State of Madras Vs. C. P. Sarathy
& ANR [1952] INSC 65 (5 December 1952)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), ss. 10
(1) (c), 29Reference to Industrial Tribunal-Nature of dispute or parties to it
not specified-Validity of reference and awardDemands by Union of employees of
several concerns-Employers of some concerns accepting terms of their employeesReference
as to all concerns Validity.
HEADNOTE:
The South Indian Cinema Employees'
Association, a registered trade union whose members were the employees of the
24 cinema houses operating in the Madras City including some of the employees
of the Prabhat Talkies, submitted to the Labour Commissioner a memorandum
setting forth certain demands against their employers for increased wages etc.
and requesting him to settle the disputes. The Labour Commissioner suggested
certain, " minimum terms " which were accepted by some of the
companies including the Prabhat Talkies and at a meeting of the employees of
the Prabhat Talkies a resolution was passed to the effect that no action be
taken about the demands of the Association. The Association decided to go on
strike. The Labour Commissioner reported to the Government, and the Government
made a reference to an Industrial Tribunal, the material portion of which
"'Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen between the workers was: and
management of the Cinema Talkies in the Madras City in respect of certain
matters and whereas in the opinion of His Excellency the Governor of Madras it
is necessary, to refer the said industrial dispute for adjudication: now
therefore etc." The Prabhat 335 Talkies contended before the tribunal that
as there was no dispute between them and their employees they should not be
included in the reference or award, but the Tribunal did not exclude them and
an award was passed, and the managing director of the Prabhat Talkies was
prosecuted for noncompliance with the award:
Held by the Full Court, (i) that the Labour
Commissioner's report clearly showed that an industrial dispute existed between
the management and the employees of the cinema houses; (ii) that as some of the
workers of the Prabhat Talkies were members of the Union, and a reference could
be made even when a dispute was apprehended, the Government had jurisdiction to
make a reference even in respect of the Prabhat Talkies and the reference and
the award were binding on the Prabhat Talkies.
Held Per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., MUKHERJEA,
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and GHULAM HASAN JJ. (BosE J. dubitante) that the reference
to the Tribunal under s. 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be
held to be invalid merely because it did not specify the disputes or the
parties between whom the disputes arose. Per BOSE J.-The order of reference
must be read with the documents which accompanied it and there was sufficient
compliance with s.
10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act
even if the words " the dispute " in the said clause require the
Government to indicate the nature of the dispute which the Tribunal is required
to settle. Even if it is not legally necessary to indicate the nature of the
dispute in a reference, it is desirable that that should be done.
Per PATANJALI SASTRI C. T., MUKHERJEA,
CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and GHULAM HASAN JJ.-Though the Government will not be
justified in making a reference under s. 10 (1) without satisfying itself on
the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite group of
establishments engaged in a particular industry and it is also desirable that
the Government should, wherever possible, indicate the nature of the dispute in
the order of reference, it must be remembered that in making a reference under
s. 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it
has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as
a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the
less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore, canvass the
order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the
Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial
determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the
resulting award to show that what, was referred by the Government, was not an
industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal
had no jurisdiction to make the award But, if the dispute 336 was an industrial
dispute as defined in the -Act, its factual existence and the expediency of
making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters
entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for
the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of
jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the
Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those
matters. The Government must have sufficient knowledge of the nature of the
dispute to be satisfied that it is an industrial dispute within the meaning of
the Act, as, for instance, that it relates to retrenchment or reinstatement.
But, beyond this no obligation can be held to lie on the Government to
ascertain particulars of the disputes before making a reference under S. 10 (1)
or to specify them in the order.
The adjudication by the Tribunal is only an
alternative form of settlement of the disputes on a fair and just basis having
regard to the prevailing conditions in the industry and is by no means
analogous to what an arbitrator has to do in determining ordinary civil
disputes according to the legal rights of the parties.
Ramayya Pantulu v. Kuttti and Rao (Engineers)
Ltd.
[(1949) 1 M.L.J. 2311, India Paper Pulp Co.
Ltd. v. India Paper Pulp Workers' Union ([1949-50] F.C.R. 348), Kandan Textiles
Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras [(1949) 2 M.L.J. 789] and Western India
Automobile Association's case ([1949-50] 1 F.C.R. 321) referred to.
Judgment of the High Court of Madras
reversed.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Case No. 86 of 1951.
Appeal under article 132 (1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and
Order dated November 15, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Menon
and Sayeed JJ.) in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1278 of 1950.
V. K. T. Chari (Advocate-General of Madras)
(Ganapathy Iyer, with him) for the appellant.
K. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar (K. Venkataramani,
with him) for respondent No. 1.
1952. December 5. The-Judgment of Patanjali
Sastri C.J., Mukherjea, Chandrasekhara Aiyar and Ghulam Hagan JJ. was delivered
by Patanjali Sastri C.J. Vivian Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.
PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-This is an appeal from
an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras quashing certain criminal
proceedings instituted in 337 the Court of the Third Presidency Magistrate,
Madras, against the first respondent who is the managing director of a cinema
company carrying on business in Madras under the name of "Prabhat
Talkies." The proceeding arose out of a charge-sheet filed by the police
against the first respondent for an offence under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The charge was that the first
respondent failed to implement certain terms of an award dated 15th December,
1947, made by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, appointed under the Act and
thereby committed a breach of those terms which were binding on him.
The first respondent raised a preliminary
objection before the Magistrate that the latter had no jurisdiction to proceed
with the enquiry because the award on which the prosecution was based was ultra
vires and void on the ground that the reference to the Industral Tribunal which
resulted in the award was not made by the Government in accordance with the
requirements of section 10 'of the Act. As the Magistrate refused to deal with
the abjection as a preliminary point, the first respondent applied to the High
Court under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to quash
the proceeding pending before the Magistrate. The application was heard in the
first instance by a single Judge who referred the matter to a Division Bench in
view of the important questions involved, and it was accordingly heard and
decided by Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed JJ. who upheld the objection
and quashed the proceeding by their order dated 15th November, 1950. From that
order the State of Madras has preferred this appeal.
The second respondent, the South Indian
Cinema Employees' Association (hereinafter referred to as the Association) is a
registered trade union whose members are employees of various cinema companies
carrying on business in the State of Madras. Among these are the 24 cinema
houses operating in the City of Madras, including the " Prabhat
Talkies". On 8th 338 November, 1946, the Association submitted to the
Labour Commissioner of Madras, who had also been appointed as the Conciliation
'Officer under the Act a memorandum setting forth certain demands against the
employers for increased wages and dearness allowance, annual bonus of three
months' wages, increased leave facilities, provident fund, and adoption of
proper procedure in imposing punishment and requesting the Officer to settle
the disputes as the employers were unwilling to concede the demands. After
meeting the representatives of the employees and the employers, the Labour
Commissioner suggested on 28th April, 1947, certain " minimum terms "
which he invited the employers and the union officials to accept. The managers
of six cinema companies in the City including " Prabhat Talkies "
agreed to accept the terms but the managements of other companies did not
intimate acceptance or nonacceptance. It would appear that, in the meantime, a
meeting was convened on 22nd February, 1947, of the employees of four cinema
companies including "Prabhat Talkies." Ninety-four out of 139 workers
attended the meeting and resolutions were passed to the effect that no action
need be taken about the demands of the Association as the managements of those
companies agreed to some improvement in the matter of wages and leave
facilities and promised to look into the workers' grievances if they were real.
But as the terms suggested by the Labour Commissioner were not accepted by all
the employers, the representatives of the Association met that Officer on 13th
May, 1947, and reported that the Association had decided to go on strike on any
day after 20th May, 1947, if their demands were not conceded. As the
conciliation proceedings of the Labour Commissioner thus failed to bring about
a settlement of the dispute, he made a report on 13th May, 1947, to the State
Government as requited by section 12 (4) of the Act stating the steps taken by
him to effect a settlement and why they proved unsuccessful. In that report,
after mentioning the minimum terms suggested by him and 339 enumerating the ten
demands put forward by the employee,;, the Labour Commissioner stated as
follows:"As the employers have not accepted even the minimum terms
suggested by me and as the employees are restive, I apprehend that they may
strike work at' anytime. I therefore suggest that the above demands made by the
workers may be referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.
I have advised the workers to defer further
action on their notice pending the orders of Government," and he concluded
by suggesting the appointment of a retired District and Sessions Judge as the
sole member of the Special Industrial Tribunal " to adjudicate on this
dispute." Thereupon the Government issued the G. O. M. S. No. 2227 dated
20th May, 1947, in the following terms:
" Whereas an industrial dispute has
arisen between the workers and managements of the cinema talkies in, the Madras
City in respect of certain matters ;
And whereas in the opinion of His Excellency
the Governor of Madras, it is necessary to refer the said industrial dispute
for adjudication;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers
conferred by section 7 (1) and (2) read with section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 " His Excellency the Governor of Madras hereby constitutes
an Industrial Tribunal consisting of one person, namely, Sri Diwan Bahadur K. S.
Ramaswami Sastri, Retired District and,
Sessions Judge, and directs that the said industrial dispute be referred to
that tribunal for adjudication.
The Industrial Tribunal may, in its
discretion, settle the issues in the light of a preliminary enquiry which it
may hold for the purpose and thereafter adjudicate on the said industrial
dispute.
The Commissioner of Labour is requested to
send copies of the order to the managements of cinema talkies concerned,"
44 340 The Tribunal sent notices to all the cinema companies in the City and to
the Association calling upon them to file statements of their respective cases
and to appear before it on 7th July, 1947.Pleadings were accordingly filed on
both sides and the Tribunal -framed as many as 22 issues of which issue (3) is
,material here and runs thus:
" Is there a dispute between the
managements of the City theatres and their respective employees justifying the
reference by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication ?
Whether such an objection is tenable in law ?" It appears to have been
claimed on behalf of some of these companies including " Prabhat Talkies
" that so far as they ware concerned there was no dispute between the,
management and their employees and therefore they should not be included in the
reference or the award. The Tribunal repelled this argument observing:
"That even if some of the theatres have
got a staff contented with their lot there is a substantial dispute in the
industry taken as a whole. After I arrive at my decision about the basic wages,
increments, dearness allowance, etc. the same will bind the industry as a whole
in the City of Madras if the Government accepts and implements my award."
The Tribunal accordingly held that none of the cinema companies should be
"removed from the ambit of this industrial dispute and adjudication
". It also found as a matter of fact that " the idyllic picture of
industrial peace and contentment " put forward by the first respondent
company was not justified by the evidence. 'Issue No. 3 was thus found for the
Association. The Tribunal finally passed its award on 15th December, 1947,
which was confirmed by the Government on 13th February, 1948, and was declared
binding on the workers and the managements with effect from 25th February,
1948, the date of its publication in the Fort St.
George Gazette, for a period of one year from
that date.
It is alleged that 341 the first respondent
failed to implement certain provisions of the award when their implementation
was due and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 29 of the
Act.
No prosecution, however, was instituted till
24th April, 1950, as, in the meanwhile, certain decisions of the Madras High
Court tended to throw doubt on the validity of references made in general terms
without specifying the particular disputes or the groups of workers and
managements between whom such disputes existed, and legislation was considered
necessary to validate awards passed on such references. Accordingly the
Industrial Disputes (Madras Amendment) Act, 1949, was passed on 10th April,
1949, purporting to provide, inter alia, that all awards made by any Industrial
Tribunal constituted before the commencement of that Act shall be deemed to be
valid and shall not be called in question in, any court of law on the ground
that the dispute to which the award relates was not referred to the Tribunal in
accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (section
5). . It also purported to validate certain specified awards including "
the award in the disputes between the managements of cinema theatres and
workers " (section 6), which obviously refers to the award under
consideration in these proceedings.
In support of his application to the High
Court the first respondent herein raised three contentions. First, the
Government had no jurisdiction to make the reference in question as there was
no dispute between the management and workers of " Prabhat Talkies "
and, therefore, the reference and the award in so far as they related to the
first respondent were ultra vires and void; secondly, in any case the
notification by the Government purporting to refer an industrial dispute to the
Tribunal was not competent under the Act, inasmuch as it did not refer to any
specific disputes as &rising for adjudication and did not mention the
companies or firms in which the disputes are said to have existed or were
apprehended; andthirdly, the Madras Amendment Act was 342 unconstitutional and
void under section, 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, being repugnant
10the provisions of, the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and also void
under article 13 (1) read with article 14 of the Constitution as being
discriminatory in character. The learned Judges, by separate but concurring
judgments, upheld these contentions and issued a certificate under article 132
(1) of the Constitution as the case raised substantial questions of law
regarding the interpretation of the Constitution. As we considered that the
contentions of, the appellant on the first two points must prevail, we did not
hear arguments on the constitutional issue.
Before dealing with the main contentions of
the parties, we may dispose of a minor point raised by Mr. Krishnaswami
Aiyangar, for the first time before us, namely, that the prosecution of the
first respondent for the alleged breach of some of the terms of the Tribunal's
award is unsustainable inasmuch as it was instituted after the expiry of the
award. In support of this argument learned counsel invoked the analogy of the
cases where it has been held that a prosecution for an offence under a
temporary statute could not be commenced, or having been commenced when the
statute was in force, could not be continued after its expiry.
Those decisions have no application here. The
first respondent is prosecuted for an offence made punishable under section 29
of the Act which is a permanent statute and when he committed the alleged
breach of some, of the terms of the award, which was in force at the time, he
incurred the liability to be prosecuted under the Act. The fact that the award
subsequently expired cannot affect that liability.
On behalf of the appellant, the Advocate General
of Madras urged that the question whether there existed an industrial dispute
when the Government made the reference now under consideration was an issue of
fact which the High Court ought not to have found in the negative at this
preliminary stage 343 before evidence was recorded by the trial court. He
submitted, however, that, on the facts already appearing on the record, there
could be no reasonable doubt that an industrial dispute did exist at the
relevant time. We are.
inclined to agree. The ten demands set forth
in the Labour Commissioner's letter of the 13th May, 1947, which were not
agreed to by the managements of the 24 cinema theatres in Madras clearly
constituted industrial disputes within the meaning of the Act. Basheer Ahmed
Sayeed J., with whom the, other' learned Judge concurred, says:
"There is nothing in the letter of the
Commissioner which would indicate that these demands made by the South Indian
Cinema Employees' Association were referred to the respective owners of the
cinema houses in the City of Madras as a body or to any of them
individually." This, we think is based on a misapprehension of the true
facts. The demands were identical with those mentioned in the Association's memorandum
originally submitted on the 8th November, 1946, and they formed the subject of
discussion with the representatives of the cinema companies in the City in the
course of the conciliation proceedings. That memorandum, which was not made
part of the I record in the court below, was produced here, and Mr.
Krishnaswami Aiyangar was satisfied that the demands referred to in that
memorandum were the same as those mentioned in the Labour Commissioner's letter
of 13th May, 1947, of which all the employers were thus fully aware. Nor is it
correct to say " that the disputes, if any,' which might have existed
between the workmen of the petitioner's cinema and the petitioner him-self had
been settled by the petitioner's ready and willing acceptance of the terms suggested.
by the Commissioner ". The terms accepted by the first respondent were
what the Commissioner called "the minimum terms " and were by no
means the same as the demands put for-ward by the Association, which were never
accepted 344 by the Association. The Commissioner's letter of the 13th May,
1947, made this clear.
But, in truth, it was not material to
consider whether there was any dispute outstanding between the first respondent
and his employees when the Government made the reference on 20th May, 1947. The
learned Judges appear to have assumed that the disputes reference to a Tribunal
under section 10 (1) (c) of the Act must, in order that the resulting award may
be binding on any particular industrial establishment and its. employees, have
actually arisen between them. " Analysing the order of reference of the
Madras Government now under consideration," the learned Judges observe,
" it is obvious that there is no mention of the existence of any dispute
between the petitioner (the first respondent herein) and his workmen
............... In fact there was no dispute to be referred to a Tribunal so
far as this petitioner is concerned. If, therefore, there was no jurisdiction
to make any reference, it follows that the whole reference and the award are
both invalid and not binding on the petitioner." This view gives no effect
to the words "or is apprehended " in section 10 (1). In the present
case, the Government referred " and industrial dispute between the workers
and managements of cinema talkies in Madras City in respect of certain
matters." As pointed out in the Labour Commissioner's letter to the
Government, there were 24 cinema companies in Madras, and the Association,
which, as a duly registered trade union, represented their employees, put forward
the demands on behalf of the employees of all the cinema houses in the City.
Fifteen out of 43 workers of the " Prabhat Talkies " were admittedly
members of the Association which thus figured as one of the parties to the
dispute. In that situation, the Government may have thought, without a close
examination of the conditions in each individual establishment, that disputes
which affected the workmen collectively existed in the cinema industry in the
City and that, even if such disputes had not actually arisen in any particular
establishment, they could, 345 having regard to their collective nature, well
be apprehended as imminent in respect of that establishment also.
It is not denied that notices were sent by
the Tribunal to all the 24 companies and they all filed written statements of
their case in answer to the demands made by the -Association on behalf of the
employees. In these circumstances, it is idle to claim that the Government had
no jurisdiction to make the reference and that the award was not binding on the
respondent's Organisation. The latter was clearly bound by the award under
section 18 of the Act.
It was next contended that the reference was
not competent as it was too vague and general in its terms containing no
specification of the disputes or of the -parties between whom the disputes
arose. Stress was laid on the definite article in clause (c) and it was said
that the Government should crystallise the disputes ,before referring them to a
Tribunal under section 1 0 (1) of the Act. Failure to do so vitiated the
proceedings and the resulting award. In upholding this objection, Govinda Menon
J., who dealt with it in greater detail in his judgment, said, " Secondly,
it is contended that the reference does not specify the dispute at all. What is
stated in the reference is that an industrial dispute has arisen between the
workers and the management of the cinema talkies in the City of Madras in
respect of certain matters. Awards based on similar references have been the
subject of consideration in this Court recently. In-Bamayya Pantulu v. Kutty
and Rao (Engineers) Ltd.(1) Horwill and Rajagopalan JJ. had to consider an
award based on similar references without specifying what the dispute
was." After referring to the decision of the Federal Court in India Paper
Pulp Co. Ltd.
v. India 'Paper Pulp Workers' Union(2), and
pointing out that though the judgment of the Federal Court was delivered on
30th March, 1949, it was not referred to by the High Court in Kandan Textile
Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras(3), which was decided on 26th August, 1949,
the learned Judge expressed the view that the trend of (1) (1949) 1 M.L.J. 231
(3) (1949) 2 M.L.J. 789.
(2) [1949-50] F. C.R. 348.
346 decisions of this Court exemplified in
the cases referred to by me above has not been overruled by their Lordships of
the Federal Court." Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J. I however, sought to
distinguish the decision of the Federal Court on the facts of that case,
remarking "that a reading of the order of reference that was the
subject-matter of the Federal Court decision conveys a clear idea as to a
definite dispute, its nature and existence and the parties between whom the
dispute existed." It is, however,, clear from the order of reference which
is fully extracted in the judgment that it did not mention what the particular
dispute was, and it was in repelling the objection based on that omission that
Kania C.J. said:
"The section does not require that the
particular dispute should be mentioned in the order; it is sufficient if the
existence of a dispute and the fact that the dispute is referred to the
Tribunal are clear from the order. To that extent the order does not appear to
be defective. Section 10 of the Act, however, requires a reference of the
dispute to the Tribunal. The Court has to read the -order as a whole and
determine whether in effect the order makes such a reference." This is,
however, not to say that the Government 'will be justified in making a
reference under section 10 (1) without satisfying itself on the facts and
circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended in relation to an establishment or a definite group of
establishments engaged in a particular industry, and it is also desirable that
the Government should, wherever possible, indicate the nature of the dispute in
the order of reference. But, it must be remembered that in making a reference
under section 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact
that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial
dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it
any the less administrative in character.' The Court cannot, therefore, canvass
the order of reference closely to see if there was any 347 material before the
Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial
determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the
resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an
industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act,, and that, therefore, the
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But if the dispute was an
industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the
expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are
matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be
competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for
want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material
before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion
on those matters. The observations in some of the decisions in Madras do not
appear to have kept this distinction in view.
Moreover, it may not always be possible for the
Government, on the material placed before it, to particularise the dispute in
its order-of reference, for situations might conceivably arise where public
interest requires that a strike or a look-out either existing or imminent
should be ended or averted without delay, which, under the scheme of the Act,
could be done only after the dispute giving rise to it has been referred to a
Board or a Tribunal (vide sections 10(3) and 23). In such cases the Government
must have the power, in order to maintain industrial peace and production, to
set in motion the machinery of settlement with its sanctions and prohibitions
without stopping to enquire what specific points the contending parties are
quarrelling about, and it would seriously, detract from the usefulness of the
statutory machinery to construe section 10 (1) as denying such power to the
Government. We find nothing in the language of that provision to compel such
construction. The Government must, of course, have sufficient knowledge of the
nature of the dispute to be 45 348 satisfied that it is an industrial dispute
within the meaning of the Act, as, for instance, that it relates to
retrenchment or reinstatement. But, beyond this no obligation can be held to
lie on the Government to ascertain particulars of the disputes before making a
reference under section 10 (1) or to specify them in the order.
This conclusion derives further support from
clause (a) of section 10 (1) which provides in the same language for a
reference of the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement. A Board is part
of the conciliation machinery provided by the Act, and it cannot be said that
it is necessary to specify the dispute in referring it to such a body which
only mediates between the parties who must, of course, know what they are
disputing about. If a reference without particularising the disputes is beyond
cavil under clause (a), why should it be incompetent under clause (c) ? No
doubt, the Tribunal adjudicates; whereas the Board only mediates. But the
adjudication by the Tribunal is only an alternative form of settlement of the
disputes on a fair and just basis having regard to the prevailing conditions in
the industry and is by no means analogous to what an arbitrator has; to do in
determining ordinary civil disputes according to the legal rights of the
parties. Indeed, this notion that a reference to a Tribunal under the Act must
specify the particular disputes appears appears to have been derived from the
analogy of an ordinary arbitration. For instance in Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty
& Rao (Engineers) Ltd.(1) it is observed "that if a dispute is to be
referred to: a Tribunal the nature of the dispute must be set out just as it
Would if a reference were made to an arbitrator in a civil dispute. The
Tribunal like any other arbitrator can give an award on a reference only if the
points of reference are clearly placed before it." The analogy is somewhat
misleading. The scope of adjudication by a Tribunal under the Act is much wider
as pointed out in the Western India (1) (1949) 1 M. L. J. 231.
349 Automobile Association's case (1), and it
would involve no hardship if the reference also is made in wider terms
provided, of course the dispute is one of the kind described in section 2(k)
and the parties between whom such dispute has actually arisen or is apprehended
in the view of the Government are indicated either individually or collectively
with reasonable clearness. The rules framed under the Act provide for the
Tribunal calling for statements of their respective cases from the parties and,
the disputes would thus get crystallised before the Tribunal proceeds to make
its award. On the other hand, it is significant that there is no procedure
provided in the Act or in the rules for the Government ascertaining the
particulars of the disputes from the parties before referring them to a
Tribunal under section 10(1).
In view of the increasing complexity of
modern life and the interdependence of the various sectors of a planned
national economy, it is obviously in the interest of the public that labour
disputes should be peacefully and quickly settled within the frame-work of the
Act rather than by resort to methods of direct action which are only too well
calculated to disturb the public peace and order and diminish production in the
country, and courts should not be astute to discover formal defects and
technical flaws to overthrow such settlements.
In the result we set aside the order of the
High Court and dismiss the first respondent's petition.
BOSE J.I agree but would have preferred to
rest my decision on the ground that in this case there was sufficient
compliance with the terms of section 10(1) (C) of the Act even on the first
respondent's interpretation of it, namely that the words, " the dispute
" require Government to indicate the nature of the dispute which the
Tribunal is required to settle. I say this because, in my judgment, we must
read the order of the 20th May, 1947, along with the documents which
accompanied it. I also agree that one (1) [1949-50] F.C.R. 321.
350 must not be over-technical, but had it
not been for the /of act that the point is now settled by the decision in the
India Paper' Pulp Company's case(1) I would have been inclined to consider that
an indication of the nature of the dispute, either in the order itself or in
the papers accompanying it, was necessary. However, that is now settled and I
have no desire to go behind the decision but I would like to say that even if
it is not legally necessary to indicate the nature of the dispute, it is, in my
opinion, desirable that that should be done.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
Agent for respondent No. 1: S. Subramanian.
(1) [1949-50] F.C.R. 348.
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