V.C. K. Bus Service Ltd. Vs. The
Regional Transport Authority, Coimbatore [1957] INSC 18 (19 February 1957)
ACT:
Road Transport-Permit for stage
carriage-Rerewal-Whether a continuation of the original Permit-Whether subject
to implied condition of validity of the original Permit-Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 (IV Of 1939), ss. 57, 58.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was granted a permit for stage
carriage by the Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate authority, the Central Road
Traffic Board, by the unsuccessful applicants the order granting the permit was
set aside and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was approved by the
Government in revision. The appellant, thereupon, moved the High Court for a
writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the Central Road Traffic Board
and the Government. During the pendency of these proceedings there was a stay
of operation of the order setting aside the grant of the permit to the
Appellant, with the result that be continued to run his buses notwithstanding
the cancellation of his permit. Before the expiry of the period fixed in the
original 664 permit, he applied for and got a renewal of the permit from the
Regional Transport Authority under s. 58 of the Act.
The High Court finally dismissed the
application for a writ of certiorari and 'the question arose as to the validity
of the renewal of the permit in view of the High Court's decision. The matter
was raised before the High Court once again by proceedings under Art. 226 of
the Constitution and the High Court held that the renewal having been obtained
on the basis of a permit which had been subsequently cancelled, it could not be
regarded as a fresh permit, that when the original permit was set aside, it
must be taken to be nonest for all purposes, and I that the renewal must
therefore be held to be a nullity. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held:(1) Under the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1949 and the rules framed there under, a renewal is a
continuation of the original permit. When the original permit was renewed in
favour of the appellant it was subject to the decision of the High Court in the
proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution which were then pending and,
therefore, when the order granting the original permit was fin ally set aside
the renewed permit became void.
Anjiah v. Regional Transport Officer, Guntur,
1956 Andhra Law Times, 347, disapproved.
(2)When the appellant applied for a renewal
of his permit under s. 58 of the Act and not merely for a fresh permit the
order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the renewal must be held to
have been made subject to the implied condition that the right of the appellant
to the original permit is recognized by the High Court and that accordingly, in
the event that had happened, the renewed permit ceased to, be effective.,.
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd.,
(1952) S.C.R. 583, explained and distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
No&323 and 324 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and orders dated
April 27, and July 13, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 42
and 88 of 1956 arising out of the orders dated March 23, and July 9, 1956, of
the said High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 333 and 564 of 1956.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, J. B. Dadachanji, S.
N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.
Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,, R.
Gan. pathy Iyer and R. Gopalkrishnan, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
665 1957. February 19. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These are appeals against the
judgment of the High Court of Madras on a certificate given under Art. 133 (1)
(c) of the Constitution, and they raise a question of some importance as to the
true legal character of a permit when it is renewed under the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as the Act.
In order to appreciate the contentions of the
parties, it is necessary to state the material facts leading up to the present
dispute. Towards the end of 1952, the appropriate authorities under the Act
decided to grant two additional permits for stage carriages in the Ondipudur-Agricultural
College route in the town of Coimbatore in the State of Madras,, and invited
applications therefor under s. 57 of the Act. There were as many as 39
applicants, and by his order dated December 3, 1952, the Regional Transport
Authority granted one permit to applicant No. 24, the Thondamuthur Trading
Company Ltd., and another to applicant No. 30, the V.C.K. Bus Service. There
were appeals by some of the unsuccessful applicants to the Central Road Traffic
Board, which by its order dated February 19, 1953, set aside the order of the
Regional Transport Authority and granted the permits, one to Stanes Transports
Ltd., and another to Thirumalaiswami Goundar. Revisions were preferred against
this order by the aggrieved applicants under s. 64-A of the Act, and by its
order dated July 9, 1953, the Government confirmed the grant of the permit to
Stanes Transports ,Ltd., but set aside the permit given to Thirumalaiswami
Goundar, and granted it instead to Annamalai Bus Transport Ltd.
Thereupon, applicants Nos. 24 and 30 moved
the High Court of Madras under Aft. 226 for a writ of certiorari to quash the
order of the Central Road Traffic Board dated February 19, 1953 and of the
Government dated July 9, 1953; but the applications were dismissed by
Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on March 8, 1954. Against the orders of dismissal, Writ
Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were preferred, and they were 666 dismissed by
Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. on March 21, 1956. It should be
mentioned that the operation of 'the order dated February 19, 1953 was stayed
pending the disposal of the revision under s. 64-A and the writ proceedings in
the High Court, with the result that both Thondamuthur Trading Company Ltd. and
V.C.K. Bus Service which had been granted permits by the Regional Transport
Authority on December 3, 1952, continued to run their buses notwithstanding
cancellation of those permits on February 19, 1953. It should also be mentioned
that in June 1954 the business of the V.C.K. Bus Service which was the grantee
of one of the permits under the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated
December 3, 1952, was taken over by a Company called the V.C.K. Bus Service
Ltd., which is the appellant before us, and by an order of the Regional
Transport Authority dated July 7, 1954, it was recognised as the transferee of
the permit granted to V.C.K. Bus Service.
To continue the narrative, the permit which
was the subject- matter of the litigation aforesaid was for a period of one
year and a half, and it expired on June 30, 1954. Before its expiry, the
appellant applied on April 15, 1954, for a renewal thereof for a period of
three years. This application was duly notified under s.57, and objections to
the grant were preferred by both Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai Bus Transport
Ltd. On September 5, 1954, the Regional Transport Authority granted a permit to
the appellant for a period of one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1955,
obviously in the expectation that Writ Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 would by
then have been decided. On March 19, 1955,the appellant again applied for a
renewal of the permit, and that was also notified under s. 57, and no
objections having been filed to the grant thereof, the Regional Transport
Authority by his order dated June 23, 1955, renewed the permit for a period of
three years from July 1, 1955 to June 30, 1958. It is this permit that forms
the subject-matter of the present litigation.
It has been already stated that Writ Appeals
Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were dismissed on March 21, 1956.
667 Apprehending that the Regional Transport
Authority might, in view of the judgment of the High Court, cancel the permit
which was renewed on June 23, 1955, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 333
of 1956 for a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Regional Transport Authority
from Cancelling the permit, and that was dismissed by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on
the ground that when the original permit was set aside, the renewal thereof
fell to the ground. The appellant filed Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 against this
order, and that was heard by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. who by
their judgment dated April 27, 1956, held, following a previous decision of
that Court in K. Muthuvadivelu v. Regional Transport Officer(1) that the
renewal having been obtained on the basis of a permit which had been
subsequently cancelled, it could not be regarded as a fresh permit, that when
the original permit was set aside, it must be taken to be non est for all
purposes, and that the renewal must therefore be held to be a nullity. In the
result, they dismissed the appeal, but granted a certificate under Art.
133(1)(c), observing that the case raised a point of general importance, which
was stated by them in these terms:
When an application for renewal of a permit
is made and granted and eventually it is held that the original permit was
itself wrongly granted, does the renewed permit subsist for the period for
which it was renewed, or does it automatically cease to be in force when it is
finally decided that the original permit was not granted validly ? This matter
now comes before us in Civil Appeal No, 323 of 1956.
After the High Court delivered its judgment
in Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 on April 27, 1956, the respondents herein, viz.,
Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai Bus Transport Ltd., applied to the
Regional Transport Authority to grant them permits in accordance with the
decisions of the High Court, and on May 5, 1956, the Regional Transport
Authority cancelled the permit granted by him on June 23, 1955, in favour (1)
A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 143.
86 668 of the appellant, and granted permits
instead to the respondents. Thereupon, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.
554 of 1956 for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated May 5, 1956, on
the grounds which had been put forward in Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 and
Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956. That petition was dismissed by Rajagopalan J. on
July 9, 1956, and the Writ Appeal No. 88 of 1956 filed against that order was
dismissed by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapa- kesa Ayyar J. on July 13, 1956.
Leave to appeal against that judgment was also given under Art. 133 (1) (c), as
the subject-matter thereof was the same as that of Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956
in respect of which leave had already been granted. Civil Appeal No. 324, of
1956 relates to this matter. Thus, both the appeals relate to the same matter,
and raise the same point for determination.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel
who appeared in support of the appeals, contends that the view taken by the learned
Judges of the High Court that when a permit is set aside by higher authorities,
it should be treated as wholly non-existent, and that, in consequence, a
renewal thereof must be held to be void, is not sound, that on a correct
interpretation of ss. 57 and 58, a renewal is practically in the nature of a
new grant, that the permit which was granted to the appellant for the period
July 1, 1955 to June 30, 1958, though styled a renewal, was in substance a
fresh permit, and that the fact that the old permit was set aside did not
therefore affect the rights of the appellant under this permit. He also argues
that the Act and the rules framed thereunder contain elaborate provisions as to
when a permit could be cancelled, forming in themselves a complete code on the
subject, that the cancellation of the original permit is not one of the grounds
on which a renewed permit could be set aside, and that the order of the
Regional Transport Authority dated May 5, 1956, was therefore ultra vires. The
contention of the learned Solicitor-General for the. respondents is that when a
permit is renewed, the renewal is, on a true construction of the provisions of
the Act, in substance as in name a continuation of the 669 previous permit, and
that, in consequence, when the, grant of a permit is set aside by a higher
authority, the renewal thereof must also stand automatically set aside, and
that further even if a renewed permit is not to be regarded as a continuation
of the original permit,, seeing that it is granted on the basis of that permit
it should be held to be subject to an implied term that it should cease if the
original permit is cancelled. The two points that arise for decision on these
contentions are: (1) when a permit is renewed, is it a continuation of the
original permit, or is it, in fact, a new one? and (2) if a renewed permit is
not a continuation of the original permit, is the grant of it subject to the
implied condition that it is liable to be cancelled, if the original permit is
cancelled ? On the first question, it is necessary to refer to certain
provisions of the Act material thereto. Section,57 prescribes the procedure to
be followed in the grant of stage carriage permits. Under sub-s. (2),
applications there for have to be made not less than six weeks before the date
appointed by the Regional Transport Authority there for.
Sub-section (3) requires that they should be:
published in the prescribed manner, and provision is made for representations
being made in connection therewith. When any representation is so received,
sub-s. (5) provides that the person making it is to be given an. opportunity of
being heard thereon in person or by a, duly authorised representative, and that
the application for permit is to be disposed of at a public hearing. Section 58
deals with renewals, and is as follows:
(1) " A permit other than a temporary
permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such
period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional
Transport Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit:
Provided that in the case of a permit issued
or renewed within two years of the commencement of this Act, the permit shall
be effective without renewal for such period of less than three years as the
Provincial Government may prescribe.
670 (2) A permit may be renewed on an
application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit:
Provided that, other conditions being equal,
an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for
permits. " The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant based
on s. 58 (2) is that under the Act an application for renewal is to be dealt
with exactly as an application for a new permit, that it is to be notified
under s. 57 and representations have to be called for in connection herewith
and considered at a public hearing, that though the grant of the previous
permit furnishes a ground of preference, it is subject to the limitation that
the other conditions are equal and is thus only one of several factors to be
taken into account, and that therefore when a renewal is actually granted, it
is on an independent consideration of the merits and it cannot be distinguished
from a fresh grant. It was further argued that the proviso to s. 58(2) meant
little, because it was well established that the grant of a permit was not a
matter of right, and the authorities under the Act would be acting within their
powers if they refused an application for renewal and granted a fresh permit to
a new applicant. It was also contended that though the statute spoke of a
renewal of a permit, that expression did not accurately bring out the true
position, because in legal terminology, renewal imports that the transaction
which is renewed, as for example, a lease, is to operate for a further period
but on the same terms, but that when a permit was renewed, it was open to the
authorities to impose new conditions, to alter the period during which it was
to operate and generally to modify its terms, and that therefore the use of the
word ,renewal " should not lead to the. inference that it was the original
permit that was being continued.
There is force in these contentions, but
there are other provisions bearing on this question, and when they are reviewed
as a whole, it is abundantly clear that the intention of the legislature was to
treat a renewal as a continuation of the previous permit. To 671 start with, s.
58(1) enacts that a permit shall be effective for the period specified therein,
but this is qualified by the words " without renewal ". Therefore,
when there is a renewal, the effective period is not the original period
specified, but the period up to which the renewal is granted. That indicates
that the life of a renewed permit is one and continuous. The matter is placed
beyond doubt when we turn to the rules which have been framed under the Act.
Rule 184 (1) provides that when a renewal is granted, it shall be endorsed on
the permit itself, and Form No. 33, which is prescribed therefor is as follows:
" This permit is hereby renewed up to
the day of....... 19 Thus, what is renewed is " this permit". In this
connection, reference must be made to the definition of " permit " in
s. 2(2) of the Act 'as " the document issued by a Provincial or Regional
Transport Authority Rule 1985 is very material for the purpose of the present
discussion, and it runs as follows:
If an application for the renewal of a permit
has been made in accordance with these rules and the prescribed fee paid by the
prescribed date, the permit shall continue to be effective until orders are
passed on the application or until the expiry of three months from the date of
receipt of the application whichever is earlier. If orders on the application
are not passed within three months from the date of receipt of the application,
the permit-holder shall be entitled to have the permit renewed by the Transport
Authority for the period specified in the application or for one year whichever
is less and the Transport Authority shall call upon the permit-holder to
produce the registration certificate or certificates and Part B or Parts A and
B of the permit, as the case may be, and endorse the renewal in Parts A and B
of the permit accordingly and return them to the permit holder ".
Under this rule, when an application for
renewal is made, the permit already granted is to be in force 'until an order
is passed thereon, and what is more important, if no order is passed within
three months, 672 the permit 'becomes automatically renewed for the ,,period
mentioned in the rule. This goes a long way to support the contention of the
respondents that on the scheme of the Act, renewal is a continuation of the
original permit. It should also be mentioned that the rules provide for
different forms for an application for fresh permit and one for renewal, and
the fee to be paid along with those applications is also different. A reading
of the relevant provisions of the Act and of the rules leads indubitably to the
conclusion that a renewal is a continuation of the permit previously granted.
The fact that the grant of renewal is not a
matter of course, or that it is open to the authorities to impose fresh
conditions at the time of renewal does not, when the permit is in fact renewed,
alter its character as a renewal.
We shall now consider the authorities cited
by learned counsel for the appellant as supporting the view that a renewal
under the Act is in the same position as a fresh permit. In Mahabir Motor Co.
v. Bihar State(1), the point for decision was whether an appeal lay under s. 64
(f) against an order granting a renewal of a permit. The contention before the
Court was that the Act made a distinction between the grant of a permit and a
renewal thereof, and that as s. 64 (f), provided only for an appeal against an
order granting a permit, no appeal lay against an order granting a renewal. In
repelling this contention the Court observed "Both grant. and renewal
stand more or less on the same footing by reason of ss. 47, 57 and 58 of the Motor
Vehicles Act............
This observation has reference to the
procedure to be followed in the renewal of a permit and the right of appeal
given under a. 64 as part of that procedure. It has, no -bearing on the
character of a permit when it is renewed.
Another decision on which the appellant
strongly relied is Anjiah v. Regional Transport Officer, Guntur There, the,
facts were that an order of suspension had been passed for breach of one of the
(1) [1556] I.L.R. 34 Patna 429.
(2) [1956] Andhra Law Times 347.
] 673 conditions of the permit. - The
correctness of the order was challenged before higher authorities, but without
success.
Meantime, the period fixed in the permit had
expired, and it had been renewed. The question was whether the period of
suspension could be enforced against the renewed permit. It was held by the
Andhra High Court that it could not be, because the renewal was, in essence, a
new permit and not a mere continuance of the old one. The reason for' this
decision was thus stated in the judgment:
" There is no right of renewal as such
and when a permit is renewed, there is no right either, on the part of the
permit-holder to insist upon the continuance of the old terms. It would be
undesirable that there should be any such restrictions upon the right of the
authorities to grant the permit to anybody they choose or subject to any
conditions that they think -it to be necessary to impose, provided that they
are acting all the time in the public interest and subject to the provisions of
the Motor Vehicles Act and the. Rules made there under." These
considerations, though not without force, can. not, in our opinion, outweigh
the inference to be drawn from the other provisions to which we have made
reference and for the reasons already given, we are unable to agree with this
decision.
In the view that we have taken that under the
provisions of the Act and the rules, a renewal is a continuation of the
original permit, there can be no doubt as to what the rights of the appellant
are. When the proprietor of V. C. K. Bus Service was granted a permit by the
Regional Transport Authority on December 3, 1952, that grant was subject to the
result of the decision of the higher authorities. On September 5, 1954, when
the permit was renewed in favour of the appellant, that was subject to the
decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954, which was then
pending.
When the renewed permit dated September 5,
1954, was again renewed on June 23, 1955, that was likewise subject to the
result of the decision in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954. When the High Court by
its judgment dated March 674 21, 1956, passed in the said Writ Appeal upheld
the cancellation of the permit which had been granted by the Regional Transport
Authority on December 3, 1952 to V. C. K. Bus Service, the permit renewed on
June 23, 1955, became ineffective at least as from that date. The Regional
Transport Authority was therefore right in treating it as having become void,
and granting by his order dated May 5, 1956, permits to the respondents.
The second question arises on the alternative
contention advanced by the respondents that even if the renewal is to be
regarded, not as a continuation of the original permit but as an independent
grant, it must be held to have been subject to an implied condition that if the
original permit is ultimately set aside, the renewal thereof should come to an
end. Mr. Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant, disputes the correctness of
this contention. He argues that when there is a document embodying the terms' of
a contract, it is not permissible to imply therein a condition, if that will
contradict or vary any terms contained in it, that to read into the permit a
condition that it is to cease if the decision of the High Court went against
the appellant,' would be to modify the terms contained therein that it is to be
effective upto June 30, 1958, and that it could not therefore be implied. He
also relies on the following observation of Lord Parker in P. A. Tamplin
Steamship Company Limited v. Anglo Mexican Petroleum Products Company Limited
(1) :
" This principle is one of contract law,
depending on some term or condition to be implied in the contract itself and
not on something entirely dehors the contract which brings the contract to an
end. It is, of course, impossible to imply in a contract any term or condition
inconsistent with its express provisions, or with the intention of the parties
as gathered from those provisions." It is undoubted law that when the
terms of a contract or grant are reduced to writing, no condition can be
implied therein, which will be inconsistent with its express terms.
But the contention of the respondents (1)
[1916] 2 A.C. 307, 422.
675 involves no conflict with this principle.
They do not seek to obtain any modification or alteration of the terms of the
permit, -leaving it to operate subject to such modification or alteration. They
want that the whole permit with all its terms as to duration and otherwise
should be held to have become inoperative. What they are pleading is a condition
subsequent on the happening of which the permit will cease, and to that
situation the observation quoted above has no application. Reference may be
made in this connection to the following observation occurring later in the
speech of Lord Parker in F. A. Tamplin Steamship Company Limited v. Anglo-Mexican
Petroleum Products Company, Limited (supra):
" Moreover, some conditions can be more
readily implied than others. Speaking generally, it seems to me easier to imply
a condition precedent defeating a contract before its execution has commenced
than a condition subsequent defeating the contract when it is part
performed." Thus, there is no legal obstacle to implying a condition that
the renewal should stand cancelled if the right of the appellant to the original
permit was negatived by the High Court.
That brings us on to the question of fact,
whether on an examination of the permit and of the circum. stances under which
it came to be granted, we can infer that it was the intention of the Regional
Transport Authority to renew the permit subject to the result of the decision
of the High Court in the appeal which was then pending before it. The permit
granted to the V. C. K. Bus Service on December 3, 1952, had been cancelled on
February 19, 1953, and it was only by reason of the stay orders that the bus
was permitted to run. When the appellant applied for renewal on April 15, 1954,
there was opposition to the grant thereof from both the respondents herein,
based on the decision of the Government dated July 9, 1953, and it was in view
of their objection that the Regional Transport Authority renewed the permit for
one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1955. It is true that 87 676 when the
appellant applied again for renewal on March 19, 1955, the respondents did not
raise objection thereto, but as the appeals in the High Court were still
pending, they had good reason to believe that the renewal would not affect
whatever rights might be declared in their favour by the High Court. As all the
papers relating to the grant of the original permit and the subsequent
proceedings were part of the record before the Regional Transport Authority
when he renewed the permit on June 23, 1955, it is impossible to resist the
conclusion that he really intended to renew the permit only subject to the
decision of the High Court.
It is of the utmost importance in this
connection to bear in mind that the appellant applied not for a fresh permit
but for a renewal, and in sanctioning it, the Regional Transport Authority
expressly acted in exercise of his powers under Rule 134-A read with s. 58 of
the Act, and if he did not expressly provide that it was subject to the
decision of the High Court, it must be because he must have considered that
that was implicit in the fact of its being only a renewal.
That that is how the appellant understood it
is clear beyond doubt from the proceedings taken by it immediately after the
High Court pronounced its judgment.
But it is argued for the appellant on the
strength of the decision in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd.(1) that
the mere knowledge on the part of the authorities that the rights of the
parties were under litigation is not a sufficient ground to import a condition
in the permit that it is subject to the result of that litigation, when in its
terms it is unconditional. We do not read that decision as authority for any
such broad contention. There, the question related to five permits, which had
been originally granted to one Balasubramania. Raman and Raman Ltd. obtained a
transfer of the relative buses, and applied to the transport authorities for
transfer of the permits to itself. Then, Veerappa having subsequently obtained
a transfer of the same buses from Balasubramania, (1) [1952] S.C.R. 583.
677 applied to have the permits transferred
in his name. On October 3, 1944, he also instituted a suit in the Sub-Court,
Kumbakonam, to establish his title to the buses against Raman and Raman Ltd.,
and that was decreed in his favour on May 2, 1946. Raman and Raman Ltd.
appealed against this decision to the Madras High Court, which by its judgment
dated September 2, 1949, reversed the decree of the Sub- Court and held that it
was entitled to the buses. While these proceedings were going on, the transport
authorities suspended on March 28, 1944, the permits which had been granted to
Balasubramania and instead, they were issuing temporary permits from time to
time to Veerappa, who had been appointed receiver in the suit in the Sub-Court,
Kumbakonam. On March 29, 1949, the Government decided to discontinue the policy
of granting temporary permits indefinitely, and accordingly granted permanent
permits, to Veerappa. Then on October 14, 1949, Veerappa applied for renewal of
these permanent permits, and that was granted by the Regional Transport Authority
on January 3,1950. The question was whether this order was bad on the ground
that it was inconsistent with the decision of the High Court that it was Raman
and Raman Ltd., that had obtained a valid title to the buses. This Court held
that the ownership of the buses was only one of the factors to be taken into
account in granting the permits, and that as the Regional Transport Authority
granted the renewal on an appreciation of all the facts, his decision was not
liable to be questioned in proceedings under Art. 226. It should be noted that
the renewal which was granted on January 3, 1950, was of permanent permits
granted in pursuance of the, order of the Government dated March 29, 1949,
which had quite plainly declared as a matter of policy that notwithstanding the
pendency of litigation between the parties, permanent permits should be granted
to Veerappa. There can be no question of implying thereafter a condition that
they were subject to the decision of the Court. Moreover, the renewal was
granted on January 3, 1950, after the litigation had ended on September 2,
1949, and any attack on that order could only be by 678 way of appeal against
it, and that had not been done, We are of opinion that the decision in Veerappa
Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. (1) is of no assistance to the appellant.
In the result, we affirm the decision of the
High Court both on the ground that the renewal dated June 23, 1955, is a
continuation of the permit granted on December 3, 1952, and must fall to the
ground when that stood finally set aside by the judgment of the High Court in
Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March 21, 1956, and on the ground that it was
an implied condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to the decision
of the High Court in that appeal, and that in the event which had happened, it
had ceased to be effective.
These appeals fail, and are dismissed with
costs in Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.
Appeals dismissed.
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