General, High Court of Madras Vs. M. Manickam and Ors.
present appeals are filed against the judgments and orders dated 15.03.2007 and
21.07.2007 in Second Appeal No. 1064 of 2005, and Review Petition No. 19 of 2007,
respectively, passed by the Madras High Court whereby it dismissed the second appeal
and the review petition filed by the appellant herein accepting the contentions
raised by the Respondent No. 1. By its judgments and orders aforementioned, the
High Court set aside the judgment and decree of Subordinate Court and restored
the judgment and decree of District Munsif Court dated 09.10.2002.
facts leading to the filing of the present appeals are that the Respondent No. 1M.
Manickam joined the State Subordinate Judicial Service as District Munsif-cum-Judicial
Magistrate on 04.11.1988, after getting duly selected for the said post by the
Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. It is alleged by the Respondent No. 1 that
in his service records, his date of birth has been entered as 19.03.1947, as
found in the S.S.L.C. Book, whereas his actual date of birth is 24.11.1950 and
that due to the wrong entry of his date of birth in the service records, he
would retire from his service 3 years, 8 months and 5 days before his actual
date of superannuation.
submitted a letter dated 07.10.1993 to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari
requesting him for permission to peruse his service register in which he
submitted that his date of birth has wrongly been submitted. He also requested him
for supplying of requisite proforma for changing his date of birth. Thereafter Respondent
No. 1 submitted an application dated 11.11.1993 to Registrar, High Court of
Madras seeking change of his date of birth. In response to his application, the
Administrative Officer of the High Court asked for certain particulars and documents
in response to which Respondent No. 1 submitted his reply vide letter dated 27.01.1994.
thereto Respondent No. 1 filed a Suit before the District Munsif Court, Karur,
which was registered as O.S. No. 549/1995, for a declaration that his date of birth
is 24.11.1950 and for a mandatory injunction to enter his date of birth in his
S.S.L.C. book and in the Service Records as 24.11.1950, instead of 19.03.1947. The
Munsif Court vide order dated 09.10.2002 decreed the suit in favour of Respondent
No. 1 and against Respondent Nos. 2-4. The Munsif Court granted mandatory
injunction against Respondent Nos. 2-4 to make the change of date of birth in their
S.S.L.C. book. However, mandatory injunction against the present appellant to
alter the date of birth in the service register was not granted.
by the decision of the Munsif Court, Respondent Nos. 2-4 filed an appeal before
the Sub-Judge, Karur which was allowed by the Sub-Judge by its judgment and
order dated 12.10.2004. Against the said order of the Sub-Judge, Respondent No.
1 preferred Second Appeal before the High Court of Madras which was registered
as S.A. No. 1064 of 2005. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 15.03.2007
allowed the second appeal of the Respondent No. 1 and restored the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court. Review Petition filed by the appellant herein before
the High Court also got dismissed vide order dated 21.07.2007. Against these
orders of the High Court, viz., 15.03.2007 and 21.07.2007 the appellant has
filed the present appeals, on which we heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the application filed by the
respondent seeking for change of his date of birth was filed after the period
of limitation contemplated under the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service Rules (hereinafter
referred to as "Rules") which is five years and therefore the decree and
the judgment passed by the High Court affirming the decree of the Munsif is
illegal and erroneous. In support of the said contention, the counsel relied upon
the contents of the letter dated 7.10.1993 which was submitted by respondent
No. 1 in which for the first time, he requested for perusal of his service
register contending inter alia that his date of birth appears to be wrongly recorded
for which he contemplated making of an application at a later point of time. It
was submitted that in the said letter, the respondent No. 1 never made a
request for said change of date of birth. According to him, the formal application
was filed by respondent No. 1 only on 11.11.1993 to the Madras High Court
requesting for passing suitable orders directing concerned authorities to
change his date of birth as 24.11.1950 instead of 19.3.1947.
further submitted that since representation for change of his date of birth was
submitted after five years, therefore, the same was required to be rejected
summarily in terms of the Rules. So far as the medical report to which
reference was made by the courts below, it was submitted that the aforesaid
medical report was not supported by any test report and proof of having made
any ossification test or any supporting document like test reports or X-Ray reports
and therefore the said medical report relied upon by respondent No. 1 and done at
his instance is of no evidentiary value and is of no assistance.
also submitted that reliance on the horoscope itself for change of birth is unfounded
as the said horoscope is not only a very weak piece of evidence but the horoscope
on which reliance is placed by respondent No. 1 is doubtful and appears to have
been created for the purpose of fortifying the claim for change of date of
had also drawn our attention to the copy of the S.S.L.C. certificate. By way of
reference to the said S.S.L.C. certificate, it was submitted that originally the
date of birth of respondent No. 1 was recorded as 19.3.1947 which appears to have
been subsequently changed in a different handwriting, changing it to 24.11.1950
without indicating as to who had changed the same. There is neither the identification
of the person who corrected the same nor any seal of the concerned authority permitting
and making such necessary changes.
aforesaid contentions of the counsel appearing for the appellant were refuted
by the counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 who submitted that in the present
case, the respondent No. 1 has submitted not only documentary evidence in
support of his claim but such a claim for change of his date of birth was also supported
by medical evidence as also oral evidence. He also submitted that inadmissibility
of the horoscope was not a question raised in the special leave petition and therefore,
the same cannot be gone into and cannot be made a case to exercise jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the aforesaid
change of date of birth in the S.S.L.C. certificate was made pursuant to an order
made by the competent authority and therefore, there is nothing wrong in
relying on the same by the High Court as also by the Munsif Court who held in
favour of respondent No. 1.
have perused the records very carefully in the light of the aforesaid submissions.
Rule 30 of the then Rules which is the relevant service Rule for deciding the
case provides for the procedure for alteration of date of birth. Sub-Rule (a)
of Rule 30 provides that if at the time of his appointment in service by direct
recruitment, a candidate claims that his date of birth is different from that
entered in the S.S.L.C. books or Matriculation Register or School Records, he should
make an application through the High Court stating the evidence on which he relies
and stating that how the mistake had occurred.
The said application
when received should be forwarded to the Board of Revenue for report after
investigation by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector and on
receipt of the report, the Government should decide as to whether such alteration
of date of birth should be permitted or the application should be rejected. Sub
Rule (b) of Rule 30 provides that after the person has entered the service by direct
recruitment, an application to correct his date of birth as entered in the official
records should normally be entertained only if such application is made within
five years of such entry into the service and that such application shall be
made to the government through the High Court and should be disposed of in accordance
with the procedure laid down in sub-Rule (a). Sub-Rule (c) of Rule 30 on the other
hand, provides that any application received after five years of entry into service
should be summarily rejected.
appearing for the respondent No. 1 put his emphasis on the word "normally"
in sub-rule (b). This sub-rule (b) is indisputably applicable to the respondent.
However, sub-rule (c) which immediately follows makes it mandatory that an
application which is received after five years of entry into the service should
be summarily rejected. Therefore, the pre-requisite of filing such an
application is that it must be submitted within five years period and when it
is so submitted the same should be entertained.
this case, the formal application was admittedly filed after expiry of the period
of five years. Sub-Rule (a) of Rule 30 clearly emphasizes that the application
seeking for change of date of birth is to be made to the government through the
High Court. The letter on which reliance is placed by respondent No. 1 which is
dated 11.11.1993 is not addressed to the government but it is addressed to the Registrar
of the High Court and in that application the respondent No. 1 has formally
sought for change of his date of birth stating the reason as to why such date
of birth is called for.
Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh Vs. Megh Raj Garg and Another reported
in (2010) 6 SCC 482, this Court while dealing with the issue of limitation in the
case of application for change of date of birth, held as follows:"13. If
the correct date of birth of Respondent 1 was 27-3-1938 and this was supported
by the certificates issued by the schools in which he had studied before
appearing in the matriculation examination, then he would have immediately after
joining the service made an application to the University for change of the
date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate and persuaded the
authority concerned to decide the same so as to en-able him to move the State Government
and the High Court for making corresponding change in the date of birth recorded
in his service book in terms of Para 1 of Annexure A to Chapter II of the Punjab
Civil Service Rules, Volume I.....
The High Court or for
that reason the State Govern-ment did not have the power, jurisdiction or
authority to entertain the representation made by Respondent 1 af-ter more than
twelve years of his entering into service. Therefore, neither of them committed
any illegality by re-fusing to accept the prayer made by Respondent 1 on the basis
of change effected by the University in the date of birth recorded in his
matriculation certificate. Un-fortunately, the trial court, the lower appellate
court and the learned Single Judge of the High Court totally misdi-rected themselves
in appreciating the true scope of the embargo contained in the relevant rule against
the en-tertaining of an application for correction of the date of birth after two
years of the government servant's entry into service and all of them committed grave
error by nullifying the decision taken by the State Government in consultation
with the High Court not to accept the repre-sentation made by Respondent 1 for
change of the date of birth recorded in his service book.
This Court has time and
again cautioned the civil courts and the High Courts against entertaining and
ac-cepting the claim made by the employees long after en-tering into service for
correction of the recorded date of birth. In Union of India v. Harnam Singh
this Court con-sidered the question whether the employer was justified in
declining the respondent's request for correction of the date of birth made
after thirty-five years of his induction into the service and whether the
Central Administrative Tribunal was justified in allowing the original applica tion
filed by him. While reversing the order of the Tri-bunal, this Court observed:
(SCC pp. 167-68, para 7) 7. A government servant, after entry into service,
acquires the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed
by the State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, unless
the services are dispensed with on other grounds contained in the relevant
service rules after following the procedure prescribed therein.
The date of birth
entered in the service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance
for the reason that the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry
in the service record. A government servant who has declared his age at the initial
stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request later
on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of
his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his
date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is
no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the
government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay.
In the absence of any
provision in the rules for correction of date of birth, the general principle of
refusing relief on grounds of laches or stale claims, is generally applied by
the courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix
a time-limit, in the service rules, after which no application for correction of
date of birth of a government servant can be entertained. A government servant
who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed,
therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of
birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth
is clearly erroneous.
The law of limitation
may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts
or tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and
allow the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as
recorded would determine his date of superannuation even if it amounts to
abridging his right to continue in service on the basis of his actual
age." (emphasis supplied)
Again in Union of
India Vs. Harnam Singh reported in
162, this Court said about
limitation in paragraph 7 in the following manner:"7. ...........................
It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix a time-limit, in the service
rules, after which no application for correction of date of birth of a Government
servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an application for correction
of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter
of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish
that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. The law of limitation may
operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts or
tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow
the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded
would determine his date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his
right to continue in service on the basis of his actual age. ...... .............................................."
strictly speaking the Respondent while filing the said application did not follow
the mandate and requisites of Rule 30 of the Rules. The application was not addressed
to the State Government nor the procedure prescribed in sub-Rule (a), which is applicable
even for a case where sub-Rule (b) applies was not adhered to nor the said application
was filed within five years. Therefore, in terms of sub-rule (c) it was to be summarily
rejected. But, instead of deciding the present appeal only on the aforesaid ground,
we proceed to decide on the other issues also which were urged before us and which
in our considered opinion call for our decision.
far as the contention with regard to change made in the S.S.L.C. Certificate is
concerned, we have perused the said certificate. In the said certificate, it was
clearly mentioned that his date of birth was 19.3.1947 which was entered into by
the headmaster of the concerned school. It also contained the declaration of the
father of respondent No. 1. The signature of the father of the respondent No. 1
is clearly visible on the declaration and the signature is distinct, bold and beautifully
written and therefore appears to be that of a man of letters. The date recorded
therein came to be changed to 24.11.1950 by someone by putting his initials,
but the same is also without any date and no seal also appears to have been
appended thereto in support of such change.
of Section 13 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 provides that
any birth or death of which information is given to the Registrar after expiry
of the period specified therein, but within thirty days of its occurrence, shall
be registered on payment of such late fee as may be prescribed. Sub-section (2)
thereof provides that any birth or death of which delayed information is given to
the Registrar after thirty days but within one year of its occurrence shall be
registered only with the written permission of the prescribed authority and on
payment of the prescribed fee and the production of an affidavit made before a notary
public or any other officer authorized in this behalf by the State Government. Sub-section
(3) of Section 30 which is relevant for our purpose also provides that any birth
or death which has not been registered within one year of its occurrence, shall
be registered only on an order made by a Magistrate of the first class or a
Presidency Magistrate after verifying the correctness of the birth or death and
on payment of the prescribed fee.
There is nothing in
the evidence to indicate that the pre-conditions and the requisites of
sub-section (3) of Section 30 were followed in the instant case by respondent
No. 1. No order of the Magistrate of the first class or Presidency Magistrate is
placed on record to prove and establish that such an order was passed after verifying
the correctness of the birth nor any other connected document thereof is placed
on record and therefore, the change apparently was not made in terms of the
aforesaid mandate of Section 13 of Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969.
is placed by respondent No. 1 on the evidence of the doctor and the medical certificate.
PW-2 is Shri Newmen who has proved the medical certificate stating that he was
the Chairman of the Medical Board and that the medical certificate was given to
the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 by the Medical Board which is Ext. A-12. He
stated in his examination-in-chief that he was the Chief of the Board formed for
issuance of Ex. A-12, which is relied upon by plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and one
doctor in Pathology, one General Medical Expert and one Radiologist were in that
team. He has also stated that the said medical team generally examined
plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and examined him radiologically and came to the conclusion
as per Ex. A-12. He also stated that what kind of examination was conducted on plaintiff/respondent
No. 1 is noted in the report of the Medical Board.
has specifically stated in his deposition that he has not produced the test report
or its copy before the Court showing supporting documents and the tests based on
which they had determined the age of respondent No. 1/plaintiff. It must be
indicated at this stage that respondent No. 1/plaintiff himself went to the
Medical Board and got himself examined and obtained the aforesaid report which was
brought in evidence. At the top of the aforesaid medical certificate, it is written
as "Age Proof Certificate". The said age proof certificate is signed by
the Chairman and also signed by two other members. What is recorded in the said
age proof certificate is extracted below:-
"This is to certify
that MEDICAL BOARD No. Office at TIRUPUR have carefully examined THIRU MANICKAM,
S/o Thiru V. Muthusamy, Subordinate Judge, Udumalpet an applicant for Age
Certificate. His identification marks are;
A. A Black mole on the
right collar bone.
B. A Black mole on the
According to my physical
examination and personal of his appearance of the individual, he appears to be
about 48 years (Forty Eight years ) according to his own statement"
our considered opinion, the said medical certificate is very vague and unreliable.
Whether or not any radiological examination was done and if so, of what nature,
and also whether any ossification test was done or not is not reflected from the
said report. It is only stated in the certificate that on the basis of physical
examination and from his appearance and on the basis of his own statement the
age of the respondent was determined as 48 years.
Court in the case of Ramdeo Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam reported
in (2001) 5 SCC 714 while dealing with the reliability of the ossification test
held as follows: "21. ........................... An X-ray ossification test
may provide a surer basis for determining the age of an individual than the
opinion of a medical expert but it can by no means be so infallible and accurate
a test as to indicate the exact date of birth of the person concerned. Too much
of reliance cannot be placed upon textbooks, on medical jurisprudence and toxicology
while determining the age of an accused. In this vast country with varied latitudes,
heights, environment, vegetation and nutrition, the height and weight cannot be
expected to be uniform."
age proof certificate appears to have been got prepared for the purpose of
adducing evidence at the time of hearing of the suit and not before. The
document is also found to unrealistic and unreliable. Considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is very difficult to place any reliance on the authenticity
and validity of the said age proof certificate. Respondent No. 1 also relied
upon the evidence of two persons in support of his contention that he was born
in the year 1950. Let us now proceed to consider the strength of such oral
Murugan who is the elder brother of respondent No. 1 was examined. He had
stated that respondent No. 1/plaintiff was born in the year 1950. He also
stated that in their family except respondent No. 1, nobody studied in school
or college which is found to be incorrect because at a later stage he himself
had stated that he had studied upto 2nd or 3rd standard.
also stated that generally when the child is born, the same is registered with
the Village Munsif and that he did not know whether his father had informed the
village Munsif about the birth of respondent No. 1. He had stated that while
his brother was at the age of about three or four years, to get him admitted in
the school, his father had given innocently his age as about 7 or 8 years and
got respondent No. 1 admitted in the school.
only other witness who was examined to prove the age of respondent No. 1 was Chettiappa
Velar, PW-4 who had stated that respondent No. 1 was born in the year 1950 and that
he also got married in the year 1950. However, in the cross-examination, he
could not say as to what is the date and month in which the respondent No. 1
was born. He also could not give the date and month of his marriage as well.
aforesaid evidence adduced by respondent No. 1 in support of his case is most unreliable.
Change of date of birth is a very important responsibility to be discharged for
there is a general tendency amongst the employees to lower their age and change
their date of birth to suit their career and to lengthen their service career.
In paragraph 6 of the judgment of this Court in State of U.P. v. Shiv Narayan Upadhyaya
reported in (2005) 6 SCC 49, this Court held thus: -
of late a trend can be noticed, that many public servants, on the eve of their retirement
waking up from their supine slumber raise a dispute about their service records,
by either invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution or by filing applications before the Administrative Tribunals concerned,
or even filing suits for adjudication as to whether the date of birth recorded is
correct or not." Again in Para 9 of the said judgment it was stated thus:
"9. ....................................................As such, unless a clear
case on the basis of clinching materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature,
is made out by the respondent and that too within a reasonable time as provided
in the rules governing the service, the court or the Tribunal should not issue a
direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim
only plausible. Before any such direction is issued or declaration made, the court
or the Tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the
person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in
accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule
must be strong, cogent and reliable evidence in support of the contention that
the date of birth entered in the service records or in the S.S.L.C. certificate
was wrongly entered by a mistake.
State of Punjab Vs. Mohinder Singh reported in this Court had occasion to deal
with the evidentiary value of horoscope as proof of date of birth. It was held
in that decision that a horoscope is very weak piece of material to prove age
of a person and in most of the cases the maker may not be available to prove
that it was prepared immediately after the birth and therefore a heavy onus
lies on the person who wants to press it to prove its authenticity. It was
further held that in fact a horoscope to be treated as evidence in terms of
Section 32(5) of Evidence Act, 1872, it must be proved to have been made by a person
having special means of knowledge as regards authenticity of the date, time
etc. mentioned therein. In that context horoscopes have been held to be
inadmissible in proof of age.
the aforesaid principles laid down by this Court in our mind, we proceed to examine
the evidentiary value of the horoscope which is relied upon by the respondent No.
1 in support of his claim. The aforesaid horoscope is the basis and foundation on
which the respondent No. 1 primarily relies upon. The said horoscope,
therefore, must be shown to have been made by a person who has special
knowledge of making such a horoscope. The creator of the horoscope or the
writer is not examined in the present case as he was stated to be dead. None of
his family members or any of his acquaintances was examined to prove
handwriting. In order to come to a definite decision about the authenticity and
evidentiary value or the reliability of the document, we have ourselves closely
and very minutely considered the horoscope.
gone through the same, we find that although it is stated to be a notebook containing
the horoscopes of all the sons and daughters of the father of Respondent No. 1
made at different points of time, but a bare perusal of the document would indicate
that all the horoscopes are made at one point of time by the same person at one
go and not on different dates as sought to be claimed. The book allegedly
containing horoscopes of all persons was shown to be maintained from 1939 to 1953.
For all the horoscopes written between a period of 14 years the same ink was
used by the same writer.
First horoscope was
of 1939 and written in that year in a note book distributed and published from Trichy-2.
At that time, i.e., before independence there was no postal zone. As per
materials available the Indian Postal Service which was constituted after
Independence has introduced a PIN code system "the Postal Index Number Code
System" in India on 15.08.1972. The objective of introduction of the said
Code was to simplify the sorting of mails and thus speed up their transmission and
delivery. Since this system came in 1972 the note book has to be of a period after
1972 and, therefore, the contention that immediately on birth of a member in
the family, the date of birth was entered in the note book has been falsified.
Therefore, it reinforces
the findings of this Court that the Respondent No. 1 has incorrectly stated the
year of preparation of horoscope. It could be deduced from the materials on record
that somewhere around 1993 this document was got prepared. If such a notebook
was available, nothing is stated as to why the same could not have been looked
at and produced at the time of his admission in the school or at the time of
his admission in the college or even at the time when he was entering into the
service. From the signature appearing on the school leaving certificate, we
find that the father of respondent No. 1 was a man of letters and there was no
reason as to why he would subscribe to a wrong age as alleged and that too in his
aforesaid S.S.L.C. certificate with the date 19.3.1947 was produced by him at
the time of his entry into the college as also in entry into the service
knowing fully well that, that particular age is factually recorded. The said
notebook allegedly contained the horoscopes of all the persons prepared at
different points of time and therefore the said date of birth was known to the
family and therefore, if it existed at that point of time, it would have definitely
been placed at the time of his entry to the school or admission in the college
or the same would have been relied upon at least at the time of his entry to the
service. We reiterate the proposition of law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decision that horoscope is a very weak piece of material to prove age
of a person and that heavy onus lies on a person who wants to press it into
service to prove its authenticity.
are of a firm opinion that respondent No. 1 has failed to discharge his onus in
proving the authenticity of the aforesaid horoscope on which reliance is
placed. Since the aforesaid horoscope is a primary document on which reliance is
placed for change of his date of birth, therefore, the same is required to be looked
into very carefully and minutely so as to ascertain the genuineness of the
claim of respondent No. 1. There cannot be any bar to examine the authenticity and
evidentiary value of the same while exercising the power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. Power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India permit
such a scrutiny particularly when it relates to the change of date of birth of a
person who seeks to get an advantage to his benefit to which he otherwise may
not be entitled to. In the decision of this Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai
and Others reported in (2003) 12 SCC 395, the ambit and
scope of power of
Article 136 is stated thus: "14. ............................In express
terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers
a wide discretionary power on this Court to interfere in suitable cases. The discretionary
dimension is considerable but that relates to the power of the Court. Article
136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is extraordinary in
its amplitude, its limits, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court
functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice wherever it is and this
power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Article 136.
...................................."The difference of age in the present
case is also considerable, as it is 3 years, 8 months and 5 days.
we look into the dispute and the matter from any angle, we find that the
judgment and the decree passed by the Munsif Court which is affirmed by the
High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. We hereby set
aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and hold that respondent No. 1 has
failed to prove that any change of date of birth is called for in the present
case. The appeals are allowed and the suit stands dismissed, leaving the
parties to bear their own costs.
[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
[Anil R. Dave]