Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi & ANR Vs.
The State of Bihar & Ors [1953] INSC 10 (20 February 1953)
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM BHAGWATI,
NATWARLAL H.
CITATION: 1953 AIR 215 1953 SCR 1129
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1956 SC 479 (14,26) F 1958 SC 538 (12) R
1961 SC1570 (14) R 1962 SC1371 (78) R 1963 SC 222 (51) R 1974 SC1044 (14) RF
1980 SC1789 (36) RF 1983 SC 1 (167) RF 1986 SC 872 (82) RF 1992 SC1277
(34,85,96)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, arts.
13,14-Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950-Law declaring settlement of land with
particular individual void-Validity-Infringement of fundamental right to equal
protection of the lawsDiscrimination-presumption of reasonableness.
HEADNOTE:
The Court of Wards granted to the appellants
a large area of land belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under the
management of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation of the Board of
Revenue, at half the usual rates. A few years later, the Working Committee of
the Indian National Congress expressed the opinion that the settlement of the
lands was against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an
Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950, which declared that,
notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the
settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party
to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to have
acquired any right or incurred any liability there under, and empowered the
Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands. The
appellants, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional, applied under article
226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bihar
restraining it from taking any action under the Act.
It was found that there were several other
settlements of lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against
which the Government had taken no action:
Held, that the dispute between the appellants
and the State was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined by a
judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as
the Legislature had, in passing the impugned enactment singled out the
appellants and deprived them of their right to 1130 have this dispute
adjudicated upon by a duly constituted Court, the enactment contravened the
provisions of article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees to every citizen
the equal protection of the laws, and was void.
Legislation which singles out a particular
individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is
not imposed upon the others and against which even the right of complaint is
taken away is highly discriminatory.
Though the presumption is in favour of the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment and it has to be presumed that a
Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people,
yet when on the face of a statute there is no classification at all, and no attempt
has been made to select any individual or group with reference to any
differentiating attribute peculiar to that individual or group and not
possessed by others, this presumption is of little or no assistance to the
State.
Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum [1953]
S.C.R. 404 and Gulf of Colorado etc. Co. v. Ellis [165 U.S. 150] referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 59 of 1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 3rd
January, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Sarjoo
Prosad JJ). in an application under article 226 of the Constitution registered
as Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 204 of 1950.
Original Petition No. 20 of 1952 under
article 32 of the Constitution was also heard along with this appeal.
P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the
appellants.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,
and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (G. N. Joshi, with them) for the
respondents.
1953. February 20. The court delivered
judgment as follows :PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-I concur in the judgment which my
learned brother Mukherjea is about to deliver, but I wish to add a few words in
view of the important constitutional issue involved.
The facts are simple. The appellants obtained
a settlement of about 200 bikhas of land in a village known as Sathi Farm in
Bettiah Estate, in Bihar, 1131 then and ever since in the management of the
Court of Wards on behalf of the disqualified proprietress who is the second
respondent in this appeal. The lands were settled at the prevailing rate of
rent but the salami or premium payable was fixed at half the usual rate as a
concession to the appellants who are said to be distant relations of the
proprietress. The appellants paid the salami and entered into possession of the
lands on the 2nd November, 1946, and' have since been paying the rents
regularly. On the 13th June, 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called
the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950. The genesis of this legislation is
thus explained in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar,
the first respondent herein.
Report against the settlement of these lands
with the petitioners as well as some other lands to Sri Prajapati Mishra and
the unlawful manner in which these settlements were brought about, was carried
to the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, which body, after
making such enquiry as it thought fit, came to the conclusion that the
settlement of these lands with the petitioners was contrary to the provisions
of law and public policy and recommended that steps should be to taken by the
State of Bihar to have these lands restored to the Bettiah Estate. In pursuance
thereof a request was made to the petitioners and to the said Prajapati Mishra
to return the lands to Bettiah Estate.
While Sri Prajapati Mishra returned the land
settled with him, the petitioners refused to do so.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Sathi Lands (Restoration) Bill runs thus:
"As it has been held that the settlement
of Sathi lands in the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri
Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan Sahi is contrary to
the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha
Narayan Sahi have refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate, Government
1132 have decided to enact a law to restore these lands to the Bettiah
Estate." The impugned Act consists of three sections. Section 2(1)
declares that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being
in force"', the settlement obtained by the appellants is "null and
void", and that "no party to the settlement or his successor in
interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any liability
thereunder". Sub-section (2) provides that the appellants and their
successors in interest "shall quit possession of the said land from the
date of commencement of this Act and if they fail to do so, the Collector of
Champaran shall eject them and restore the lands to the possession of the
Bettiah Wards Estate". Subsection (3) provides for the refund of the
amount of salami money and the cost of improvement, if any, to the lessees by
the estate on restoration to it of the lands in question.
In the "case" lodged in this court
for the State of Bihar, the legislation is sought to be justified and its
validity maintained on the following grounds:
" It is well settled that a Legislature
with plenary powers so long as it enacts law, within the ambit of its powers,
is competent to enact a law which may be applicable generally to society or to
an individual or a class of individuals only ... It is submitted that grants of
the lands belonging to the Bettiah Estate made by the Court of Wards were of
doubtful validity; hence they have been dealt with by the impugned Act ... No
evidence has been adduced by the appellants, except a bare allegation, which
has not been substantiated, that about 2000 acres of land were settled to show
that persons in similar circumstances with whom similar settlements were made,
were treated differently. It is submitted that in the context the impugned Act,
has a reasonable basis of classification." The decision of the majority of
this Court in Chiran v. The Union of India(1) is relied on in suport of these
contentions, In that case, however, the (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869, 1133 majority
felt justified in upholding the legislation, though it adversely affected the
rights and interest of the shareholders of a particular joint stock company,
because the mismanagement of the company's affairs prejudicially affected the
production of an essential commodity and caused serious unemployment amongst a
section of the community.
Mr. Justice Das and I took the 'view that
legislation directed against a particular named person or corporation was obviously
discriminatory and could not constitutionally be justified even if such
legislation resulted in some benefit to the public. In a system of government
by political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent in special
enactments which deprive particular named persons of their liberty or property
because the Legislature thinks them guilty of misconduct, and I said in my
dissenting opinion:
"Legislation based upon mismanagement or
other misconduct as the differentia and made applicable to a specified
individual or corporate body is not far removed from the notorious
parliamentary procedure formerly employed in Britain of punishing individual
delinquents by passing bills of attainder, and should not, I think receive
judicial encouragement." My apprehensions have come true. Recently we had
before us a case from Hyderabad (Civil Appeal ,No. 63 of 1952Ameerunnissa Begum
v. Mahboob Begum)' where the duly constituted legislative authority of that
State intervened in a succession dispute between two sets of rival claimants to
the estate of a deceased person and " dismissed " the claim of the
one and adjudged the Property to the other by making a special " law
" to that effect. And now comes this case from Bihar of an essentially
similar type. The appellants assert title to certain lands in Bettiah Estate
under a settlement which they claim to have lawfully obtained from the Court of
Wards, while it is now alleged on behalf of the Estate that the settlement was
not for the benefit of the Estate and was contrary to law, as the Court of
Wards did not then " apply its (1) Since reported as [1953] S.C.R 404 147
1134 mind " to that question. This is purely a dispute between private
parties and a matter for determination by duly constituted courts to which is
entrusted, in every free and civilised society, the important function of
adjudicating on disputed legal rights, after observing the well established
procedural safeguards which include the right to be heard, the right to produce
witnesses and so forth. This is the protection which the law guarantees equally
to all persons, and our Constitution prohibits by article 14 every State from
denying such protection to anyone. The appellants before us have been denied
this protection. A political Organization of the party in power decides after
making such enquiry as it thought fit, that the settlement in question was
" contrary to the provisions of law and public policy " and the State
Legislature, basing itself on such decision, purports to declare the settlement
" null and void " and directs the eviction of the appellants and the
restoration of the lands to the Estate. The reasons given for this
extraordinary procedure are indeed remarkable for their disturbing
implications. It is said that "there was agitation amongst the tenants of
the locality and opposition on the part of persons living in the locality
against the appellants' possession of the lands which led to breach of the
peace and institution of criminal cases ". Whenever, then, a section of
the people in a locality, in 'assertion of an adverse claim, disturb a person
in the quiet enjoyment of his property, the Bihar Government would seem to
think that it is not necessary for the police to step in to protect him in his
enjoyment until he is evicted in due course of law, but the Legislature could
intervene by making a " law " to oust the person from his possession.
Legislation such as we have now before us is
calculated to drain the vitality from the rule of law which our Constitution so
unmistakably proclaims, and it is to be hoped that the democratic process in
this country will not function along these lines.
MUKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come
before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of 1135 Patna under
article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed against a judgment of a
Division Bench of that court, dated 3rd January, 1952, by which the learned
Judges dismissed a petition of the appellants under article 226 of the
Constitution. The prayer in the petition was for a writ in the nature of mandamus,
directing the opposite party, not to take any action, under an Act passed by
the Bihar Legislative Assembly in 1950 and known as The Sathi Lands
(Restoration) Act which was challenged as void and unconstitutional.
To appreciate the points in controversy
between the parties to the proceeding, it may be necessary to narrate the
material facts briefly. Maharani Janki Koer, the respondent No. 2 in the
appeal, is the present proprietress of an extensive Estate in Bihar known by
the name of Bettiah Raj, which is held and managed on her behalf by the Court
of Wards, Bihar, constituted under Bengal Act IX of 1879. On 19th July, 1946,
the appellants, who are two brothers and are distantly related to the Maharani,
made a representation to the Government of Bihar through the Manager of the
Estate, praying for settlement in raiyati right, of 200 bighas of land
preferably in Sathi farm or Materia farm along with a certain quantity of waste
lands. On 20th July, 1946, the then Manager of the Wards Estate wrote a letter
to the Collector of Champaran recommending that the applicants might be given
settlement of the lands as prayed for, without payment of any selami. The
Collector, however, did not. agree to this proposal, nor did the Commissioner
of the Tirhut Division, and the matter then came up for consideration before
the Board of Revenue which recommended that settlement might be made with the
applicants provided they were agreeable to pay selami at half the usual rates.
On 14th October, 1946, the recommendation of
the Revenue Board was accepted by the Provincial Government and six days later
the Court of Wards accepted a cheque for Rs. 5,000 from one of the lessees,
towards payment of the selami money and rent for the year 1354 F.S. On the 2nd
November, 1946, possession 1136 of the lands was given to the appellants and on
the 18th of November following, the Manager of the Court of Wards recorded a
formal order fixing the selami of the land at Rs.
3,988 annas odd and rent at Rs. 797 annas odd
per year. On the same day, a Hisab Bandobasti form, which is the usual form
employed in the Estate for raiyati settlements, was signed by the Circle
Officer on behalf of the Court of Wards and by one of the lessees for himself
as well as the constituted attorney of the other lessees. It is not disputed
that the lessees continued to possess the lands since then on payment of the
stipulated rent.
On the 3rd June, 1950, the Bihar Legislative
Assembly passed an Act known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act which
received the assent of the Governor on the 13th June, 1950. The object of the
Act, as stated in the preamble, is to provide for restoration of certain lands
belonging to the Bettiah Wards Estate which were settled contrary to the
provisions of law in favour of certain individuals. Section 2, which is the
only material section in the Act, enacts in the first sub-section that the
settlement of Sathi lands (described in the schedule to the Act) on behalf of
the Bettiah Court of Wards Estate with the appellants, as per order of the
Manager of the Estate dated the 18th November, 1946, is declared null and void
and no party to the settlement ,or his successor-in-interest shall be deemed to
have acquired any right or incur any liability under the same. The second
sub-section embodies a direction to the effect that the said lessees and their
successor-in-interest shall quit possession of the lands from the date of the
commencement of the Act and if they fail to do so, the Collector of Champaran
shall eject them and restore the lands to the possession of the Bettiah Estate.
The third and the last sub -section provides that the Bettiah Wards Estate
shall on restoration to it of the lands pay to the lessees the selami money
paid by them and also such amount as might have been spent by them in making
improvements on the lands prior to the commencement of the Act.
1137 In substance, therefore, the Act
declared the lease granted by the Bettiah Wards Estate to the appellants on the
18th November, 1946, to be illegal and inoperative and prescribed the mode in
which this declaration was to be given effect to and the lessees evicted from
the lands.
On the 28th August, 1950, the appellants
filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises, under article 226 of the
Constitution in the High Court of Patna, challenging the validity of The Sathi
Lands Act and praying for a writ upon the respondents restraining them from
taking any steps under the said Act, or from interfering with the possession of
the appellants in respect of the lands comprised in the lease.
It was asserted by the petitioners that in
passing the impugned legislation the Bihar Legislature actually usurped the
power of the judiciary and the enactment was not a law at all in the proper
sense of the expression. The other material contentions raised were that the
legislation was void as it conflicted with the fundamental rights of the
petitioners guaranteed under articles 14, 19(1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution.
The respondents opposite parties in resisting
the petitioners' prayer stated inter alia in their counteraffidavit that the
settlement of the lands in question with the appellants by the Court of Wards,
was not for the benefit of the estate or advantage of the ward and that the
transaction was entered into by the Wards Estate without properly applying
their mind to it. It was stated further that after the settlement was made,
there was a good deal of agitation among the tenants in the locality which led
to the institution of certain criminal proceedings. In these circumstances, the
matter was brought to the notice of the Working Committee of the Indian
National Congress and the Working Committee was of opinion that the settlement
of these lands was against public interest. The lessees, therefore, were asked
to vacate the lands and on their refusal the legislation in question was
passed.
The petition was heard by a Division Bench
consisting of Ramaswami and Sarjoo Pershad JJ. Ramaswami J.
1138 decided all the points raised by the
petitioners against them and held that the Act was neither ultra vires the
Bihar Legislature nor was void under article 13(1) of the Constitution. The
learned Judge was further of opinion that it was not a fit case for
interference by the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. The other
learned Judge expressed considerable doubts as to whether a legislation of this
type, which in form and substance was a decree of a court of law, was within
the competence of the legislature and warranted by the Constitution. He agreed,
however, with his learned colleague that the case was not such as to justify an
interference of the High Court in exercise of its discretionary powers under
article 226 of the Constitution. The remedy of the petitioners might lie,
according to him, in a regularly constituted suit. The result, therefore, was
that the appellants' petition was dismissed and it is the propriety of this
judgment that has been assailed before us in this appeal.
Mr. P. R. Das, who appeared in support of the
appeal, put forward at the forefront of his arguments, the contention raised on
behalf of his client in the court below that the impugned legislation was void
by reason of its violating the fundamental rights of the appellants under
article 14 of the Constitution. The point appeared to us to be of substance and
after hearing the learned Attorney-General on this point we were satisfied that
the contention of Mr. Das was wellfounded and entitled to prevail, irrespective
of any other ground that might be raised in this appeal.
There have been a number of decisions by this
court where the question regarding the nature and scope of the guarantee
implied in the equal protection clause of the Constitution came up for
consideration and the general principles can be taken to be fairly well
settled. What this clause aims at is to strike down hostile discrimination or
oppression or inequality. As the guarantee applies to all persons similarly
situated, it is certainly open to the legislature to classify persons and
things to achieve particular legislative objects;
1139 but such selection or differentiation
must not be arbitrary and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to
the object which the legislature has in view. It cannot be disputed that the
legislation in the present case has singled out two individuals and one
solitary transaction entered into between them and another private party,
namely, the Bettiah Wards Estate and has declared the transaction to be a
nullity on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of law, although
there has been no adjudication on this point by any judicial tribunal. It is
not necessary for our present purpose to embark upon a discussion as to how far
the doctrine of 'separation of powers has been recognised in our Constitution
and whether the legislature can arrogate to itself the powers of the judiciary
and proceed to decide disputes between private parties by making a declaration
of the rights of one against the other. It is also unnecessary to attempt to
specify the limits within which any legislation, dealing with private-rights,
is possible within the purview of our Constitution. On one point our
Constitution is clear and explicit, namely, that no law is valid which takes
away or abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the
Constitution. There can be no question, therefore, that if the legislation in
the present case comes within the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution,
it has got to be declared invalid. This leads us to the question as to whether
the impugned enactment is, in fact, discriminatory and if So, whether the
discrimination made by it can be justified on any principle of reasonable
classification ? The appellants, it is not disputed, are only two amongst
numerous leaseholders who hold lands in raiyati right under the Bettiah Wards
Estate. It cannot also be disputed that the lands were settled with them on the
recommendation of the Board of Revenue after due consideration of the
respective views put forward by the Manager of the Estate on the one hand and
the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner on the other. The appellants are
admittedly paying rents which are normally assessed on lands of similar 1140
description in the locality. The learned AttorneyGeneral referred in this
connection to the provisions of section 18 of the Court of Wards Act and argued
that the lease in dispute was granted in contravention of that section.
Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act provides
as follows:
"The Court may sanction the giving of
leases or farms of any property under its charge ... and may direct the doing
of all such other acts as it may judge to be most for the benefit of the
property and the advantage of the Ward".
Apparently it makes the Court of Wards the
sole judge of the benefit to the estate or advantage of the ward. But it is
said that the Court of Wards did not apply its mind properly to this matter
when it granted lease to the appellants at half the usual rate of selami. The
Wards Estate thus suffered loss to the extent of nearly Rs. 4,000 which could
legitimately have been recovered from any other lessee. This contention does
not impress us much; the utmost that can be said is that this could have been
put forward, for what it is worth and with what result, nobody can say, as a
ground for setting aside the lease in a court of law. But that is not the
question which is relevant for our present purpose at all; we were not called
upon to decide whether or not the lease was a proper one or beneficial to the
estate. The question for our decision is, whether the statute contains
discriminatory provisions so far as the appellants are concerned and if so,
whether these discriminations could be reasonably justified ? It is clearly
stated in paragraph 9 of the affidavit made by the appellants in support of
their petition that there are numerous other persons to whom leases on similar
terms were granted by the Bettiah Wards Estate. Clauses (b), (c) and (d) of
paragraph 9 of the affidavit stand thus:
"(b) In this long course of management
by tile Court of Wards, leases or settlement of lands used to be made without
any selami on proper rent. This state of affairs continued down to recent times
during 1141 which period thousands of bighas were so settled with numerous
persons;
(c) in 1945 the authorities decided to make
settlements on large scale with war returned soldiers on a selami equal to 5
times the average rent prevailing in the locality for similar lands;
(d) in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949 a good
number of settlements covering about 2000 acres of lands were settled on the
basis of IO years' rental obtaining in the locality and in some cases for good
reasons, at five years' rental." In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit
put in on behalf of the respondents, these statements are not denied. In fact,
they are admitted and the only thing said is, that these leases were granted in
due course of management. Ramaswami J. has dismissed this part of the case by
simply remarking that no details of these settlements were furnished by the
appellants; but no details were at all necessary when the correctness of the
statements was not challenged by the respondents. It will be interesting to
note that the respondents themselves in paragraph 10 of their counteraffidavit
mentioned the name of Shri Prajapati Mishra as one of the persons with whom
similar settlement of lands was made by the Bettiah Estate. It is stated in
that paragraph that the cases of the appellants as well as of Prajapati Mishra
were brought to the notice of the Working Committee of the Indian National
Congress and the Committee came to the conclusion that both the settlements
were contrary to the provisions of law. Thereupon a request was made to both
these sets of lessees to restore their lands to the Estate, but whereas
Prajapati Mishra returned his lands to the Bettiah Estate, the appellants
refused to do so. In reply to this statement, the appellants stated in their
rejoinder that the said Prajapati Mishra did not vacate the land,% but created
a trust in respect of the same, he being the chairman of the board Of trustees and
the lands were still in possession of the board of trustees. Strangely, as it
seems, the State of Bihar raked up this matter again in a 148 1142 further
affidavit where it was admitted that the said Prajapati Mishra did execute a
trust and that the trustees took possession of the property. It was stated,
however, that Prajapati Mishra, who was one of the trustees, did actually
surrender the lands in two installments but the other trustees did not, and
hence legal advice was being taken to find out ways and means of recovering the
property from them. The whole thing smacks of disingenuousness and the State of
Bihar, it seems, was not well advised in relying upon facts like these in their
attempt to repel the appellants' attack on the legislation on the ground of
discrimination.
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the
appellants were not the only lessees under the Bettiah Estate who got
settlement of lands at a selami of five years' rental. On the sworn statements
of the appellants, which are not challenged by the other side, it appears that
there are numerous persons occupying the same position as the appellants, who
however were not subjected to this expropriatory legislation. But the vice in
this legislation goes much deeper than this. It is not merely a question of
treating the appellants differently from the other lessees under the Wards
Estate, with whom settlements of land have been made on similar or identical
terms. If a lease has been given by a Court of Wards, which is not for the
benefit of the estate or advantage of the ward, it is for a court of ,law to
decide whether it is warranted by the terms of the Court of Wards Act. If the
lessor proceeds to cancel the lease, the lessee has a legal right to defend his
claim and satisfy the court that the lease is not in contravention of law. If,
on the other hand, the lessee is actually dispossessed, he has a right to sue
in court for recovery of possession of the property on establishing that he has
been illegally turned out. The dispute here, is a legal dispute pure and simple
between two private parties. What the Legislature has done is to single out
these two individuals and deny them the right which every Indian citizen
possesses to have his rights adjudicated upon by a judicial tribunal in accordance
with 1143 the law which applies to his case. The meanest of citizens has a
right of access to a court of law for the redress of his just grievances and it
is of this right that the appellants have been deprived by this Act. It is
impossible to conceive of a worse form of discrimination than the one which
differentiates a particular individual from all his fellow subjects and visits
him with a disability which is not imposed upon anybody else and against which
even the right of complaint is taken away. The learned AttorneyGeneral, who
placed his case with his usual fairness and ability, could not put forward any
convincing or satisfactory reason upon which this legislation could be
justified. It is true that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality
of a legislative enactment and it has to be presumed that a Legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people. But when on
the face of a statute there is no classification at all, and no attempt has
been made to select any individual or group with reference to any
differentiating attribute peculiar to that individual or group and not
possessed by others, this presumption is of little or no assistance. to the
State. We may repeat with profit what was said by Mr. Justice Brewer in Gulf
Colorado etc. Co. v. Ellis(1) that "to carry the presumption to the extent
of holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reason for
subjecting certain" individuals or corporations to hostile and
discriminatory legislation is to make the protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment a mere rope of sand". In our opinion, the present case comes
directly within the principle enunciated by this court in Ameerunnissa, Begum
v. Mahboob Begum(2 ).
The result is that we allow the appeal and
set aside the judgment of the High Court. A writ in the nature of mandamus
shall issue directing the respondents not to take any steps in pursuance of The
Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act of 1950 or to interfere with the possession of
the appellants in respect to the lands (1) 165 U-S. 150. (2) [1953] S.C.R404.
1144 comprised in the lease referred to in
that Act. The appellants will have their costs in both courts.
VIVIAN BOSE J.-I am in entire agreement with
my Lord the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea.
GHULAM HASAN J.-I agree with my Lord the
Chief Justice and with my brother Mukherjea.
BHAGWATI J.-I entirely agree with the
judgment just delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Mukherjea
and there is nothing which I can usefully add.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff.
Agent for the respondents: G. H.
Rajadhyaksha.
Back
