The Times of India Vs. Arabinda Bose
& ANR [1952] INSC 76 (12 December 1952)
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
CITATION: 1953 AIR 75 1953 SCR 215
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1971 SC 221 (15)
ACT:
Contempt of Court-Article imputing motives to
judges-Gross contempt-Apology-Practice of Supreme Court.
HEADNOTE:
It is not the practice of the Supreme Court
to issue a rule for contempt of Court except in very grave and serious cases
and it is never over-sensitive to public criticism; but when there is danger of
grave mischief being done in the matter of administration of justice, the
animadversion will not be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity.
A leading article in the " Times of
India " on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose v.
Arabinda Bose and Another ([1953] S.C.R. 1) contained the following statements:
"the fact of the matter is that in the higher legal latitudes in Delhi the
dual system was regarded as obsolete and anomalous......... There is a,
tell-tale note at the top of the rules framed by the Supreme Court for
enrolment of advocates and agents to the effect that the rules were subject to
revision and the Judges had under consideration a proposal for abolishing the
dual system......... To achieve a dubious or even a laudable purpose by
straining the law is hardly 216 edifying. Politics and policies have no place
in the pure region of the law and Courts of law would serve the country and the
Constitution better by discarding all extraneous considerations and
uncompromisingly observing divine detachment............" In proceedings
for contempt of Court: Held, that if the articles had merely preached to Courts
of law a sermon of divine detachment no objection could be taken, but in
attributing improper motives to the judges, the article not only transgressed
the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to affect
the dignity and prestige of the Court and it was therefore a gross contempt of
court.
If an impression is created in the minds of
the public that the judges of the highest court in the land act on extraneous
considerations in deciding cases the confidence of the whole community in the
administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief
than that can possibly be imagined.
[In view of the unconditional apology
tendered by the Editor, Printer and Publisher and the undertaking given by them
to give wide publicity to their regret, the proceedings were dropped.] Andrew
Paul v. Attorney-General of Trinidad (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141) referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 160 of
1952. Contempt of Court proceedings against the Editor, Printer and Publisher
of the "Times of India" (Daily), Bombay and Delhi, for publishing a
leading article in their paper of October 30, 1952, entitled A Disturbing Decision ".
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney- General for India (P. A. Mehta, with him) (amicus curiae).
N. C. Chatterjee (Nur-ud-Din Ahmad and A. E.
Dutt, with him) for the contemners.
1952. December 12. The Order of the Court was
delivered- by MAHAJAN J.-In its issue of the 30th October, 1952, the "
Times of India", a daily newspaper published in Bombay and New Delhi, a
leading article was published under the heading " A disturbing decision
". The burden of it was that in a singularly oblique and infelicitous
manner the Supreme Court -had -by a majority decision tolled the knell of the
much maligned dual system prevailing in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts by
holding that the 217 right to practise in any High Court conferred on advocates
of the Supreme Court, made the rules in force in those High Courts requiring
advocates appearing on the Original Side to be instructed by attorneys
inapplicable to them. The article concluded with the following passage:- "
The fact of the matter appears to be that in the -higher legal latitudes at New
Delhi and elsewhere the dual -system is regarded as obsolete and anomalous.
There is a tell-tale note at the top of the rules framed by the Supreme Court
for enrolment of advocates and agents to the effect that the rules were subject
to revision and the judges had under consideration a proposal for abolishing
the dual system.
Abolish it by 'all means if the system has
outgrown its usefulness and is found incongruous in the new setting of a
democratic Constitution. But to achieve a dubious or even a laudable purpose by
straining the law is hardly edifying.
Politics and policies have no place in the
pure region of the law; and courts of law would serve the country and the
Constitution better by discarding all extraneous considerations and
uncompromisingly observing divine detachment which is the glory of law and the
guarantee of justice." No objection could have been taken to the article
had -it merely preached to the courts of law the sermon of divine detachment.
But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the judges, it not only
transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear
tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court. The article in
question was thus a gross contempt of court. It is obvious that if an
impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the
-highest court in the land 'act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases,
the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound
to be undermined and no greater , mischief than that can possibly be imagined.
It was for this reason that the rule was issued against the respondents.
218 We are happy to find that the Editor,
Printer and the Publisher of the paper in their respective affidavits filed in
these proceedings have frankly stated that they now realize that in the
offending article they had exceeded the limits of legitimate criticism in that
words or expressions which can be construed as casting reflection upon the
court and constituting Contempt had crept into it. They have expressed sincere
regret and have tendered unreserved and unqualified apology for this first
lapse of theirs. We would like to observe that it is not the practice of this
Court to issue such rules except in very grave and serious cases and it is
never over-sensitive to public criticism; but -*hen there is danger of grave
mischief being done in the matter of administration of justice,. the
animadversion cannot be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity. In this
'matter we are of the same opinion as was expressed by their Lordships of the
Privy Council in Andre Paul v. Attorney- General of Trinidad (1), Where they
observed as follows:- "The path of criticism is A public way: the
wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public
abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the
administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism
and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice,
they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to
suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary
men." In view of the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents and
the undertaking given by them to give wide publicity to their regret, we have
decided to drop further proceedings and we accept the apology and discharge the
rule without any order as to costs.
Rule discharged.
Agent for the contemners: Rajinder Narain.
(1) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141.
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