Workers of The Industry Colliery,
Dhanbad Vs. Management of The Industry Colliery [1952] INSC 75 (12 December
1952)
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
CITATION: 1953 AIR 88 1953 SCR 428
CITATOR INFO :
R 1959 SC 841 (4)
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 20 (2)
(b), 22 (1) (d), 24--Conciliation proceedings-Withdrawal of workers-Strike
after Conciliation Officer has made his report but before it is received by
Government-Legality of strike-Chief Labour Commissioner whether agent of
Government.
HEADNOTE:
A conciliation proceeding cannot be deemed to
have concluded under s. 20 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in a
case where no settlement has been arrived at, as soon as the Conciliation
Officer sends his report. It can be deemed to have concluded only when the
report is actually received by the appropriate Government.
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 729.
429 The Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi,
is not, in the absence of any express delegation of powers by the Central
Government, the agent of the latter for the purpose of receiving the report of
a Conciliation Officer.
The appellants who had sent notice of their
intention to strike declined to participate in conciliation proceedings which
were initiated by the Regional Labour Commissioner, and the latter sent his
report to the Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, on October 22, 1949. The
report was received by the Chief Labour Commissioner on October 25, but a copy
of the report was sent by the Chief Labour Commissioner, and received by the
Ministry of Labour, only on November 17. Meanwhile the appellants went on
strike on November 7:
Held, confirming the decision of the
Industrial Tribunal, that under s. 20 (2) (b) of the Act the conciliation
proceeding held by the Regional Labour Commissioner concluded only on November
17 when his report was received by the Central Government, and as the
appellants went on strike before that date, it was a strike during the pendency
of conciliation proceedings and therefore illegal under s. 22 (1) (d) of the
Act.
The provisions of several sections of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, show that time is of the essence of the Act and the
requirements of its relevant provisions must be punctually obeyed and carried
out, if the Act is to operate harmoniously.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 133 of 1951.
Appeal by special leave granted by the
Supreme Court on the 1st December, 1950, from the Judgment dated the 24th April,
1950, of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, in Appeal No. 1
of 1950, arising out of Order dated the 2nd February, 1950, of the Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central) Dhanbad.
N. C. Chatterjee (S. L. Chhibber, with him)
for the appellants.
S. P. Sinha (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for
the respondent.
1952. December 12. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by DAS J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the
decision dated April 24, 1950, of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at
Dhanbad confirming the decision dated February 2, 1950, of 430 the Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, which had declared the one-day strike
by the appellants that took place on November 7, 1949, to be an illegal strike.
The relevant facts are as follows: On October 13, 1949, the appellants through
the Secretary of their Union gave a notice to the respondents, under section
22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that they proposed to call a
one-day strike on the expiry of November 6, 1949, for the fulfilment of
demands, 16 in number, noted therein. This strike notice was, in accordance
with rule 85 of the rules framed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, sent
to (1) the Conciliation Officer (Central), Dhanbad, (2) the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, (3) the Chief Labour Commissioner, Department
of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi, (4) Secretary, Ministry of Labour,
Government of India, New Delhi, and (5) A.D.C., Dhanbad.
This notice was received at the office of the
Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, on October 15, 1949.
'The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central)
held conciliation proceedings at Dhanbad on October 22, 1949, but the
appellants, by their letter of the same date , declined to participate in the
proceedings alleging that they were convinced that nothing would come out of
the same and that the proceedings should, therefore, be considered "to be
ceased." On the same day the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central),
Dhanbad, addressed letter No. RLC/CON 5 (Token) 7910 to the Chief Labour
Commissioner, New Delhi, stating that after receipt of the notice of strike he
had issued notice to the parties for conciliation, that the employers'
representatives were ready to discuss the demands but the Union's
representative filed a petition in writing saying that they did not want to
participate in the proceedings and that no fresh material had been placed
before him to change his view and that he was not in favour of recommending a
reference of the demand to the Industrial Tribunal. The letter ended with a
request that -the Government 431 may be informed of the situation. It appears
that this report was received in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner,
New Delhi, on October 25, 1949. Although the Chief Labour Commissioner, in his
letter' of November 17, 1949, to the Regional Labour Commissioner ( Central),
Dhanbad, states that the contents of the latter's report had already been
communicated to the Ministry of Labour, a copy of the report was actually sent
to and received by the Ministry of Labour only on that day. In the meantime on
November 7, 1949, the appellants about 700 in number, went on one-day strike as
per their strike notice. Apparently the respondents contended that the strike
was illegal and they made an application, under section 8 (2) of the Coal Mines
Provident Fund and Bonus Scheme Act, 1948, to the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central), Dhanbad, for a decision on the question whether the strike was legal
or illegal. By his order dated February 2, 1950, the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central), Dhanbad, declared that the strike was illegal. Being
aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the appellants, under section 8 (4) of the
last mentioned Act, preferred an appeal to the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal at Dhanbad which, however, also held that the strike was illegal and that
the conclusions arrived at by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) were
correct and accordingly dismissed the appear The appellants thereafter applied
for and obtained special leave to appeal to this Court.
The only question raised on this appeal is
whether the strike was illegal. Section 24 (1) of the Act provides, inter alia,
that a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention
of section 22 or section 23 of the Act. Section 22 (1) provides as follows:"
22. (1) No person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike in
breach of 'contract(a) without giving to the employer notice of strike, as
hereinafter provided, within six weeks before striking; or 56 432 (b) within
fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of
strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or (d) during the pendency of
any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days,
after the conclusion of such proceedings." Notice of strike having been
given in terms of clause (a) and 14 days having elapsed after the giving of
such notice as required -by clause (b) and the actual strike having taken place
after November 6, 1949, being the date specified in the strike notice, the only
other question for consideration is whether the strike took place during the
pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer, and
seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. Under section 20(1) a
conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which
a notice of strike under section 22 is received by the Conciliation Officer. In
this case the strike notice was received by the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) who is the Conciliation Officer, 'on October 15, 1949, and the
conciliation proceedings, therefore, commenced on that date under section
20(1). The relevant portion of sub-section (2) of that section runs as follows:
A conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded(a)...................................
(b) where no settlement is arrived at, when
the report of the Conciliation Officer is received by the appropriate
Government or when the report of, the Board is published under section 17, as
the case may be, or (c)...................................
The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central),
who is the Conciliation Officer in this dispute, is required by section 12 to
hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner and, without delay,
investigate the dispute and to do all such things as 433 he thinks fit for the
purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of
the dispute. In this -case the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), held
conciliation proceedings on October 22, 1949, but no settlement could be arrived
at as the appellants declined to take part in the proceedings on the ground
that they were convinced that nothing would come out of it. That being the
position, under section 12 (4) it became the duty of the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) to "as soon' as practicable after the close of the
investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth
the steps taken by him.for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to
the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof together with a full
statement of such facts and circumstances. and the reasons on account of which,
in this case, a settlement could not be arrived at ". Subsection (6) of
this section. requires that the report shall be submitted within fourteen days
of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter
period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government. As already stated, the
conciliation proceedings commenced on October 15, 1949. The report, therefore,
was to be submitted within fourteen days from that date., In point of fact the
report was sent by the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) to the Chief
Labour Commissioner New Delhi, on October 22, 1949 (which was well within 14
days from the commencement of the conciliation proceedings), with the request
that the Government may' be informed of the situation. Under sub-section (4)
the report has to be sent to the " appropriate Government " which
according to the definition under section 2 (a) means, in relation to an
industrial dispute concerning a mine, the Central Government. The Regional
Labour Commissioner (Central) did not send the report direct to Central
Government but sent it to the Chief Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, in
accordance with what has been called the usual course and routine of 434
official business. Therefore, however, was received by the Central Government
on or about November 17, 1949, and it is only on such receipt that the
conciliation proceedings are to be deemed to have concluded according to the
provisions of section 20(2)(b). Prima, facie, therefore, the strike which took
place .on November 7, 1949, was during the pendency of the conciliation
proceedings as held by the authorities below.
Shri N. C. Chattanooga, however, argues that
in point of fact the conciliation proceedings came to an end when the
appellants had withdrawn from the proceedings and the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) had Bent his report.
It is by a legal fiction, introduced by
section 20 (2) (b), that the conciliation proceedings are prolonged until the
actual receipt of the report by the appropriate Government.
According to Shri N. C. Chatterjee the
conciliation proceedings should be held to' terminate when the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) sent his report within fourteen days of the commencement
of the conciliation proceedings. The difficulty in accepting this' argument is
that while the word "send is used in section 12 (4) and the word "
submitted in section 12(6), the word used in section 20 (2), (b)is "
received ". That word obviously implies the actual receipt of the report.
To say that the conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded when
the report should, in the ordinary course of business, have been received by
the appropriate Government would introduce an element of uncertainty, for the
provisions of section 22 (1) (d) clearly contemplate that the appropriate
Government should have a clear seven days' time after the conclusion of the
conciliation proceedings to make' up its mind as to the further steps it should
take. It is, therefore, necessary that the beginning of the seven days' time
should be fixed so that there would be certainty as to when the seven days'
time would expire. It is, therefore, provided in section 20 (2) (b) that the
proceedings shall be deemed to have 435 concluded, where no settlement is
arrived at, when the report is actually received by the appropriate Government.
Shri N. C. Chatterjee on the other, hand strongly urges, and not without some
force, that on that construction it may be possible for the Government or its
officers to withhold the report' designedly or the -report may be lost in
course of transit or may be actually received after the expiry of the date
fixed for the strike in the notice under section 22 (I). Shri N. C. Chatterjee
also points out that it will not be possible for the workers to know when the
report is actually received and their right to strike may thus be taken away
from them' Shri N. C. Chatterjee contends that the Government cannot take advantage
of its own wrong.
While we feel considerable force in Shri N.
C. Chatterjee's argument based on hardship we are bound to assume that the.
public officers concerned would act fairly
and properly.
Further, it is not a case of the Government
taking advantage of-its own wrong as suggested by Shri N. C. Chatterjee, for
here we are concerned with a dispute between the employers and the employees
and there is no material before us to justify our attributing the misdeeds, if
any, of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) or of the Chief Labour
Commissioner, to the respondents, the employers who are entitled to take their
stand on the language of the law.
The Court can only construe the statute as it
finds it and if there is any defect in the law it is for other authority than
this Court to rectify the same.
Shri N. C. Chatterjee also urges that the
Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) should have, under section 12, -sent his
report to the appropriate Government, which in this cage means the Central Government,
and he should not have sent the report to the Chief Labour Commissioner.
Assuming that that is the position then. the fact will still remain that the
Central Government did not receive the report and, therefore, the conciliation
proceedings did not come to an end when the strike took place. Shri 436 N. C.
Chatterjee also suggests that the Chief Labour Commissioner should have
returned the report to the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) because under
the law the report should not have been made to him. He, however, did not
return the,same to the Regional Commissioner but took upon himself to.for ward
the same to the Labour Ministry.
In the circumstances, Shri N. C. Chatterjee
urges, on the authority of Chaturbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of State for India
(1), that the Chief Labour Commissioner must be deemed to be the agent of the
Central Government for the purpose of receiving the report. We adjourned this
case in order to enable Shri N. C. Chatterjee to ascertain whether there was
any delegation of authority in this behalf by the Central Government to the
Chief Labour Commissioner. Shri N. C.
Chatterjee has not been able to discover any
such delegation of authority. It seems obvious to us that the Chief Labour
Commissioner cannot possibly be regarded for this purpose as the Central
Government. In point of fact by a notification in the Gazette of India dated
April 5, 1947$ the Chief Labour Commissioner has been appointed as a
Conciliation Officer. and, therefore, in conciliation proceedings conducted by
him he has to submit his report to the Central Government. It follows,
therefore, that the Chief Labour Commissioner must be an authority separate
from the Central Government. According to rule 85 to which reference has been
made the strike notice has to be sent, amongst others, to the Chief Labour
Commissioner as well as to the Department of Labour of the Government of India,
which again. indicates that the two are different entities. The Chief Labour
Commissioner is, therefore, only the channel or post office through which
correspondence between the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) and the
Central Government is to pass and he cannot possibly be regarded as an agent of
the 'Central Government for the purpose of receiving the report. The Chief Labour
Commissioner (1) A.I.R. 1927 All, 2i5.
437 being the official channel the ruling
relied upon by Shri N. C. Chatterjee can have no application to the facts of
this case.
For reasons stated above we are of opinion
that the conclusions arrived at by the authorities below on this point are
correct and that this appeal must be dismissed.
In the -peculiar circumstances of the case,
however, we think that there should be no order as to costs and the parties
should bear their own costs.
Before concluding we must draw the attention
of the authorities concerned to the slack and un-business like manner in which
the matter was dealt with in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner. The
Act requires that the Conciliation Officer must submit his report within 14
days from the commencement of conciliation proceedings and then on receipt of
the report by the appropriate Government the conciliation proceedings are to be
deemed to have concluded.
Although factually the conciliation
proceedings terminate when a settlement is arrived at before the Conciliation
Officer or when it is found that no settlement can be arrived at, the Act, by a
legal fiction, prolongs the conciliation proceedings until the actual receipt
of the report by the appropriate Government and goes on to provide that the
appropriate Government must have seven days' time to consider what further
steps it would take under the Act.
Up 'to the expiry of this period of 7 days
the Act permits no strike but after that period is over the employees -are left
free to resort to collective action by way of a strike.
Indeed, it is on the basis of these
provisions that the date of strike has to be carefully selected and specified
in the notice of strike to be given by the employees under section 22 (1) of
the Act. Thus, even a cursory perusal of the Act makes it clear that time is of
the essence of the Act and that the requirements of its relevant provisions
must be punctually obeyed and carried out if the Act is to operate harmoniously
at all. In this case the conciliation officer submitted his report on October
438 22, 1949, i.e., well within 14 days from the commencement of the
conciliation proceedings as required by section 12 (6) of the Act. The report
was -sent through what has been called the routine official channel.
Admittedly, it was received in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner at
New Delhi on October 25, 1949, but surprisingly it was not passed on to the
Ministry of Labour, which is also in New Delhi, until about November 17, 1949.
The employees had no means of knowing when the report was actually received by
the Central Government which is the appropriate Government in this case or when
the period of 7 days after such receipt expired. But in the belief,
entertained, we think, quite legitimately, that the official business had been
conducted regularly and promptly the employees went on strike on November 7,
1949, as previously notified.' It now transpires that the report had -not been
actually received by the Central Government and, therefore, on the letter of
the law, the strike must be hold to be illegal and the employees must face and
bear the consequences of an illegal strike and may even be deprived' of
benefits to which they would otherwise have been entitled. This hardship has
been thrown upon the employees for no fault of their own but simply because of
the callous indifference or utter inefficiency and slackness apparently
prevailing in the office of the Chief Labour Commissioner which cannot be too
strongly deprecated. It is to be hoped that public officers would, in the
discharge of their official duties in future, show a greater sense of
responsibility than, what they have done in the case before us.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellants: Gobind Saran Singh.
Agent for the respondent: P. K. Chatterjee.
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