Romesh Thappar Vs. The State of Madras
 INSC 16 (26 May 1950)
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, SUDHI RANJAN MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION: 1950 AIR 124 1950 SCR 594
CITATOR INFO :
F 1950 SC 129 (26) R 1951 SC 270 (4) E 1951
SC 318 (25) D 1952 SC 75 (5,16) E 1952 SC 329 (3,4,5) R 1953 SC 252 (31) RF
1953 SC 384 (5) RF 1957 SC 620 (3,4,5,7) RF 1957 SC 628 (12,16,20,21) E&D
1957 SC 896 (14) RF 1958 SC 578 (129) F 1959 SC 395 (13,40) R 1959 SC 725 (8) R
1960 SC 633 (9,16) RF 1961 SC1457 (8) RF 1962 SC 171 (23) R 1962 SC 305 (29) R
1962 SC 955 (21) R 1962 SC1621 (78,108,110,132) R 1963 SC 996 (2,5) MV 1966 SC
740 (48,69) RF 1967 SC1110 (16) RF 1967 SC1643 (165,227) D 1969 SC 903 (23) D
1970 SC1923 (12,13) F 1971 SC2486 (8,13,14) R 1973 SC 106 (16) RF 1973 SC1461
(1705) RF 1974 SC1389 (247) RF 1977 SC 908 (23) R 1978 SC 597 (77) RF 1980 SC
494 (9) RF 1986 SC 515 (24,33,34) R 1986 SC 872 (74) RF 1989 SC 190 (11)
Constitution of India, Art. 19, cls. (1) (a)
and (2), 32 Application under Art. 32--Preliminary objection--Fundamental right
of freedom of speech and expression--Law imposing restrictions for securing
public order and maintenance of public safety--Validity-Severability of
Act--Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (XXIII of 1949), s. 9
Held, by the Full Court (i) (overruling a
preliminary objection) --Under the Constitution the Supreme Court is
constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot,
consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain
applications seeking protection against infringement of such rights, although
such applications are made to the Court in the first instance without resort to
a High Court having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter.
Urquhart v. Brown (205 U.S. 179) and Hooney
v. Kolohan (294 U.S. 103) distinguished.
(ii) Freedom of speech and expression
includes freedom propagation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the
freedom of circulation.
Ex parte Jackson (96 U.S. 727) and Lovell v.
City of Griffin (303 U.S. 444) referred to.
Held per KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR
CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.--(FAZL ALI J. dissenting):
(i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a
law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the
undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law
cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution,
although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived
generally in the interests of public order. Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras
Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXIII of 1949, which authorises impositions
of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance
of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under cl.
(2) and is therefore void and unconstitutional; (ii) Where a law purports to
authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language
wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of
constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not
possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the
constitutional limits, as it is not severable. So long as the possibilitY of
its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be
ruled out 595 must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.
Section 9 (1-A) is therefore wholly
unconstitutional and void.
Per FAZL ALI J.--Restrictions which s. 9
(1-A) authorised are within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the
Constitution and s. 9 (1-A)is not therefore unconstitutional or void.(1) Brij
Bhushan and Another v. The State  S.C.R. 605 referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. XVI of
1950. Application under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of
prohibition and certiorari. The facts are set out in the judgment.
C.R.Pattabhi Raman, for the petitioner.
K. Rajah Ayyar, Advocate-General of MadraS,
(Ganapathi Ayyar, with him) for the opposite party.
1950. May 26. The Judgment of Kania C.J.,
Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ. was delivered by Patanjali Sastri J.
Fazl Ali J. delivered a separate judgment.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.--The petitioner is the
printer, publisher and editor of a recently started weekly journal in English
called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay.
The Government of Madras, the respondents
herein, in exercise of their powers under section 9 (1-A) of the Madras
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned
Act) purported to issue an order No. MS.
1333 dated 1st March, 1950, whereby they
imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal in that State. The
order was published in the Fort St. George Gazette and the notification ran as
follows :-"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (I-A) of the
Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXIII of 1949) His
Excellency the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of
securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it is necessary
so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the date of publication of
this order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation,
sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the
newspaper entitled Cross Roads an English weekly published at Bombay." The
petitioner claims that the said order contravenes the fundamental right of the
petitioner to freedom of See the headnote to Brij Bhushan v. The State of
Delhi, p. 605 infra.
596 speech and expression conferred on him by
article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and he challenges the validity of section
9 (1-A) of the impugned Act as being void under article 13 (1) of the
Constitution by reason of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right
The Advocate-General of Madras appearing on
be half of the respondents raised a preliminary objection, not indeed to the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under article 32, but
to the petitioner resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the first
instance. He contended that, as a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner
should first resort to the High Court at Madras which under article 226 of the
Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He cited
criminal revision petitions under section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
applications for bail and applications for transfer under section 24 of the
Civil Procedure Code as instances where, concurrent jurisdiction having been
given in certain matters to the High Court and the Court of a lower grade, a
rule of practice has been established that a party should proceed first to the
latter Court for relief before resorting to the High Court. He referred to
Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha (1) where such a rule of practice was
enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our attention also to certain
American decisions Urquhart v.
Brown (2) and Hooney v. Kolohan (3) as
showing that the Supreme Court of the United States ordinarily required that
whatever judicial remedies remained open to the applicant in Federal and State
Courts should be exhausted before the remedy in the Supreme Court---be it
habeas corpus or certiorari-would be allowed. We are of opinion that neither
the instances mentioned by the learned Advocate General nor the American
decisions referred to by him are really analogous to the remedy afforded by
article 32 of the Indian Constitution. That article does not merely confer
power on this Court, as article 226 does on the (1) I.L.R. 56 All. 158. (2) 205
U. S. 179. (3) 294 U.S. 103.
597 High Courts, to issue certain writs for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose,
as part of its general jurisdiction. In that case it would have been more
appropriately placed among articles 131 to 139 which define that jurisdiction.
Article 32 provides a "guaranteed" remedy for the enforcement of
those rights, and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental right by
being included in Part 1II. This Court is thus constituted the protector and
guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the
responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking
protection against infringements of such rights. No similar provision is to be
found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider that the
American decisions are in point.
Turning now to the merits, there can be no
doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of
ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. "Liberty
of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication.
Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value ": Ex
parte Jackson(1). See also LoveIl v. City of Griffin(s).
It is therefore perfectly clear that the
order of the Government of Madras would be a violation of the petitioner's
fundamental right under article 19 (1) (a), unless section 9 (1-A) of the
impugned Act under which it was made is saved by the reservations mentioned in
clause (2) of article 19 which (omitting immaterial words regarding laws
relating to libel, slander, etc., with which we are not concerned in this case)
saves the operation of any "existinglaw in so far as it relates to any
matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the
State." The question accordingly arises whether, the impugned Act, in so
far as it purports by section 9 (1-A) to authorise the Provincial Government
"for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of
public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into (1) 96 U.S. 727. (2) 303
598 or the circulation, sale or distribution
in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of
documents" is a "law relating to any matter which undermines the
security of or tends to overthrow the State." The impugned Act was passed
by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon it by
section 100 of the Government of India Act 1935, read with Entry 1 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule to that Act, which comprises among other matters,
"public order." Now "public order" is an expression of wide
connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among the
members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced
by the government which they have established. Although section 9 (I-A) refers
to "securing the public safety" and "the maintenance of public
order" as distinct purposes, it must be taken that "public
safety" is used as a part of the wider concept of public order, for, if
public safety were intended to signify any 'matter distinct from and outside
the content of the expression "public order," it would not have been
competent for the Madras Legislature to enact the provision so far as it
relates to public safety. This indeed was not disputed on behalf of the
respondents. But it was urged that the expression "public safety" in
the impugned Act, which is a statute relating to law and order, means the
security of the Province, and, therefore,' 'the security of the State"
with the meaning of article 19 (2)as "the State" has been defined in
article 12 as including, among other things, the Government and the Legislature
of each of the erstwhile Provinces. Much reliance was placed in support of this
view on Rex v. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison(1) where it was held that the phrase
"for securing the public safety and the' defence of. the realm" in
section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, was not
limited to securing the country against a foreign foe but included also protection
against internal disorder such as a rebellion. The decision is not of much
assistance to the respondents as the context in (1) L.R.  2 K.B. 805.
599 which the words "public safety"
occurred in that Act showed unmistakably that the security of the State was the
aim in view. Our attention has not been drawn to any definition of the
expression "public safety," nor does it appear that the words have
acquired any technical signification as words of art.
"Public safety" ordinarily means
security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything
which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as
securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary
according to the context. In the classification of offenCes in the Indian Penal
Code, for instance, Chapter XIV enumerates the "offences affecting the
public health, safety, convenience, decency, and morals" and it includes
rash driving or riding on a public way (section 279) and rash navigation of a vessel
(section 280), among others, as offences against public safety, while Chapter
VI lists waging war against the Queen (section 121), sedition (section 124-A)
etc. as "offences against the State", because they are calculated to
undermine or affect the security of the State, and Chapter VIII defines
"offences against the public tranquillity" which include unlawful
assembly (section 141) rioting (section 146), promoting enmity between classes
(section 153-A), affray (section 159) etc. Although in the context of a statute
relating to law and order "securing public safety" may not include
the securing of public health, it may well mean securing the public against
rash driving on a public way and the like, and not necessarily the security of
the State. It was said that an enactment which provided for drastic remedies
like preventive detention and ban on newspapers must be taken to relate to
matters affecting the security of the State rather than trivial offences like
rash driving, or an affray. But whatever ends the impugned Act may have been
intended to sub serve, and whatever aims its framers may have had in view, its
application and scope cannot, in the absence of limiting words in the statute
itself, be restricted to those aggravated forms of prejudicial activity which
are calculated to 600 endanger the security of the State. Nor is there any guarantee
that those authorised to exercise the powers under the Act will in using them
discriminate between those who act prejudicially to the security of the State
and those who do not.
The Government of India Act, 1935, nowhere
used the expression" security of the State" though it made provision
under section 57 for dealing with crimes of violence intended to overthrow the
Government. While the administration of law and order including the maintenance
of public order was placed in charge of a Minister elected by the people, the
Governor was entrusted with the responsibility of combating the operations of
persons who "endangered the peace or tranquillity of the Province" by
committing or attempting to commit "crimes of violence intended to
overthrow the Government." Similarly, article 352 of the Constitution
empowers the President to make a Proclamation of Emergency when he is satisfied
that the "security of India or any part of the territory thereof is
threatened by war or by external aggression or by internal disturbance."
These provisions recognise that disturbance of public peace or tranquillity may
assume such grave proportions as to threaten the security of the State.
As Stephen in his 'Criminal Law of England(1)
observes:'' Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of
war, are offences which run into each other and are not capable of being marked
off by perfectly defined boundaries. All of them have in common one feature,
namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the
cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least by the show and
threat of it." Though all these offences thus involve disturbances of
public tranquillity and are in theory offences against public order, the
difference between them being only a difference' of degree, yet for the purpose
of grading the punishment to be inflicted in respect of them they may be
classified into different minor categories as has been done by (1) Vol. II, p.
601 the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the
Constitution, in formulating the varying criteria for permissible legislation
imposing restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in article 19 (1),
has placed in a distinct category those offences against public order which aim
at undermining the security of the State or overthrowing it, and made their
prevention the sole justification for legislative abridgement of freedom of
speech and expression, that is to say, nothing less than endangering the
foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment
of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of peaceable
assembly "sub-clause (b)" and the right of association
"sub-clause (c)" may be restricted under clauses (3) and (4) of
article 19 in the interests of" public order," which in those clauses
includes the security of the State. The differentiation is also noticeable in
Entry 3 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which refers to
the "security of a State" and "maintenance of public order"
as distinct subjects of.legislation.
The Constitution thus requires a line to be
drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, may be,
roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public
disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the
relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance, treating
for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind.
It is also worthy of note that the word
"sedition" which occurred in article 13 (2) of the Draft Constitution
prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the article was finally.
passed as article 19 (2). In this connection it may be recalled that the
Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King
Emperor (1), held that "the acts or words complained of must either incite
to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their
intention or tendency", but the Privy Council overruled that  F.C.R.
602 decision and emphatically reaffirmed the
view expressed in Tilak's case (1) to the effect that "the offence
"consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad
feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite
mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small
"-King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (2) Deletion of the word
"sedition" from the draft article 13 (2), therefore, shows that
criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not
to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression
and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to
overthrow the State. It is also significant that the corresponding Irish
formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the
State" article 40 (6) (i) of the Constitution of Eire,  did not
apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus, very
narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative
abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless
due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the
foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political
discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the
processes of popular government, is possible. A freedom of such amplitude might
involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have
reflected, with Madison who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution," that "it is better
to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by
pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper
fruits.": [Quoted in Near v. Minnesotta (3)].
We are therefore of opinion 'that unless a
law restricting freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the
undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law
cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of article 19, although the
(1) 22 Bom. 112. (21 L.R. 74, I A. 89. (8) 282U.S, 607, 717-8.
603 restrictions which it seeks to impose may
have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. It follows that
section 9 (1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the wider
purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls
outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (2), and is therefore
void and unconstitutional.
It was, however, argued that section 9 (1-A)
could not be considered wholly void, as, under article 13 (1), an existing law
inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent of the
inconsistency and no more. In so far as the securing of the public safety or
the maintenance of public order would include the' security of the State, the
impugned provision, as applied to the latter purpose, was covered by clause (2)
of article 19 and must, it was said, be held to be valid. We are unable to
accede to this contention. Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of
restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover
restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible
legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even
so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not
severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not
sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be
wholly unconstitutional and void. In other words, clause (2) of article 19
having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of speech and
expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment,
which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise,
cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent.
The application is therefore allowed and the
order of the respondents prohibiting the entry and circulation of the
petitioner's journal in the State of Madras is hereby quashed.
FAZL ALI J.--For the reasons given by me in
Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State(1) , which practically 605.
604 involves the same question as is involved
in this case, I hold that the reliefs sought by the petitioner cannot be
granted. In this view, I would dismiss this petition, but I should like to add
a few observations to supplement what I have said in the other case.
It appears to me that in the ultimate
analysis the real question to be decided in this case is whether
"disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province"
and affecting "public safety" will be a matter which undermines the
security of the State or not. I have borrowed the words quoted within inverted
commas from the preamble of the Act which shows its scope and necessity and the
question raised before us attacking the, validity of the Act must be formulated
in the manner I have suggested. If the answer to the question is in the
affirmative, as I think it must be, then the impugned law which prohibits entry
into the State of Madras of "any document or class of documents" for
securing public safety and maintenance of public order should satisfy the
requirements laid down in article 19 (2)of the Constitution. From the trend of
the arguments addressed to us, it would appear that if a document is seditious,
its entry could be validly prohibited, because sedition is a matter which
undermines the security of the State; but if, on the other hand, the document
is calculated to disturb public tranquillity and affect public safety, its
entry cannot be prohibited, because public disorder and disturbance of public
tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State.
Speaking for myself, I cannot understand this argument. In Brij Bhushan and
Another v. The State(1), I have quoted good authority to show that sedition
owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorders and an authority on
criminal law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence against
public tranquillity. If so, how could sedition be a matter which would undermine
the security of the State and public disorders and disturbance of public safety
will not be such a matter? It was argued that a small riot or an affray will
not (1)  S.C R, 605.
605 undermine the security of the State, but
to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer :-(1) The Act, as its
preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving
menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There are degrees of
gravity in the offence of sedition also and an isolated piece of writing of
mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, from
the layman's point of view, be a matter which undermines the security of the
State, but that would not affect the law which aims at checking sedition. It
was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive,
but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another.
We are here concerned with the latter aspect only.
I shall not pursue the matter further as I
have said enough on the subject in the connected case.
Agent for the petitioner:--K. J. Kale.
Agent for the opposite party :--P. A. Mehta.