Attar Singh & Ors Vs. The State of
U. P [1958] INSC 136 (17 December 1958)
WANCHOO, K.N.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
SUBBARAO, K.
CITATION: 1959 AIR 564 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 928
CITATOR INFO :
D 1967 SC 57 (7) RF 1967 SC 856 (13) F 1967
SC1568 (6)
ACT:
Agricultural Holdings, Consolidation
of-Constitutional validity of enactment-Procedure, if discriminatory-U.P. Consolidation
of Holdings Act (U.P. V of 1954) as amended by Act No. XVI of 1957, ss. 8, 9,
10, 14 to 17, 19 to 22, 49Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 31(2).
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners challenged the constitutional
validity of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U . P. V of 954), as
amended by the amending Acts, which was intended to encourage the development
of agriculture by the allotment of compact areas to tenure-holders in lieu of
scattered plots so that large-scale cultivation might be possible with all its
attendant advantages. A notification was issued under s. 4 Of the impugned Act
declaring the decision of the State Government to formulate a scheme of'
consolidation in respect of the area where the petitioners held their lands.
This was followed up by a statement of
proposals under s. 19. The petitioners objected to these proposals and
thereafter appealed to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) but to no effect.
It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf that (1) the provisions of ss. 8,
9 and 10 read with those Of s49 Of the impugned Act were discriminatory in that
they laid down a procedure for correction and revision of revenue records for
929 villages under consolidation that was vitally different from that
applicable to other villages under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901; (2) that
ss. 14 to 17 as also ss. 19 to 22 read with s. 49 conferred arbitrary powers on
the consolidation authorities in respect of the lands of the tenure-holder and
his rights therein and deprived him of the protection of courts available to
other tenure: holders and that (3) S. 29B which provided for compensation, by
giving inadequate compensation, offended Art. 31(2) Of the Constitution.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
Although the procedure laid down by the
impugned Act was to some extent different from that under the U.P. Revenue Act,
1901, it was by no means arbitrary or devoid of natural justice. Regard being
had to the advantages that consolidation conferred on the tenure-holder such
difference was supportable as a permissible classification on an intelligible
differentia reasonably connected with the object of the Act. The expeditious
procedure for effectuating consolidation laid down by ch. II of the Act read
with the Rules, therefore, could not be said to violate Art. 14 Of the
Constitution.
Nor could for similar reasons the provisions
of ch. III of the Act be said to violate Art. 14 Of the Constitution. The
provision Of S. 22(2) Of the Act which made the decision of the arbitrator
final by ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary courts even where a party had
obtained a decree which might be under appeal, was necessary in the interest of
expedition.
Having regard to the peculiar conditions in
cases of this kind and the advantages a scheme of consolidation offered to the
entire body of tenure-holders, it could not be said that the cash compensation
for tenure holders provided by s. 29B of the impugned Act was inadequate, even
assuming that Art.
31(2) applied to the case.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 119
of 1957.
Writ Petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Achhru Ram, J. P. Goyal and K. L. Mehta, for
the petitioners.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of
India, K.L. Misra, Advocate-General for the State of U. P. and Gopi Nath Dixit,
for the respondent.
1958. December 17. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
challenges the constitutionality of the 117 930 U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act, (U. P. V of 1954), as amended by U. P. Acts No. XXVI of 1954, No. XIII of
1955, No. XX of 1955, No. XXIV of 1956 and No. XVI of 1957, (hereinafter called
the Act). The applicants are four brothers holding land in village Banat,
tahsil Kairana, District Muzaffarnagar. A notification was issued under s. 4 of
the Act in respect of 223 villages in tahsil Kairana, declaring that the State
Government had decided to make a scheme of consolidation in that area. This was
followed up by necessary action under the various provisions of the Act resulting
in a statement of proposals under s. 19.
Objections to these proposals were filed by
the petitioners and others, which were decided in April 1956. The petitioners
went in appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which was decided in
August 1957. It was thereafter that the present petition was filed in this
Court.
The petitioners challenge the
constitutionality of the Act on various grounds, of which the following five
have been urged before us:(1)Section 6 read with s. 4 of the Act gives arbitrary
powers to the State Government to accord discriminatory treatment to
tenure-holders in different villages by placing some villages under
consolidation while excluding others, thus offending Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
(2)Sections 8, 9 and 10 read with s. 49 of
the Act provide a procedure for the correction and revision of revenue records
for villages under consolidation, which is vitally different from that
applicable to villages not under consolidation, and there is thus
discrimination which offends Art. 14 of the Constitution ;
(3)Sections 14 to 17 read with s. 49, confer
arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities under which they can deprive
a tenure-holder of his land or rights therein and the tenure-holder has been
deprived of the protection of courts available to other tenure-holders in
villages not under consolidation, thus creating discrimination which offends
Art. 14.
931 (4)Sections 19 to 22, read with s. 49,
again create discrimination on the same grounds as ss. 14 to 17, and are,
therefore, hit by Art. 14; and (5)Section 29-B, which provides for compensation
gives inadequate compensation and is, therefore, hit by Art. 31(2) of the
Constitution.
Before we take these points seriatim, it is
useful to refer to the background of this legislation. As far back as 1939, the
U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act No. VIII of 1939, was passed. It was,
however, of little effect, because it could only be applied when more than
one-third of the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for an
order of consolidation of the village. It was, therefore, felt that some kind
of compulsion would be necessary in order to achieve consolidation of holdings
in villages. That consolidation would result in improving agricultural
production goes without saying and it was with the object of encouraging the
development of agriculture that consolidation schemes with a compulsory
character were taken up in various States, after the recommendation of The
Famine Inquiry Commission, 1944, in its Final Report; (Seepage 263). The State
of Bombay. was the first to pass an Act called the Bombay Prevention of
Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, (Bom. LXII of 1947). This was
followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh. The object of the Act is to
allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to tenure-holders so that large
scale cultivation may be possible with all its attendant advantages. Thus' by
the reduction of boundary-lines saving of land takes place and the number of
boundary-disputes is reduced. There is saving of time in the management of
fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling from field to field,
which may be at considerable distances from each other.' Proper barriers such
as fences, hedges and ditches can be erected around a compact area to prevent
trespassing and thieving. It would further be easier to control irrigation and
drainage and disputes over water would be reduced considerably where compact
areas are allotted to tenure-holders. Lastly, the control of pests, insects 932
and plant-disease is made easier where farmers have compact areas under
cultivation. These advantages resulting from consolidation of holdings are
intended to encourage the development of agriculture and larger production of
food grains, which is the necessity of the day.
With these objects in mind, the Act was
passed by the U. P. Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the
President on March 4, 1954. It was published in the gazette on March 8, 1954,
and declarations under s. 4 were made for the major part of the State of Uttar
Pradesh, including the petitioners' village, in July, 1954.
The scheme of the Act is as follows: When
consolidation of a village is taken up, the first thing that is done is to
correct the revenue records, and ss. 7 to 12 deal with that. Then comes the
second stage of preparing what are called statements of principles ; (see ss.
14 to 18). Objections to these principles are entertained and decided and
thereafter the principles are confirmed under s.
18. Then comes the third stage (vide ss. 19
to 23), which deals with the preparation of the statement of proposals.
Objections to this are also invited and
disposed of, and then proposals are confirmed under s. 23. After the proposals
have been confirmed, we come to the last stage in which the confirmed proposals
are enforced; (see ss. 24 onwards). It will be clear therefore from the objects
of the Act and the advantages that accrue from its implementation that it is a
piece of legislation, which should be a boon to the tenure-holders in a village
and should also lead to the development of agriculture and increase of
food-production. It is in this setting that we have to examine the attack that
has been made on the constitutionality of the Act.
Re. 1 : Section 6 of the Act gives power to
the State Government at any time to cancel the declaration made under s. 4 in
respect of the whole or any part of the area specified therein. When such
declaration is made the area ceases to be under consolidation operations and s.
5 which provides for the effect of a declaration ceases to operate.
It is urged that s. 4 933 gives arbitrary
power to the State Government to cancel the declaration, even with respect to a
part of the area covered by it and thus discriminates between villages which
are under consolidation and those which are not under consolidation. The
learned Additional Solicitor General counters this argument in two ways: (i)
Section 6 is nothing more than a restatement of the power which the State
Government otherwise possessed under the General Clauses Act; and (ii) the high
status of the authority to whom the power is given, namely, the State
Government, and the rules framed under the Act laying down a standard for the
Government to follow, remove any flavour of arbitrariness which the terms of
the section might import. It is not necessary to express any opinion in this
case on the said contention, for, even if it be accepted, the result would be
only that s. 6 would be struck down. The petitioners would be in the same
position with s. 6 on the Statute or without it. It may be that, if a citizen
in whose favour an order of consolidation has been made but subsequently
cancelled, comes to court with a grievance that the order of consolidation was
for his benefit but was cancelled in exercise of a power under a void section,
this question might arise for consideration. It may also be that the
petitioners' right might be infringed if s. 6 were not severable from the other
provisions of the Act which enable the Government to direct consolidation of
holdings. The power of cancellation cannot be said to be so inextricably mixed
up with the power to order consolidation as to prevent the operation of one
section without the other. Nor can it be said that the Legislature would not have
conferred the power on the Government to consolidate holdings without at the
same time conferring on them the power to cancel the said order of
consolidation. The said provisions are clearly severable. In the circumstances,
as the petitioners' case is not affected by s. 6 of the Act, we leave this open
to be decided in an appropriate case.
Re. 2: This deals with the first stage of
revision and correction of maps and records, which has to take place before the
actual consolidation scheme is put 934 into force. Section 7 provides for the
examination of the revenue records by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and
he is enjoined to test the accuracy of the village map, khasra and the current
annual registers by making a partal in accordance with the procedure to be
prescribed. After he has done the partal, he is to prepare a statement showing
the mistakes discovered in the map, khasra and khatauni, 'and the number and
nature of disputes pertaining to land records under the U. P. Land Revenue Act,
1901. Then under s. 8 he submits a report to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation)
in this connection with his opinion whether any revision of such maps and
records is needed. On receipt of this report, the Settlement Officer may either
order the Assistant Consolidation Officer to proceed with the correction of
maps and records, which we presume he will order when there are not too many
mistakes, or recommend to the State Government for revision of maps or records
in accordance with the provisions of Ch. IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act,
1901, which he will presumably do if there are too many mistakes found. If the
Assistant Consolidation Officer is ordered to make the corrections he will make
a further partal, if necessary, and correct the map or the entries in annual
register in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed. The procedure is
prescribed in r. 22 and among other things it lays down that the Assistant
Consolidation Officer shall issue a notice to all persons affected by the
provisional entries proposed by him;
objections are invited and parties are
examined and heard and their evidence taken and then the Assistant
Consolidation Officer makes the corrections. His order is open to appeal within
twenty one days under s. 8(4) to the Consolidation Officer, and the order of
the latter is made final.
It is urged that this procedure is vitally
different from the procedure prescribed under the U. P. Land Revenue Act and
that under s. 49 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts
with respect to any matters arising out of consolidation proceedings is barred,
thus depriving those affected by the orders of the Consolidation Officer the
right to file a suit as they 935 could have done under the provisions of the U.
P. Land Revenue Act; (see ss. 40, 41, 51 and 54). There is no doubt that there
is some difference between the procedure provided under the Act and that which
the tenure-holders 'Would have been entitled to if their village was not under
consolidation. But if consolidation is a boon to the tenure-holders of a
village, as we hold it is, and if it is to be put through within a reasonable
period of time, it is necessary to have a procedure which would be shorter than
the ordinary procedure under the U. P. Land Revenue Act or through a suit in a
civil or revenue court. The procedure that has been provided cannot by any
means be said to be arbitrary or lacking in the essentials of principles of
natural justice. The Assistant Consolidation Officer gives notice to the
persons affected, hears their objections and gives them an opportunity to
produce evidence. Thereafter he decides the objections and one appeal is
provided against his order. This should, in our opinion, be enough in the
special circumstances arising under the Act to do justice to those who object
to the correction of records. All that has happened is that the number of
appeals is out down to one and that in our opinion is not such a violent
departure from the ordinary procedure as to make us strike down the provisions
contained in Ch. II of the Act as discriminatory, in the peculiar circumstances
arising out of a scheme of consolidation which must, if it has to be of any
value, be put through within a reasonable period of time.
Whatever difference there may be may well be
supported as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia having
a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Further
s. 12 provides that where there is dispute as to title and such question has
not already been deter. mined by any competent Court, the Consolidation Officer
has to refer the question for determination to the Civil Judge who thereafter
will refer it to the arbitrator. The arbitrator then proceeds in the manner
provided by r. 73 and gives a bearing to the parties and takes evidence both
oral and documentary before making his award; and s. 37 of the Act makes the
936 Arbitration Act applicable to the proceedings before the arbitrator in the
matter of procedure. Taking, therefore, the scheme of Ch. 11 and remembering
that if consolidation is to be put through there must be a more expeditious
procedure, there is in our opinion rational basis for classification which
justifes the procedure under Ch. 11 of the Act read with the Rules in villages
where consolidation scheme is to be effective. The attack, therefore, under
Art. 14 of the Constitution on the provisions of Ch. II fails.
Re. 3 and 4: The contentions on these heads
may be taken together. They attack the provisions of Ch. III dealing with the
Statement of Principles and Statement of Proposals.
The statement of principles is first
published and objections are invited. Under s. 17 the Assistant Consolidation
Officer decides the objections after hearing the parties, if necessary, and
taking into account the view of the Consolidation Committee. He then submits a
report to the Consolidation Officer who after hearing the objectors and taking
such evidence as may be necessary passes final order and confirms the statement
of principles; (see r. 43B). Similarly, when statements of proposals are
published, objections are invited to them, and the same procedure is followed
in the decision of these objections as in the case of the objections to the
statement of principles. In the case of the statement of proposals also, there
is similar provision to refer disputed question of title to the Civil Judge,
who, in his turn, refers it to the arbitrator.
Section 22 also provides that where such
question has been referred to the arbitrator, all suits or proceedings in the
court of first instance, appeal, reference or revision, in which the question
of title to the same land has been raised, shall be stayed. Section 22(3) makes
the decision of the arbitrator final. There is no provision for appeal in Ch.
III though in fact two persons hear the matter, namely, the Assistant
Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer. But the main attack is on
the provisions of s. 22(2) on account of which it is said that even where a
party has obtained a decree which might be under appeal, the jurisdiction of
the ordinary 937 courts is taken away and the decision of the arbitrator is
made final. That is undoubtedly so. But if the consolidation scheme has to be
put through in a reasonable period of time such a provision is, in our opinion,
necessary; but for it the consolidation schemes may never be really put through
for there will be little purpose in making consolidation where a large number
of disputes are pending in the courts. Reasons which we have given in dealing
with the second point apply with equal force to these two points also, and we
are of opinion that there is a rational basis for a classification which has a
nexus with the object of the Act, and therefore, the attack under Art.
14 on the provisions of Chapter III also must
fail.
Re. 5. Under this head,, the inadequacy of
compensation provided under s. 29-B of the Act is raised. It may be mentioned
that the Act, as originally passed, did not contain any provision for
compensation. There were a number of writ applications in the Allahabad High
Court and that court held that inasmuch as some property was taken away under
s. 14(1) (ee) for public purposes and no compensation was provided, that
provision was void under Art. 31 (2) as it stood before the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Fourth Amendment,).
Appeals by the State Government from that decision of the Allahabad High Court
are pending before us and we shall deal with them separately. The legislature
then enacted s. 29-B laying down the principles on which compensation would be
paid for lands taken away under s. 14 (1) (ee) after the decision of the
Allahabad High Court. This section was put by Act XVI of 1957 in the original
Act with retrospective effect from the date from which the original Act was
enforced. It is urged that the compensation provided therein is inadequate,
and, therefore, the provision should be struck down under Art. 31 (2), as it
was before the Fourth Amendment.
Arguments were also addressed on the question
whether s. 29B would be saved by the 118 938 Fourth Amendment. We, however,
think it unnecessary to go into these arguments for we have come to the
conclusion that in the circumstances of this case the compensation provided
under s. 29-B is adequate. Assuming that the case is governed by Art. 31 (2) as
it was before the Fourth Amendment, s. 29-B provides for payment of cash
compensation equal to four times the value determined at hereditary rates to a
bhumidar and two times the value to a sirdar. The difference between the two
rates has not been attacked for the rights of a bhumidar are much higher than
the rights of a sirdar. The bhumidar is the owner of the land while the sirdar
is merely a tenant; but the argument is that the amount provided is inadequate,
and that it is certainly not the fair market value of the land.
Let us see what s. 14 (1) (ee) provides. It
lays down the basis on which the tenure--holder will contribute towards the
land required for public purposes and the extent to which vacant land may be
utilised for the said purpose. We are here concerned with the first part,
namely, the contribution of tenure-holders towards land required for public
purposes. In this case the petitioners had lands in one chak of the rental
value of Rs. 20-6-0 and they have been allotted lands of the rental value of
Rs. 20-5-0 instead. In another chak, in place of land the rental value of which
is Rs. 148-10-0 they have been allotted land of the rental value of Rs.
147-13-0. Thus out of the land valued at Rs. 169-0-0, they have been allotted
land of the value of Rs. 168-2-0, and land valued at Annas 0-14-0 has gone to
the common pool. The percentage is just over a half per cent.
it hardly ever exceeds one per cent. Thus the
land which is taken over is a small bit, which sold by itself would hardly
fetch anything. These small bits of lands are collected from various
tenure-holders and consolidated in one place and added to the land which might
be lying vacant so that it may be used for the purposes of s. 14 (1) (ee). A
compact area is thus created and it is used for the purposes of the
tenure-holders themselves and other villagers. Form CH-21 framed under r. 41
(1) shows the purposes to which this land would be applied, 939 namely, (1)
plantation of trees, (2) pasture land, (3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor,
(5) cremation ground, (6) graveyards, (7) primary or other school, (8)
playground, (9) panchayatghar, and (10) such other objects. These small bits of
land thus acquired from: tenure-holders are consolidated and used for these purposes,
which are directly for the benefit of the tenure-holders. They are deprived of
a small bit and in place of it they are given advantages in a much larger area
of land made up of these small bits and also of vacant land. The question then
is whether in these circumstances it can be said that the tenure holders have
been given adequate compensation by. s. 29-B for the small bits of land
acquired from them for public purposes. This case must be distinguished from
other cases where lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, for here
the benefit is direct to the tenure-holders while in ordinary cases of land
acquired for public purposes, if there is any benefit to the person from whom
the land is acquired, it is indirect and remote. It is contended on behalf of
the State in the circumstances that the compensation which the tenure holders
get is not merely the cash compensation which they receive under s. 29-B but
also the advantage which they receive by these small bits taken from them being
consolidated into a larger area of land in which they will have benefits, the
nature of which is indicated in form CH21, over and above the advantage of
having their scattered holdings consolidated into a compact block. The
question, therefore, is whether in these circumstances the provision of actual
cash compensation under s. 29-B can be said to be inadequate. We are of opinion
that taking into account the peculiar conditions in cases of this kind and
remembering that the land taken from each individual tenure-holder may be a
small bit and it is then consolidated into a large area by adding some other
lands taken from other tenure-holders, and the whole is then used for the
advantage of the whole body of tenure-holders, it cannot be said that the cash
compensation, added to the advantages which the tenure holders get in the 940
large area of land thus constituted and on account of getting a compact block
for themselves, is inadequate.
Therefore, assuming that Art. 31 (2) applies
as it was before the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be said that the compensation
which the tenure-holders will get under s. 29-B is inadequate in the
circumstances. This ground of attack also therefore fails.
There is no force in this petition and it is
hereby dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
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