Sudevanand Vs. State
[Criminal Appeal No. 174
of 2012 arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.6489 of 2006]
Santoshanand Vs. State
[Criminal Appeal No. 175
of 2012 arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.6625 of 2006]
Ranjan Dwivedi Vs. State
[Criminal Appeal No. 176
of 2012 arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.6800 of 2006]
Aftab Alam, J.
March 20, 1975, at about 4.15 p.m. when the car in which Mr. Justice A.N. Ray,
holding the office of the Chief Justice of India at that time, was travelling, along
with his son Shri Ajoy Nath Ray and a Jamadar Jai Nand and the driver Inder
Singh, stopped at the intersection of Tilak Marg and Bhagwan Dass road, at a
stone throw distance from the Supreme Court of India, two live hand grenades
were lobbed inside the car. Fortunately, the grenades did not explode and the
occupants of the car, including the Chief Justice of India, escaped unharmed.
case was registered and investigation was started by the Crime Branch of the
Delhi Police. But, as the police investigation did not make much headway, on
June 30, 1975 the case was handed over to the CBI. On the same day, one Santoshanand
Avadhoot (appellant in Criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) 6625 of
2006) was arrested followed by the arrest of an advocate, namely, Ranjan
Dwivedi (appellant in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6800/2006)
on July 6, 1975.
it may be noted that about two and a half months before the attempt on the life
of the Chief Justice of India, Shri L.N. Mishra, the Minister of Railways in
the Union Cabinet was killed in a bomb blast taking place during a function on
the platform of Samastipur Railway Station. In connection with that case, Sudevanand
Avadhoot (appellant in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6489/2006) and
one Vikram alias Jaladhar Das were arrested at Bhagalpur.
On July 27, 1975 they
were also arrested in the present case relating to the attempt on the life of
the Chief Justice and were brought to Delhi where they were sent on police
remand from July 31, 1975 to August 14, 1975. While on remand, Vikram made a
confessional statement and requested to be allowed to become an Approver.
He was produced
before a Magistrate on August 14, 1975, before whom he made a statement under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short "Cr.P.C.")
giving the details of the conspiracy to kill the Chief Justice of India. He was
again produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on August 22, 1975 before whom
he made a similar statement for grant of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C.
CBI completed investigation of the case and submitted charge-sheet against the three
accused, namely, Sudevanand, Santoshanand and Ranjan Dwivedi and they were put on
trial in Sessions Case No.9/1976. Sudevanand and Santoshanand were charged under
Section 307 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4(b)
of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. So far as Ranjan Dwivedi is concerned, he
was charged jointly with the other two accused under Section 120 B of the Penal
At the conclusion of the
trial, the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi vide his judgment and order dated October
28, 1976 convicted Sudevanand and Santoshanand under Sections 115, 307/120B of
the Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years
under Section 115 read with 120-B(1), 10 years for attempting to kill Chief
Justice A. N. Ray and three other occupants of the car and 7 years under
Section 4(b) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Ranjan Dwivedi was
convicted under Section 115/120 B(1) of the Penal Code and was sentenced to 4
years rigorous imprisonment.
may be noted here that Vikram, the Approver was examined by the prosecution as PW.1
and according to the appellants their conviction is mainly based on his
the judgment and order passed by the trial court, Ranjan Dwivedi filed appeal
before the High Court on December 6, 1976 which is registered as Criminal
Appeal No.436/1976. Sudevanand and Santoshanand jointly filed a separate appeal
which is registered as 443/1976.
the appellants' trial was over, and they were convicted and sentenced by the trial
court, as noted above, and after they had filed their appeals before the High
Court against the judgment and order passed by the trial court, certain
developments took place in the L. N. Mishra murder case. That case was also
investigated by the CBI and in that case too Sudevanand and Santoshanand (along
with others) were accused and in that case also Vikram was granted pardon on becoming
an Approver. According to his statements made before the Magistrates both the
killing of L. N. Mishra and the attempt on the life of Chief Justice of India were
parts of a larger conspiracy, at the instance of the same organisation and a
common group of persons.
August 30, 1978, the Chief Minister of Bihar wrote a highly confidential letter
to the Prime Minister of India, a copy of which was endorsed to the DIG (CID) Bihar.
In pursuance of the Chief Minister's letter, the DIG (CID) is said to have made
an inquiry into the circumstances in which Vikram @ Jaladhar Das had made the
confessional statement and was tendered pardon to become Approver.
Following the enquiry,
on 6September 30, 1978 the statement of Vikram was recorded at Danapur jail
where he was lodged at that time. The statement was taken in the question and answer
form and it was recorded in the presence of Dr. D. Ram, Superintendent; Danapur
Hospital, (Ex-officio Jail Superintendent) and Haider Ali, the Jailor. The
statement was also recorded on a tape recorder. In this statement Vikram retracted
from his earlier statements incriminating himself and the other accused in the
case. He said that his earlier statements were obtained by the CBI by subjecting
him to great mental and physical torture.
He was beaten up and
tortured to such an extent that he agreed to make whatever statement CBI wanted
him to make. The retraction made by Vikram was placed before the Chief Minister
who requested Mr. Tarkunde, a former judge of the Bombay High Court to give a report
in light of the statement made by Vikram in jail on September 30, 1978. Mr.
Tarkunde is said to have given his opinion that the conviction of all the
accused in the Chief Justice's case was based on fabricated evidence of the
Approver and, therefore, the High Court should be requested to consider the
appeals of the three accused keeping aside the Approver's evidence. We need not
go any further in this matter, as all this was plainly outside the legal
needs, however, to be noted that upset by these developments, the CBI moved
this Court in Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 69/1979 praying for the transfer of the
trial of the L.N. Mishra murder case outside Bihar.
In the transfer
petition though the State of Bihar was not formally made a party, a number of allegations
were made against some of its officers. In those circumstances, the concerned officers
after obtaining permission from the State Government, filed
affidavits/applications denying the allegations made against them in the transfer
petition filed by the CBI and supporting the veracity of the retraction made by
Vikram in Danapur jail on September 30, 1978 disowning the earlier statements
made by him.
In the overall facts
and circumstances of the case, however, this Court deemed just and proper to
transfer the trial of the L.N. Mishra murder case from Bihar to Delhi where it now
remains pending as Sessions Case No. 1/2006 (after being renumbered) before the
Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi.
is curious to note that in the L.N. Mishra murder case Vikram was examined by
the prosecution as PW.2 and in course of his deposition before the court he said
that the statement made by him at Danapur jail was not voluntary but he was forced
to make the statement under coercion and threats by the Chief Secretary, Law Secretary
and Home Secretary, Government of Bihar and the SP and the DSP in the State
Police. He said in his deposition before the court that his statement in jail was
made on the 8basis of a statement prepared and given to him in writing by the State
back to the appellant's appeal pending before the Delhi High Court, both Sudevanand
and Santoshanand were released on bail in 1986 after remaining in jail for
almost 11 years. In 1997-1998, that is to say 11 years after coming out of jail,
the appellants filed three criminal miscellaneous applications in the pending
miscellaneous application No. 5786/97 was filed on September 24, 1997 praying
to call for and taking on the appeal record the statement made by Vikram, the
Approver, in Danapur jail on September 30, 1978, the affidavits of the
officials of the Bihar Government filed in the transfer petition before this
Court and the enquiry report of Justice Tarkunde.
The second application
(criminal miscellaneous) No.5700/98 was filed on September 16, 1998 to summon Vikram,
the Approver (PW.1 in the case), for further cross-examination in terms of Section
145 of the Evidence Act. The third application (criminal miscellaneous) No.6300/98
was filed on October 15, 1998 praying to call the evidence of Vikram, the
Approver (PW.2), recorded in the trial of L.N. Mishra murder case.
Delhi High Court took up all the three criminal miscellaneous applications and
disposed them of by order dated November 22, 2006. The High Court noted that it
was within the knowledge of the appellants that the Approver had made the retraction
in the year 1978 disowning his earlier statements but the three applications in
question were filed after a lag of more than 20 years and primarily for that
reason did not allow all the prayers made in the three applications but granted
the appellants only a limited and partial relief.
In the operative
portion of the order the High Court observed and directed as follows: "The
last application moved by the appellant for considering the record, certified
copies etc. u/s 80 and other provisions under the Evidence Act, report of justice
V.M. Tarkunde and other documents which may be admissible under the Evidence
Act has to be permitted.
This prayer is being kept
open and would be considered as per law. Succinctly stated, the applications for
leading further evidence which would have entailed further time are hereby
dismissed, but the third application for considering those documents which have
already been placed on the record as per law, is hereby permitted. This case is
fixed for final arguments on 6th December, 2006 at 12.15 P.M. The case would be
taken up on day to day basis."Against the order passed by the High Court,
the appellants have come to this Court in these appeals.
Lahoty and Mr. Arvind Kumar, counsel appearing for the appellants in the three appeals
placed before the Court passages from the statement of Vikram recorded in Danapur
jail on September 30, 1978 describing the manner in which his earlier
statements, incriminating himself and the other accused, were obtained by the CBI.
Referring to the latter statement of Vikram, counsel submitted that denial to
further cross-examine him in light of his statement of September 30, 1978 would
cause grave prejudice to the appellants and would lead to a miscarriage of
Mr. Lahoty stated that
the accused in the L.N. Mishra murder case had earlier come to this court for quashing
the trial proceedings and their appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1987) was
heard along with the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and was disposed of by a
common judgment reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225. In paragraph 98 of the judgment, the
Court noted the submission made on behalf of the appellants that a very unusual
feature of the case was the exchange of charges and counter charges between the
CBI and the Bihar (CID) of false implication and frame up against each other.
According to the
Bihar (CID), the CBI was guilty of frame up against the members of Anand Marg,
while according to CBI, the Bihar (CID) had been deliberately proceeding against
innocent persons while letting of the real culprits. Mr. Lahoty submitted that
as a result of the Central Investigating Agency and the State Investigating
Agency acting at cross purpose, the case had become highly murky to the great
detriment of the appellants. He further submitted that in that situation if the
appellants are not allowed the opportunity to further cross-examine Vikram, the
Approver (PW.1), it would be highly unfair and unjust to them. He also
submitted that the Delhi High Court was wrong in rejecting the applications
made by the appellants on the ground of delay.
Arvind Kumar in support of the plea raised by the appellants placed reliance on
the decision of this Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat,
(2004) 4 SCC 158, commonly known as the Best Bakery Case. He also pressed into
service a decision of this Court in Pandit Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra,
1964 (1) SCR 926 (939-940).
far as the Best Bakery Case is concerned, we see absolutely no application of
that decision to the facts of the present case. Suffice to note here that in
Satyajit Banerjee v. State of W.B., (2005) 1 SCC 115, the Court explained the
very exceptional nature of the Best Bakery Case and observed that the decision cannot
be applied to all cases against the established principles of criminal
jurisprudence (See paragraph 25 & 26 in Satyajit Banerjee).
also fail to see how the decision in Pandit Ukha Kolhe might help the
appellants in the present appeals.
agree with Mr. Lahoty's submission that the delay in filing the applications should
not have been the sole ground for rejecting the appellants' applications before
the High Court. The High Court does not say that the appellants were in anyway responsible
for the inordinate delay in their appeals, that remains pending since 1976,
being taken up for hearing.
That being the
position, as long as the appeals were pending, the High Court should have considered
the appellants' request for summoning PW.1 for further cross-examination on merits,
and in light of the relevant legal provisions. Mr. Lahoty is also right in submitting
that any further cross-examination of PW.1 would not have taken more than two
or three days and would not have contributed to any further delay in the
disposal of the appeal in any material way.
the question remains to be examined whether the law permits the summoning of
PW.1 for the reason as stated on behalf of the appellants.
P.K. Dey, the counsel appearing for the CBI, strongly opposed the appellants'
prayer for summoning Vikram, the Approver (PW.1), for further cross-examination
in light of his statement recorded in Danapur jail on September 30, 1978.
Learned counsel submitted that Vikram had made his confessional statements completely
voluntarily and on three different occasions. He was produced before the Magistrate
on August 14, 1975 for recording his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
He was then produced
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on August 22, 1975 for recording his
statement for grant of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. Finally, he was produced
before the trial court as PW.1 where he was examined first by the prosecution
and was then subjected to a lengthy cross-examination on behalf of the accused.
On none of the three occasions he made the slightest complaint that his statements
were obtained under coercion or threats.
He was also produced before
the Magistrate many times for the purpose of remand and for other purposes,
such as taking cognizance, commitment of the case to the court of Sessions and
also before the trial court where the trial proceeded and got concluded and at
no point of time he gave any indication that his statements/evidence were given
under any coercion, threats or inducement.
Dey also submitted that the statement of Vikram that was recorded in Danapur
jail on September 30, 1978 had no legal sanctity, as it was recorded in a
manner and by means completely unknown to law. It also did not qualify as the
previous statement within the meaning of Section 145 of the Evidence Act as in fact,
it was later in time than the deposition of PW.1 in this case before the trial
court. He also referred to passages from the deposition of Vikram, the Approver,
made in the trial of the L.N. Mishra murder case in which he was examined as PW.2
where he stated that his statement of September 30, 1978 recorded in Danapur
jail was not voluntary but it was made under threats from the top officials of
the State Government.
Dey submitted that the statement made by Vikram in jail on September 30, 1978
could never be the basis for summoning him for further cross-examination at the
stage of the appeal and in support of this submission relied upon a decision of
this Court in Mishrilal v. State of M.P., (2005) 10 SCC 701.
In that case, one of
the prosecution witnesses (PW.2) had supported the prosecution case before the trial
court but before the Juvenile Court that was trying some of the juvenile
accused in the same case he did not support the prosecution case and as a
result, the juvenile accused were acquitted of the charge under Section 307 IPC
for having made an attempt on the life of this witness. After his evidence before
the Juvenile Court, he was again summoned before the trial court where the other
accused were facing trial and was confronted with the evidence he had given
before the Juvenile Court.
This Court found and held
that the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge was not in accordance with law
and in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment observed and held as follows: 15"5.
The learned Counsel for the appellants seriously attacked the evidence of PW.2
Mokam Singh. This witness was examined by the Sessions Judge on 6-2-1991 and
cross-examined on the same day by the defence counsel. Thereafter, it seems,
that on behalf of the accused persons an application was filed and PW.2 Mokam
Singh was recalled. PW.2 was again examined and cross-examined on 31-7-1991.
It may be noted that
some of the persons who were allegedly involved in this incident were minors
and their case was tried by the Juvenile Court. PW.2 Mokam Singh was also
examined as a witness in the case before the Juvenile Court. In the Juvenile Court,
he gave evidence to the effect that he was not aware of the persons who had attacked
him and on hearing the voice of the assailants, he assumed that they were some
Upon recalling, PW.2 Mokam
Singh was confronted with the evidence he had given later before the Juvenile
Court on the basis of which the accused persons were acquitted of the charge
under Section 307 IPC for having made an attempt on the life of this witness.6.
In our opinion, the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge was not strictly in
accordance with law. Once the witness was examined-in-chief and cross-examined
fully, such witness should not have been recalled and re-examined to deny the
evidence he had already given before the court, even though that witness had
given an inconsistent statement before any other court or forum subsequently.
A witness could be
confronted only with a previous statement made by him. At the time of examination
of PW.2 Mokam Singh on 6.2.1991, there was no such previous statement and the
defence counsel did not confront him with any statement alleged to have been made
previously. This witness must have given some other version before the Juvenile
Court for extraneous reasons and he should not have been given a further
opportunity at a later stage to completely efface the evidence already given by
him under oath.
The courts have to
follow the procedures strictly and cannot allow a witness to escape the legal action
for giving false evidence before the court on mere explanation that he had
given it under the pressure of the police or for some other reason. Whenever the
witness speaks falsehood in the court, and it is proved satisfactorily, the
court should take a serious action against such witnesses."
decision in Mishrilal was followed in Hanuman Ram v. State of Rajasthan and
others, (2008) 15 SCC 652. The case of Mishrilal had come to this Court after the
appeal court had maintained the conviction and sentence passed against the accused.
But Hanuman Ram came at the intermediate stage when the trial court was directed
by the High Court to recall two prosecution witnesses under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C.
under similar circumstances.
In Hanuman Ram too,
two of the witnesses (PWs 3 and 5) who had supported the prosecution case
before the trial court did not support the case of the prosecution before the
Children's Court where one of the accused in the case who was a minor was being
tried. Before the trial court an application was made under Section 311 Cr.P.C.
for summoning those two witnesses for cross-examination with reference to their
statements before the Children's Court.
The trial court did not
accept the prayer and rejected the petition. On an application in revision, the
High Court intervened in favour of the accused and directed the trial court to
recall and re-examine the two witnesses. In appeal against the High Court
order, this Court following the earlier decision in Mishrilal, held that there
was no legal foundation for recalling the witnesses under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and
set aside the High Court judgment.
first sight, the decisions in Mishrilal and Hanuman Ram seem to clinch the
issue arising in the case. But, on a deeper examination, it would appear that
the decision in Mishrilal did not interpret Section 311 Cr.P.C. defining the
import, scope and ambit of the provision contained therein. It rather said that
on the facts of the case, the provision had no application and the procedure
adopted by the trial court was not strictly in accordance with law. Now, the
interpretation of a legal provision and its application to a set of facts are two
different exercises requiring different approaches.
means the action of explaining the meaning of something. For interpreting a
statutory provision, the court is required to have an insight into the
provision and unfold its meaning by means of the well-established canons of
interpretation, having regard to the object, purpose, historicism of the law
and several other well-known factors. But, what is important to bear in mind is
that the interpretation of a legal provision is always independent of the facts
of any given case.
means the practical use or relevance (of something to something); the application
of a statutory provision, therefore, is by definition case related and as opposed
to interpretation, the application or non-application of a statutory provision
would always depend on the exact facts of a given case. Anyone associated with the
process of adjudication fully knows that even the slightest difference in the
facts of two cases can make a world of difference on the question whether or
not a statutory provision can be fairly and reasonably applied to it.
Keeping in mind what is
said here if we read Mishrilal, it would be evident that in the over all facts of
that case, the Court was satisfied that the statement of the witness (PW.2,
Mokam Singh) before the Juvenile Court was for some extraneous reasons and, therefore,
he should not have been allowed an opportunity to completely efface the evidence
already given by him under oath. The Court with its vast experience of the way criminal
justice system works in our country was in a manner commenting upon the serious
and widespread malady of prosecution witness being won over by the accused.
Once the Court came to
realise that the witness was gained over before he was examined in the Juvenile
Court, it naturally felt that at least he should not have been allowed to spoil
the other case too and it would, therefore, logically follow that his recall and
re-examination in the trial of the other accused before the Sessions Court was
an abuse of Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. To us, it appears that it was mainly due
to that reason that the Court frowned upon the latter evidence of PW.2 taken by
the Sessions Court on his recall after his examination before the Juvenile
in Mishrilal the question that came up for consideration before the Court was
whether the deposition of Mokam Singh (PW.2) before the Juvenile Court would
come within the meaning of "previous statement" under Section 145 of
the Evidence Act so as to justify his recall for further cross-examination confronting
him with his deposition before the Juvenile Court. The Court answered the
question in the negative pointing out that at the time of his examination
earlier before the Sessions Court there was no such statement with which he
could be confronted by the defence.
Hanuman Ram, on identical facts and for the same reasons the Court simply
followed the decision in Mishrilal.
facts of the case before us are quite different. It is not only Vikram who is making
diametrically opposite statements but the CBI and the State (CID) seem to be at
loggerheads with the one accusing the other of manipulating and using Vikram
for its own designs. It is an unusual case by any reckoning.
is obvious that one of the two statements of Vikram is false. But unlike Mishrilal
or Hanuman Ram where the Court was able to sense without difficulty that the
witnesses' depositions before the Juvenile Court and the Children's Court
respectively were false, it is very difficult to say at this stage which of the
statements is true and which of the statement was made under the influence, threat
or coercion by the State officials or the CBI. The position may be clear in case
he is subjected to further examination with reference to his statement made in Danapur
jail on September 30, 1978.
matter may be looked at from another angle. Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. provides
as follows: "391. Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to
a. In dealing with any
appeal under this Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks additional evidence
to be necessary, shall record its reasons and may either take such evidence
itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or, when the Appellate Court
is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate.
b. When the additional
evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify
such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon proceed to
dispose of the appeal.
c. The accused or his
pleader shall have the right to be present when the additional evidence is
d. The taking of evidence
under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if
it were an inquiry. "
is, thus, to be seen that the provision is not limited to recall of a witness for
further cross-examination with reference to his previous statement. The Appellate
Court may feel the necessity to take additional evidence for any number of
reasons to arrive at the just decision in the case. The law casts a duty upon
the court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means. This is another reason why
we feel any reliance on Mishrilal that considered the recall of a witness in
the context of Section 145 of the Evidence Act is quite misplaced in the facts
of this case.
Dey contended that Vikram's statement that he is alleged to have made in jail
has no legal sanctity and it came to be made and recorded in a manner completely
unknown to law. Mr Dey may be right but on that ground alone it would not be
correct and proper to deny the application of Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. Take the
case where, on the testimony of the Approver, a person is convicted by the trial
court under Section 302 and 120-B etc. of the Penal Code and is sentenced to a life
After the judgment
and order passed by the trial court and while the convict's appeal is pending before
the High Court, the `Approver' is found blabbering and boasting among his
friends that he was able to take the Court for a ride and settled his personal score
with the convict by sending him to jail to rot at least for 14 years. Such a
statement would also be completely beyond the legal framework but can it be
said that in light of such a development the convicted accused may not ask the
High Court for recalling the Approver for further examination.
a matter of fact, if some later statement, has come to be made in some legal ways,
it may be admissible on its own without any help from Section 311 or Section 391
of the Cr.P.C. It is only such statement or development which is otherwise not
within the legal framework that would need the exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction to bring it before it as part of the legal record.
light of the discussions made above, we have no hesitation in holding that the
High Court was in error in refusing to summon Vikram, the Approver (PW.1) for
his further examination as prayed for on behalf of the appellants.
We, accordingly, set
aside that part of the High Court order and direct the High Court to summon
Vikram (PW.1) for his further examination by the appellants and if so desired
by the CBI. For the sake of convenience, the High Court may direct a member of the
Registry of the rank of a Sessions Judge/Additional Sessions Judge to record
the additional evidence of Vikram (PW.1). The examination of the witness by the
appellants and the CBI must not go beyond two working days each so that the
recording of his evidence should be complete in not more than four days. The Registrar
recording the evidence would certify it and place before the Court and the
Court shall then proceed to dispose of the appeals.
appeals are thus allowed.
parting with the record of the case we are constrained to say that we are distressed
beyond words to find that the case relating to the attempt on the life of the
CJI remains stuck up at the stage of the appeal even after about 37 years of
the occurrence. We are informed that the other case of the killing of Shri L.N.
Mishra is still mired before the trial court. We do not wish to make any
comment on that case as that is the subject matter of Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos.
200 and 203 of 2011 that remains pending before this Court.
But so far as the present
case is concerned, we would request the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court
with all the strength at our command to take notice of the inordinately long time
for which these appeals (Criminal Appeal Nos.436 & 443 of 1996) are pending
before the High Court and to put a tab on them so as to ensure that the appeals
are disposed of without any further delay and in any case not later than six
months from the date of the receipt/production of a copy of this order.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)