1, 1947, of the Court
of SubJudge, Ambala in Suit No. 239 of 1946.
Tarachand Brijmohan Lal, for the appellant.
Hardayal Hardy, for respondent No. 1.
1958. May 1. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by DAS C. T.-This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment and
decree passed on April 22, 1952, by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court
reversing the decree passed on July 1, 1947, by the First Class Subordinate
Judge, Ambala in favour of the plaintiff and dismissing the plaintiff's Suit
No. 239 of 1946. The appeal has been preferred on the strength of a certificate
granted by the ]Division Bench on December 19, 1952.
The facts material for the purpose of this
appeal may now be shortly stated: One Lala Beni Pershad died in the year 1910
leaving him surviving his widow Mst. Daropadi (defendant respondent No. 2) and'
two sons by her, namely, Gokul Chand (defendant respondent No. 1) and Raghunath
Das (plaintiff appellant) who was then a minor. Lala Beni Pershad left
considerable moveable properties including many G. P. Notes and also various
immoveable properties including agricul- tural land, gardens and houses. After
his death the family continued to be joint until disputes and. differences
arose between the two brothers in 1934. Eventually oil November 12, 1934, the
two brothers executed an agreement referring their disputes relating to the
partition of the family properties to the arbitration of Lala Ramji Das who was
a common relation.
813 It is alleged that the respondent Gokul
Chand had disposed of part of the ()'F. P. Notes and that at the date of the
reference to arbitration G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 26,500 only were held
by Gokul Chand, as the Karta of the family.
On June 21, 1936, the arbitrator made an
award which was signed by both the, brothers statedly ill token of their
acceptance thereof. The award was registered on July 28, 1936. By that award
the arbitrator divided the imoveable, properties and shops as therein
mentioned. As regards the G. P. Notes the arbitrator directed and awarded that
out of the G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 26,500, which then stood in the name
of Gokul Chand, G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 13,300 should be entered into
the names of Gokul Chand and Mst. Daropadi and the remaining Notes of the value
of Rs. 13,200 should be endorsed in the names of Raghunatb Das and Mst.
Daropadi and that till her death Mst. Daropadi should alone be entitled to the
interest on the entire G. P. Notes of the value of Its. 26,500 and that after
her death Gokul Chand would be the owner of the ("X. P. Notes of the value
of Rs. 13,300 and Raghunath Das of G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 13,200. The
arbitrator further directed Gokul Chand to pay to Raghunath Das a sum of Rs.
20,000 in four several installments together with interest thereon as mentioned
therein.
On August 31, 1936, Gokul Chand applied to
the District Judge, Ambala under paragraph 20, of Schedule 11 to the Code of
Civil Procedure for filing the award. During the pendency of those Proceedings
the two brothers entered into a compromise modifying certain terms of the award
which are not material for the purpose of the present appeal. By an order made
on November 18, 1936, the District Judge directed the award as modified by the
compromise to be filed and passed a decree in accordance with the terms of the
award thus modified.
On November 15, 1939, Raghunath Das made an
application to the court of the District judge for execution of the decree.
The District Judge transferred the
application to the court of the Subordinate Judge 814 who directed notice of
that application to be issued to Gokul Chand. Gokul Chand filed objection to
the execution mainly on the ground that the decree had been passed without
jurisdiction in that the District Judge had no power to pass a decree for
partition of agricultural lands. The Subordinate Judge on December 23, 1942,
accepted Gokul Chand's plea and dismissed the execution application. On appeal
by Raghunath Das to the High Court a learned Single Judge on April 5, 1944,
accepted the appeal, but on Letters Patent Appeal filed by Gokul Chand the
Division Bench on March 15, 1945, reversed the order of the Single Judge and
restored the order of dismissal passed by the Subordinate Judge.
Having failed to obtain the relief granted to
him by the decree passed upon the award on the ground of defect of jurisdiction
in the court which passed the decree and consequently for want of jurisdiction
in the executing court, Raghunath Das, on August 21, 1945, instituted Suit No.
80 of 1945 against Gokul Chand for the recovery of Rs. 7,310-11-3 being the
balance with interest remaining due to him out of the said sum of Rs. 20,000,
awarded in his favour. Gokul Chand raised a number of pleas but eventually all
his pleas were negatived and the senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala, by his
judgment pronounced on December 22, 1945, decreed the suit in favour of
Raghunath Das. Gokul Chand did not file any appeal there from and consequently
that decree became final and binding as between the parties thereto.
On June 5, 1946, Raghunath Das filed in the
court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala a suit being Suit No. 239 of 1946
out of which the present appeal has arisen. In this suit Raghunath Das claimed
that Gokul Chand be ordered to transfer G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 13,200
out of the G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 26,500 to Raghunath Das and Mst. Daropadi
by means of endorsement or some other legal way, to get them entered into the
Government registers and to make them over to Raghunath Das, the plaintiff.
Particulars of the numbers, the year of
issue, the face value and the interest payable on all the said G. P. 815 Notes
were set out in the prayer. There was an alternative prayer that Gokul Chand be
ordered to pay Rs. 13,200 to the plaintiff. Gokul Chand filed his written
statement taking a number of pleas in bar to the suit. Not less than 12 issues
were raised, out of which only issues Nos. 2 and 3 appear from the judgment of
the Subordinate Judge to have been seriously pressed. Those two issues were as
follows:-" (2) Is the suit within time ? and (3) Is the suit barred by
Order 2, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code?" The Subordinate Judge
decided both the issues in favour of the plaintiff. He held that Art. 49 of the
Indian Limitation Act had no application to the facts of this case and that
there being no other specific Article applicable, the suit was governed by the
residuary Art. 120. The learned Subordinate Judge also took the view that the
period from November 15, 1939 to March 15, 1945, spent in the execution
proceedings should be excluded under s. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act in
computing the period of limitation under Art. 120. The learned Subordinate
Judge also held that the cause of action in the earlier suit for the recovery
of the sum of Rs. 7,310-11-3 was not the same as the cause of action in the
present suit and, therefore, the present suit was not barred under 0. 2, r. 2,
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly
decreed the suit in favour of Raghunath Das. Gokul Chand appealed to the High
Court.
The appeal came up for hearing before a
Division Bench of the Punjab High Court. Only two points, were pressed in
support of the appeal, namely, (1) whether the suit was barred by time and (2)
whether the suit was barred under 2, r. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Learned counsel appearing for Gokul Chand urged that the suit was one for the
recovery of "-other specific moveable property " that is to say
specific moveable property other than those falling within Arta. 48, 48A and
48B of the Indian Limitation Act and was accordingly governed by Art. 49.
Article 49.
provides three years' period of limitation
I04 816 for a suit for " other specific moveable property or for
compensation for wrongful taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same
" and this period of three years begins to run from " when the
property is wrongfully taken or injured or when the detainer's possession
becomes unlawful ". In the opinion of the High Court the suit was for the
recovery of specific Government promissory notes and this, according to the
High Court, was plain from the perusal of para. 18 of the plaint which set out
the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. The reference to the numbers,
value and the year of issue of G. P. Notes and the rates of interest carried by
them appeared to the High Court to be decisive on this point. The High Court
held that the suit was governed by Art. 49 and that, as the plaintiff would be
out of time even if the period between November 15, 1939, and March 15, 1945,
was excluded, the High Court did not think it necessary to consider the
question of the applicability of s. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. As its
finding on the issue of limitation was sufficient to dispose of the suit, the
High Court did not discuss the other issue founded on 0. 2, r. 2, of the Code
of Civil Procedure but allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit as barred by
limitation.
We are unable to accept the decision of the
High Court as correct. The High Court overlooked the fact that so far as the G.
P. Notes were concerned the decree upon the award only declared the rights of
the parties. Under the decree Raghunath Das was entitled to have G. P. Notes of
the value of Rs. 13,200 endorsed in the names of himself and Mst. Daropadi out
of the G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 26,500.
The award or the decree thereon did not
actually divide the G. P. Notes by specifying which particular G. P. Notes were
to be endorsed in the names of Gokul Chand and Mst.
Daropadi or which of them were to be endorsed
in the names of Raghunath Das and his mother. Until the G. P. Notes were
actually divided, either by consent of parties or by the decree of the court,
neither of the brothers could claim any particular piece of G. P. Notes as his
separate property or 817 ask for delivery of any particular C. P. Notes in
specie.
Gokul Chand not being agreeable to come to an
amicable division of the G. P. Notes, Raghunath Das had perforce to seek the
assistance of the court and pray that the entire lot of C. P. Notes of the
value of Rs. 26,500 be divided by or under the directions of the court into two
lots and one lot making up the value of Rs. 13,200 be endorsed in favour of him
(Raghunath Das) and his mother by or on behalf of Gokul Chand and then
delivered to him, the plaintiff. He could not in his plaint claim that
particular pieces of G. P. Notes making up the value of Rs. 13,200 be delivered
to him in specie. This being the true position, as we conceive it, Raghunath
Das's suit cannot possibly be regarded as a suit for a " specific moveable
property ". That expression is apt only to cover a suit wherein the
plaintiff can allege that he is entitled to certain specific moveable property
and/or of which he is presently entitled to possession in specie and which the
defendant has wrongfully taken from him and/or is illegally withholding from
him. That is not the position here. It should be remembered that the two
brothers were entitled to the G. P. Notes of the value of Rs. 26,500 originally
as joint coparceners and thereafter, when the decree upon the award had been
passed, as tenants- in-common. Until actual partition by consent of the parties
or by court Gokul Chand, who held the custody of the G. P. Notes, could not be
said to have taken them wrongfully from Raghunath Das and his possession of
them could not be said to be or to have become unlawful. These considerations
clearly distinguish this case from the case of Gopal Chandra Bose v. Surendra
Nath Dutt (1) on which the High Court relied because in that case the defendant
had no right to or interest in the G. P. Notes in question and had no right to
retain possession thereof. Therefore, to the present situation the terminus a
quo specified in the third column of Art. 49 can have no application. It is now
well established that a suit by an heir against other heirs to recover his share
of the moveable estate of a deceased person is not one for (1) (1908) XII C. W.
N. 1010 818 specific moveable property wrongfully taken such as is contemplated
by Art 49, but is governed by Art. 120. See Mohomed Riasat Ali v. Mussumat
Hasin Banu (1). The only difference between the facts of that case and those of
the present case is that here the rights of the parties had been declared by
the decree upon the award but that circumstance does not appear to us to make
any material difference in the application of the principle laid down by the
Judicial Committee. The substance of the plaintiff's claims in both cases is
for separating his share out of the estate and for allotment and delivery to
him of his share so separated. In short such a suit is nothing but a suit for
partition or division of the moveable properties held jointly or as
tenants-in-common by the parties and there being no specific Article applicable
to such a suit it must be governed by Art. 120.
The period of limitation fixed by Art. 120 is
six years from the date when the right to sue accrues. In order, therefore, to
be within the period of limitation the plaintiff claims to exclude the period
November 15, 1939, to March 15, 1945, spent in the execution proceedings.
Section 14 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act runs as follows:
" 14 (1) In computing the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has
been prosecuting with, due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a
Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall
be excluded where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and
is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, for defect of jurisdiction, or
other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it." The respondent
contends that the above section has no application to the facts of his case. We
do not think that such contention is well-founded. The execution proceedings
initiated by Raghunath Das were certainly civil proceedings and there can be no
doubt that he prosecuted such civil proceedings with due diligence and good
faith, for lie was obviously (i) (1893) L. R. 20 I. A. 155. 819 anxious to have
his share of the G. P. Notes separately allocated to him. He lost in the
execution court but went on appeal to the High Court where he succeeded before
a Single Judge, but eventually he failed before the Division Bench which
reversed the order the Single Judge had passed in his favour. Therefore, there
can be no question of want of due diligence and good faith on the part of
Raghunath Das. In the next place the section excludes the time spent both in a
court of first instance and in a court of appeal.
Therefore, other conditions being satisfied,
the entire period mentioned above would be liable to be excluded. The only
questions that remain are (1) whether the proceedings were founded upon the
same cause of action and (2) whether he prosecuted the proceedings in good
faith in a court which for defect of jurisdiction ",as unable to entertain
it. The execution proceedings were founded upon his claim to enforce his rights
declared under the decree upon the award. The cause of action in the present
suit is also for enforcement of the same right, the only difference being that
in the former proceedings Raghunath Das was seeking to enforce his rights in
execution and in the present instance he is seeking to enforce the same rights
in a regular suit. There is nothing new that he is asking for in the present
suit.
That he prosecuted the execution proceedings
in the Subordinate Court as well as in the High Court in good faith cannot be
denied, for the Single Judge of the High Court actually upheld his contention
that the court had jurisdiction to entertain his application. The execution
proceedings failed before the Division Bench on no other ground than that the
executing court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, because the
decree sought to be executed was a nullity having been passed by a court which
had no jurisdiction to pass it. Therefore, the defect of jurisdiction in the
court that passed the decree became, as it were, attached to the decree itself
and the executing court could not entertain the execution proceeding on account
of the same defect. The defect of jurisdiction in the executing court was
finally determined when 820 the Division Bench reversed the decision of the
Single Judge who had entertained the execution proceeding. In our opinion
Raghunath Das is entitled to the benefit of s. 14 (1) of the Indian Limitation
Act and the period here in before mentioned being excluded, there can be no
doubt that the suit was filed well within the prescribed period of limitation
and the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained.
In the view it took on the question of
limitation the Division Bench did not consider it necessary to go into or give
any decision on the other issue, namely, as to whether the suit was barred by
0. 2, r. 2. The suit should, therefore, go back to the High Court for
determination of that issue. The result, therefore, is that we accept the
appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the case
back to the High Court for a decision on issue No. 3 only. The appellant will
get the costs of this appeal as well as the costs of the hearing in the High Court
resulting in the decree under appeal and the general costs of the appeal and
the costs of further hearing on remand will be dealt with by the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
Case remanded.
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