Re: Hira Lal Dixit & Ors [1954] INSC
84 (1 October 1954)
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM
CITATION: 1954 AIR 743 1955 SCR 677
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1971 SC 221 (16) RF 1992 SC 904 (37)
ACT:
S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Contempt of Court-Court hearing a case-Leaflet distributed by a party in Court
premises during hearing-Language used Affecting the Judges-Time and place of
distributionHindering or obstructing due administration of justice.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was an applicant in one of the
writ petitions which had been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the
validity of U. P. Road Transport Act, 1951.
During the hearing of the writ petitions a leaflet
printed in the Hindi language and instituted "Our Transport
Department" purporting to be written by the petitioner was distributed in
the Court premises. The leaflet contained a graphic account of the harassment
and indignity said to have been meted out to the writer by the State officers
and the then State Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation
and eventual restoration of his license in respect of a passenger bus.
87 678 The second paragraph at page 15 of
that leaflet contains a passage of which the following is the English
translation :
" The public has full and firm faith in
the Supreme Court, but sources that are in the know say that the Government
acts with, partiality in the matter of appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as
Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners, etc., who give judgments against
Government but this has so far not made any difference in the firmness and
justice of the Hon'ble Judges. " Held, (1) that the offending passage and
the time and place of its distribution tended to hinder or obstruct the due
administration of justice and was a contempt of Court.
(2)It was not fair comment on the proceedings
but an attempt to prejudice the Court against the State and to stir up public
feeling on the very question then pending for decision. The manner in which the
leaflets were distributed, the language used in them and the timing of their
publication could only have had one object, namely, to try and influence the
Judges in favour of the petitioner and the others who were in the same position
as himself. This again was clear contempt of the Supreme Court.
(3)It is not necessary that there should in
fact be an actual interference with the course of administration of justice but
it is enough if the offending publication is likely or if it tends in any way
to interfere with the proper administration of law. Such insinuations as were
implicit in the passage in question were derogatory to the dignity of the Court
and were calculated to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity
of the Judges.
Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh ([1953] S.C.R. 1 169) referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: In the matter of the
Contempt of Court proceedings relating to the printing, publishing and
circulation of a pamphlet over the name of Hira Lal Dixit (General-Secretary,
Praja Socialist Party, Mainpur) entitled "HAMARA VAHAN VIBRAG"
arising out of (Civil) Petition No.
379 of 1953. (Hira Lal Dixit v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh).
The Attorney-General for India (P. A. Mehta,
with him) to assist the Court.
S.C. Issacs (R. Patnaik and S. S. Shukla,
with him) for respondent No. I (Hira Lal Dixit).
Mohan Lal Saxena and S. S. Shukla for
respondent No. 2 (Kishore Dutt Paliwal).
S.S. Shukla for respondent No. 3 (Printer,
Sainik Press).
679 1954. October 1. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by DAS J.-This Rule was issued by this Court on the 16th
September, 1954, calling upon the respondents to appear and show cause why they
should not be proceeded against for contempt of this Court.
It is desirable to mention at the outset the
circumstances in which it became necessary for this Court to issue this Rule.
On the 14th September, 1954, there were on that day's cause list for hearing
and final disposal two appeals, being 'Appeal No. 182 of 1954 (Saghir Ahmad v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others) and Appeal No. 183 of 1954 (Mirza Hasan
Agha v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others). A large number of writ
petitions, 224 in number, under article 32 of the Constitution raising the same
questions were also on the cause list for that day. Both the appellants and all
the petitioners were engaged in carrying on businesses as carriers of
passengers and goods by motor buses or lorries on different routes under licenses
issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh and in cases where the route passed into
or through the State of Delhi, countersigned by that State. Some of these
persons had originally been granted permanent permits by the Regional Transport
Authority. Pursuant to the policy of nationalisation of road transport business
the State of Uttar Pradesh made declarations under section 3 of the Uttar
Pradesh State Road Transport Act, 1950, to the effect that road transport
services on certain routes should be run and operated by the State Government
in the manner mentioned in the relevant declarations and it also published
schemes of road transport services under section 4 of that Act. In furtherance
of its object the State Government began to serve notices on the licensees to
stop plying buses on specified routes. The appellant thereupon applied to the
Allahabad High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government and
its Minister of Transport to withdraw the declaration made under section 3 of
the Uttar Pradesh Road Transport Act, 1950, in respect of their respective
routes and directing them and their officers to refrain from proceeding further
under sections 4 and 680 5 of that Act and not to interfere with the operation
of their respective stage carriages and for other ancillary reliefs. By an
order made on the 17th November, 1953, the Allahabad High Court dismissed
those, applications. The two petitioners thereupon filed these two appeals in
this Court after having obtained a certificate from the Allahabad High Court
under article 132(1) of the Constitution. The appellants obtained orders for
stay of proceedings until the determination of their appeals. In view of the
decision of the Allahabad High Court many other persons holding licenses for
plying motor stage carriages or contract carriages came direct to this Court
with applications under article 32 for appropriate writs and obtained interim
stay. As already stated, the two appeals and all those numerous applications
were posted on the cause list for the 14th September, 1954, for final disposal.
The respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, was the petitioner in one of those writ
applications. The two appeals were called on for hearing on that day and were
part-heard. The hearing continued for the whole of the 15th and 16th September,
1954, and was concluded on the 17th September, 1954, when the Court took time
for considering its decision. The Court has not 'yet delivered its judgment. A
large number of persons, presumably the petitioners in the writ petitions or
otherwise interested therein, attended the Court on all those dates, for the
result of the decision of the appeals would also conclude the writ petitions.
It appears that on the 15th September, 1954, a leaflet printed in the Hindi
language and characters, consisting of 18 pages, entitled "Hamara Vahan
Vibhag" meaning "Our Transport Department", purporting to be
written by the respondent Hira Lal Dixit and containing a foreword purporting
to be written by Sri Krishna Dutt Paliwal and a block photograph of the respondent,
Hira Lal Dixit, on the front page was distributed in the Court premises. The
leaflet contained a graphic account of the harassment and indignity said to
have been meted out to the writer by the State officers and the then State
Minister of Transport in connection with the cancellation and eventual
restoration of his license 681 in respect of a passenger bus. The second
paragraph on page 15 of that leaflet contained a passage of which the following
is an English translation prepared by an advocate of this Court duly authorised
in that behalf" The public has full and firm faith in the Supreme Court,
but sources that are in the know say that the Government acts with partiality
in the matter of appointment of those Hon'ble Judges as Ambassadors, Governors,
High Commissioners, etc., who give judgments against Government but this has so
far not made any difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon'ble Judges.
" The leaflet containing the above offending paragraph having been brought
to its notice the Court on the 16th September, 1954, issued the present rule
and sent a copy of the rule to the Attorney-General for India. All the
respondents have been duly served. They have filed affidavits and have appeared
before us by their respective advocates. The respondent, Sri Krishna Dutt
Paliwal, the writer of the foreword, who was present in Court, made the
following statement to the Court through his advocate, Sri Mohan Lal Saksena:"
When I wrote the foreword I did not go through the whole manuscript. I was only
told that it dealt with the working of the Transport Control. Now that my
attention has been drawn to the passage objected to I am sorry that I wrote a
foreword to the pamphlet and I offer my apology to the Court. I never knew that
the pamphlet was intended for circulation and I was not a party to its
circulation. " One., Devendra Sharma, the General Manager of the Sainik
Press, Agra, where the offending leaflet was printed, filed an affidavit on
behalf of the respondent Press stating that at the time when the leaflet had
been given to the Press for being printed he did not notice the paragraph in
question, that his attention was drawn to it only after the service of the
present Rule, that he was sorry that it, had been printed in the Press and that
he never had the slightest intention of committing any contempt of this Court.
In his affidavit as well as through his advocate, Sri S. Sukla, the 682
respondent Press represented by Devendra Sharma who was present in Court
tendered an unqualified apology to the Court. In view of the statements made in
Court by the advocates of these two respondents this Court accepts their
apology and discharges the rule as against them and nothing further need be
said about them.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent,
Hira Lal Dixit, strongly urged that the passage complained of could not
possibly be capable of any derogatory meaning or implication and could not be
regarded as constituting a contempt of Court. There are innumerable ways by
which attempts can be made to hinder or obstruct the due course of
administration of justice in Courts. One type of such interference is to be
found in cases where there is an act or publication which scandalises the Court
itself. A situation of that type was considered by this Court in the case of
Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(1), and the
principles governing a case of that type were discussed-and laid down in the
judgment of the Court. The present case does not fall within that category, for
here there has been no scandalising of the Court itself. The question here is
whether the offending passage is of such character and import or made in such
circumstances as would tend to hinder or obstruct or interfere with the due
course of administration of justice by the Court. To begin with, the leaflet
was written by a person who was himself the petitioner in one of the writ
petitions which were on the cause list for hearing. The actual timing of the
publication of the leaflet is significant. It was circulated at a time when the
appeal and the writ petitions including that of the respondent, Hira Lal Dixit,
himself were posted on the cause list and the appeals, on the decision of which
depended the fate of those numerous petitions, were being actually heard. The
place of publication was also not without significance. It was distributed in
the Court premises where a very large number of licensees had fore gathered.
The fact of distribution of the leaflet in the Court premises was denied in the
affidavit of this respondent but when a (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1169.
683 suggestion was made that evidence be
recorded on this point the learned counsel appearing for him did not press for
it and accepted the position that the leaflet was in fact distributed in the
Court premises. In the circumstances, the only other question that remains is
as to what was the meaning and purpose of the offending passage in the leaflet.
Learned counsel for the respondent, Hira Lal
Dixit, maintained that the passage in question was perfectly innocuous and only
expressed a laudatory sentiment towards the Court and that such flattery could
not possibly have the slightest effect on the minds of the Judges of this
august tribunal. We do not think flattery was the sole or even the main object
with which this passage was written or with which it was published at the time
when the hearing of the appeals was in progress. It no doubt begins with a
declaration of public faith in this Court but this is immediately followed by
other words connected with the earlier words by the significant conjunction
"but." The words that follow are to the effect that sources that are
in the know say that the Government acts with partiality in the matter of
appointment of those Judges as Ambassadors, Governors, High Commissioners,
etc., who give judgments against the Government. The plain meaning of these
words is that the Judges who decide against the Government do not get these
high appointments. The necessary implication of these words is that the Judges
who decide in favour of the Government are rewarded by the Government with
these appointments. The attitude of the Government is thus depicted surely with
a purpose and that purpose cannot but be to raise in the minds of the reader a
feeling that the Government, by holding out high hopes of future employment,
encourages the Judges to give decisions in its favour. This insinuation is made
manifest by the words that follow, namely, "this has so far not made any
difference in the firmness and justice of the Hon'ble Judges." The linking
up of these words with the preceding words by the conjunction "but"
brings into relief the real significance and true meaning of the earlier words.
The passage read as a 684 whole clearly amounts to this: "Government
disfavours Judges who give decisions against it but favours those Judges with
high appointments who decide in its favour: that although this is calculated to
tempt Judges to give judgments in favour of the Government it has so far not
made any difference in the firmness and justice of the Judges." The words
"so far" are significant. What, we ask, was the purpose of writing
this passage and what was the object of the distribution of the leaflet in the
Court premises at a time when the Court was in the midst of hearing the appeals
? Surely, there was hidden in the offending passage a warning that although the
Judges have "so far" remained firm and resisted the temptation of
deciding cases in favour of Government in expectation of getting high
appointments, nevertheless, if they decide in favour of the Government on this
occasion knowledgeable people will know that they had succumbed to the
temptation and had given judgment in favour of the Government in expectation of
future reward in the shape of high appointments of the kind mentioned in the
passage. The object of writing this paragraph and particularly of publishing it
at the time it was actually done was quite clearly to affect the minds of the
Judges and to deflect them from the strict performance of their duties.
The offending passage and the time and place
of its publication certainly tended to hinder or obstruct the due
administration of justice and is a contempt of Court.
These is another aspect of the matter. Even
if the passage about the Judges were not in the leaflet the rest would still
amount to a serious contempt of Court. There is in' it a strong denunciation of
the State of Uttar Pradesh, a party to the appeal and the petitions' regarding
the very matters then under the consideration of this Court. It was not fair
comment on the proceedings but an attempt to prejudice the Court against the
State and to stir up public feeling on the very question then pending for
decision. The manner in which the leaflets were distributed, the language used
in them and the timing of their publication could only have had one object,
namely, to try and influence 685 the Judges in favour of the petitioner and the
others who were in the same position as himself. This again is a clear contempt
of this Court.
It is well established, as was said by this
Court in Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
(supra), that it is not necessary that there should in fact be an actual
interference with the course of administration of justice but that it is enough
if the offending publication is likely or if it tends in any way to interfere
with the proper administration of law. Such insinuations as are implicit in the
passage in question are derogatory to the dignity of the Court and are
calculated to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the
Judges. Whether the passage is read as fulsome flattery of the Judges of this
Court or is read as containing the insinuations mentioned above or the rest of
the leaflet which contains an attack on a party to the pending proceedings is
taken separately it is equally contemptuous of the Court in that the object of
writing it and the time and place of its publication were, or were calculated,
to deflect the Court from performing its strict duty, either by flattery or by
a veiled threat or warning or by creating prejudice in its mind against the
State. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion and we hold that the respondent,
Hira Lal Dixit, by writing the leaflet and in particular the passage in
question and by publishing it at the time and place he did has committed a
gross contempt of this Court and the qualified apology contained in his
affidavit and repeated by him through his counsel cannot be taken as sufficient
amends for his misconduct.
It should no doubt be constantly borne in
mind that the summary jurisdiction exercised by superior Courts in punishing
contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference
with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is
administered in the Court and thereby affording protection to public, interest
in the purity of the administration of justice.
This is certainly an extraordinary power
which must be sparingly exercised but where the public interest demands it, the
Court will 88 686 not shrink from exercising it and imposing punishment even by
way of imprisonment, in cases where a mere fine may not be adequate.
After anxious consideration we have come to
the conclusion that in all the circumstances of this case it is a fit case
where the power of the Court should be exercised and that it is necessary to
impose the punishment of imprisonment. People must know that they cannot with
impunity hinder or obstruct or attempt to hinder or obstruct the due course of
administration of justice. We, therefore, find respondent, Hira Lal Dixit,
guilty of contempt of Court, make the Rule absolute as against him and direct
that he be arrested and committed to civil prison to undergo simple
imprisonment for a fortnight. He must also pay the costs, if any, incurred by
the Union of India.
Order accordingly.
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