Reddy (D) by LRs. Vs Godi Jaya Rami Reddy & ANR.
R.M. Lodha, J.
controversy in this appeal, by special leave, is concerned with will dated May 21,
1920 executed by Bijivemula Subba Reddy resident of Chennavaran, village Kattera
Gandla, Badwel Taluq, Cuddapah District. The question is one of construction
upon which the two courts - High Court and trial court - are not in accord and,
have taken divergent view.
the time of execution of the will, Bijivemula Subba Reddy - a Hindu - was aged about
75 years. He had his wife Subbamma, daughter Pitchamma, son-in-law Rami Reddy,
widowed sister Chennamma, widowed daughter-in-law and granddaughter Lakshumamma
living. His only son Sesa Reddy had died in 1917. The testator was man of
sufficient wealth. He had landed property (wet and dry lands and wells) at various
places, namely, in Katteragandla, Rampadu, Varikuntla and Thiruvengala Puram.
He also owned few houses and plots of lands at different places. He had
moveable properties as well in the form of bonds, securities and promissory
notes. The will recites, as indeed is the undisputed fact, that the testator, except
one house situate at Kotha Laxmipally village in which he had 1/3rd share, was
the absolute owner of the properties specified therein.
had no child although she had married 20 years before the execution of the
will. The testator desired that his daughter Pitchamma adopted a son with the
consent of her husband and his granddaughter Lakshumamma got married to the
adopted son of his daughter Pitchamma.
will is written in vernacular (Telugu). The correctness of its English
translation annexed with the appeal was disputed by the respondents. The parties
were then directed to submit agreed translation of the will which they did and
that reads as follows: "I, Bijivemula Subba Reddy son of Balachennu,
resident of Chennavaran village Kattera gandla, Badwel Taluq Cuddapah District,
cultivation, this the 21st day of May, 1920, with sound mind, free will executing
the will. Now I am aged about 75 years. My wife Subbamma is living. I had one
son by name Sesa Reddy. He died at the age of 24 years, about three years back.
He had one wife and one daughter aged about 6 years by name Lakshumma. I have one
daughter by name Pitchamma. I have given in marriage to one Rami Reddy adopted
son of Siddamurthi Duggi Reddy, Papireddypally village Rampadu Majira., though
she married about 20 years back, but she has no issues.
She intended to take a
boy in adoption with the consent of her husband. As I am old I could not [sic] able
to run my family. After the death of my son, since 15 years, the above persons
are looking after my family and my welfare. I have also one widow sister by
name Chennamma. She is living with me since 30 years. She is also helping me in
all aspects. I intend to give my grand daughter Lakshumamma to the proposed adopted
son of my daughter Pitchamma. In the said event, I intend to give all my
belongings, moveable and immovable properties to the said Lachumma and the adopted
son of my daughter Pitchamma. But my daughter and her husband so far did not
take any steps for getting a boy in adoption.
Now as I am sick and
suffering from fever and other ailments, I am doubting whether I can perform
the above said acts during my life time. I own lands in Katteragandla Village, Rampadu
village, Varikuntla village, and Thiruvengala puram village, both wet and dry
lands and also wells. I also own a Midde in Majira. I have one Beeruva in Pancha
of my house. I also have household articles, kallamettelu. I also have lands in
Papireddypally village of Rampadu Majira, two plots and I have absolute rights
in one of the same. I also have one house in Kotha Laxmipally village, of Kathera
gandla majira and in that I have 1/3rd share. I also have bonds and securities and
promissory notes transactions. As I have the above said moveable and immoveable
properties and as I am having absolute rights over the same, none others have any
rights whatsoever in the above said properties. Therefore, I intend to execute the
will and the same shall come into force after my demise. The following are the
terms of the will.
a. After my demise, my grand
daughter, Lachumamma who is the daughter of my son shall have absolute rights in
my entire properties.
b. As my grand daughter is
minor, till she attains the age of majority and attains power to manage the above
said properties, I hereby appoint my son in law Siddamurthy ramireddy as executor
of the will till then.
c. According to the will
of my grand daughter Laxmamma, in case to marry the adopted son of my daughter,
it shall be performed.
d. As I am having my wife
Subbamma, Widow daughter in law, Pitchamma, and my widow sister Chennamma, the present
guardian, Ramireddy and my grand daughter Laxmumma, after attaining majority, shall
look after the above persons. If they do not satisfied (sic) with the above arrangements,
they shall enjoy my property with limited rights and necessary arrangements shall
be made by the guardian and after him and my granddaughter Laxmamma after attaining
e. In case, as God's
grace is not in favour of my aforesaid proposals, namely if my daughter did not
take any boy in adoption and if the said boy will not accept to marry my
granddaughter Laxmamma, I intend to give my aforesaid properties, 1/3rd share to
my daughter Pitchamma and her husband who is also my son in law Ramireddy together.
The remaining 2/3rd share is given to my grand daughter Laxmumma. Accordingly I
executed the will and they have the right to partition and they shall enjoy the
properties after division with absolute rights during their life time and
thereafter their legal heirs"
Subba Reddy died within few months of the execution of the will. After few years
of death of the testator, Pitchamma wanted to adopt Godi Venkat Reddy as her son
but her husband Rami Reddy did not agree to that adoption. Rami Reddy left the
Village Chennavaran, his wife Pitchamma and settled in other village - Pappireddypally.
Rami Reddy then married with 5Subbamma. Out of the wedlock of Rami Reddy and his
second wife, two sons were born : (i) Siddamurthy Jayarami Reddy and (ii)
Siddamurthy Rami Reddy.
married Godi Venkat Reddy somewhere in 1926 and out of that wedlock one son
Godi Jayarami Reddy was born. Unfortunately Godi Venkat Reddy died within three
years of marriage. Godi Jayarami Reddy has one son Godi Ramachandra Reddy. Rami
Reddy died in 1939; Pitchamma died in 1953 and Lakshumamma died in 1971.
1980, the two sons of Rami Reddy, born out of wedlock of his second wife
Subbamma, filed a suit for partition of the schedule properties - the properties
bequeathed by Bijivemula Subba Reddy vide his will dated May 21, 1920 -
claiming 1/3rd share therein under that will. They also claimed rent and
profits. The case of the plaintiffs was that they and the defendants were
members of a composite family and were in joint possession and enjoyment of the
properties of Bijivemula Subba Reddy and as per the will they were entitled to
1/3rd share. During the pendency of the suit, one of the sons died and his legal
representatives were brought on record. The plaintiffs are the present
defendants traversed the claim of the plaintiffs and set up the plea that there
was a dispute between Pitchamma and her husband Rami Reddy over the adoption of
Godi Venkat Reddy; Rami Reddy left the house somewhere in 1924 and settled in Village
Pappireddypally. It was averred that Rami Reddy married a second wife and not only
abandoned Pitchamma but also abandoned his rights to the property given under the
will. Pitchamma then looked after the family in the absence of any male member,
managed the properties and got the patta of these properties transferred in the
name of Lakshumamma and bequeathed her share in the property by a will in 1953
defendants also set up the plea that Lakshumamma purchased few properties mentioned
in the schedule from her own resources in 1955. They gave the details of those
properties. They further set up the case that Lakshumamma after executing the
will on March 6, 1953 partitioned the properties between herself and first
defendant. By way of additional written statement, the plea of res judicata was
raised. The defendants are the respondents herein.
the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed diverse
issues; the parties let in oral as well as documentary evidence and the trial
court heard the counsel for the parties.
trial court in its judgment dated December 22, 1986 negated the plaintiffs' claim
that they and the defendants were members of a composite family and the subject
properties were in their joint possession and enjoyment. However, the trial court
did hold that under the will dated May 21, 1920 Pitchamma and Rami Reddy got 1/6th
share each in the properties of the testator. While concluding so, the trial court
held that there was no condition imposed in the will by the testator that his
daughter Pitchamma and son-in-law Rami Reddy must adopt a son and her granddaughter
should marry the adopted son of Pitchamma and her husband. It was only a pious wish
of Bijivemula Subba Reddy that his daughter Pitchamma adopted a son with the
consent of her husband and that his granddaughter Lakshumamma should marry the
adopted son of Pitchamma and her husband. The trial court further held that the
plaintiffs were not claiming the property directly as legatees under the will
but as legal heirs of Rami Reddy and Pitchamma since will had come into force and
was acted upon after the death of Bijivemula 8Subba Reddy and, accordingly,
Pitchamma and Rami Reddy got 1/6th share each. The trial court also held that the
property acquired by Pitchamma by way of bequest under the will was a separate
property and after her death, it devolved upon her husband's heirs (i.e.
plaintiffs) and, thus, plaintiffs were entitled to 1/3rd share in the schedule properties.
The trial court negated the plea of adverse possession set up by the defendants
and passed a preliminary decree for partition in favour of plaintiffs with regard
to their 1/3rd share.
defendants (present respondents) challenged the judgment and decree passed by the
trial court in appeal before the High Court. The High Court formulated three
points for determination in the appeal viz; (i) whether Rami Reddy failed to
comply with the obligations cast on him under the will dated May 21, 1920
executed by Bijivemula Subba Reddy and he abandoned the family and if so,
whether his legal heirs (Plaintiffs) could claim his share in the property of
the testator; (ii) whether will executed by Pitchamma in 1953 was genuine, true
and bona fide and (iii) whether the defendants have acquired rights in the schedule
properties by adverse possession.
High Court held that it was obligated upon Rami Reddy under the will to
maintain the dependants of the testator and act as an executor of the will. Rami
Reddy failed to discharge both obligations - in maintaining the dependants of the
testator and in acting - as executor. The High Court, thus, concluded that Rami
Reddy could not claim any property under the will. The High Court overturned
the finding of the trial court as regards the will executed by Pitchamma and held
that the will executed by her in 1953 was genuine and true. As regards plea of
adverse possession set up by the defendants--although negated by the trial
court--the High Court held that there was ouster of the plaintiffs 60 years back
and there was no semblance of any enjoyment of property by the plaintiffs'
predecessors-in-title along with the defendants jointly. Consequently, the High
Court by its judgment dated April 20, 2003 reversed the judgment and decree of the
trial court and allowed the appeal preferred by the defendants.
is from the judgment of the High Court that present appeal by special leave
R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel for the appellants argued: The
importation of Section 57 and Section 141 of 10Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for
short, `the 1925 Act') is wholly inappropriate since the present case is
concerned with the muffussil will of a Hindu dated May 21, 1920 with regard to the
properties situate outside the city of Madras. The muffussil wills (executed
before 1927) do not require the formalities of execution, attestation and
revocation to be carried out in the manner required by the 1925 Act. The parties
did not join issue about the truthfulness of the will and there was only dispute
about its construction and implementation. Even if it be assumed that Section
141 of the 1925 Act is attracted, the same has been complied with; the attesters
were already dead.
was vehemently contended by Mr. R. Sundaravaradan that the property vested in the
executor in 1920 on the death of testator and Section 141 of the 1925 Act, even
if applicable, could not divest such vesting in title. Dealing with the expression
"take the legacy" in Section 141, it was argued by learned senior
counsel that the said expression means taking possession of legacy and not
vesting of the legacy. He submitted that the word "executor" used in
the will has been used in loose sense of the term; Rami Reddy was the
son-in-law of the testator, he was looking after and managing the 11lands and,
therefore, the legacy bequeathed to him was not because he was to be the executor
in strict sense but because he was the testator's son-in-law and manager.
senior counsel submitted that there is no legal evidence of mismanagement, malversation
or misappropriation and a vague allegation that the executor has not done his
job required no serious consideration. He argued that the marriage of Rami
Reddy with Subbamma was with the consent of Pitchamma and there was no legal
impediment for a Hindu to have a second wife before Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or
Bigamy Prevention Act, 1949 especially when Pitchamma was barren and it is indeed
a legal requirement based on Shastric injunction to have progeny so that religious
efficacy of satisfying the souls of forefathers is completed. Learned senior
counsel contended that there was no voluntary and conscious abandonment by Rami
Reddy and the High Court was in clear error in holding so.
R. Sundaravaradan criticized the findings of the High Court on the plea of adverse
possession set up by the defendants and genuineness of the will executed by
Pitchamma in 1953 in favour of Lakshumamma.
P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
supported the judgment of the High Court.
Succession Act, 1865 (for short, `the 1865 Act') was enacted to provide for
intestate and testamentary succession in British India. Section 331 of the 1865
Act, however, excluded its applicability to intestate or testamentary
succession to the property of any Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist and it further
provided that its provisions shall not apply to any will made, or any intestacy
occurring, before January 1, 1866.
the Hindu Wills Act, 1870 (for short, `the 1870 Act'), statutory provisions were
made to regulate the wills of Hindus, Jainas, Sikhs and Buddhists in the Lower
Provinces of Bengal and in the towns of Madras and Bombay. Inter alia, Section 2
thereof provided as follows : "S. 2. The following portions of the Indian
Succession Act, 1865, namely,-- sections forty-six, forty-eight, forty-nine, fifty,
fifty- one, fifty-five and fifty-seven to seventy-seven (both inclusive), sections
eighty-two, eighty-three, eighty-five, eighty- eight to one hundred and three
(both inclusive), 13 sections one hundred and six to one hundred and seventy-seven
(both inclusive), sections one hundred and seventy-nine to one hundred and
eighty-nine (both inclusive), sections one hundred and ninety-one to one hundred
and ninety-nine (both inclusive), so much of Parts XXX and XXXI as relates to
grants of probate and letters of administration with the will annexed, and Parts
XXXIII to XL (both inclusive), so far as they relate to an executor and an administrator
with the will annexed, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section three
hundred and thirty-one of the said Act, apply-- (a) to all wills and codicils made
by any Hindu, Jaina, Sikh or Buddhist, on or after the first day of September one
thousand eight hundred and seventy, within the said territories or the local
limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of
Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and (b) to all such wills and codicils made outside
those territories and limits, so far as relates to immoveable property situate
within those territories or limits:"
1925 Act which came into force on September 30, 1925 has eleven parts. Part VI
has twenty three chapters. Section 57 to Section 191 are covered by Part VI. Section
57 provides thus: "S.57. Application of certain provisions of Part to a
class of Wills made by Hindus, etc. - The provisions of this Part 14 which are set
out in Schedule III shall, subject to the restrictions and modifications
specified therein, apply-- (a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist,
Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of September, 1870, within the
territories which at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant- Governor of
Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction
of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and (b) to all such Wills
and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immoveable
property situate within those territories or limits; and (c) to all Wills and codicils
made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of
January, 1927, to which those provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and
(b):] Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such Will or codicil." Clauses
(a) and (b) of Section 57 of the 1925 Act are pari materia to clauses (a) and
(b) of Section 2 of the 1870 Act. Clause (c) is a new provision.
noticed above, present case is concerned with the will executed in 1920. The
will is admittedly a muffussil will as it has not been executed within the local
limits of ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras. Clause (a) of Section 57 is apparently not attracted. The subject will
also does not 15relate to immoveable properties situate within the local limits
or territories as set out in clause (a). In this view of the matter, clause (b)
is also not attracted. Clause (c) does not get attracted, as it applies to
wills and codicils made on or after January 1, 1927.
the subject will is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 57, Part VI of
the 1925 Act is not applicable thereto. Section 141 which falls in Chapter XIII
of Part VI of the
Act that provides - if a legacy is bequeathed to a person who is named an executor
of the will, he shall not take the legacy, unless he proves the will or
otherwise manifests an intention to act as executor -- is, thus, not applicable
to the subject will. As a matter of fact, both learned senior counsel were ad
idem that Section 141 of the 1925 Act, as it is, has no application at all. 25.
We may also state that although the statutory provisions concerning
construction of wills from Sections 74 to 111 of the 1925 Act do not apply but the
general principles incorporated therein would surely be relevant for
construction of the subject will.
is well settled that the court must put itself as far as possible in the
position of a person making a will in order to collect the testator's intention
from his expressions; because upon that 16consideration must very much depend the
effect to be given to the testator's intention, when ascertained. The will must
be read and construed as a whole to gather the intention of the testator and
the endeavor of the court must be to give effect to each and every disposition.
In ordinary circumstances, ordinary words must bear their ordinary construction
and every disposition of the testator contained in will should be given effect to
as far as possible consistent with the testator's desire.
above are the principles consistently followed and, we think, ought to be guided
in determining the appeal before us. What then was the intention of this testator?
The only son of the testator had predeceased him. At the time of execution of will,
he had his wife, widowed sister, widowed daughter-in-law, daughter and minor
granddaughter surviving; the only other male member was his son-in-law - Rami
Reddy. He intended to give all his properties to the granddaughter but he was aware
that after her marriage, she would join her husband's family. The testator
intended that his entire estate remained in the family and did not go out of
that and having that in mind, he desired that his daughter adopted a son with the
consent of her husband and his granddaughter married the adopted son of his daughter.
He, therefore, stated, "I intend to give all my belongings, moveable and immoveable
properties to the said Lakshumamma and the adopted son of my daughter Pitchamma".
He expressed in unequivocal terms, "after my demise, my granddaughter Lakshumamma
who is the daughter of my son shall have absolute rights in my entire
testator gave two very particular directions in the will that until Lakshumamma
attained the age of majority and attained power to manage properties; (one) Rami
Reddy shall act as an executor till then and (two) the executor shall look
after the female members in the family, namely, his wife Subbamma, widowed
daughter-in-law, daughter Pitchamma, widowed sister Chennamma and granddaughter
Lakshumamma. Rami Reddy, thus, was obligated to carry out the wishes of the testator
by managing his properties and looking after the minor granddaughter
Lakshumamma till she attained majority and also look after other female members
in the family.
clause, however, upon which the appellants' are claiming the rights in the
properties of Rami Reddy is the clause that reads "...if my daughter did
not take any boy in adoption and if the 18said boy will not accept to marry my
granddaughter Lakshumamma, I intend to give my aforesaid properties, 1/3rd share
to my daughter Pitchamma and her husband, who is also my son-in-law Rami Reddy
together. The remaining 2/3rd share is given to my granddaughter
R. Sundaravaradan, senior counsel for the appellants is right in contending that
the above clause in the will is not a repugnant condition that invalidates the will
but is a defeasance provision.
Mt. Rameshwar Kuer & Anr. v. Shiolal Upadhaya and Ors.1, Courtney-Terrell, C.J.,
speaking for the Bench, explained the distinction between a repugnant provision
and a defeasance provision thus : "The distinction between a repugnant provision
and a defeasance provision is sometimes subtle, but the general principle of
law seems to be that where the intention of the donor is to maintain the absolute
estate conferred on the donee but he simply adds some restrictions in
derogation of the incidents of such absolute ownership, such restrictive clauses
would be repugnant to the absolute grant and therefore void; but where the grant
of an absolute estate is expressly or impliedly made subject to defeasance on
the happening of a contingency and where the effect of such defeasance would not
be a violation of any rule of law, the original estate is curtailed and the
gift over must be taken to be valid and operative."1 A.I.R. 1935 Patna 401
distinction between a repugnant provision and a defeasance provision explained in
Mt. Rameshwar Kuer1 has been followed subsequently. In our view, Patna High
Court rightly explains the distinction between a repugnant provision and a defeasance
question, however, upon which the fate of this appeal depends is : whether Rami
Reddy became entitled to any legacy by virtue of the defeasance clause under
the will at all.
testator was clear in his mind that after his death, his granddaughter should have
absolute rights in his entire properties. He has said so in so many words in the
will. However, he superadded a condition that, should his daughter Pitchamma and
son-in-law Rami Reddy not adopt a son or if his daughter and son-in-law adopted
a son but that boy did not agree to marry his granddaughter, then 1/3rd share
in his properties shall go over to his daughter Pitchamma and her husband Rami
Reddy. The bequest to the extent of 1/3rd share in the properties of the
testator in favour of Pitchamma and her husband Rami Reddy jointly was conditional
on happening of an uncertain event noted above. As a matter of fact and in law,
immediately after the death of testator in 1920, what became 20vested in Rami Reddy
was not legacy but power to manage the properties of the testator as an executor;
the legacy vested in Lakshumamma, albeit, defeasibly to the extent of 1/3rd share.
The only event on which the legacy to Lakshumamma to the extent of 1/3rd share was
to be defeated was upon happening of any of the above events. Mr. R.
Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel, thus, is not right in contending that
on the death of testator in 1920, the legacy came to be vested in Rami Reddy and
once vesting took place, it could not have been divested.
has come in evidence that Pitchamma wanted to adopt Godi Venkat Reddy as her son,
but her husband - Rami Reddy - did not agree to that and as a result thereof Godi
Venkat Reddy could not be adopted by Pitchamma. On the issue of adoption of
Godi Venkat Reddy, a serious dispute ensued between Pitchamma and her husband. Rami
Reddy left the family of the testator and the village Chennavaran somewhere in
1924 and went to nearby village Pappireddypally where he married second time.
It may be that there was no legal impediment for Rami Reddy to have a second wife
before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or Bigamy Prevention Act of 1949 when no
child was begotten from Pitchamma yet the fact of the 21matter is that he
abandoned the family of the testator. There is no merit in the submission of
Mr. R. Sundaravaradan that abandonment was not voluntary and conscious.
Reddy neither continued as a guardian of minor granddaughter Lakshumamma nor looked
after the testator's wife, widowed daughter-in-law, widowed sister and
daughter. The female folk were left in lurch with no male member to look after.
He took no care or interest in the affairs of the family or properties of the
testator and thereby failed to discharge his duties as executor.
view of the predominant desire that his granddaughter should have his properties
and that his properties did not go out of the family, the testator desired that
his daughter adopted a son with the consent of her husband and his
granddaughter married that boy. The conditional legacy to Rami Reddy (to the
extent of 1/3rd share jointly with Pitchamma) was not intended to be given to him
if he happened to be instrumental in defeating the testator's wish in not
agreeing to the adoption of a son by his (testator's) daughter. Such an
intention might not have been declared by the testator in express terms but
necessary inference to that effect can safely be drawn by reading the will as a
whole. In the circumstances, the legacy to the extent of 1/3rd share cannot be held
to have ever vested in Rami Reddy jointly with Pitchamma as it was he who
defeated the adoption of son by the testator's daughter. As a matter of fact by
his conduct, Rami Reddy rendered himself disentitled to any legacy.
only that Rami Reddy did not discharge his obligations under the will of looking
after the family and managing the properties as an executor but he was also instrumental
in frustrating the adoption of son by the testator's daughter. Much before the defeasance
clause came into operation when Lakshumamma married Godi Venkat Reddy who could
not be adopted as son by Pitchamma, Rami Reddy had already left the testator's
family for good and abandoned the legacy that could have come to him under that
plea, of the appellants, that Rami Reddy's family from the second wife and the
testator's family was a composite family and the properties were joint family
properties of the plaintiffs and the defendants, has not been accepted by the
trial court as well as High Court. We have no justifiable reason to take a
different view on this aspect.
Rami Reddy during his life time - although he survived for about 19 years after
the death of the testator - never claimed any legacy under the subject will.
in all, on the construction of the will and, in the circumstances, it must be
held, and we hold that no legacy came to be vested in Rami Reddy and he did not
become entitled to any interest in the estate of the testator and, therefore, the
plaintiffs did not acquire any right, title or interest in the properties of Bijivemula
view of the above, the challenge to the findings of the High Court on the plea of
adverse possession set up by the defendants and the genuineness of the will
executed by Pitchamma in 1953 pale into significance and needs no
fairness to Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel for the appellants,
it must be stated that he cited the following authorities: (Katreddi) Ramiah and
another v. Kadiyala Venkata Subbamma and others [A.I.R. 1926 Madras 434]; Balmakund
v. Ramendranath Ghosh [A.I.R. 1927 Allahabad 497]; Ratansi D. Morarji v. Administrator-General
of Madras [A.I.R. 1928 Madras 1279]; Bhojraj v. Sita Ram and others [A.I.R.
1936 Privy Council 60]; 24Ketaki Ranjan Bhattacharyya and others v. Kali Prasanna
Bhattacharyya and others [A.I.R. 1956 Tripura 18]; P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi
Reddy [(1957) SCR 195]; AL. PR. Ranganathan Chettiar and another v. Al. PR. AL.
Periakaruppan Chettiar and others [A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 815]; Darshan Singh and others
v. Gujjar Singh (Dead) By LRs. and others [(2002) 2 SCC 62]; Govindammal v. R. Perumal
Chettiar and others [(2006) 11 SCC 600] and Govindaraja Pillai and others v. Mangalam
Pillai and another [A.I.R. 1933 Madras 80]. However, in view of our discussion
above, we do not think we need to deal with these authorities in detail.
the result, appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
J. (R.M. Lodha)