State of Madras Vs. V.G. Row. Union Of
India [1952] INSC 19 (31 March 1952)
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ) MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
CITATION: 1952 AIR 196 1952 SCR 597
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1954 SC 92 (35) RF 1954 SC 229 (28) RF
1956 SC 479 (19) R 1956 SC 559 (4,8,9) E&R 1957 SC 896 (10) E 1958 SC 578
(169) F 1958 SC 731 (21) F 1959 SC 300 (5) R 1960 SC 468 (6) R 1960 SC1080 (40)
R 1960 SC1124 (25,42,64) R 1961 SC 448 (7) R 1961 SC 705 (5,11,20) R 1961 SC
884 (24) R 1962 SC 123 (15) R 1962 SC 263 (25) R 1962 SC 305 (29) A 1962 SC 316
(35,36) R 1962 SC1371 (34,64,65,66) R 1963 SC 996 (2) R 1964 SC 416 (11) RF
1967 SC 829 (6,7) R 1968 SC 445 (14) RF 1970 SC 898 (58) R 1970 SC1157 (12) R
1970 SC1453 (15) R 1971 SC 530 (259) R 1971 SC 966 (7) R 1971 SC1667 (10,25,27)
RF 1973 SC 947 (8) RF 1973 SC1461 (594,1547) F 1975 SC 550 (8) RF 1976 SC1207
(300) RF 1977 SC1825 (29) R 1978 SC 597 (132) F 1978 SC 771 (15,22) R 1978
SC1457 (62) R 1979 SC 25 (31) R 1980 SC 898 (70) RF 1980 SC1992 (12) R 1981 SC
873 (19,23) RF 1981 SC1030 (16) MV 1982 SC1325 (32) R 1984 SC 882 (3) R 1984
SC1213 (8) RF 1985 SC 551 (35) R 1986 SC 515 (80) R 1986 SC1205 (17)
ACT:
Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of
1908) as amended by Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, ss. 15
(2)(b), 16--Law empowering State to declare associations illegal by
notification-No provision for judicial inquiry or for service of notification
on association or office-bearers--Validity of law--Unreasonable restriction on
right to form associations--Constitution of India, art. 19 (1) (c), (4).
HEADNOTE:
Section 15 (2) (b) of the Indian Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment (Madras)
Act, 1950, included within the definition of an "unlawful
association" an association "which has been declared by the State by
notification in the Official Gazette to be unlawful on the ground (to be
specified in the notification) that such association (i) constitutes a danger
to the public peace, or (ii)has interfered or interferes with the maintenance
of public order or has such interference for its object, or (iii) has
interfered or interferes with the administration of the law, or has such interference
for its object." Section 16 of the Act as amended provided that a
notification under s. 15 (2) (b) shall (i) specify the ground on which it is
issued and such other particulars, if any, as may have a bearing on the 598
necessity there for and (ii) fix a reasonable period for any office bearer or
member of the association or any other person interested to make a
representation to the State Government in respect of the issue of the
notification.
Under s. 16 A the Government was required
after the expiry of the time fixed in the notification for making representation
to place the matter before an Advisory Board and to cancel the notification if
the Board finds that' there was no sufficient cause for the issue of such
notification.
There was however no provision for adequate
communication of the notification to the association and its members or office
bearers. It was conceded that the test under s.
15(2)(b) as amended was, as it was under s.
16 as it stood before the amendment, a subjective one and the factual existence
or otherwise of the grounds was not a justiciable issue and the question was
whether s. 15(2)(b) was unconstitutional and void:
Held, (for reasons stated below) that s. 15
(2)(b) imposed restrictions on the fundamental right to form associations
guaranteed by art. 19 (1) (c), which were not reasonable within the meaning of
art. 19 (4) and was therefore unconstitutional and void. The fundamental right
to form associations or unions guaranteed by art. 19 (1) (c) of the
Constitution has such a wide and varied scope for its exercise, and its
curtailment is fraught with such potential reactions in the religious,
political and economic file this, that the vesting of the authority in the
executive Government to impose restrictions on such right, without allowing the
grounds of such imposition, both in their factual and legal aspects to be duly
tested in a judicial inquiry, is a strong element which should be taken into
account in judging the reasonableness of restrictions imposed on the
fundamental right under art. 19(1)(c). The absence of a provision for adequate
communication of the Government's notification under s. 15(2)(b). by personal
service or service by affixture to the association and its members and
office-bearers was also a serious defect.
The formula of subjective satisfaction of the
Government or of its officers with an advisory Board to review the materials on
which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom guaranteed to the
citizen, may be viewed as reasonable only in very exceptional circumstances and
within the narrowest limits.
In considering the reasonableness of laws
imposing restrictions on fundamental right, both the substantive and procedural
aspects of the impugned law should be examined from the point of view of
reasonableness and the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be
applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general
pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The
nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of
the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time should all 599 enter into the judicial verdict. In
evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is
reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the
social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the
decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference
with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of
responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the
Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all,
and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in
authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be
reasonable.
A.K. Gopalan v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 88)
and Dr. Khare v. The State of Punjab ([1950] S.C.R. 519) distinguished.
M. C, Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,
(S. Govind Swaminathan and R. Ganapathi Iyer, with him) for the appellant
(State of Madras).
C.R. Pattabhi Raman for the respondent.
M C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (G.
N. Joshi.
with him) for the Union of India.
T.N. Subrahmanya lyer, (Advocate-General
Travancore Cochin (M. R. Krishna Pillai, with him) for the State of
Travancore-Cochin.
1952. March 31. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.--This is an appeal from an order of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras adjudging section 15 (2)(b) of the Indian
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Act No. XIV of 1908) as amended by the Indian
Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the
impugned Act) as unconstitutional and void, and quashing Government Order No.
1517, Public (General) Department, dated 10th March, 1950, whereby the State
Government declared a Society called the People's Education Society an unlawful
association.
The respondent, who was the general secretary
of the Society, which was registered under the Societies' Registration Act,
1860, applied to the High Court on 78 600 10th April, 1950, under article 226
of the Constitution complaining that the impugned Act and the Order dated 10th
March, 1950, purporting to be issued there-under infringed the fundamental
right conferred on him by article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution to form
associations or unions and seeking appropriate reliefs. The High Court by a
full bench of three Judges (Raja- mannar C.J., Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha
Sastri JJ.) allowed the application on 14th September, 1950, and granted a
certificate under article 132. The State of Madras has brought this appeal.
The Government Order referred to above runs
as follows:-"WHEREAS in the opinion of the State Government, the
Association known as the People's Education Society, Madras, has for its object
interference with the administration of the law and the maintenance of law and
order, and constitutes a danger to the public peace;
NOW, therefore, His Excellency the Governor
of Madras, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 16 of the Indian
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Central Act XIV of 1908) hereby declares the
said association to be an unlawful association within the meaning of the said
Act.
No copy of this order was served on the
respondent or any other office-bearer of the society but it was notified in the
official Gazette as required by the impugned Act.
The declared objects of the Society as set
out in the affidavit of the respondent are:
(a) to encourage, promote, diffuse and
popularise useful knowledge in all sciences and more specially social science;
(b) to encourage, promote, diffuse and
popularise political education among people;
(c) to encourage, promote and popularise the
study and understanding of all social and political problems and bring about
social and political reforms; and 601 (d) to promote, encourage and popularise
art, literature and drama.
It was, however, stated in a
counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant by the Deputy Secretary to
Government, Public Department, that, according to information received by the
Government, the Society was actively helping the Communist Party in Madras
which had been declared unlawful in August 1949 by utilising its funds through
its Secretary for carrying on propaganda on behalf of the Party, and that the
declared objects of the Society were intended to camouflage its real
activities.
As the Madras Amendment Act (No. XI of 1950)
was passed on the 12th August, 1950, during the pendency of the petition, which
was taken up for hearing on the 21st August, 1950, the issues involved had to be
determined in the light of the original Act as amended. In order to appreciate
the issues it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions.
Before amendment by the Madras Act, the
material provisions were as follows:-"15. In this Part(1) "association"
means any combination or body of persons whether the same be known by any
distinctive name or not; and (2) "unlawful association" means an
association(a) which encourages or aids persons to commit acts of violence or
intimidation or of which the members habitually commit such acts, or (b) which
has been declared to be unlawful by the Provincial Government under the powers
hereby conferred.
16. If the Provincial Government is of
opinion that any association interferes or has for its object interference with
the administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, or that
it constitutes a danger to the public peace, the Provincial Government may by
notification in the official Gazette declare such association to be
unlawful." The amending Act substituted for clause (b) in Section 15(2)
the following clause :-602 "(b) which has been declared by the State
Government by notification in the official Gazette to be unlawful on the ground
(to be specified in the notification) that such association-(i) constitutes a
danger to the public peace, or (ii)has interfered or interferes with the
maintenance of public order or has such interference for its object, or (iii)
has interfered or interferes with the administration of the law, or has such interference
for its object".
For the old section 16, sections 16 and 16 A
were substituted as follows:
"16. (1) A notification issued under
clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 15 in respect of any association shall(a)
specify the ground on which it is issued, the reasons for its issue, and such
other particulars, if any, as may have a bearing on the necessity there for;
and (b) fix a reasonable period for any office-bearer or member of the
association or any other person interested to make a representation to the
State Government in respect of the issue of the notification.
(2) Nothing in sub-section ( 1 ) shall
require the State Government to disclose any facts which it considers to be
against the public interest to disclose.
Under section 16 A the Government is
required, after the expiry of the time fixed in the notification for making
representations, to place before an Advisory Board constituted by it a copy of
the notification and of the representations, if any, received before such expiry,
and the Board is to consider the materials placed before it, after calling for
such further information as it may deem necessary from the State Government or
from any office-bearer or member of the association concerned or any other
person, and submit its report to the Government. If it is found by the Board
that there is no sufficient cause for the issue of the notification in respect
of the association 603 concerned, the Government is required to cancel the
notification.
There is no amendment of section 17 which
prescribes penalties by way of imprisonment or fine or both for membership or
management of an unlawful association and for taking part in meetings of such
association or making, receiving or soliciting contributions for purposes
thereof. Section 17 A, which confers power on the Government to notify and take
possession of places used for the purposes of an unlawful association, was
amended by the addition of sub clauses 2(a) and 2(b) providing for a remedy,
where such power was exercised, by way of application, within thirty days of
the notification in the official Gazette, to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause
Court or the District Judge according as the place notified is situated in the
Presidency Town or outside, for "a declaration that the place has not been
used for the purposes of any unlawful association". If such declaration is
made, the Government is to cancel the notification in respect of the place.
Section 17B empowers the officer taking possession of a notified place to forfeit
movable property found therein if, in his opinion, such property" is, or
may be used for the purposes of the unlawful association" after following
the procedure indicated.
Section 17E similarly empowers the Government
to forfeit funds of an unlawful association "if it is satisfied after such
enquiry as it may think fit that such funds are being used or intended to be
used for the purposes of an unlawful association". The procedure to be
followed in such cases is also prescribed. By section 17F jurisdiction of civil
courts, save as expressly provided, is barred in respect of proceedings taken
under sections 17 A to 17E.
By section 6 of the amending Act
notifications already issued and not cancelled before the amendment are to have
effect as if they had been issued under section 15 (2) (b) as amended, and it
is provided in such cases a supplementary notification should also be issued as
required in section 16 (1)( a) and (b) as amended and thereafter the procedure
provided by 604 the new section 16-A should be followed. It was under this
provision that the validity of the notification issued on the 10th March, 1950,
under old section 16 fell to be considered in the light of the provisions of
the amended Act when the petition came up for hearing in the High Court on 21st
August, 1950.
It will be seen that while old section 16
expressly conferred on the Provincial Government power to declare associations
unlawful if, in its opinion, there existed certain specified grounds in
relation to them, those grounds are now incorporated in section 15(2)(b) as
amended, and the reference to the "opinion" of the Government is
dropped.
This led to some discussion before us as to
whether or not the grounds referred to in section 15 (2) (b) as amended are
justiciable issues. if the factual existence of those grounds could be made the
subject of inquiry in a court of law, the restrictions sought to be imposed on
the right of association would not be open to exception, but then the
Government would apparently have no use for section 15 (2) (b). For, it was
strenuously contended on its behalf by the Attorney-General that the
incorporation of these grounds in a definition clause, which made a declaration
by Govenment the test of unlawfulness, rendered the insertion of the words
"in its opinion" unnecessary and, indeed, inappropriate, and that the
omission of those words could not lead to any inference that the grounds on
which the declaration was to be based were intended to be any more justiciable
than under the old section 16; more especially as the "opinion" or
the "satisfaction" of the Government or of its officers is still the
determining factor in notifying a place under section 17 A (1) and in
forfeiting the movables found therein under section 17B (1) or the funds of an
unlawful association under section 17E (1). The provision for an inquiry as to
the existence or otherwise of such grounds before an Advisory Board and for
cancellation of the notification in case the Board found there was no
sufficient cause for declaring the association as unlawful also pointed, it was
urged, to the same conclusion. The contention is not 605 without force, and the
position was not contested for the respondent. It may, accordingly, be taken
that the test under section 15 (2) (b) is, as it was under the old section 16,
a subjective one and the factual existence or otherwise of the grounds is not a
justiciable issue.
It is on this basis, then, that the question
has to be determined as to whether section 15 (2)(b)as amended falls within the
limits of constitutionally permissible legislative abridgement of the
fundamental right conferred on the citizen by article 19 (1) (c). Those limits
are defined in clause (4) of the same article.
"(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the
said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any imposing, in the interests of
public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause." It was not disputed that the
restrictions in question were imposed "in the interests of public
order". But, are they "reasonable" restrictions within the
meaning of article 19 (4)? Before proceeding to consider this question, we
think it right to point out, what is sometimes overlooked, that our
Constitution contains express provisions for judicial review of legislation as
to its conformity with the Constitution, unlike as in America where the Supreme
Court has assumed extensive powers of reviewing legislative acts undercover of
the widely interpreted "due process" clause in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. If, then, the courts in this country face up to such
important and none too easy task, it is not out of any desire to tilt at
legislative authority in a crusader's spirit, but in discharge of a duty
plainly laid upon them by the Constitution. This is especially true as regards
the "fundamental rights ", as to which this Court has been assigned
the role of a sentinel on the qui vive.
While the Court naturally attaches great
weight to the legislative judgment, it cannot desert its own duty to determine
606 finally the constitutionality of an impugned statute. We have ventured on
these obvious remarks because it appears to have been suggested in some quarters
that the courts in the new set up are out to seek clashes with the legislatures
in the country.
The learned Judges of the High Court
unanimously held that the restrictions under section 15 (2) (b) were not
reasonable on the ground of-(1)the inadequacy of the publication of the
notification, (2) the omission to fix a time limit for the Government sending
the papers to the Advisory Board or for the latter to make its report, no
safeguards being provided against the Government enforcing the penalties in the
meantime, and (3) the denial to the aggrieved person of the right to appear
either in person or by pleader before the Advisory Board to make good his
representation.
In addition to these grounds one of the
learned Judges (Satyanarayana Rao J.) held that the impugned Act offended
against article 14 of the Constitution in that there was no reasonable basis
for the differentiation in treatment between the two classes of unlawful
associations mentioned in section 15 (2) (a) and (b). The other learned Judges
did not, however, agree with this view. Viswanatha Sastri J.
further held that the provisions for
forfeiture of property contained in the impugned Act were void as they had no
reasonable relation to the maintenance of public order. The other two Judges
expressed no opinion on this point. While agreeing with the conclusion of the
learned Judges that section 15 (2) (b) is unconstitutional and void, we are of
opinion that the decision can be rested on a broader and more fundamental
ground.
This Court had occasion in Dr. Khare's ease
(1) to define the scope of the judicial review under clause (5) of article 19
where the phrase "imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right" also occurs, and four out of the five Judges participating in the
decision expressed the view (the other Judge leaving the question open) that
both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive (1)
[1950] S.C.R. 519, 607 law should be examined from the point of view of
reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such
as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances
under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is
important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness,
where ever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
and no abstract standard.
or general pattern, of reasonableness can be
laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have
been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent
and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the
imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own
conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case. it
is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges
participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to
their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated
by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection
that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but
for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people
have, in authorising the imposition of' the restrictions, considered them to be
reasonable.
Giving due weight to all the considerations
indicated above, we have come to the conclusion that section 15 (2) (b) cannot
be upheld as falling within the limits of authorised restrictions on the right
conferred by article 19 (1) (c). The right to form associations or unions has
such wide and varied scope for its exercise, and its curtailment is fraught
with such potential reactions in the religious political and economic fields,
that the vesting of authority in the executive government to impose
restrictions on such right, without allowing the grounds of such imposition,
both in their factual and legal aspects, to be 608 duly tested in a judicial
inquiry, is a strong element which, in our opinion, must be taken into account
in judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by section 15 (2) (b)
on the exercise of the fundamental right under article 19 (1) (c); for, no
summary and what is bound to be a largely one-sided review by an Advisory
Board, even where its verdict is binding on the executive government, can be a
substitute for a judicial enquiry. The formula of subjective satisfaction of
the Government or of its officers, with an Advisory Board thrown in to review
the materials on which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom
guaranteed to the citizen, may be viewed as reasonable only in very exceptional
circumstances and within the narrowest limits, and cannot receive judicial
approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights.
In the case of preventive detention, no doubt, this Court upheld in Gopalan's
case(1) deprivation of personal liberty by such means, but that was because the
Constitution itself sanctions laws providing for preventive detention, as to
which no question of reasonableness could arise in view of the language of
article 21. As pointed out by Kania C.J. at page 121, quoting Lord Finlay in
Rex v. Halliday(2), "the court was the least appropriate tribunal to
investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such anticipatory action
must be largely based".
The Attorney-General placed strong reliance
on the decision in Dr. Khare's ease(3) where the subjective satisfaction of the
Government regarding the necessity for the externment of a person, coupled with
a reference of the matter to an Advisory Board whose opinion, however, had no
binding force, was considered by a majority to be "reasonable"
procedure for restricting the right to move freely conferred by article 19
(1)(b). The Attorney-General claimed that the reasoning of that decision
applied a fortiori to the present ease, as the impugned Act provided that the
Advisory Board's report was binding on the Government. We cannot agree. We
consider that that ease (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88. (2) [1917] A.C. 260, 269. (3)
[1950] S.C.R. 519, 609 is distinguishable in several essential particulars. For
one thing, externment of individuals, like preventive detention, is largely
precautionary and based on suspicion. In fact, section 4 (1) of the East Punjab
Public Safety Act, which was the subject of consideration in Dr. Khare's
case(1), authorised both preventive detention and externment for the same
purpose and on the same ground namely, with a view to preventing him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of
public order it is necessary, etc." Besides, both involve an element of
emergency requiring prompt steps to be taken to prevent apprehended danger to
public tranquillity, and authority has to be vested in the Government and its
officers to take appropriate action on their own responsibility. These features
are however, absent in the grounds on which the Government is authorised,under
section 15 (2) (b), to declare associations unlawful. These grounds, taken by
themselves, are factualand not anticipatory or based on suspicion. An association
is allowed to be declared unlawful because it "constitutes" a danger
or "has interfered or interferes" with the maintenance of public
order or "has such interference for its object" etc. The factual
existence of these grounds is amenable to objective determination by the court,
quite as much as the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of
section 15, as to which the AttorneyGeneral conceded that it would be incumbent
on the Government to establish, as a fact, that the association, which it
alleged to be unlawful, "encouraged" or "aided" persons to
commit acts of violence, etc. We are unable to discover any reasonableness in
the claim of the Government in seeking, by its mere declaration, to shut out
judicial enquiry into the underlying facts under clause (b). Secondly, the East
Punjab Public Safety Act was a temporary enactment which was to be in force
only for a year, and any order made there-under was to expire at the
termination of the Act.
What may be regarded as a reasonable restriction
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 519.
610 imposed under such a statute will not
necessarily be considered reasonable under the impugned Act, as the latter is a
permanent measure, and any declaration made thereunder would continue in
operation for an indefinite period until the Government should think fit to
cancel it. Thirdly, while, no doubt, the Advisory Board procedure under the
impugned Act provides a better safeguard than the one under the East Punjab
Public Safety Act, under which the report of such body is not binding on the
Government, the impugned Act suffers from a far more serious defect in the
absence of any provision for adequate communication of the Government's
notification under section 15 (2) (b) to the association and its members or
office-bearers. The Government has to fix a reasonable period in the
notification for the aggrieved person to make a representation to the
Government. But, as stated already, no personal service on any office-bearer or
member of the association concerned or service by affixture at the office, if
any, of such association is prescribed.
Nor is any other mode of proclamation of the
notification at the place where such association carries on its activities
provided for Publication in the official Gazette, whose publicity value is by
no means great, may not reach the members of the association declared unlawful,
and if the time fixed expired before they knew of such declaration their right
of making a representation, which is the only opportunity of presenting their
case, would be 1oat. Yet, the consequences to the members which the
notification involves are most serious, for, their very membership thereafter
is made an offence under section 17.
There was some discussion at the bar as to
whether want of knowledge of the notification would be a valid defence in a
prosecution under that section. But it is not necessary to enter upon that
question, as the very risk of prosecution involved in declaring an association
unlawful with penal consequences, without providing for adequate communication
of such declaration to the association and its members or office bearers, may
well be considered sufficient to render the imposition of 611 restrictions by
such means unreasonable. In this respect an externment order stands on a different
footing, as provision is made for personal or other adequate mode of service on
the individual concerned, who is thus assured of an opportunity of putting
forward his case. For all these reasons the decision in Dr. Khare's case(1) is
distinguishable and cannot rule the present case as claimed by the learned
Attorney General. Indeed, as we have observed earlier, a decision dealing with
the validity of restrictions imposed on one of the rights conferred by article
19 (1) cannot have much value as a precedent for adjudging the validity of the
restrictions imposed on another right, even when the constitutional criterion
is the same, namely, reasonableness, as the conclusion must depend on the
cumulative effect of the varying facts and circumstances of each case.
Having given the case our best and most
anxious consideration, we have arrived at the conclusion, in agreement with the
learned Judges of the High Court, that, having regard to the peculiar features
to which reference has been made, section 15 (2)(b) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1908, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment (Madras) Act,
1950, falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (4) of
article 19 and is, therefore, unconstitutional and void.
The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: P.A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent: S. Subrahmanyan.
Agent for the Union of India and the State of
Travancore-Cochin: P.A. Mehta.
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